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  • Frontoviki tell the terrible truth about the Second World War. Memories of participants of the Great Patriotic War Military Secrets 1941 1945

    Frontoviki tell the terrible truth about the Second World War. Memories of participants of the Great Patriotic War Military Secrets 1941 1945

    Tank riddles Great Patriotic War

    And it is still popular with a misconception, according to which the German army has had a significant superiority in the number of existing tanks at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The latest research of researchers, as well as previously grilled and now known evidence of eyewitnesses, this refute. But first things first.

    For the first time, for reflection on a tank, there was an immediate after the beginning of the spring campaign of 1942, when despite the heavy losses were finally achieved superiority in tanks. The most dramatic events of the Great Patriotic War include the Kharkiv Operation of 1942. Of the three Soviet armies, which were surrounded, only 20 thousand soldiers succeeded. The reader, who conceived over the causes of such a tragedy, the first comes the idea of \u200b\u200bagain the military-technical advantage of the enemy. However, the facts say the opposite. Head of the headquarters of the land forces of Nazi Germany Franz Galder described the actions of tanks:

    May 14. Strong attacks with the support of a large number of tanks; South Kharkov operate 3-5 tank divisions and 4-6 tank brigades, east of the city - 3 tank brigades; Over 50 tanks destroyed.

    May 25. They deserve attention to the successes of our troops in the fight against the tanks of the enemy. " As the reader understands, we are talking about Soviet tanks.

    Starting the Kharkiv surgery, the front had two tank corps against two German tank divisions. Thus, we had almost a thousand tanks, that is, several times more than the enemy. However, after five days, the initiative on the Bavenkovsky ledger moved to the Germans. In less than a week, the superiority in the tanks became incredibly evaporated: whether it was not possible at all, whether they could not manage it ... At the request of the Military Council of the front of the help, Stalin, among other things, answered: "If you do not learn better to manage the troops, you do not Enough the entire weapons produced throughout the country. " So, "above" the reason for tank failures seems to be in poor management of troops.

    On July 8, 1942, the previously mentioned F. Galder recorded the following: "Of 600 enemy tanks, 289 beyond." In August, he noted that "Russians suffered large losses in tanks." September 11, when the German headquarters counted our losses, Halder recorded: "The enemy lost 600 tanks" - and added no more than a third of the opponent from their number. But on September 20, he suddenly noted in his military diary: "In Stalingrad, the fatigue of the upcoming troops is beginning to feel gradually."

    On the same day Supreme Commander The Red Army Stalin aroused the leadership in the rate of just derived to the reserve of the tank army: Comandarm P. Romanenko, a member of the Military Council S. Melnikova (he described this technique), as well as the head of the main armored control of the Red Army, Ya. Fedorenko. The immediate cause of the "tank reception" from Stalin could be a failure of the Soviet command to win Stalingrad battle At its very beginning one powerful tank strike (150 tanks). The Supreme Commander drew attention to the "shortcomings in the actions of tankers" marked in the army of the army: insufficient maneuverability, weak use of firing power, the small efficiency of fire. Similar characteristics, in fact, meant failure.

    And then it turned out that Stalin, most likely, invited practitioner tankers along with a tank manager because he received data on the "survivability" of German tanks. It turned out that Soviet combat vehicles withstand from 1 to 3 attacks, while German - at least 5, and then 15! That is, 5 times more! Despite the massive application, the Soviet tank forces melted, without bringing the expected success.

    There were absolutely logical questions: why do our tanks "live" less? What are they inferior to German in quality? Or is the reason in something else? How not to appear suspicion that the bet on a new average T-34 tank is erroneous? But the tank team rejected this hypothesis and expressed his opinion: "We have worse the mechanics of drivers." I explained the reason for this: "They receive driving practices from 5 to 10 hours, after which they go into battle." And in order to learn how to drive a tank, it was necessary, according to Fedorenko, practicing at least 25 hours! It was a brave phrase, because to the question of Generalissimus: "What prevents the best practices to train mechanics and spending more motocams on their preparation?" - I had to answer that in accordance with the order of Stalin the same, it was forbidden to spend more than 10 motorcycles for training (and actually they were not given)! No, the Supreme did not cancel his order, but ... she forbade it to fulfill: Soon a new order was received, which was not allowed to save the motor resources in the process of combat training. The union on the scale of the country made it possible both to carry out ridiculous solutions with tragic consequences and their rapid cancellation.

    Next, 1943, a year with its large tank battles, including the largest tank battle in the history of a prokhorova on Kursk Dug., again gave reason to think about the same topic. In the West, they argue that the Red Army lost more than a few times more tanks, than the Wehrmacht.

    When the battle was tamed near Kursk, another tank commander. - Pavel Fishing thought: "I want to understand why we lost so much tanks. Whether the enemy or ... "S. Melnikov remembered the conversation from the Supreme to the vitality of Tankov:" Let's collect the conference of mechanics drivers. " But those began to speak not only about "their": exploration is poorly carried out; Management is not always clearly organized; The crew often does not know the task, at best, the chassis problem is known, therefore, if the header is broken, the rest are lost and far behind; Alarms are not used; Because of the factory undersensation, the tanks sometimes fail at the very beginning of the attack; mechanics drivers from replenishment make serious mistakes due to lack of experience; Some crews do not know how to fire with the go. The commander of the army with all the noted agreed and ordered to eliminate the shortcomings.

    So the reasons for tank problems were and "upstairs" and "below." They were eliminated not for the month and not for the year. For technical backwardness, it was necessary to pay not only by the match, but also the lives of tankers. It is not by chance that in the book Marshal Zhukov "Memories and Reflections", comparable data on tanks at the time of attack on Soviet Union. Only the number of heavy and medium tanks is given from the Soviet side, from the opponent, and even plus self-propelled artillery installations. But the secret edition of 1958 "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" He led to the exact number of the ratio of tank forces in the border.

    The ratio of German and Soviet tanks at the time of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union was 1: 4.9, that is, the superiority of the Soviet Union was obvious. From the book of Zhukov, we learn that among others we had a "significant number of light Soviet tanks outdated design." But after all, the opponent had light tanks. Yes, and then, under the progesto in the attack on heavy "tigers", not only the average "thirty parts", but also light tanks - flying on a rabid velocity and shooting the caterpillars ... to explain the tank advantage to the surprise of the first strike, as it is three hours before the attack The districts received a directive to bring troops in combat readiness and dispersal. And if soldiers Brest Fortress At the time of the beginning of the war lay in beds, then it was the wines first of all command!

    In the memoirs of Hermann Goth, the former commander of one of the German tank groups, it is possible to read that it is the counterattack of tank units who stopped the promotion of German troops in Ukraine, thoring the plan of the rapid breakthrough to Kiev. At the time of the attack, the opponent had less than 4 thousand tanks and assault guns (the latter still could not fight with tanks). It was a great strength, but even more was the psychological effect of German tank attacks. Marshal Zhukov recalls the conversation that occurred on June 24, 1941 with the commander of one of the armies (a very experienced general who received a good practice in the battles on the Khalkhin-goal), who was reporting that his army attacks up to 2 thousand tanks, but it is half of all combat vehicles of this type, which had an opponent on the whole immense front!

    Over time, the Soviet tankers also learned how to create "visibility." The author of the German doctrine of Tank War, Heinz Guderian writes in his memoirs, that on October 6, 1941, against one of the divisions of his tank army, "a large number of Russian T-34 tanks, causing significant losses to our tanks, was thrown. As a result, "scheduled fast offensive on Tulu had to be postponed." Elimination of loss is true: only tanks - 43! The visibility of the "large quantity" was intentionally created in order to hide from the enemy a very impressive inconsistency of forces: a brigade fought with the German tank division, in which there was only one battalion "thirty highways". The opponent has tanks 20 times more! Yes, and how it was not to believe that only the group of Lieutenant Dmitry Lavrinenko in the composition of four T-34 destroyed, no loss, 15 enemy tanks, as well as two anti-tank guns and four motorcycles in addition. For a month, the fighting only the combat vehicle of Lavrinenko himself recorded 52 tanks, several guns, with a dozen cars, mortar battery.

    So, according to your combat qualities, Soviet tanks, such as T-34, were not inferior to German. Even the crews without great combat experience were able to create wonders on them. The evidence is the fact that when the rifle parts knocked out of the German movement (on the first day of the war!), 13 "thirty highways" contained 50 German tanks on the approaches to the city, having hanged 14 of them. "Thirty highways" moved in full force. English tank historian Douglas Ordzhill in his book about T-34 notes: "The Russian command is now (in the summer of 1941) found that possession of weapons is a decisive factor only when the owner knows how to use it ... T-34 in the hands of the rates ... was Another rapier in the hands of a beginner. " So it was necessary to study not only ordinary tankers, but also to Marsham! By the way, D. Ordzhill leads in the book by the data of the German command, and without being subjected to question: but the Red Army "Agronizing Summer" of 1941 lost 18 thousand tanks - exactly as much as he was opposed to the invaders on June 22.


    It is not known how military events would unfold, and with them, perhaps the whole world history, if Mikhail Koshkin and his KB did not make T-34 high-tech and highly referred. German intelligence could not know this, so on July 4, Hitler said: "It's good that we defeated tanks ... Russian forces at the very beginning. Russians will never be able to restore them anymore. "

    We started talking about tanks by no means to hang next labels on someone. After all, the past will not return. He should not be ashamed or sank. But to learn a lesson - military, managerial, political, economic - necessary. And it consists in the fact that everything solves in the war is not a numerical advantage and not even technical in itself, but the level of ownership of technique.

    Tank riddles of the Great Patriotic War

    And it is still popular with a misconception, according to which the German army has had a significant superiority in the number of existing tanks at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. The latest research of researchers, as well as previously grilled and now known evidence of eyewitnesses, this refute. But first things first.

    For the first time, for reflection on a tank, there was an immediate after the beginning of the spring campaign of 1942, when despite the heavy losses were finally achieved superiority in tanks. The most dramatic events of the Great Patriotic War include the Kharkiv Operation of 1942. Of the three Soviet armies, which were surrounded, only 20 thousand soldiers succeeded. The reader, who conceived over the causes of such a tragedy, the first comes the idea of \u200b\u200bagain the military-technical advantage of the enemy. However, the facts say the opposite. Head of the headquarters of the land forces of Nazi Germany Franz Galder described the actions of tanks:

    May 14. Strong attacks with the support of a large number of tanks; South Kharkov operate 3-5 tank divisions and 4-6 tank brigades, east of the city - 3 tank brigades; Over 50 tanks destroyed.

    May 25. They deserve attention to the successes of our troops in the fight against the tanks of the enemy. " As the reader understands, we are talking about Soviet tanks.

    Starting the Kharkiv surgery, the front had two tank corps against two German tank divisions. Thus, we had almost a thousand tanks, that is, several times more than the enemy. However, after five days, the initiative on the Bavenkovsky ledger moved to the Germans. In less than a week, the superiority in the tanks became incredibly evaporated: whether it was not possible at all, whether they could not manage it ... At the request of the Military Council of the front of the help, Stalin, among other things, answered: "If you do not learn better to manage the troops, you do not Enough the entire weapons produced throughout the country. " So, "above" the reason for tank failures seems to be in poor management of troops.

    On July 8, 1942, the previously mentioned F. Galder recorded the following: "Of 600 enemy tanks, 289 beyond." In August, he noted that "Russians suffered large losses in tanks." September 11, when the German headquarters counted our losses, Halder recorded: "The enemy lost 600 tanks" - and added no more than a third of the opponent from their number. But on September 20, he suddenly noted in his military diary: "In Stalingrad, the fatigue of the upcoming troops is beginning to feel gradually."

    On the same day, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, Stalin aroused the leadership in the rate of just derived to the reserve of the tank army: Comandarm P. Romanenko, a member of the Military Council of S. Melnikov (he described this technique), as well as the head of the main armored control of the Red Army, I. Fedorenko. The immediate cause of the "tank reception" from Stalin could have failed attempts by the Soviet command to win the Stalingrad battle at its very beginning one powerful tank blow (150 tanks). The Supreme Commander drew attention to the "shortcomings in the actions of tankers" marked in the army of the army: insufficient maneuverability, weak use of firing power, the small efficiency of fire. Similar characteristics, in fact, meant failure.

    And then it turned out that Stalin, most likely, invited practitioner tankers along with a tank manager because he received data on the "survivability" of German tanks. It turned out that Soviet combat vehicles withstand from 1 to 3 attacks, while German - at least 5, and then 15! That is, 5 times more! Despite the massive application, the Soviet tank forces melted, without bringing the expected success.

    There were absolutely logical questions: why do our tanks "live" less? What are they inferior to German in quality? Or is the reason in something else? How not to appear suspicion that the bet on a new average T-34 tank is erroneous? But the tank team rejected this hypothesis and expressed his opinion: "We have worse the mechanics of drivers." I explained the reason for this: "They receive driving practices from 5 to 10 hours, after which they go into battle." And in order to learn how to drive a tank, it was necessary, according to Fedorenko, practicing at least 25 hours! It was a brave phrase, because to the question of Generalissimus: "What prevents the best practices to train mechanics and spending more motocams on their preparation?" - I had to answer that in accordance with the order of Stalin the same, it was forbidden to spend more than 10 motorcycles for training (and actually they were not given)! No, the Supreme did not cancel his order, but ... she forbade it to fulfill: Soon a new order was received, which was not allowed to save the motor resources in the process of combat training. The union on the scale of the country made it possible both to carry out ridiculous solutions with tragic consequences and their rapid cancellation.

    The next, 1943, a year with its large tank battles, including the biggest in the history of the tank battle under Prokhorova on the Kursk arc, again gave rise to reflection on the same topic. In the West, they argue that the Red Army lost more than a few times more tanks, than the Wehrmacht.

    When the battle was tamed near Kursk, another tank commander. - Pavel Fishing thought: "I want to understand why we lost so much tanks. Whether the enemy or ... "S. Melnikov remembered the conversation from the Supreme to the vitality of Tankov:" Let's collect the conference of mechanics drivers. " But those began to speak not only about "their": exploration is poorly carried out; Management is not always clearly organized; The crew often does not know the task, at best, the chassis problem is known, therefore, if the header is broken, the rest are lost and far behind; Alarms are not used; Because of the factory undersensation, the tanks sometimes fail at the very beginning of the attack; mechanics drivers from replenishment make serious mistakes due to lack of experience; Some crews do not know how to fire with the go. The commander of the army with all the noted agreed and ordered to eliminate the shortcomings.

    So the reasons for tank problems were and "upstairs" and "below." They were eliminated not for the month and not for the year. For technical backwardness, it was necessary to pay not only by the match, but also the lives of tankers. It is not by chance that in the book Marshal Zhukov "Memories and Reflections" are not given comparable data on tanks at the time of attack on the Soviet Union. Only the number of heavy and medium tanks is given from the Soviet side, from the opponent, and even plus self-propelled artillery installations. But the secret edition of 1958 "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" He led to the exact number of the ratio of tank forces in the border.

    The ratio of German and Soviet tanks at the time of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union was 1: 4.9, that is, the superiority of the Soviet Union was obvious. From the book of Zhukov, we learn that among others we had a "significant number of light Soviet tanks outdated design." But after all, the opponent had light tanks. Yes, and then, under the progesto in the attack on heavy "tigers", not only the average "thirty parts", but also light tanks - flying on a rabid velocity and shooting the caterpillars ... to explain the tank advantage to the surprise of the first strike, as it is three hours before the attack The districts received a directive to bring troops in combat readiness and dispersal. And if the soldiers of the Brest Fortress at the time of the beginning of the war lay in beds, then this is the wines first of all command!

    In the memoirs of Hermann Goth, the former commander of one of the German tank groups, it is possible to read that it is the counterattack of tank units who stopped the promotion of German troops in Ukraine, thoring the plan of the rapid breakthrough to Kiev. At the time of the attack, the opponent had less than 4 thousand tanks and assault guns (the latter still could not fight with tanks). It was a great strength, but even more was the psychological effect of German tank attacks. Marshal Zhukov recalls the conversation that occurred on June 24, 1941 with the commander of one of the armies (a very experienced general who received a good practice in the battles on the Khalkhin-goal), who was reporting that his army attacks up to 2 thousand tanks, but it is half of all combat vehicles of this type, which had an opponent on the whole immense front!

    Over time, the Soviet tankers also learned how to create "visibility." The author of the German doctrine of Tank War, Heinz Guderian writes in his memoirs, that on October 6, 1941, against one of the divisions of his tank army, "a large number of Russian T-34 tanks, causing significant losses to our tanks, was thrown. As a result, "scheduled fast offensive on Tulu had to be postponed." Elimination of loss is true: only tanks - 43! The visibility of the "large quantity" was intentionally created in order to hide from the enemy a very impressive inconsistency of forces: a brigade fought with the German tank division, in which there was only one battalion "thirty highways". The opponent has tanks 20 times more! Yes, and how it was not to believe that only the group of Lieutenant Dmitry Lavrinenko in the composition of four T-34 destroyed, no loss, 15 enemy tanks, as well as two anti-tank guns and four motorcycles in addition. For a month, the fighting only the combat vehicle of Lavrinenko himself recorded 52 tanks, several guns, with a dozen cars, mortar battery.

    So, according to your combat qualities, Soviet tanks, such as T-34, were not inferior to German. Even the crews without great combat experience were able to create wonders on them. The evidence is the fact that when the rifle parts knocked out of the German movement (on the first day of the war!), 13 "thirty highways" contained 50 German tanks on the approaches to the city, having hanged 14 of them. "Thirty highways" moved in full force. English tank historian Douglas Ordzhill in his book about T-34 notes: "The Russian command is now (in the summer of 1941) found that possession of weapons is a decisive factor only when the owner knows how to use it ... T-34 in the hands of the rates ... was Another rapier in the hands of a beginner. " So it was necessary to study not only ordinary tankers, but also to Marsham! By the way, D. Ordzhill leads in the book by the data of the German command, and without being subjected to question: but the Red Army "Agronizing Summer" of 1941 lost 18 thousand tanks - exactly as much as he was opposed to the invaders on June 22.

    It is not known how military events would unfold, and with them, perhaps the whole world history, if Mikhail Koshkin and his KB did not make T-34 high-tech and highly referred. German intelligence could not know this, so on July 4, Hitler said: "It's good that we defeated tanks ... Russian forces at the very beginning. Russians will never be able to restore them anymore. "

    We started talking about tanks by no means to hang next labels on someone. After all, the past will not return. He should not be ashamed or sank. But to learn a lesson - military, managerial, political, economic - necessary. And it consists in the fact that everything solves in the war is not a numerical advantage and not even technical in itself, but the level of ownership of technique.

    From the book of the author

    Special forces After graduating from the Great Patriotic War, most authors who decided to tell the story of the GRU special forces, begin their narration from the fifties of the last century. Formally they are right. After all, special forces in our country appeared only on 24 October 1950,

    From the book of the author

    Divisions of the special forces during the Great Patriotic War of the 1st volunteer partisan detachment of the Institute of Physical Culture. PF Lesgafeta (1st DPO IFC them. P.F. LESGAFTA) Deposit of the Northern Front. Formed on June 29, 1941, the deployment of the headquarters of Leningrad

    From the book of the author

    Collaborationism During the Great Patriotic War, the facts of cooperation between Soviet citizens with the Wehrmacht during the Great Patriotic War are known for quite a long time. However, in Soviet historiography, the myth was cultivated, according to which they were mainly reduced to

    From the book of the author

    The initial period of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, at exactly 4 hours, Kiev was bombed, we were announced that the war began to ... A whole group of delusions and myths in the history of the Great Patriotic War is associated with its initial period. Some part of them were generated in the consciousness of the masses

    From the book of the author

    Stalin in the first days of the Great Patriotic War "Today at 4 o'clock in the morning without presenting any claims to the Soviet Union, without an ad warrant, German troops attacked our country, attacked our borders in many places and subjected to bombing from their aircraft

    From the book of the author

    The beginning of the Great Patriotic War dramatic night from 21 to 22 June 1941 is described in an infinitely huge number of memoir and artistic works. In the overwhelming majority of cases, their authors adhered to the thesis on the sudden attack of Germany, whom

    From the book of the author

    Topic: The beginning of the Great Patriotic War 1. Directive No. 21 of the High Command by the Armed Forces of Germany (Operation "Barbarossa") On December 18, 1940, the Hermann Armed Forces should be ready to break Soviet Russia during the short-term campaign before

    From the book of the author

    After the Great Patriotic War, she soon changed. At the meeting of the Main Military Council, in the summer of 1946 he was accused of exaggerating his own role during the war. He was attributed to the illegal export from Germany a significant number of trophy property. IN

    From the book of the author

    Chapter 1. The situation on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. For several decades, many historians have already expressed the assumption that Germany's attack on the USSR in June 1941 was not so unexpected. It is assumed that the Soviet leadership has all

    From the book of the author

    Museum of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk

    From the book of the author

    Part fourth. We want the Secrets of the Great Patriotic War, we want to or do not want, but the time comes, and the fact that there was a great state secret, loses its exclusivity and secrecy due to steep turns in the history of the state and becomes the common property -

    From the book of the author

    Chapter 4. In the battles of the Great Patriotic War, German troops crossed the border of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The Great Patriotic War began. By this time, the Red Army had in service 34 light armored train, 13 heavy, 28 platforms with anti-aircraft

    From the book of the author

    The Soviet "experience" of captivity to the Great Patriotic War is usually prisoners of war called persons belonging to the armed forces and in the power of the enemy side. At the same time, the status of prisoners of war never spread to mercenaries. In Encyclopedia F.A.

    On the eve of the celebration of the Victory Day on the network again pops up the standard set of "Myths about War". Well, those where "Stalin worse than Hitler", "USSR - and was the initiator of war", "bought in corpses" and other "millions of raped Germans", and also "War in the US War, and the Soviet Union was only slightly participating."

    These myths do not change from year to year, and knowing that this information wave will be incurred by the network again, it is necessary to reveal the most popular of them once again. The benefit of historical research on this topic is many, and you only need to convey this information to the widest audience.

    It is also necessary to remember that all these conversations about the second World War, they are only partly about the past. Mainly all these myths about our present and future. Undering our glorious past, the titanic efforts and the victims of the Soviet people during the Great Patriotic War, the Russophobian propagandists simply try to show that Russia is a monster. Was in the past, it takes off now and will be such in the future. Not anything else, except for mass murders and looting, country. Which also Hitler provoked.

    Therefore, in fact, it is necessary to expose this mythology every year as it occurs in an urgent information agenda.

    So, one of the popular Beks in the liberal, opposition medium is the myth of the friendship of Stalin and Hitler, and that the German weapons "were invented in the USSR". On this occasion, once a number of historians appeared. For example, relatively recently, the researcher of the Second World Eugene Spitsyn, in his interview, once again told about who and exactly the "millennial Reich weapons".

    And this in the period "Interbelloum", between the first and second world wars, the economic stakeholders and Britain with France and other "European democracies" were. Which, in fact, until the very end of the 30s, much was afraid of the USSR than Germany and fascism. Actually, the Europeans supported, for example, rejection of the territories from Czechoslovakia. And in general, the campaign of Germany "east."

    As for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Covenant and the active indignation of the "progressive public" on this occasion, the Spitsyn explains: "It beat European geopolitics in one click simply. He actually signing the pact a week before the attack of Hitler to Poland, having collapsed all the multicipation and design, which was born in their heads a few years before. They came simply in indescribable horror. The winners of the diplomatic battles of the 18th, 19th, the 20th centuries, believed that they would bring anyone around the finger. Not circled!

    The plan of war against Poland under the codenate name "Weiss" Hitler signed in April 1939, that is, 4 months before the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Covenant. Hitler attacks Poland. It is clear that in Poland he will not stop. Does he go further? According to the plan of strategists in Paris and in London, Hitler should have moved to the east. He himself wrote about the "living space" in the east. And they already sat in anticipation, they were given to power to power. And what does Hitler do?! He signed an agreement with the USSR and moved his hordes to the West. And we know well than it ended for European countries.

    That is why the pact causes burning hatred from representatives of our liberal community. Stalin defeated European diplomacy and strategy before the start of the war. "

    Similar information on how the West "Motigal" in the east of Hitler Germany provoked to war from the USSR, in 2016, in 2016, the historian Alexander Chausov in his article: "It comes to 1925, which passes the Locarnian conference.

    By and large, it was she who determined the promotion of the Third Reich, first of all to the east. For example, at that point that Germany undertakes to respect the territorial integrity of the Western European powers. But O. Eastern Europe Everyone somehow forgotten. The second paragraph - the Agreement of Locarno in a very streamlined form recognized the right of "consolidation of all Germans in a single sovereign state."

    And, most importantly, now the state aggressor was considered that the first attacked exactly another Western European state. In 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany, and, in fact, the first thing he began to do is to embody Locarnic agreements to life as he understood it.

    It looked like this: Reich captured the next territory, violated another item of Versailles, conducted the next militarist initiative, and then stated that "on this the interests of Germany are completely satisfied." And the European Allies "believed." Well, people go to the east, it doesn't touch us too much. "

    In other words, the West fed and the fascist monster fascinated, and he entered the war with him only when it turned out that this monster does not intend to obey the West and act in its global interests.

    One way or another, but the USSR was attacked Germany. And the vone for our country was very heavy. We suffered millions of losses - and there is also a few "myths." First, about the "broken corpses" and that the entire RKKKA was captured to the Germans. Therefore, Germany and allies won Germany. Who fought during the last steps of the Great Patriotic and entered Berlin - in this case, it is not very clear. But where propaganda myths are created, logic, apparently, is not important.

    In this regard, the answer again gives the historian Yevgeny Spitsyn: "For example, the same prisoners who were taken in the first months of the war, said that almost the entire worker-peasant red army was captured in the first months of war - there are 3-3 , 5 million people. This is a lie that someone will post. Serious historians were specially engaged in this calculation - in the first weeks of the war, about 500-550 thousand fell into captivity. Under Kiev, the Captive Count of Captive was hundreds of thousands, but not 650 thousand, as Liberal historians say, about 430 thousand. This, of course, is much, but these are not three million people. "

    At the same time, the researcher emphasizes, "the most important result of border battles, Smolensky battle, the battle for Kiev, etc. It was that Barbarossa plan collapsed. They knocked out Hitler from the schedule. The lightning war did not happen, and Hitler lost the war in 1941. It was clear to everyone. The question was only in time when Hitler will finally be broken by the ridge. Therefore, all those who fought in 1941 should pay the lowest and holy bow for their lives, in fact, predetermined our victory in May 1945. "

    But this is not all. Those who are "prey" through the "corpses" and the "valor of allies" are stumbled on the notorious Germans. In the number of two million rapes. These figures, as it turned out, in the past year, came up with Anthony Bivor, British Soviet Worker, and Litterially Lutsky Russophobe. Two million rapes he brought out of nine (!!!) known cases of violence. By the way, all the guilty Soviet soldiers went under the Tribunal. Yes, unfortunately, such crying things happened, but the guilty carried an inevitable punishment, and there were few cases of such.

    In parallel with rape, Western and our liberal community are told at all very ridiculous things, about the "stealing of bicycles". Allegedly, a certain Soviet soldier tried to steal a bike from a resident of Berlin and was captured by this classroom. As it became known in 2010, the soldier bike bike. At least in the explanatory entry to this photo it is written in this way: "Russian Soldier Tries to Buy Bicycle from Woman in Berlin, 1945".

    Well, finally, we are "treated" by the phrase, which is attributed to the Zhukov, then Voroshilov, then Stalin, in general, Peter I or Apraksin, about the "soldier not to regret, women still give out" - which is a typical propaganda craft without references to the original sources. But nevertheless, she is in the course of our "liberal community", which shows the "all the inhumanity of the Soviet system".

    In general, all this, of course, sad. And the fact that on the eve of Victory Day I have to write not about an outstanding feud of the Soviet people, but to expose the readers that are poured on this feat on all sides - the sad reality of today. Sad and the fact that in the US and Europe already very few know the canvas of those historical events. But there the case of anti-Russian propaganda is delivered to the flow.

    The main thing is that we, in Russia, let everything remember everything correctly, and understood that we were alive thanks to the huge victim of our ancestors.

    And that before the "myths", the wind of the stories dispel and their.

    In advance was warned about the plans of Germany to attack the USSR and had the opportunity to prepare a country to war. Such conclusions can be made from the declassified CVR dispatheds of intelligence officers who fell on the General Secretary table since 1938. Thanks to secret archives, it also becomes clear that in those days Europe had no complaints about Moscow because of the Molotov - Ribbentrop Covenant.

    On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Russian External Intelligence Service has declassified a number of archives regarding the period from 1938 to 1941.

    "All this information on the preparation of the attack for a long time went to the table Stalin"

    The documents entered into the collection "Aggression", in particular, shed light on whether Germany has fallen a surprise for the Soviet leadership. "This book reveals" backstage "of European policy and shows how the USSR leadership was informed about the processes that occurred in Europe. . Documents are impassively showing the extent to which Soviet intelligence has fulfilled its function of advanced informing the USSR leadership on the processes and changes in the international situation, "said RIA Novosti, the compiler of the collection of Major Major Svr retired Lion Sotsk.

    The book hit the deposits of Soviet intelligence officers about the plans of Germany, who came to the Kremlin from all over the world. "All this information on the preparation of the attack for a long time went to the table to Stalin, but he did not take measures. Stalin was reported all, and he was aware of all events. Only immediately under the pressure of the then military leadership and personally the head of the General Staff of Konstantin Zhukov on the most eve of the war - in the evening of June 21 - it was possible to convince Stalin to bring all the troops in combat readiness, "explains Sotsk.

    According to him, the Soviet Residency in Berlin informed the Kremlin that all preparations for the attack on the USSR in the Wehrmacht were completed. The developers managed to even intercept the Encryption of Mussolini from the ITALY Ambassador in Germany, which reported that the attack on the USSR will begin in the gap from 20 -How on June 22.

    CVR also removed the vulture of the "Council" from the reports on the correspondence of Western diplomats, in particular with the analysis of the foreign policy of the Kremlin in the pre-war years, prepared on September 27, 1941 by the UK Ambassador in the USSR Stafford Kripps for London.

    According to this document, in that period of time, Europe has no complaints about the fact that Moscow has signed the Molotov - Ribbentrop pact with Berlin. "Modern historians will not know, why in London, with understanding, they treated the steps of the Soviet leadership, which today, 70 years later, cause outrage in some European foreign policy institutes," said the head of the press bureau to "Interfax" in connection with the promulgation of this document. Svr Sergey Ivanov.

    In the telegram of the British ambassador, for example, it is said that "there is no doubt that the direct reason for the signing of this Covena was, as the Soviet leaders repeatedly stated, their desire to remain out of war." "In my opinion, Soviet leaders have never considered the pact as something more than a temporary means. Soviet leaders were determined to use any opportunity, while there was still time, to strengthen their defense, to strengthen their strategic positions in case of war with Germany, "the message says.

    Joint statement of the State Duma and the Council of the Federation regarding the OSCE resolution

    "In the document, a barely covered attempt to put Nazi Germany on one board and one of the main member states of the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the founders of the UN is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"

    The first step in this direction, continued the ambassador, was the entry of Soviet troops to Poland in September 1939 "Immediately after it turned out that only the full occupation by the Germans of this country can be an alternative to their entry." "There is no doubt that the Soviet government is extreme Carefully all this time was trying to hold out the war, but in the end, just like other countries, was convinced that the one-sided determination to be out of war is useless if another antagonistic country intends to fight. However, the USSR did what other countries could not do, namely, used the time won by the "peace" to strengthen their strength of resistance, "said telegram.

    IN last years Europe has repeatedly tried to reproach Russia that it was the signing of the Covenant that became a "trigger curken of war."

    In 2009, the European Union even suggested declare the date of signing the Covenant - August 23 - the Day of Memory of the victims of Stalinism and Nazism.

    Subsequently, the initiative was supported by the OSCE PA, having voted for a resolution condemning the crimes of Nazism and Stalinism. In the document wearing a recommendation, it was emphasized that "in the 20th century, the countries of Europe have experienced two powerful totalitarian regimes - Nazi and Stalinsky," during which the genocide had the right and human rights and freedoms were disturbed, military crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. Reacted to the emergence of this document. As the joint statement of the State Duma and the Council of the Federation adopted in the summer of 2009, the attempt to put on one board Nazi Germany and one of the main states participating in the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the founders of the UN "insults the memory of millions of people who have given their lives for the liberation of Europe during the Second World War From the fascist yoke, from the Holocaust, from gas chambers and concentration camps, for the fact that we, the descendants of the fallen, lived in peaceful and free Europe. "

    "Absolutely insolvent are appeals to do on August 23 - the date of signing the non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany - the day of memory of the victims in equal degree of Stalinism and Nazism. As if the signing of the Soviet-German agreement was not preceded by a dismandling "Munich collusion", which rake Hitler and a predetermined direction of aggression of Nazi Germany to the east. As if there was no ignoring by the leaders of the Western powers of the efforts of the Soviet leadership to establish an anti-Hitler Alliance before the start of the war, "the statement was emphasized.

    Olga Gritsenko

    Source: vz.ru.

    The profession of a medical sister, implying medical assistance to people, carries in itself first of all patriotic debt. In the hottest points, the copper worker is breeding in the war itself. He does not pay attention to the explosions and shots around. He has one goal - to pull out of the fire, from under the root, from under the nose itself at the enemy wound. To pull it on yourself from the battlefield into a safe place, and then, not paying attention to your own existence, to provide the necessary medical in power. In the history of the nursing case, you can find thousands of examples of courage and the courage of medium medical work-nicks. Of course, that only love for Fatherland, faith in the victory of their people over the invaders gave them strength in the most severe moments. Therefore, first of all, the copper employee must be a patriot of his homeland. And one of the moments of upbringing patriotism in the soul of each of us is to study the history of their homeland.

    Fig. 1. Territory MOU SOSH "Prigortneng Central School"

    The topic of my research is not chosen by chance. The Patriotic War of 1941-1945 touched upon each house and every family. And now 70 years after the victory, it would seem that you can still remember? After all, so much has been said, so much studied. But, despite this, we have such settlements, in which the echo of war remains so far. The last one, the most relevant example - in Schigrach in August 2013, the tractor driver fell out of the Earth the next fascist airbomb.

    Objectives:

    Find ways of possible movement of Soviet and fascist troops on the territory of the Schigor region in the period 1942-1943.

    To develop a sense of patriotism from students of the Schigrovsky medical number, by recruitment to the history of Russian Heritage of Russia.

    Study:

    The study was conducted during the May 2013 - October 2013 with the direct participation of students with both SPO "Schigrovsky Medical College".

    The first stage of our work was to raise some archival data:

    On the presence of the 3rd army team of renovation (in the future, 191 "Dulag") for the Soviet Union in the territory of the municipal state institutional institution "Prigorodnaya Central comprehensive school"And the 4th Army team-toreland for the Soviet military prisoners;

    On the occupation of the territory of the shigs and adjacent areas (Schigrovsky, Timsky) in the period from 1941-43 years. Articles Korovin V.V. "Your way I will share, as a faithful girlfriend.", Lagutich M. "Occupation and liberation" describe and documented by the ranked row on the occupied zones:

    On the main tank battle in the village of Prokhorovka;

    as well as about the movement of the Soviet 121 rifle di-vision under the command of A. M. Bushina, from the side of Kursk in February 1943, when the main battles were held in the village of Urban Type Castor, the village of Soviet, the village of Mikhaylovka (Cheremisinosc Rn ), Stations "Featory" (pos. "Avan-Gard").

    Notice

    Mountains ._________________

    selion ______________________

    We hereby notify you that you have been recruited at work

    in Germany, and therefore we offer __________________ to 8 of us. morning to appear in _________________

    medical examination, and to ___________________ Be ready to send to Germany.

    Stornish __________________

    Voloster clerk ______________________

    Dana Citizer Sokoli Flot, Timsky District, Kursk Region, Bulgakova Nina Timofeevna is that the cat's existing ones is registered in Sokolsky Starostat and the tax in the amount of 20 rubles. paid.

    Street ____________________________ (signature)

    Clerk ____________________________ (signature)


    But together with these data, an interesting fact of the presence of camps for prisoners of war on the territory of Kursk and near the lying regions.

    This is the forward-sorting camps "Dulag", which went in Castor, Kursk and Belgorod, "Stalag" - camp for prisoners of war and sergeant co-worn in Orel

    Current place

    State

    Belgorod

    Belgorod region

    August 1942.

    Kastorno

    Kursk Oblast

    Fig. 2. "The road from p. Suburban in p. Sokol

    Unlike them, the army team-forwarding points carried out the task of rapid transmission of military-prisoners in the camp in the rear.

    It follows that the inhabitants of our occupy-bath and the surrounding areas could have witnessed the departure of Soviet prisoners of war in you-cheesened forward-sorting camps.

    The next stage of our work was the search for information confirming our guesses. From the article "In the years

    The Great Patriotic War "D. Sondukov, A. Bruschensk, published on the" Naru.ru "website in the historic heading:" .4 July 1942 German troops occupy-Vali Castor. Seven months they hosted on our land. Despite the established "new orders," on-village sabotaged the instructions of the German Commandant, shied away from the hijacking to Germany. Our Komsomol members were underigned underground: Shura Schmykova, who passed radist courses, Natasha Lemberg, who had just graduated from a decade, who knew German well, frenchwho worked as a translator in the commocomandature. They supported Lena Demidov, Maria Rykunov, twice the front line twice ... "

    Collecting data on forward-sorting camps, members of the circle came across information on the state of the Kursk-Belgorod railway, according to historical data in the period 1942-1943 in this section of Periodicheski partisan detachmentsFrom the article "Belgorod during the Great Patriotic War - 1941": ". In the course of two days - on 23 and 24 October 1942 - five kilometers from Belgorod, under the suburban village of Streletsky, the Soviet warriors led a stubborn fight with superior enemy forces. Station Belgorod left the last echelons. In Pa-Rolozoic Depot, the parking lot is blown up, collapsed in the north-sky Donets of the railway bridge. " , from the book I. G. Ehrenburg War. 1941 - 1945: ". Curren not only waited. Smokyan fought with invaders. The baregoers exploded German locomotives. Girls transported weapons. The partisans killed the Germans. " . This historical certificate and the study of the iron-native map of the Kursk and Belgorod regions, pushed us to the idea that the movement of troops and prisoners could pass along the "Voronezh Kursk" highway, with exit in p. Deceively, and through it on a 39-rail-line-up km and further, already echelons towards Belgorod. But then the "Voronezh-Kursk" highway should have an additional way and the shortest way out of schigrov.

    Studying satellite I. topographic maps Weekly, we came across a barely a cattle road, leading to the village of Tim, it is much smaller at your distance, hidden from human eye by landings, i.e., it is quite convenient for the transfer of troops and prisoners of war. This road coming from the village "Prigode" in the village "Sokolé" has access to the "Roonge - Kursk" highway, passes through several settlements - D. Avdeevka, D. Morozovka, p. Sokol.

    After interviewing several residents of these villages, we ultrasounded that in these places in the spring and autumn on their gods, they dig a large number of gils of the time of the Patriotic War.

    From the memories of Vorobyeva Alexey Stefanovich, a native of the village of Lena, living in with. Sokolie, together with his family for 70 years, fought in the Belarusian front in 1944-1945 and the semi-incredible wound near Mozremire (Belarus) in April 1945: "For 1942 years old I and my fellow villagers were captured by the Germans . In total, we were 12 people - 8 girls and 4 guys. We were chased to lay the road from schigs to the coupie, through the field and landing. We lived in the co-neck, in the cellar of the destroyed house, which was not far from the dam. Applying us very brutally. They fed us once every three days. Water gave half-water at all. Once we were pulled out to chase on work, and we saw our soldiers behind the reservoir, tried to go to them. There is a shootout between the Germans and our soldiers. So we ran out of captivity. "

    Alexey Stefanovich's words about ill-treatment not only with prisoners, but also with Selhanov confirms the declaration of the Hungarian fascist command, published in the article Lagutich M. "Occupation and exemption":

    From the ads of the Hungarian fascist command:

    "With the consequences of which they conducted against persons committing an intentional explosion on railwaysIt has been established that this subversive work is performed with the help of the population of the nearest villages.

    Old buildings took a big mistake, police and peasants, when these cases did not inform the nearest military commandants or did not pay for it in the time of time.

    Therefore, I draw the attention of the population to the need to immediately report any preparing conspiracy or sabotage. In the case of identifying and covering such actions, every tenth people from the nearest places will be executed, despite the floor and age. This fate awaits all those who hide the conspirators or supply them or has its information about this ...

    At the same time I inform the population if someone leads us on the trail or will show the location of the partisans, parachutists or sabota companies, will receive WHO awards: money, land plot or satisfaction in any request.

    Hungarian military command. "

    The conversation with Alexei Stefanovich served as a basis for conducting a search research. We needed a terrain with a total area of \u200b\u200b500 square meters. Meters around the perimeter of the forest-sized strip at the intersection of the roads "Frost - Epiphany" and "Frost - Dubrov", as well as the freshly plowed field in the village of Avdeevka near the road "suburban - falcon" (Fig. 2). Even not the previous excavation on this territory, traces of the Great Patriotic War were found. Under the layer of autumn Little, we found sleeves from different caliber cartridges, a further detailed study of which confirmed information about the presence of Hungarian troops in the occupied territory, since the sleeves and Hungarian production were met among the sleeves of the cartridge "Mauser".

    Fig. 3. "Fucking a shell for an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun Flak in the village of Avdeevka."

    Fig. 4. Students of the Schigrovsky Medicolage with Vorobyev A. S.

    Fig. 5. "The sleeves from the Mauser cartridge" on the plowed field. D. Morozovka. "

    A ravine was also found and surveyed, explicitly not natural origin, according to our assumptions - German trench. The foundations for such the Temia were the finds around the perimeter and in the center of the ravine: cartridges for the Parabellum pistol and Mauser rifles, barbed wire along the edge, looking towards the road. As well as several canning cans, on one of which managed to disassemble the inscription USSR, R126E7 and the date of release 10.01. 39., Install exactly the manufacturer failed (allegedly Leningrad region, slanders). These banks allow us to conclude that in this place the location of the German troops was quite long in time.

    Fig. 6. "Instead of mushrooms, Mauser sleeves grow here. Landing D. Morozovka »

    Fig. 7. "Trench with German bullets. Landing D. Morozovka. "

    Fig. 8. "Barbed wire around the perimeter of the trench."

    Fig. 9. "Canning Bank. Trench".

    Fig. 10. "The sleeves from the lighting German cartridges. Landing. D. Morozovka »

    Fig. 11. "Button from German underwear, soldiers'"

    This fact is confirmed and some other on-walkers, already at the perimeter of the search - aluminum sleeves from the German lighting cartridges, which go-vorit about the location of stationary posts of the fascists along the road and conducting round-the-clock duty in the keyboard roads (development, intersections);

    - unusual metal buttons, very small concave inside, with four holes inside for fixation - such buttons were used in the German soldier's lingerie.

    Regarding weapons, in total, we found more than 50 gils of the Second World War, in varying degrees co-storage. Below I give a list, those sleeves and cartridges, series and numbers of which managed to consider:

    The sleeves and cartridges found in the village near the village of Avdeevka.

    1. Length Length 25 mm - P131S 7 - D.W. M. AG., WERK BERLIN-BORSIGWALDE, BERLIN 7,63х25-mm Pisto flight cartridge Mauser
    2. P25S * 3 37 - factory manufacturer not identify-ration
    3. P25S * 1 36 - factory manufacturer not identify-rational
    4. P25S * 11 36 - factory manufacturer is not identified-called
    5. P131S * 3 39 - D.W. M. AG., WERK BERLIN-BORSIGWALDE, BERLIN
    6. P131S * 8 39 - D.W. M. AG., WERK BERLIN-BORSIGWALDE, BERLIN
    7. P131S * 4 39 - D.W. M. AG., WERK BERLIN-BORSIGWALDE, BERLIN
    8. P120S * 18 35 - Dynamit A. G., Werk Hannover-Empelde
    9. P69S * 49 36 - SELLIER & BELLOT trading company traditionally occupies a key position in the production of ammunition and is one of the oldest engine-based enterprises in the Czech Republic, which is also one of the oldest in the world.
    10. P69S * 83 37 - Sellier & Bellot, Czech Republic
    11. P249 S * 12 38 - FINOWER INDUSTRIERK GMBH, FINOW / MARK,
    12. P249S * 2 36 - FINOWER INDUSTRIEERK GMBH, FINOW / MARK,
    13. P340S * 2 38 - Metallwarenfabrik Silber ^ TTE, St. Andreasberg, Saint Andreansberg
    14. The impossal sleeve is the length of 53mm - 1735 - idle rifle cartridge, also used for throwing RU-Press Pomegrata PGS-41. On the Donets: Plant - 17 (Barnaul), year of release - 35 / or a cartridge for Mosina rifle, from-prepared on a Podolsky Patron Plant No. 17
    15. Cartridge Length - 75 mm (code is not determined) - It is somewhat less common than 7.92 mm German rifle cartridge. It was used by the German army and the Soviet militia for firing from the French rifles of Lebel and Machine guns of Gelki.

    The sleeves found in the field and landing d. Frost

    1. Aux * 15 40 sleeve - Polte Armaturen und Maschi-Nenfabrik A. G., PolTestr. und Fichtestr., Werk Magdeburg, Sachsen
    2. PS * 8 37 - Polte Armaturen-U. Maschinenfa-Brik A. G., Werk Magdeburg, Sachsen
    3. P28S * 10 38 - Deutschewaffen-U. MUNITIONSFA-BRIK A. G., Werk Karlsruhe. Durlah
    4. P186S * 6 37 - factory manufacturer not identifies
    5. P 131 S * 38 38 - D.W. M. AG., WERK BERLIN- BORSIGWALDE, BERLIN
    6. P131 S * 8 39 - D.W M. A.G., Werk Berlin-Borsig- Walde, Berlin
    7. Gilza * 42 * - Chapelsky Arsenal, g. Budapest, Hungary
    8. PK 67 DZ 40 - WYTWORNIA AMUNICJI NR.2, Poland
    9. P316 S * 22 36 - Westfalische Metallindustrie, Westfalen.

    4 of them were from the Parabellum pistol cartridges, judging by the code located on them - "Aux" - Pathproons were made in Germany at the Polte Ar-Maturen und Maschinenfabrik A. G., Poltestr. UND Ficht- Estr., Werk Magdeburg, Sachsen, "used during the Second World War as weapons of limited standard and non-Officers-Officer Composition (which pistols had relied on the staff) in the technical fees of the troops of the German Armed Forces, in police and troops Ss. As for the other found sleeves, notes that in some places of the forest-sized band they were located in the ground at a distance of 2m - 4 m from each other and almost on one longitudinal line. The sleeves from the cartridges were the same type, but with different over-styers. Analysis of these sleeves showed that combat cartridges - for a rifle Mauser model 98, 98a, 98K with long-range-Stew 2000m, because caliber in all cartridges 7.92. The inscriptions on the sleeves told their unique history.

    On each sleeve there are 4 alphanumeric marks that are responsible for certain characteristics: cipher in the manufacturer, material cipher, party number and year of manufacture.

    For example, we found the sleeve 36 P316 22 S, Rasp said that it was released in 36, made from La Tuni, party number 22, cipher of the R316 plant (Westfalische Metallindustrie, Westfalen), this is a classic non-Metsk production sleeve for a rifle "Mauser").

    But, the sleeve 40 PK 67 DZ, made us feel good in the literature and find her story, this sleeve (40 PK 67 DZ), was produced in the city of Reberts in 15 km from Warsaw in 40, for a rifle Mauser and has brass coating.

    The article "Poland's Palders", on-spotted in the September issue of the magazine "Maslozhye" for 2006: "In February 1921, the Polish Ministry of Defense opened the first-a-judicial plant for the production of rifle panels, including the release Cartridge 7,92x57 »Mauser." After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the company for the production of Polish cartridges Zaklady amunicyjne "Pocisk SA", located until 1935 in Rebertov (15 km from Warsaw) was renamed in 1939 in WYTWORNIA AMUNICJI NR.2. This factory indicated the cartridges of the PK.

    An interesting and unusual find was a sleeve with an encoding * 42 *

    During the analysis, it was found that such sleeves were pro-armed for the armament of the Hungarian army by the Chapelsky Arsenal in Budapest to the rifle G.98 / 40. This rifle (also known as PUSKA 43M) was rarely on the Hungarian FEG armory in Budapest in 1941, on the order of the German army, under the regular non-Metsky rifle cartridge 7.92x57 Mauser. For eco-nomia and resources, the rifle was created on the basis of the design of the Hungarian rifle 35m. In the parts of the German Army, this rifle had an Infanterie Gewehr 98/40 index or briefly gew.98 / 40 or g.98 / 40. In 1943, G.98 / 40 rifle with minor cosmetic changes was adopted by the Hungarian army under the index 43m.

    In the course of the identification of the sleeves and cartridges found in the area of \u200b\u200bthe D. Frost and the village of Avdeevka, two cartridges were found, which can be attributed to the Pagrands of the Soviet Army. This find, may be a confirmation of the presence of an intelligence or par-Tizansky Soviet detachment, moving from the village Tim. Since in this village, based on the Military Card Military Settlement of the Soviet and Hermann Fronts, the front line took place. It is confirmed by the story of M. A. Bushina, the commander of the 121 rifle division on the operation to free the city of Shchigra in February 1943: "The division headquarters at that time was five kilometers east of the city at the development of the Du-Rogue of Cheremisinovo - Tim ... "

    Results of the search engine, the presence of a large coat of gils from the German cartridges, a shell from the non-Metsk 88-mm anti-aircraft gun Flak, testimony of the Ocho-Vita and the participant of the events of that time Vorobyeva A. S. confirm our guesses about the position of the German troops on the border of the Schigrovsky and Timsky districts in the period 1942, about the possible movement of prisoners of war for their distance transit into forward-withdrawal camps "Dulag", and then in an unknown direction.

    The presence of a large number in the area of \u200b\u200bcrossing the roads "Morozovka - Epiphany" and "Frost - Dubrov" combat cartridges of the fascist troops, tells us not only about the good weapons of the fascist army, but also the possible protective position occupied by relation to such strategic objects of that time like roads. This is especially true to the site of the road leading on the Voronezh-Kursk highway. This road was important for fascists as a possible re-gravity for retreat and to obtain reinforcements in the winter period of 1942-1943. Since this section of the road connects the exit to conversation, which means the approach to the lawil cannon, with the occupied area of \u200b\u200bthe plot, bypassing such localityAs Tim, from the Stro-Rona of which in December 1942 was planned an impact-finding operation of our troops in order to liberate the Kursk region from the fascist occupation. This fact is confirmed not only by the setting card at the co-wind-German front in December 1942, but also the re-remembrance of E. Krestikova, the former communication of the division: "" In the 121st division, 297 artillery regiment was included. It consisted of three divisions. The third division collaboration with 705 rifle regions. After heavy battles for Voronezh, Castor and other items, we did not count, were many artilleryrs. Especially large losses were in the seventh battery. With the approach to Schigram, many girls from other units expressed the same-labnce to replace the retired fighters, become artillery.

    The commander of the division allowed girls to become an ordnance to the ordinary. For the outcome on February 2, 1943, we took a loan point under Schigram. The root fight behind the city.

    Our girls all day beat back the enemy counterattack. Fa-Shistes equipped the observation points and embrasures on the roofs of the houses, from where, our advanced positions were well seen. Two days led fierce fights under bequely, then for the village - Cranberry, Lebiazhye, the Cup and then for Kursk. " .

    As the collected historical and literary certificate shows - from the Soviet soldiers in February 1943, everything was done to isolate non-Metric troops located in the Schigrovsky district and to close them towards Belgorod. From the article "Belgorod during the Great Patriotic War - 1941": "" After the glorious victories survived in the battle on the Volga, and the offensive battles of the first half of 1943, the troops of the Bryansky, Central and Voronezh fronts, the de-Boco wedged into the army of the enemy of the West Kursk. The front line here formed an arc shape, Belgorod was located on the southern ledge, on the North - Ponyry. On July 12, under Prokhorovka, the largest tank battle in the history of Wars began, in which a thousand two hundred tanks operated simultaneously. The enemy was stopped, suffered huge losses, and then after not-how many stubborn battles were discarded to Belgorod. " .

    Conclusion: The mined information at this stage of the study was discovered by many new facts of schigrov occupation. Of course, while we could not produce more detailed research in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Frost, which is associated with the seasonality of search for work, as well as the need to directly participate with the chambers of the Kursk Museum of Local Lore in the organization of further archaeological activities. Therefore, all the historical data obtained during the study and artifacts we were transferred to the Schigrovsky branch of the Kursk Local Lore Museum for a detailed study, and over-we are on further joint cooperation in this direction.

    The road coming from the village of the suburban in the village of Sokolé with access to the Voronezh - Kursk highway, could be an important strategic object both for driving a military-unscrewed-sorting camps of Kursk and Belgorod, the supply of the fascist army and its in-depths in February 1943.

    Active search and research activities in the field of historical heritage of their homeland, socialize the development of patriotism, respect and love for their Fatherland from students of the Schigrovsky Medical College.

    Kopilovich Malvina Vitalevna, teacherOBOO SPO "Schigrovsky Medical College" (Kursk region)

    From the collection "Historical Studies: Materials II Meshdunar. Scientific conf. (Chita, December 2013). "

    Literature:

    1. R. spikes. The article "In Schigrach, the tractor driver discovered the German bomb."
    2. Military patriotic page "Memories of participants in battles for shigra", gas. District Bulletin No. 10, 01. 02.2013
    3. Alexander Gfüllner, Aleksander Rostocki, Werner Schwarz "List of fascist camps for prisoners of war."
    4. D. Sundukov, A. Blusnow. Article "During the Great Patriotic War".
    5. Railway map of the Kursk region.
    6. Map - scheme of the Kursk region.
    7. Satellite map of the Kursk region.
    8. Summary Table of Mauser Construction Rifle Table under smokeless powder.
    9. Stamps and codes of manufacturers of gels in Germany until 1945.
    10. A. Fighters "Poland" Magazine "Mastersuzhye" No. 114, 2006 year.
    11. The article "Belgorod during the Great Patriotic War - 1941".
    12. Map Kursk battle. Defensive battle in July 1943
    13. Camp of Soviet prisoners of war in Belarus, Directory, Minsk - 2004
    14. Erenburg I. G. War. 1941 - 1945. M., 2004. P. 366-381.
    15. Map "The situation on the Soviet-German front in December 1942".
    16. S. coinchikov. "Parabellaum": you want the world, get ready for war "W". .Bratyashka "for special purpose divisions, No. 8, 2006
    17. Map "CounterStiver near Moscow and the overall offensive of the Soviet Army in the Western direction on December 5, 1941-20 AAPEL 1942" ..
    18. M. Lagutich. Article "Occupation and Exemption".
    19. Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - 417, op.9855, d.2, l.96; op. 27266, d.4, l.100
    20. Modern small arms of the world.
    21. Cartridges for Wehrmacht Pistols. Magazine "Weapon" No. 10 2000
    22. Archival materials of the historical and local history museum of the Lomonosovsky district of the Leningrad region.