Kursk arc 1943. Kursk battle is a great turning battle. Forces and means of confront

The Kursk battle, which continued from July 5 to August 23, 1943, became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Soviet and Russian historiography shares the battle for Kursk defensive (July 5-23), Orlovskaya (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkiv (August 3-23) offensive operations.

Front on the eve of the battle
During the winter onset of the Red Army and the previously followed by the vermochet counteroffensive in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge of a depth of 150 km was formed and a width of up to 200 km, facing the western side - the so-called Kursk arc (or ledge). The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on a Kursk ledge.
For this was also developed in April 1943, a military operation was approved under the code name Zitadelle ("Citadel").
To conduct it, the most combat-ready compounds were attracted - a total of 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized, as well as a large number of individual parts included in the 9th and 2nd field armies of the Center for Army, in 4- Yu Tank Army and the Operational Group "Cempf" Group of Army "South".
The grouping of the German troops numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2 thousand 245 tanks and assault guns, 1 thousand 781 plane.
Since March 1943, the Supreme Command Bet (VGK) has worked on a strategic offensive plan, whose task was to defeat the main forces of the South Army and Center for the Force, crush enemy defense at the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go to the offensive. However, in mid-April, on the basis of data on the fact that the command of the Wehrmacht plans to conduct an offensive under Kurk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense, and then proceed to counteroffensive. Owning a strategic initiative, the Soviet side intentionally started martialctions Not an offensive, but defense. The development of events showed that this idea was correct.
To the beginning of the Kursk battle in the Soviet Central, Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, more than 1.9 million people were numbered, more than 26 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery plants, about 2.9 thousand aircraft.
Troops of the central front under the command of the general of the army of Konstantin Rokossovsky defended the North Fas (addressed to the enemy a plot of kursk protrusion, and the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of General of the Army Nikolay Vatutina - South. The troops, which occupied the protrusion, relied on the steppe front as part of the rifle, three tank, three motorized and three cavalry buildings (Commander - Colonel-General Ivan Konev).
Coordinated the actions of the fronts Representatives of the rates of the Supreme Commander Marshals Soviet Union George Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

Battle's move
On July 5, 1943, German shock groups began an offensive to Kursk from the regions of Eagle and Belgorod. During the defensive phase of the Kursk battle On July 12, the largest tank battle in the history of war occurred on Prokhorovsky.
In both parties, up to 1 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns at both sides at the same time.
The battle near the station Prokhorovka in the Belgorod region became the largest battle of a Kursk defensive operation, which went into history under the title of Kursk arc.
In the staff documents there are evidence of the first Boy, which occurred on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This fight did not have tanks, and the rifle parts of the 69th Army, which, exhausting the enemy, suffered large losses and were replaced by the ninth airborne division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11, the fascists were stopped by the outskirts of the station.
On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks faced a narrow section of the front, the width of only 11-12 kilometers.
Tank parts "Adolf Hitler", "Dead Head", Division "Reich" and others were able to regrouping their strength on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about it.
The Soviet parts of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a deliberately complex position: the shock group of tanks is located between the beams of the south-west of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy to the entire wide tank group. Soviet tanks were forced to move on a small area limited on one side by rail, and on another floodplain river Psöl.

The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Peter Skyrgin, was shot down. The crew, pulling out his commander, hid in a funnel. Tank burned. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved toward the Soviet tank workers to crush them with caterpillars. Then the mechanic to save his comrades, rushed from the saving tag. He rested to his burning car, and sent it to German "Tiger". Both tank exploded.
For the first time about Tank Duel, Ivan Markin wrote in his book in his book. He called the battle under Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the XX century.
In fierce battles, the troops of the Wehrmacht lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, moved to defense, and on July 16 began to take their strength.
July, 12 The next stage of the Kursk battle began - the counteroffensiveness of the Soviet troops.
5th of August As a result of the operations of "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev", Eagle and Belgorod were liberated, in the evening of the same day in Moscow in honor of this event for the first time during the war, artillery salute was produced.
August 23kharkov was released. Soviet troops advanced in the southern and southwest direction by 140 km and occupied a favorable position for the transition to the overall attack for the liberation of the left bank of Ukraine and the exit to the Dnieper. The Soviet army finally consolidated its strategic initiative, the German command was forced to move to defense on the entire front.
In one of the largest battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War, more than 4 million people took part in both parties, about 70 thousand guns and mortars were involved, over 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 12 thousand combat aircraft.

Results of the battle
After the most powerful tank battle, the Soviet army turned the events of the war to reverse, took the initiative to their hands and continued to promote to the West.
After the fascists failed to turn their "Citadel" operation, at the global level it looked like a full defeat of the German campaign before the Soviet Army;
The fascists turned out to be morally suppressed, disappeared their confidence in their superiority.
The value of the victory of the Soviet troops in the Kursk arc goes far beyond the Soviet-German front. She had a huge impact on the further course of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk forced the German fascist command to remove large compounds of troops and aviation from the Mediterranean Theater of Military Activities.
As a result of the defeat of the significant forces of the Wehrmacht and the transfer of new compounds to the Soviet-German front, favorable conditions were created for the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Italy, their promotion to its central regions, which ultimately predicted the exit of this country from the war. As a result of the victory under the Kursk and the release of the Soviet troops to the Dnieper ended with a radical fracture not only in the Great Patriotic War, but also in the entire Second World War in favor of countries antihytler coalition.
For the senses in the Kursk battle of the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 180 soldiers and officers were awarded, over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals.
About 130 compounds and parts received the Guards title, more than 20 - honorary names of Orlovskiy, Belgorod, Kharkov.
For a contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Kursk region was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the city of Kursk - the Order of the Patriotic War I degree.
On April 27, 2007, the decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin Kursk was awarded the honorary title of the Russian Federation - the city of Military Glory.
In 1983, a feat of Soviet soldiers was immortalized in Kursk on a Kursk arc - On May 9, the memorial died in the years of the Great Patriotic War was opened.
On May 9, 2000, in honor of the 55th anniversary of the victory in the battle, the Memorial Complex "Kursk Arc" was opened.

Material prepared according to "TASS Dossier"

Wounded memory

Dedicated to Alexandrikolaev,
Mechanics-driver T-34 tank, which made the first tank ram in the battle under Prokhorovka.

The memory will not be lost like a wound
Do not forget the soldiers of all simple,
What they entered this fight, dying,
And forever stayed alive.

No, nor step back, look straight,
Only blood was cast on behalf of
Only sketches are stubbornly -
Here we will stand until the end!

Let any price - the life of a soldier,
We all will be today armor!
Your mother, your city, honor of a soldier
Behind the boyish thin back.

Two steel avalanches - two forces
Among the rye field merged.
No you, no me - we are one,
We are steady steady.

No maneuvers, no building - there is power,
The power of rage, the power of fire.
And cruel battle mowing
Both armor and soldiers names.

Tank fell, Kombat is wounded,
But again - I'm in battle - let the metal burns!
Creek by the sense is equal to:
- Everything! Farewell! I go to the ram!

Still enemies, choosing heavy -
You will not believe it right away.
Tank burning flies without a blister -
He gave life for his homeland so much.

Only Black Square Funeral
Explain to mothers and relatives ...
His heart - in the ground, like fragments ...
He remained always young.

... on the burned land nor the tin
Tank on the tank, armor on armor ...
And on the forehead of the wrinkle commanders -
The battle is nothing to compare in war ...
The wound will not be lost -
His feat is always next to him.
Because he knew, dying,
How easy to die young ...

In the temple a memorable quiet and holy
Your name - the scar on the wall ...
You stayed to live here - yes, it is necessary
So that the Earth did not burn in the fire.

On earth this, black once,
The trail burning does not forget.
Your torn heart of a soldier
In the spring, cornflowers blooms ...

Elena Muhamedshina

Kursk battle was planned by German-fascist invaders under the leadership of Hitler in response to the battle near Stalingradwhere they suffered a crushing defeat. The Germans, as usual, wanted to attack suddenly, but accidentally captured by the Saper-Fascist, passed his own. He reported that at night of the fifth of July 1943, the Nazis would begin to surpass the "Citadel" operation. The Soviet army is decided to start the battle first.

The main idea of \u200b\u200bthe "Citadel" was to apply a sudden strike in Russia with the involvement of powerful equipment and self-propelled installations. Hitler did not doubt his success. But the General Staff of the Soviet Army was developed a plan aimed at liberation russian troops And the defense of the battle.

The battle received its interesting name in the form of a battle on the Kursk arc, due to the external similarity line of the front with a huge arc.

Change the course of the Great Patriotic War and to solve the fate of Russian cities, such as Eagle and Belgorod, was assigned to the "Center" army, "South" and the "Cempf" operational group. On the defense of the eagle, the troops of the central front were delivered, and on the defense of Belgorod - the Voronezh Front.

Date of the Kursk Battle: July 1943.

July 12, 1943 marked the greatest tank battle on the field under the station Prokhorovka. After the battle, the Nazis had to change the attack on defense. This day cost them huge human losses (about 10 thousand) and defeat 400 tanks. Further, in the Eagle area, the Bryansky, Central and West Front continued, by going to the Kutuzov operation. For three days, from July 16 to July 18, the Central Front was eliminated by the Hitler group. In the future, they betrayed aviation persecution and thus were discarded 150 km. west. Russian cities Belgorod, Eagle and Kharkov sighed freely.

The results of the Kursk battle (briefly).

• sharp turn of the course of the events of the Great Patriotic War;
• after the fascists failed to turn their "Citadel" operation, at the global level it looked like a full defeat of the German campaign before the Soviet Army;
• the fascists turned out to be morally suppressed, disappeared all confidence in their superiority.

The meaning of the Kursk battle.

After the most powerful tank battle, the Soviet army turned the events of the war to reverse, took the initiative to their hands and continued to promote to the West, exempting Russian cities.

The battle on the Kursk arc lasted 50 days. According to the results of this operation, the strategic initiative finally passed on the side of the Red Army and until the end of the war was carried out mainly in the form of offensive actions on its part. In the day of the 75th anniversary of the beginning of the legendary battle, the site of the "Star" TV channel collected ten little-known facts about the Kursk battle. 1. Initially, the battle was not planned as an offensivePlanning the 1943 Summer Military Campaign, the Soviet command stood before complex choice: What method of action to prefer - to come or defend. In his reports about the situation in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk Arc, Zhukov and Vasilevsky offered to bleed the enemy in a defensive battle, and then go to counteroffensive. A number of military leaders opposed - Vatutin, Malinovsky, Tymoshenko, Voroshilov, - However, Stalin supported the decision on defense, fearing that as a result of our offensive, the Nazis would be able to break through the front line. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when.

"The real course of events has shown that the decision on deliberate defense was the most rational type of strategic actions," the military historian emphasizes, Candidate of Historical Sciences Yuri Popov.

2. In the number of troops, the battle exceeded the scale of the Battle of the Battle of StalingradKursk battle is still considered one of the largest battles of World War II. On both sides, more than four million people were involved in it (for comparison: during the Stalingrad battle at different stages of hostilities, just over 2.1 million people participated). According to the General Staff of the Red Army, only during the offensive from July 12 to August 23, 35 German divisions were defeated, including 22 infantry, 11 tanks and two motorized ones. The remaining 42 divisions suffered heavy losses and largely lost their combat capability. In the battle under Kursk, the German command used 20 tank and motorized divisions from the total number of 26 divisions that were available at the Soviet-German front. After Kursk, 13 of them were completely defeated. 3. Information about the opponent's plans promptly received from scouts from abroadSoviet military intelligence managed to open the preparation of the German army to a major offensive on the Kursk arc. Foreign residuments in advance mined information on the preparation of Germany to the 1943 Spring-Summer Campaign. So, on March 22, the resident of the GRU in Switzerland, Shandor Rado reported that for "... hitting the Kursk, may be used by the SS tank corps (the organization is prohibited in the Russian Federation - approx. Red.), Which currently receives replenishment. " And the intelligence officers in England (resident GRU General-Major I. A. Sklyarov) mined the analytical certificate prepared for Churchill "Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943."

"The Germans will concentrate the forces to eliminate Kursk protrusions," said in the document.

Thus, the information extracted by intelligence in early April, the plan of the enemy's summer campaign planned in advance and allowed to prevent the enemy blow. 4. Kursk arc became a large-scale combat baptism for "Spear"The counterintelligence bodies "Smered" were formed in April 1943 - three months before the beginning of the historical battle. "Death to Spies!" - So concisely and at the same time, Emko identified the main task of this special service Stalin. But the Massians not only reliably defended the parts and compounds of the Red Army from the enemy agents and saboteurs, but also used by the Soviet command, they conducted a radoigra with an opponent, conducted combinations on the conclusion on our side of the German agent. In the book "Fire Arc": the Kursk battle by the eyes of Lubyanka, "published on the materials of the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia, talks about the whole series of security officers at that time.
Thus, with the aim of disinfecting the German command, the management of the "Spear" of the Central Front and the Sewer Department of the Oryol Military District held a successful radio game "Experience". She continued from May 1943 to August 1944. The work of the radio station was legended on behalf of the interlerships of the agents of Abver and introduced into the German command of misleading about the plans of the Red Army, including in the Kursk area. In total, 92 radiograms were transferred to the enemy, 51 were obtained on our side and several German agents were neutralized, loads were obtained from an airplane (weapons, money, fictitious documents, uniforms). . 5. In Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their qualityThis settlement has ringed, as it is believed to be the largest battle of armored cars for the entire World War II. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. Wehrmacht had superiority over the Red Army due to greater efficiency of his technology. Let's say T-34 possessed only a 76 mm gun, and the T-70 - and at all a 45-mm tool. In Churchill III tanks, obtained by the USSR from England, the gun was a caliber of 57 millimeters, but this car was distinguished by low speed and weak maneuverability. In turn, the German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" had an 88-mm gun, the shot of which he pierced the armor of the thirty part of the range to two kilometers.
Our tank could break through the armor with a thickness of 61 millimeters on a kilometer's range. By the way, the front armor of the same T-IVH reached 80 millimeters thickness. It was possible to fight with the hope of success in such conditions only in the near battle, which was applied, however, the price of large losses. Nevertheless, under Prokhorovka Wehrmacht lost 75% of his tank resources. For Germany, such losses have become a catastrophe and turned out to be well-replenished almost until the very end of the war. 6. Cognac General Katukukov did not reach the ReichstagDuring the Kursk battle for the first time during the war years, the Soviet command was echelonically used large tank formations for keeping the defensive strip on a wide front. One of the armies commanded Lieutenant-General Mikhail Katukov, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Armored Troops. Subsequently, in his book "On the edge of the main strike", he, in addition to the severe moments of his front-line epic, recalled one funny case related to the events of the Kursk battle.

"In June 1941, coming out of the hospital, I jumped to the store on the way to the front and bought a bottle of brandy, having decided that he was rapidly with combat comrades, as soon as she was obsessed with the first victory, - writing front-line. - Since then, this cherished bottle traveled with me on all fronts. And finally, the long-awaited day has come. We arrived at KP. The waitress quickly roasted the scrambled eggs, I took a bottle from the suitcase. Spere with comrades for a simple boardboard. They spilled cognac, which brought pleasant memories of peaceful pre-war life. And the main toast - "For the victory! On Berlin!" "

7. In the sky above the Kursk enemy, Kozhevub and MaresyevDuring the Kursk battle, many Soviet soldiers showed heroism.

"Every day, fights gave many examples of courage, courage, the persistence of our soldiers, sergeants and officers," notes the participant in the Great Patriotic War, Colonel-General retired Alexey Kirillovich Mironov. "They consciously sacrificed themselves, seeking to prevent the passage of the enemy through their defense site."

Over 100 thousand participants of those fights are awarded orders and medals, 231 became the hero of the Soviet Union. 132 compounds and parts received the Guards title, and 26 were awarded the honorary names of Orlovskiy, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachevsky. Future three times of the Hero of the Soviet Union. Aleksey Maresyev accepted participation in the battles. On the twentieth of July 1943, during an air combat with superior enemy forces, he saved the lives of two Soviet pilots, destroying two enemy fighters of the FW-190 at once. On the twenty-fourth of August 1943, Deputy Commander of the Squadron of the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment Senior Lieutenant A. P. Maresyev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 8. The defeat in the Kursk battle has become a shock for HitlerAfter the failure on the Kursk Dug, the Führer was treated: he lost the best compounds, not yet knowing that in the autumn he would have to leave the entire left-bank bank. Without changing her character, Hitler immediately laid the guilt for the Kursk failure on Field Marshals and the generals who carried out the direct command of the troops. Feldmarshal Erich Von Manstein, who developed and conducted the operation "Citadel", later wrote:

"It was the last attempt to preserve our initiative in the East. With its failure, the initiative finally moved to the Soviet side. Therefore, the Operation "Citadel" is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. "

German historian from the Military Historical Office of the Bundeswehr Manfred Pay wrote:

"The Irony of History is that the Soviet generals began to assimilate and develop the art of operational leadership by the troops who received a high assessment of the German side, and the Germans themselves under pressure from Hitler moved to the Soviet positions of tough defense - according to the principle" by all means "."

By the way, the fate of elite tank Divisions of the SS, who took part in the battles on the Kursk Arc, - "Lybstandard", "Dead Head" and "Raiha" - in the future there was even more sadly. All three compounds participated in battles with the Red Army in Hungary, were defeated, and the remains made their way into the American occupation zone. However, the Soviet Tankists issued the Soviet side, and they suffered punishment as war criminals. 9. The victory in the Kursk arc brought the opening of the second frontAs a result of the defeat of the significant forces of the Wehrmacht on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created to deploy the actions of the American-English troops in Italy, it was the beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc - failed the Mussolini regime, Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance in the countries occupied by the German troops increased, the authority of the USSR was strengthened as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition. In August 1943, the Committee of the US headquarters has prepared an analytical document in which the role of the USSR has been assessing the role of the USSR.

"Russia occupies a dominant position," the report was noted, "and is a decisive factor in the upcoming defeat of the Axis countries in Europe."

Not by chance, President Roosevelt realized all the danger of further delaying the opening of the second front. On the eve of the Tehran Conference, he spoke to his son:

"If things in Russia go further as now, then, perhaps, the future in the spring, the second front is not needed."

Interestingly, a month after the completion of the Kursk battle, Roosevelt had already had its own plan for the dismemberment of Germany. He presented it just at the conference in Tehran. 10. For salute in honor of the liberation of Eagle and Belgorod, the entire stock of single shells in Moscow was spentDuring the Kursk battle, two key cities of the country were liberated - Eagle and Belgorod. Joseph Stalin ordered the artillery salute on this occasion in Moscow - the first for the whole war. It was estimated that in order for the salute to be heard in the whole city, about 100 anti-aircraft guns need to use. Such fire facilities were, however, only 1,200 idle shells were at the disposal of the organizers (during the war, they were not held in the Moscow Garrison in the reserve). Therefore, from 100 guns could be given only by 12 volleys. True, the Kremlin Division Division of Mountain Guns (24 guns) was also involved in Salute (24 guns), idle shells to which were available. Nevertheless, the effect of the promotion could not be as expected. The solution was the increase in the interval between volley: at midnight, on August 5, the shooting of all 124 guns was carried out every 30 seconds. And so that the salute has been heard in Moscow everywhere, the guns of the guns were placed in stadiums and wastelands in different parts of the capital. We continue the topic of the Kursk arc, but at first I wanted to say a few words. Now I moved to the material about the loss of technology in our and German parts. We had significantly higher, especially in Prokhorovsky battle. Reasons for losses incurred by the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rothmistra She was engaged in the decision of Stalin, a special commission chaired by Malenkov. In the report of the Commission, in August 1943, the fighting of the Soviet troops on July 12, under Prokhorovka, are called a sample of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact, by no means victorious. In this regard, I want to bring you several documents that will help you understand the reason what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to the report by Rothmistrova Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although she sins places against truth, but still, it deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle ...

"Why did Prokhorovsky battle been won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces? The answer gives combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.

29th Tank Corps :

"The attack began without the artwork occupied by the turn of the pr-com and without cover from the air.

This gave the opportunity to open a concentrated fire on the combat orders of the corps and is impunity to produce tanks and motorized bombing, which led to great losses and a decrease in the attack tempo, and this in turn provided the opportunity to lead more effective fire of artillery and tanks from . The terrain for the offensive did not favor their intersection, the presence of impassable for tanks of the north-west and southeastern roads Prokhhorovka-Benhenichino forced tanks to press the road and open their flanks, without having to cover them.

Separate divisions that have come out forward, even to St.x. The Komsomolets, who lasted the big losses from the artogne and the fire of tanks from ambushes, moved to the line of fire forces.

The cover of the upcoming tanks from the air was absent until 13.00. From 13.00 the cover was carried out by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 cars.

With the exit of tanks to the front edge of the defense of the pr-ka from the forest with / s. Watchdog and east. ok. The PR-K opened a hurricane fire from the ambushes of Tiger Tanks, self-propelled guns and fet guns. The infantry was cut off from tanks and forced to heal.

Blowing into the depths of defense, the tanks carried big losses.

Parts of the pr-ka with the support of a large number of aviation and tanks switched to the counterattack and part of the brigade were forced to move away.

While attacking the front edge of the pr-ka self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of the battle orders of tanks and even pulling forward tanks, had losses from the anti-tank fire of the pr-ka (eleven self-propelled guns were output). "

18th Tank Corps :

"The opponent's artillery led an intensive fire on the combat orders of the corps.
The building, without having due support in fighter aviation and carrying large losses from the arthogne and intensive bombing from the air (by 12.00 the opponent's aviation produced up to 1500 aircraft), slowly moved ahead.

The locality in the hull action strip is crossed by three deep ravines passing from the left bank of the river. Psle to Zh.d. Belenikhino - Prokhorovka, why the coming in the first echelon 181, 170 tank brigades were forced to act on the left flank of the hull strip in the strong reference point of the enemy of the FX. OCTOBER. 170 TBR, operating on the left flank, by 12.00 lost up to 60% of its combat material part.

The opponent to the outcome of the day from the District of Kozlovka, Greznoy took the frontal attack of tanks with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the combat orders of the body from the direction of Kozlovka, Polezhaev, using his tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding combat orders of air.

Performing the task, 18 TC met the well-organized, strong anti-tank defense of the enemy with pre-sword with tanks and assault implements at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and technology, my order No. 68 part of the corps moved to defense on the reached frontiers. ""

"Machine with a flame of an embrace"

Field of the battle on the Kursk arc. In the foreground on the right side of the Soviet T-34

Dressed in the Belgorod T-34 district and the deceased tanker

T-34 and T-70, banging during the battle on the Kursk arc. 07.1943g.

Handled T-34 during the battle for the state farm Oktyabrsky

Burnt T-34 "For Soviet Ukraine" in the area of \u200b\u200bBelgorod. Kursk arc. 1943

MZ "Lee", the 193rd of a separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Arc, July 1943.

MZ "Lee" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193th separate tank regiment. Kursk Arc

Baked Covenant Light Tank T-60

Sted T-70 and BA-64 from the composition of the 29th Tank Corps

Owls. Secret
Ex N1
First Deputy People's Commissar Defense of the Union of the USSR - Marshal of the Soviet Union
Tov. Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5 Guards Tank Army met with exceptionally new types of enemy tanks. Most of all on the battlefield was T-V tanks ("Panther"), in a significant number of T-VI tanks ("Tiger"), as well as upgraded tanks T-III and T-IV.

Commanded with tank parts from the first days of the Patriotic War I have to report to you that our tanks have lost their superiority before tanks of the enemy in armor and armament.

Armament, armor and action of fire in German tanks have become much higher and only the exceptional courage of our tankers, the big saturation of the tank parts of artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to use until the end of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good sighting devices in German tanks puts our tanks into a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure increases.

I walked me in the summer of 1943 in the summer of 1943 in the years that we can now behave independently maneuverable tank fight, using the excellent maneuverable properties of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans go with their tank parts, at least temporarily, to defense, then these most they deprive us of our maneuverable advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully apply the sighting distance of their tank guns, while at the same time almost in full inaccessibleness from our sight tank fire. .

Thus, when a collision with the German tank units passed to defense, we like general rule, We carry huge losses in tanks and do not have success.

Germans, opposing our tanks T-34 and KV their T-V tanks ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger"), no longer experienced a tankoboy on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply could not be allowed to tank battle, as they are more than easily destroyed by fire of German tanks.

I have bitterness to state that our tank technique, except for the introduction of SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled installations, during the war years did not give anything new, and the lack of disabilities on the tanks of the first release, somehow: the imperfection of the transmission group (Main friction, transmission change box and side friction), extremely slow and uneven turn of the tower, exceptionally bad visibility and close crew accommodation not completely eliminated and today.

If our aviation over the years of the Patriotic War in its tactical and technical data is steadily forward, giving new and new more advanced airplanes, unfortunately it is impossible to say about our tanks.

Now T-34 and a kV tanks lost the first place, which they rightly had among the tanks of warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I was captured by the secret instruction of the German command, which was written on the basis of the Polygon's Tests conducted by the Germans and T-34.

As a result of these tests, the instructions were written, about the following: German tanks of tank combat with Russian tanks of the KV and T-34 cannot avoid tank combat. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to cover with artillery and transfer the actions of the tank parts to another portion of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank fights 1941 and 1942, it can be argued that the Germans usually did not enter into battle with us without the help of other types of troops, and if they entered, then with multiple superiority among their tanks, which They were not difficult to achieve in 1941 and in 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world by the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 were able to give an even more improved tank T-V, "Panther"), which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, according to its own Qualities is significantly higher than T-34 tank and in particular the quality of weapons.

For the characteristics and comparison of our and German tanks, we bring the following table:

Brand Tank and Su	Nose armor in mm.	Tower forehead and stern	Board	Stern	Roof, bottom	Caliber cannon in mm.	Count shells.	Speed \u200b\u200bMax.
T-34	45	95-75	45	40	20-15	76	100	55,0
T-V.	90-75	90-45	40	40	15	75x)
KV-1C.	75-69	82	60	60	30-30	76	102	43,0
T-V.1	100	82-100	82	82	28-28	88	86	44,0
Su-152.	70	70-60	60	60	30-30	152	20	43,0
Ferdinand	200		160	85		88		20,0

x) The barrel of 75 mm of the gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a much greater initial speed.

I, as an agile patriot of tank troops, I ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, break the conservatism and the treasury of our tank designers and industrialists and with all the sharpness will raise the issue of a mass issue for the winter of 1943 new tanks that are superior to their combat qualities and constructive Registration of the current types of German tanks.

In addition, I ask to dramatically improve the equipment of the tank parts by evacuation means.

The opponent all his baked tanks, as a rule, evacuates, and our tankers of this opportunity are often deprived, as a result of which we lose a lot on this in the terms of the recovery of tanks. At the same time, in cases where the field of tank fights for some period remains behind the enemy, our repairmen find formless piles of metal, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, all our baked tanks explodes.

Commander of the troops
5 Guards Tank Army
Guard Lieutenant-General
Tank troops -
(Rothmistrov) Signature.

Acting army.
=========================
RChdney, f. 71, OP. 25, d. 9027c, l. 1-5

Something that I would definitely add to:

"One of the reasons for stunning losses of 5 gv ta is also the fact that about a third of her tanks made up lungs T-70. The armor of the windshield sheet is 45 mm, the armor of the tower is 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm gun 20K sample 1938, 45 mm armoredness at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). The crew is two people. There were nothing to catch with these tanks on the field under Prokhorovka (although, of course, they could damage the German tank of class PZ-4 and older, driving up to the emphasis and working in the "Dyatla" mode ... if they persuade the German tank workers to look at the other side; Well, or the armored personnel carrier, if it is lucky to find such, in the field to drive). There is nothing to catch in the framework of the oncoming tank fight, of course - if it was lucky enough to break through the defense, they could fully support their infantry, for which, in fact, were created.

It should not be discharged and the overall impetus for the personnel of 5, which received replenishment literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, the unlikely, both directly ordinary tankers and junior / middle commanders. Even in this suicide attack, it was possible to achieve the best results, observing the competent construction - which, alas, was not observed - everyone broke into the attack of a bunch. Including SAU, which is not a place in attacking orders.

Well, most importantly - monstrous Inefficient work of repair and evacuation teams. It was very bad at all that was very bad until 1944, but in this case 5, just a large-scale job wound up. I do not know how much it was at this point in the state of Bram (and whether they were generally in those days in her combat orders - they could have been forgetting in the rear), but they did not cope with the work. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front) in the report on July 24, 1943, Stalin writes about the tank battle under Prokhorovka: "The opponent has been evacuating his knocked tanks and other material parts with a waste of specially created teams, and everything that is impossible to take out, including our Tanks and our material part burns and undermines. As a result of this, the damaged material part captured by us is not repaired, and can not be used, as a scrap metal that we will try to evacuate from the battlefield. "(RGASPI, F. 83, op 1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And still a little in addition. Regarding the general situation with the management of troops.

The fact is that the German reconnaissance aircraft opened in advance the approach to Prokhorovka compounds of 5 GB and 5 GW A, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, under Prokhorov, Soviet troops will go to the offensive, therefore the Germans especially strengthened PTOs on the left flank division " Adolf Hitler "2 MOP Tank Corps. They, in turn, were collected after the reflection of the offensive of the Soviet troops, to switch to counter-project and surround the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovsky area, so the Germans concentrated their tank pieces on the flanks of 2 TK SS, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, 18 and 29, the TC had to attack the most powerful German ptwork into the forehead, so they suffered such large losses. In addition, the attacks of Soviet tanks German tank workers reflected fire from the spot.

In my opinion, the best thing that could make the Rothmisters in such a situation is to try to insist on the abolition of Conrtedar on July 12 under Prokhorovka, but no traces of what he at least tried to do this is not found. There is particularly clearly manifested by the difference in approaches when comparing the actions of two commander of tank armies - Rothmistrova and Katukov (for those who have a bad geography, I will clarify - 1 Catukov's tank army occupied the positions of West Prokhorovka at the turn of Belaya Oboyan).

The first disagreements of Katukuz with Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander gives an order for applying Construdar 1 of the Tank Army together with 2 and 5 Gaardi tank corps towards Tomarovka. Catukov sharply responds that in the context of the quality superiority of German tanks, it is detrimental to the army and will cause unjustified losses. Best way Battle is a maneuverable defense with the help of tank ambushes, allowing to shoot the tanks of the enemy with short distances. Vatutinium solutions does not cancel. Next, the events occur as follows (I quote from the memories of M.E. Katukov):

"Straighing the heart I gave an order about the application of the counter. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield under Yakovlevo showed that we do not at all what we need. As you should expect, the brigades carried serious losses. With the pain in my heart I saw with NP, as flaming and smoking thirty parts.

It was necessary, by all means to make the abolition of the counterdard. I hurried at KP, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report to him my considerations. But barely crossed the heaven threshold, as the boss of communication in some particularly significant tone reported:

From the bet ... Comrade Stalin. I didn't take the phone without excitement.

Hello, coils! - There was a good familiar voice. - Decide the situation!

I told the commander-in-chief about what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

In my opinion, "I said," we hurried with Construdar. The enemy has big unspent reserves, including tank.

What are you offering?

While it is advisable to use tanks to keep fire from a place, to break them into the ground or putting in ambushes. Then we could let the enemy cars at a distance of three hundred and four hundred meters and destroy them by sighting fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

Well, - he said - you will not apply the counter. You will call you Vatutin. "

As a result, Constridar was canceled, the tanks of all parts were in the trenches, and the day on July 6 became the most "black day" for the 4 German tank army. During the day of the battle, 244 German tanks were bent (48 TC lost 134 tanks and 2 TC ss - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (mostly in their orders, so there were no problems with their evacuation - this is again the difference between the baked and destroyed tank emphasize). Thus, Katukuk tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front of the conclusions did not and on July 8 gives a new order for the Condrudar, only 1 such (due to the stubbornness of its commander) the task is not attacked, but to hold the positions. Conrtdard conduct 2 TC, 2 GW TC, 5 TC and individual tank brigades and shelves. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet buildings - 215 tanks irrevocably, the losses of the German troops - 125 tanks, of which it is irretrievably - 17. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 becomes the most "black day" for the Soviet tank troops, in its losses it is comparable with losses In Prokhorov battle.

Of course, there is no special hope that Rothmistrov would manage to sell its decision, but at least try it!

It should be noted that limiting the battles under Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only an attack of 5 GW is illegally. After July 12, the main efforts of 2 TC ss and 3 TCs were aimed at surrounding the division 69 of the army, to the south-west of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to bring the personnel of 69 of the army from the formed bag, but most of the weapons and They had to throw the techniques. That is, the German command was achieved to achieve very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 GW A and 5 GW, and for some time to deprive the combat capability 69 A. After July 12, with the German side, there were actual attempts by the environment and making the maximum damage to Soviet troops (in order to safely start Distill your strength to the former front line). After that, the Germans, under the cover of strong terrigards, calmly took their troops on the frontiers held by them until July 5, evacuating the damaged technique and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front is completely incomprehensible from July 16 to move to a stubborn defense on the boregings occupied when the Germans are not going to attack, but on the contrary, they gradually disassemble their forces (in particular, the Division "Dead Head" actually started to go on July 13 ). And when it was found that the Germans do not occur, but they are late - it was already too late. That is, to quickly sit the Germans on the tail and peck them in the back of the head.

The impression is that the command of the Voronezh front poorly imagined what was happening at the front from July 5 to July 18, which was manifested in a slower reaction to the rapidly changing environment at the front. The texts of the orders for extension, attack or abound are abounding with inaccuracies and uncertainties, they do not have data on the opposing opponent, its composition and intentions, there is no at least approximate information about the inscription of the forefront. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Kursk battle was given "through the head" of the lower commanders, and the latter did not inform about it, a perplexed, why and for which the subordinates of the parts produce some incomprehensible actions.

So there is nothing surprising that the Bardak in parts reigned sometimes indescribable:

So on July 8, Soviet 99 Tank Brigade 2 Tank Corps attacked Soviet 285 Rifle regiment 183 of the Rifle Division. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units 285, the regiment stop tankers, they continued to put the fighters and lead a gun fire on 1 battalion of the indicated regiment (result: 25 people were killed and 37 wounded).

July 12, Soviet 53 Guards Private Tank Regiment 5 GW Ta (sent in the consolidated detachment of Major General K.G.Trufhanov to the rescue of 69 armies) without having accurate information about the location of their and Germans and not sent forward intelligence (in battle without intelligence - This is close and clear to us), the tankers of the regiment with the go opened fire on the combat makers of the Soviet 92 Rifle Division and Tanks of the Soviet 96 Tank Brigade of the 69 Army, defended from the Germans in the village of Alexandrovka (24 km southeastern Station Prokhorovka). Having passed with the battle through his, the regiment came across the advancing German tanks, after which he turned around and, while having fascinated by the individual groups of their own infantry, began to retreat. Followed by the front line behind the same regiment (53 GW TP) and only the anti-tank artillery just submitted to the place of events, having accepted the tanks of 96 TBR for the German, pursuing 53 Guards Private Tank Regiment, turned out and did not open fire on their infantry and tanks only Happy accident.

Well, so on ... In the order of the commander of the 69 Army, all this was characterized as "these disgraces". Well, gently said.

So we can summarize that the Prokhorov battle won the Germans, but this victory was a private case on a general negative background for Germany. German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (the manstein insisted on), but not for defense. And it was impossible to advance for reasons, directly with what is happening near Prokhorovka is not associated. Far from Prokhorovka on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance of the fight on the part of the Soviet Western and Bryansky fronts (adopted by the German command of the land forces for the offensive), and on July 12, these fronts really moved to the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the upcoming offensive of the Soviet South Front in the Donbas, that is, almost on the southern flank of the South Army Group (this offensive followed July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily was sharply complicated for the Germans, where Americans and the British landed on July 10. There were also required tanks.

On July 13, a meeting was held at the Führera, which was also called by General Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. Adolf Hitler ordered to stop the "Citadel" operation in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various sections of the Eastern Front and sending part of the forces from it to form new German compounds in Italy and in the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution, despite the objections of Manstein, who considered that Soviet troops in the South Face Kursk Arc were on the verge of defeat. Manstein did not directly ordered the troops, but it was forbidden to use his only reserve - the 24th Tank Corps. Without the commissioning of this building, further offensive was lost perspective, and therefore it did not make sense to hold the captured positions. (Soon 24 TC has already repeatedly reflected the offensive of the Soviet south-western front on average the North Donets River). 2 TK SS was designed for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint actions with 3 TCs to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet South Front's troops on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense strip of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they shot down the pace of the offensive of the Germans to Kursk, which, in combination with the general military-political situation and coincidence, not in favor of Germany in July 1943, did the operation "Citadel" impracticable, but to talk about purely the military victory of the Soviet Army in the Kursk battle is give the desired for valid. "

Kursk Battle of 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) Operations conducted by the Red Army in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk Provider on the disrupting the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

The victory of the Red Army near Stalingrad and its subsequent overall offensive in the winter of 1942/43 in a huge space from the Baltic to the Black Sea, undermined the military power of Germany. In order to prevent the decline of the moral spirit of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal trends inside the Hitler's aggressor block and his generals decided to prepare and spend a large offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With her success, they associated hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and turn during the war in their favor.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go to the offensive. However, in mid-April, the TGC rate revised the method of scheduled actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command plans to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk ledge. The rate decided to urge the enemy with a powerful defense, then proceed to counteroffensive and defeat his shock forces. The case rare in the history of wars occurred when the strongest side, owning a strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not on the onset, but defense. The development of events showed that this bold design was absolutely justified.

From the memories of A. Vasilevsky on strategic planning by the Soviet command of the Kursk battle, April-June 1943

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to once again open the training of the Hitler's army to a major offensive in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk protrusion using the newest tank technology on a mass scale, and then establish the enemy transition time in the offensive.

Naturally, in the current conditions, when an alleged blow to the enemy was completely obvious, the most appropriate solution was required. Soviet command turned out to be in front of a complex dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the forthcoming actions of the enemy and on its preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the rate were increasingly inclined to the idea of \u200b\u200btransition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and the Deputy Supreme Commander G.K. Zhukov at the end of March - early April. We took the most particular conversation about the planning of combat operations in the near future, on April 7, when I was in Moscow, in the General Staff, and G. Khukov - on a Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, sick of G.K.zhukov was sent by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Report with an assessment of the situation and considerations about the plan of action in the Kursk area of \u200b\u200bKursk, in which it was noted: "The transition of our troops in the coming days in the coming days to prevent the enemy consider it inexpedient. Better It will be if we are exhausting the enemy on our defense, we'll throw it tanks, and then by introducing fresh reserves, the transition to the overall offensive finally achieve the main grouping of the enemy. "

I had to be at when he received the report G.K.zhukov. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commands." Giving the general staff order to request the opinion of the fronts and obligatory to prepare a special meeting at the rate on the discussion of the plan of the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk arc, he himself called N.F.Vatutin and K.K. Crosovsky and asked for April 12 to present his considerations on the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held on the evening of April 12, attended by I.V. Stalin, who arrived from the Voronezh Front of G. Zhukov, Head of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made for deliberate defense (...)

After making a preliminary decision on deliberate defense and, a comprehensive and thorough preparation for the upcoming actions turned into a subsequent transition to the counteroffensive. At the same time, intelligence actions of the enemy continued. The Soviet command was exactly known for the start of the commemorative offensive, which were transferred three times with Hitler. At the end of May - early June 1943, when the Enemy's plan was fully paid for a strong tank blow to the Voronezh and central fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, a final decision was made to deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan of the Kursk battle, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan of the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest authorities of the strategic leadership, and not other command instances (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Kursk battle. Kursk battle. M.: Science, 1970. P.66-83.

The beginning of the Kursk battle in Central and Voronezh fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and sau, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of Kursk speakers, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was a bet of bet. He had to prevent a deep breakthrough as from the eagle, so Belgorod, and when switching to a counteroffensive, increase the force of impact from depth.

The German side part of two shock groups intended for the offensive in the North and South Face Kursk protrusion, introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized, which amounted to about 70% of Wehrmacht's tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. Total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the attacks of the enemy was assigned to the massive use of new military equipment: Tiger tanks and Panther, assault guns "Ferdinand", as well as new aircraft "Foke-Wulf-190A" and "Henchel-129".

The appeal of the Fuhrer to German soldiers on the eve of the operation "Citadel", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you start a great offensive game, which can have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory is stronger than before, the belief is strengthened about the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces. In addition, the new brutal time of the Russians is even more shakebel a faith in the possibility of success of Bolshevism, which has already been shameful in many co-unity of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big War, faith in victory from them, no matter what will disappear.

Russians sought one or another success primarily with their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have the best tanks than the Russians.

They seemed to be inexhaustible human masses so they were deferred in a two-year struggle that they were forced to prize-put the most young and old people. Our infantry, as always, in the same extent exceeds Russian as our artillery-ry, our tank fighters, our tankers, our Sa Pens and, of course, our aviation.

Mighty blow that will overtake today's in the morning soviet army, I must shake them to the base.

And you need to know that everything may depend on the outcome of this battle.

I as a soldier clearly understand what I demand from you. In a coast, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and severe is one or another separate battle.

The German Motherland is your wives, daughters and sons, Sa-Musselly confused, meet enemy wagon blows and while tirelessly work in the name of victory; They look with hot hope for you, my salt-dates.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is subject to destruction in the division headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz Des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

Battle's move. On the eve

From the end of March 1943, the rate of the Soviet Supreme Commands worked on a strategic offensive plan, whose task was to defeat the main forces of the South Army Group and Center and crush the enemy defense at the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of these army intelligence, the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to strike under the foundation of Kursk protrusion, in order to surround our troops there.

Banner offensive operation Under Kursk emerged at the Hitler's bet, immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943, the configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrera to inflict strikes on the convergent directions. In the circles of the German command there were opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, adhered to the point of view that they should not be used as the main impact force in a large battle - this could lead to a vain waste of forces . Wehrmacht's strategy for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, should have become an exceptionally defensive, as much as possible in terms of consumption of strength and funds.

However, the majority of German military leaders actively supported offensive plans. The date of the operation that received the code name "Citadel" was determined on July 5, and German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored cars exceeded their firepower and armoredness the main Soviet Tank T-34. By the beginning of the "Citadel" operation, the German forces of the Army Groups "Center" and "South" were at their disposal to 130 "tigers" and more than 200 "Panther". In addition, the Germans have significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-II and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting 88-mm gun on many cars. In total, about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault implements, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars were located in the drum groups of the Wehrmacht in the area of \u200b\u200bKursk protrusion for the beginning of the offensive. At the southern wing of the protrusion, the strike forces of the Army Group "South" were focused under the command of Manstein, where the 4th tank army of General Gota and the Kempf group were. On the northern wing, the troops of the Center for Army Center "Center" The kernel of the shock group here was the strength of the 9th army of General Model. The South German group was stronger than North. Tanks among generals Gota and Keff numbered about two times more than the model.

The TGC rate decided not to move the first in the offensive, but to take a tough defense. The idea of \u200b\u200bthe Soviet command was to first bleed up the power of the enemy, knock out his new tanks, and only then, introducing fresh reserves, go to the counteroffensive. I must say that it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, other representatives of the Supreme Soviet Command remembered well that it was never since the beginning of the war of the Red Army could not organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive exhausted at the stage of a breakthrough of Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war under the Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals who advised not to rush with the beginning of the offensive. Under Kursk built deeply echelonized defense, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, in the northern and southern sections of the Kursk protrusion, was created another - the steppe front, designed to become a reserve association and enter into battle at the time of the transition of the Red Army to counter-project.

Military factories of the country uninterruptedly worked on the release of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty parts" and powerful SU-152 self-propelled guns. The latter could already deal with the "tigers" and "panthers" with great success.

The organization of Soviet defense under Kursk was the idea of \u200b\u200bdeep echelonation of combat orders of troops and defensive positions. On the Central and Voronezh fronts, 5-6 defensive frontiers were erected. Along with this, a defensive border of the troops of the steppe military district was created, and on the left bank of the river. Don prepared state border of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, at the beginning of the Kursk battle, Soviet troops significantly exceeded the enemy both in humans and in the technique. The central and Voronezh fronts had about 1.3 million people in their composition, and the steppe front behind them was still additional 500 thousand people. At the disposal of all three fronts there were up to 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 28 thousand guns and mortars. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand. We are against about 2 thousand in Germans.

Battle's move. DEFENSE

The closer the date of commencement of the "Citadel" operation was approaching, the harder it was to hide its preparation. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it will begin on July 5. From the reports of intelligence, it became known that the opponent's offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. Headquarters of the Central (Commander K. Crosovsky) and Voronezh (Commander Natutin) of the fronts decided to produce artillery counterpropasia on the night of July 5. It began in 1 hour. 10 min. After the hum of cannonade verse, the Germans could not come to themselves for a long time. As a result of a predetermined artillery counterpropitation, German troops suffered losses and began the offensive by 2.5-3 hours later than scheduled time. Only after some time, German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry compounds began about half of the sixth in the morning.

The German command pursued the target of the shock to break through the defense of the Soviet troops and go to the coupie. In the center of the central front, the main blow of the enemy took the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans introduced up to 500 tanks here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the central front caused a part of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps on the advancing group. The offensive of the Germans here was detained here, and on July 10, it was finally broken. For six days, the fighting enemy wedged into the defense of the central front wax only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wing of Kursk protrusion was that Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, the Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns of tanks, burned to the ground, opened an effective fire on German armored machines. And yet, the thick armor of German tanks allowed them in some areas to pierce Soviet defense and wed up into combat orders of parts of the Red Army. However, the rapid breakthrough did not work. Overcoming the first defensive line, German tank units were forced to seek help to saperes: all the space between the positions was densely mined, and the passages in mineral fields were well shot by artillery. While the German tank worms were waiting for sappers, their combat vehicles were exposed to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to keep the domination in the air. All over the battlefield appeared Soviet attack aircraft - famous IL-2.

Only for the first day of the battles, the grouping of the model, acting on the northern wing of Kursk speakers, lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks participating in the first strike. Soviet losses were also great: only two companies of the German "tigers" who were against the strength of the central front, were destroyed for the period 5 - 6, 111 T-34 tanks. By July 7, the Germans, moving a few kilometers ahead, came to a large settlement of Ponyry, where the powerful battle between the shock parts 20, 2 and the 9th German tank divisions with the compounds of the Soviet 2nd tank and the 13th armies were established. The result of this battle became extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern shock group was forced to stop. Promulously forward just 10 - 15 km, the model in the end lost the impact power of his tank parts and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

In the meantime, on the southern wing of the Kursk protrusion, an event developed in a different scenario. By July 8, the shock units of the Germanized Motorized Compounds "Great Germany", "Reich", "Dead Head", Leibstandart "Adolf Hitler", a few tank divisions of the 4th tank army Gota and Kempf Group managed to embry on Soviet defense to 20 and more than a few The offensive was initially in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong counteraction of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, the 6th Guards Army and other associations on this site, the Commander of the Army Group "South" von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It is from this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War has ringed, in which up to a thousand two hundred tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both parties.

Battle under Prokhorovka - the concept is largely collective. The fate of the opposing parties was decided not in one day and not in the same field. The theater of combat operations for Soviet and German tank compounds represented a terrain of more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, this battle largely determined the entire subsequent course of not only the Kursk battle, but also the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Ortamistrov from the composition of the steppe front to the assistance of the Troops of the Voronezh Front. Emphasized, the need to attempt to join german tanks In the near battle to limit their advantages in the armor and the firepower of the tower guns.

Focusing in the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovka, in the morning of July 10, the Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they were superior to the enemy in the ratio of approximately 3: 2, but the fighting qualities of German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty parts" even on the approach to their positions. Fights continued here in the morning until evening. Soviet tanks broken forward met with Germanic practically armor to armor. But this was just a command of the 5th Guards Army. Moreover, soon the fighting orders of opponents were mixed so much that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to substitute their side armor under the fire, which was not so durable as the frontal. When the battle by the end began on July 13, finally, it was time to calm the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army practically lost its fighting impact. But the German losses did not allow them to continue to develop an offensive at the Prokhorov direction: the Germans remained in the system of all up to 250 good combat vehicles.

The Soviet command has hurriedly transfer new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that lasted in the area 13 and 14 July did not lead to a decisive victory of one or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually exit. In stock, Germans had the 24th tank corps, but send it to the battle meant to lose the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably large. On July 15, the rate decided to introduce the Southern Wing of the Kursk protrusion of the power of the steppe front of General I. Koniev - the 27th and 53rd armies with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks strongly focused on the northeastern Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go to the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in the new oncoming battle. German parts began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

On July 13, Hitler invited himself at the meeting on the meeting of Field Marshals Forens of Manstein and Bluche background. On that day, he ordered to continue the operation of the "Citadel" and not to reduce the heat of battles. Success under Kursk seemed to be no longer outside the corner. However, in just two days of Hitler, a new disappointment has suffered. His plans collapsed. July 12 switched to the offensive of the troops of Bryansky, and then, from July 15, the central and left wings of Western fronts in the general direction to the eagle (Operation "). The German defense could not stand here and shut up on the seams. Moreover, some territorial successes on the southern wing of the Kursk protrusion were negated after the battle under Prokhorovka.

At the meeting at the Führera rate on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt the "Citadel" operation. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk protrusion (although it was no longer possible on the northern wing of the protrusion). But the new efforts of the Manstein grouping did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the Command of the Ground Forces of Germany ordered the 2nd Tank Corps of the SS from the composition of the Army Army Group. Manstein did not have anything else, how to retreat.

Battle's move. Offensive

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle under Kurk began. July 12 - 15 switched to the offensive Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, and on August 3, after the Troops of Voronezh and Steppe Fronts dropped the enemy to the initial positions on the southern wing of Kursk speakers, they began to implement Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operation (Operation "Rumyantsev "). Fights on all sites continued to wear an extremely complex and fierce character. The situation was also complicated by the fact that in the strip of the onset of Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the center of the central front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were not applied on weak, but according to the strong section of enemy defense. This decision was made in order to maximize the time of preparation for offensive actions, to catch the enemy by surprise, i.e., at that moment, when he was already exhausted, but did not yet occupy a strong defense. The breakthrough forward was carried out by powerful shock groups at narrow sections of the front using a large number of tanks, artillery and aviation.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, competent use in battles of military equipment could not not lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Eagle and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war in Moscow, an artillery salute was made in honor of the valiant compounds of the Red Army, who won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, part of the Red Army, the enemy was dropped to the West for 140-150 km and released Kharkov a second time.

Wehrmacht lost in the Kursk battle of 30 selected divisions, including 7 tanks; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. There were even bigger losses of Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; Over 6 thousand tanks and sau; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the ratio of forces on the front has changed in favor of the Red Army. At its disposal there was an incomparably more fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The onset of the Red Army after entering into the battle of new connections continued to increase its pace. In the central portion of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts to Smolensk began. This old Russian city, who was considered since the XVII century. Gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, part of the Red Army in October 1943 came to the Dnieper in the Kiev region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, Soviet troops carried out an operation to free the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was shot over Kiev.

It would be wrong to assert that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Kursk battle, the continued onset of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kiev, the enemy managed to apply powerful counterdads in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr on the advanced compounds of the 1st Ukrainian Front and to cause us a considerable damage, suspending the offensive of the Red Army in the Right Bank of Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more intense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, the Soviet troops came out by November 1943 to the areas of East Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, followed by the attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the rigid defense of the German Army Group "Center" did not led to any significant results. It was necessary to focus on the Minsk direction additional forces, to leisurely exhausted in previous battles of compounds and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for the new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944

And in 1943, Victory near Kurk and then in the battle for the Dnieper, they completed a radical fracture in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered the final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were in a state of war with the mains of the axis. The disintegration of the fascist block began. Among the remarkable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943. The soldiers and commander awards are the orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order "Victory", as well as in the sign of the liberation of Ukraine - the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees. There was still a long and bloody struggle in front, but the root fracture has already happened.