Zhukov against Halder [Clash of military geniuses] Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

Work of the General Staff of the Red Army in 1941

In 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by G.K. Zhukov carried out his work in parallel in several directions.

Measures continued to strengthen the Red Army, increase its combat power, primarily due to the arrival of new types of weapons and military equipment in the troops.

Tanks. In this regard, much attention was paid to the creation of large formations of tank forces and equipping them with new military equipment. After the February conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1941, the creation of large tank formations went faster. New mechanized corps began to deploy. For their armament in the first half of the same year, 1,500 tanks of new designs were manufactured. All of them entered the troops, but due to lack of time they were not properly mastered. The human factor also played a significant role - many military commanders did not dare to launch new models of tanks into intensive operation without a command from above, but such a command was not received.

Artillery. By the beginning of the war, the leadership of the artillery was carried out by the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Sandpiper. His deputy was Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev. Directly in the troops there were chiefs of artillery of districts, armies, corps, divisions. Troop artillery was subdivided into regimental, divisional and corps artillery. There was also the artillery of the RKG, which consisted of cannon and howitzer regiments, separate high-power divisions and anti-tank artillery brigades. The cannon artillery regiment had 48 122-mm cannons and 152-mm howitzers-guns, the high-power cannon regiment had 24 152-mm cannons. The howitzer artillery regiment had 48 152 mm howitzers, and the high power howitzer regiment had 24 152 mm howitzers. The armament of individual high-power divisions consisted of five 210-mm cannons, or 280-mm mortars, or 305-mm howitzers.

Characteristics of the manning of the mechanized corps of the western border military districts on June 22, 1941

By June 1941, prototypes of rocket launchers, the future "Katyushas", were manufactured. But their mass production has not yet been established. There were also no specialists capable of effectively controlling this new weapon.

With anti-tank artillery in the Red Army, there was a great lag. Only in April 1941, the Soviet command began to form the artillery brigades of the RGK. According to the state, each brigade was supposed to have 120 anti-tank guns and 4,800 anti-tank mines.

Cavalry. Despite the addiction to cavalry of some Soviet military leaders, its share in the structure of the ground forces by the beginning of the war had significantly decreased, and it was only 5% of their total number. Organizationally, the cavalry consisted of 13 divisions, eight of which were part of the four cavalry corps. The cavalry division had four cavalry and one tank regiment (almost 7.5 thousand personnel, 64 tanks, 18 armored vehicles, 132 guns and mortars). If necessary, the cavalry division could fight hastily, like an ordinary rifle unit.

Engineering troops. Engineering support was handled by the Main Engineering Directorate, which until March 12, 1941 was headed by Major General of the Engineering Troops A.F. Khrenov, and from March 20 - Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar. Engineering units were deployed in the troops, but their technical support was very weak. Basically, the calculation was made for a shovel, an ax and improvised building materials. In peacetime, sappers almost did not deal with questions of mining and demining of the terrain. Since 1940, almost all the engineering units of the border military districts were constantly involved in the construction of fortified areas on the new border of the USSR and were not engaged in combat training.

Connection. All issues of strategic communications and the supply of communications equipment were assigned to the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, which from July 1940 was headed by Major General N.I. Gapich. By that time, frontline, army, corps and divisional radio communication kits were developed and entered into the troops, but not all of them were sufficiently mastered. In addition, many commanders did not trust radio communications, and also did not know how to use it from the point of view of ensuring the secrecy of control.

Air defense. To solve the problems of air defense on a strategic scale, the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country was created in 1940. Its chief was initially Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, and from March 19, 1941 - Colonel-General G.M. Stern. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov.

To solve air defense tasks, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into air defense zones in accordance with the boundaries of military districts. The zones were headed by assistant district commanders for air defense. To solve specific tasks, the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country had anti-aircraft artillery forces, searchlight, balloon units, as well as fighter aviation units.

To solve air defense missions, 39 regiments of fighter aviation were allocated from the air formations of military districts, which organizationally remained subordinate to the commanders of the air forces of the districts. In this regard, the assistant commander of the military district for air defense, in whose subordination were units of anti-aircraft artillery, all questions of the use of aviation for air defense purposes had to be coordinated with the commander of the air force.

The military air defense was equipped with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, but in rifle and tank formations these means were few, and in practice they could not provide reliable cover for the entire area of ​​concentration of troops.

Aviation. Aviation was mainly equipped with aircraft of outdated designs. There were very few new combat vehicles. So, an armored attack aircraft designed by A.S. Ilyushin Il-2, created in 1939, began to enter the troops only in 1941. Fighter designed by A.S. Yakovlev Yak-1, which was put into serial production in 1940, also began to enter the troops in 1941.

From April 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force was Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, who from November 1937 to September 1938 commanded a group of Soviet "volunteer" pilots in China.

Flight technical and combat characteristics of Soviet aircraft

Then, as a result of massive purges among the highest command personnel of the Air Force, he made a quick career and in December 1940 became the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force.

There was an increase in the total number of personnel of the Red Army. As of June 22, 5 million people were already under arms in the USSR Armed Forces. Of this number, the Ground Forces accounted for 80.6%, the Air Force - 8.6%, the Navy - 7.3%, the Air Defense Forces - 3.3%. In addition, numerous reserves were prepared. At the same time, the level of specialization of reservists was not very high. They proceeded from the fact that more than 1.4 million tractor drivers and car drivers work on collective farms alone, who could be quickly transferred to combat vehicles if necessary. Throughout the country, the Osoaviakhim system trained pilots, radio operators, parachutists, infantry riflemen.

Reconnaissance of a potential enemy. Having barely entered into a new position, G.K. Zhukov summoned the head of the Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova. He arrived exactly at the appointed time and entered the office of the Chief of the General Staff with a large folder in his hands. In a well-trained voice, he began to report confidently ...

In the last months before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence worked quite actively. Already on January 12, 1941, in the reconnaissance report No. 2 of the Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, it was reported that on December 9, the commander-in-chief of the German land army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, visited the area of ​​the city of Sanok, who inspected the troops and fortifications in the area. In the same report, it was reported about the arrival of new German units in the border zone, the construction there of barracks for personnel, concreted firing points, loading and unloading areas on the railway and airfields.

Following this, there are frequent cases of violation by the German side of the State border of the USSR. So, the chief of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR on January 24, 1941, in his report also reports on the deployment in Warsaw of the army headquarters, and on the territory of the border districts - the headquarters of the army corps, eight headquarters of the infantry and one cavalry division, 28 infantry, seven artillery, three cavalry and one tank regiment, two aviation schools.

F.I.Golikov - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army

It was reported below: “From the time of the conclusion of the Convention to January 1, 1941, a total of 187 various conflicts and incidents arose on the border with Germany ... During the reporting period, 87 cases of border violations by German aircraft were recorded ... Three German aircraft, after crossing the border, were landed ... which were subsequently released to Germany.

One German plane was shot down on March 17, 1940, at the site of the 10th outpost of the Avgustov border detachment as a result of the use of weapons.

In connection with the need to maximize the intelligence and operational work of the state security organs and the increased volume of this work, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks), on February 3, 1941, adopts a special Resolution on the division of the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs into two People's Commissariats: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). The NKGB is entrusted with the tasks of conducting intelligence work abroad and combating the subversive, espionage, sabotage, terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR. He is also instructed to conduct the operational development and liquidation of the remnants of all anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among different layers the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc., as well as to protect the leaders of the party and government. The same Resolution ordered the organization of republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD.

On February 8, 1941, the following Decree was adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy. “To assign to special departments of the NKO and the NKVMF (Third Directorates) the following tasks: to combat counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and the Navy; identifying and informing the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar, respectively Navy about all the shortcomings and condition of the army and navy units and about all the compromising materials and information about the army and navy servicemen. "

The same document determined that "all appointments of the operational staff of the Third Directorates of the NKO and the NKVMF, starting with the operative regiment and the corresponding unit in the fleet, are made by orders of the People's Commissars of Defense and the Navy." Thus, in the structure of the Red Army and the Navy, powerful punitive bodies emerged, possessing enormous powers and not accountable to the commanders and commanders of the formations under which they operated. It was determined that the head of the 3rd department of the corps is subordinate to the chief of the 3rd department of the district (front) and the commander of the troops of the district (front), and the head of the 3rd department of the division is subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the corps and the corps commander.

On February 7, 1941, the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR reported on the spreading rumors among the diplomatic corps in Moscow about the impending German attack on the USSR. At the same time, it was indicated that the purpose of the German attack was the southern regions of the USSR, rich in bread, coal and oil.

Around February 8, this information was confirmed by an agent of the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican", and on March 9, 1941, a telegraphic report was received from Belgrade from the military attaché to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. It reported that "the German General Staff refused to attack the British islands, the immediate task is set - the capture of Ukraine and Baku, which should be carried out in April-May this year, for which Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing."

In March 1941, two more secret messages came from Berlin from an agent named "The Corsican." The first reported on the preparation of the German Air Force for military action against the USSR.

In the second, Germany's plans for a war against the USSR were once again confirmed. At the same time, it was indicated that the main target of the aggressor could be grain Ukraine and the oil regions of Baku. Also cited were the statements of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, General F. Halder, about the low combat effectiveness of the Red Army. Both of these messages were reported by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On March 24, 1941, a message was received from the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR about the preparation of the General Staff of Aviation for military operations against the USSR. And this document emphasizes that “the aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular of Kiev.

Among the officers of the aviation headquarters, there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR was supposedly timed to end April or early May. These terms are associated with the intention of the Germans to preserve the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops during the retreat will not be able to set fire to green bread. "

On March 31, 1941, the head of the foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR about the advance of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union. They talked about the transfer of specific formations and units of the German army. In particular, he reported that "in the border points of the General Governorship against the Brest region, the German authorities proposed to vacate all schools and additionally prepare premises for the arrival of the expected military units of the German army."

In early April 1941, the head of the foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the higher authorities that, on his instructions, in Berlin, an agent named "Sergeant Major" had met with another agent named "Corsican". At the same time, "Sergeant Major", referring to other sources, announced the complete preparation and development of a plan for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. According to the available information, “the operational plan of the army consists in a lightning-fast surprise attack on Ukraine and advance to the east. From East Prussia, a blow to the north is simultaneously struck. German troops advancing in the northern direction must join up with the army coming from the south, by doing this they cut off the Soviet troops located between these lines, closing their flanks. The centers are ignored following the example of the Polish and French campaigns ”.

S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov on exercises (spring 1941)

On April 5, 1941, the Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR announced the construction of airfields and landing sites by the Germans in the strips bordering the USSR. In total, from the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built and restored in Poland. Directly on the territory of Germany itself during this time, 250 airfields and 150 landing sites were built.

On April 10, the chief of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR reports to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army with specific data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border and the transfer of new formations and units there. At the same time, an agent of the Berlin station "Yuna" reported about the plans of German aggression against the USSR.

On April 21, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKO of the USSR received another message from the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria on the receipt of new intelligence information by the border detachments of the NKVD on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border.

At the end of April 1941, Moscow received another message from Berlin from an agent working in Germany under the name of "Sergeant Major", with the following content:

“A source working at the headquarters of the German army reports:

1. According to information received from the liaison officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headquarters of the German aviation Gregor, the question of Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally resolved, and it should start from day to day. Ribbentrop, who until now was not a supporter of opposing the USSR, knowing Hitler's firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR.

2. According to information received at the aviation headquarters, in recent days there has been an increase in activity in cooperation between the German and Finnish General Staffs, expressed in the joint development of operational plans against the USSR ...

The reports of the German Aviation Commission, which visited the USSR, and Aschenbrenner's Air Attaché in Moscow, made a depressing impression at the Aviation Headquarters. However, they expect that, although Soviet aviation is capable of delivering a serious blow to German territory, the German army will nevertheless quickly be able to suppress the resistance of the Soviet troops, reaching the strongholds of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.

3. According to information received from Leibrandt, who is an assistant for Russian affairs at the foreign policy department, Gregor's message is confirmed that the issue of opposing the Soviet Union is considered resolved. "

The postscript to this message indicates that it was reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria as the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin on April 30, 1941, but the resolutions of none of the named persons are not contained in the document.

On the same day, April 30, 1941, an alarming message arrived from Warsaw. It stated: “According to intelligence information received from various sources, it has been established in recent days that military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of the General Government are being conducted openly, and German officers and soldiers speak quite frankly about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union, as about the case already decided. The war supposedly should begin after the end of the spring field work ...

From April 10 to 20, German troops moved eastward through Warsaw continuously, both during the night and during the day ... On the railways in the eastern direction there are trains loaded mainly with heavy artillery, trucks and aircraft parts. Since mid-April, a large number of trucks and Red Cross vehicles have appeared on the streets of Warsaw.

The German authorities in Warsaw have given an order to urgently put in order all the bomb shelters, darken all the windows, and create Red Cross sanitary squads in every house. All vehicles of private individuals and civilian institutions, including German ones, were mobilized and selected for the army. Since the beginning of April, all schools and courses have been closed, and their premises are occupied by military hospitals. "

This message was also reported by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On May 6, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army F.I. Golikov made a special report "On the grouping of German troops in the east and southeast on May 5, 1941". This message directly indicated on many points about Germany's preparation for war against the USSR. The conclusions read: “In two months, the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12 divisions. With the Romanian and Hungarian armies, this will amount to about 130 divisions. "

On May 30, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army received a telegraphic report from Tokyo. It reported:

“Berlin informs Ott that the German offensive against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% confident that the war will begin. The circumstantial evidence that I see for this is currently:

The technical department of the German air force in my city received instructions to return shortly. Ott demanded that BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. The transport of rubber through the USSR has been reduced to a minimum.

Reasons for the German uprising: the existence of a powerful Red Army makes it impossible for Germany to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe... In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be driven back as soon as possible. That's what Ott said. "

The message was signed: "Ramsay (Sorge)". But even this message does not contain a resolution of any of the leaders of the Soviet state.

On May 31, 1941, on the table of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov received a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660569 as follows:

During the second half of May, the main German command, at the expense of the forces liberated in the Balkans, produced:

1. Restoration of the Western grouping to fight England.

2. Increase of forces against the USSR.

3. Concentration of reserves of the main command.

The general distribution of the German armed forces is as follows:

- against England (on all fronts) - 122-126 divisions;

- against the USSR - 120-122 divisions;

- reserve - 44–48 divisions.

Specific distribution of German forces against England:

- in the West - 75–80 divisions;

- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR ...

The distribution according to the directions of the German forces against the USSR is as follows:

a) in East Prussia - 23-24 divisions, including 18-19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction against the ZAPOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - 35–36 divisions, including 24–25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry regiments;

d) in Slovakia (area Zbrov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

e) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

f) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;

g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment.

The reserves of the main command are concentrated:

a) in the center of the country - 16-17 divisions;

b) in the area of ​​Breslau, Moravska Ostrava, Kattovice - 6–8 divisions;

c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and west of it) - 11 divisions ... "

This document says: "Zhukov read 11.6.41."

On June 2, on the concentration of large formations of the German and Romanian armies on the border with the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) receives information from the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the authorized person of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in Moldova. Then, certificates of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine about the military activities of Germany on the border with the USSR are received almost every day. On June 11, an agent of the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR, acting under the name of "Sergeant Major", informs about the impending German attack on the USSR. On June 12, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) received a message from the NKVD of the USSR about the strengthening of intelligence activities by the German side on the border with the USSR and in the border areas. In accordance with this message, from January 1 to June 10, 1941, 2080 border trespassers were detained by Germany.

On June 16, NKGB agents working in Berlin under the nicknames "Old Man", "Sergeant Major" and "Corsican" received messages about the timing of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in the coming days. At the same time, the structural divisions of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR, in parallel with reports on the state of affairs at the border, continue to engage in routine paperwork.

On June 19, the NKGB of Belarus sends a special message to the NKGB of the USSR about the military mobilization preparations of Nazi Germany for a war against the USSR. This message contains extensive information on the redeployment and deployment of German troops to the Soviet border. It is said about the concentration in the border areas of a large number of formations, units, combat aircraft, artillery pieces, boats and motor vehicles.

On this day, the resident of the NKGB "Titus", who worked in Rome, reports that the military operations of Germany against the USSR will begin between June 20 and 25, 1941.

On June 20, 1941, a telegraphic report came to the head of the intelligence department of the Red Army from Sofia. It read literally the following: “The source said today that a military clash is expected on June 21 or 22, that there are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 5 in Finland, 10 in Hungary and 7 in Slovakia. motorized divisions. A courier who arrived by plane from Bucharest says that mobilization in Romania is over and military action is expected at every moment. Currently, there are 10 thousand German troops in Bulgaria. "

There is no resolution on this message either.

On the same day (June 20, 1941), a telegraphic report also came to the head of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate from Tokyo from Sorge. In it, the intelligence officer writes: “The German ambassador to Tokyo, Ott, told me that a war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last large European army as well as it was done at the very beginning (of the war), because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR are still no more combat-ready than they were in the defense of Poland.

Insest told me that the Japanese General Staff is already discussing the position to be taken in case of war.

The proposal for Japanese-American negotiations and the internal struggle between Matsuoka, on the one hand, and Hiranuma, on the other, have stalled because everyone is waiting for a solution to the question of relations between the USSR and Germany. "

This report was received by the 9th squad at 17 o'clock on June 21, 1941, but there is no resolution on it either.

In the evening of June 20, another intelligence report of the NKGB of the USSR No. 1510 about Germany's military preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union is being compiled. It states the concentration of German troops near the border with the USSR and the preparation of fascist troops for military operations. In particular, it is said that machine guns and anti-aircraft guns are installed in some houses of Klaipeda, that in the area of ​​Kostomolota a forest has been prepared for building bridges across the Western Bug River, that in the Radom district of 100 settlements the population has been evicted to the rear, that German intelligence is sending its agents to USSR for a short time - three to four days. These measures cannot be regarded as anything other than direct preparation for the aggression, which should take place in the coming days.

As a result of the analysis of all these documents, it can be concluded that Soviet intelligence on the territory of Germany and its allies worked quite successfully. Information about Hitler's decision to attack the USSR and the beginning of preparations for this action began to arrive in the Soviet Union more than a year before the start of the aggression.

Simultaneously with intelligence through the Foreign Ministry and the GRU, the Western military districts were also conducting intelligence, which constantly and in sufficient detail reported on the preparation of Germany and its allies for a war against the USSR. Moreover, as we approached the fateful date, these reports became more frequent and more specific. From their content, there was no doubt about Germany's intentions. The measures that were carried out on the other side of the border no longer had a reverse course, but inevitably had to result in a military operation of a strategic scale. This concerned the resettlement of the local population from the border strip, saturation of this strip with troops, clearing the border strip from mine and other engineering barriers, mobilizing vehicles, deploying field hospitals, storing a large number of artillery shells on the ground, and much more.

The top Soviet leadership and the command of the Red Army had information about the composition and deployment of the troops of the border military districts of the Soviet Union by the fascist command, which were obtained and summarized already at the beginning of February 1941, almost 5 months before the start of the aggression, and practically corresponded to reality.

However, the fact that on many intelligence reports there are no signatures of the highest leaders of the state and the highest ranks of the country's military leadership suggests that they were either not communicated to these persons or were ignored by these persons. The first is virtually excluded by the practice of the Soviet bureaucratic machine of that time. The second is possible in two cases: first, mistrust of information sources; secondly, the stubborn unwillingness of the country's top leadership to abandon the vision it has developed for the upcoming course of events.

As you know, in the last peace months only general orders were received from the General Staff to the troops. No specific reaction of the Soviet government and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the situation developing near the borders of the USSR was indicated. Moreover, the Soviet leadership and the General Staff constantly warned the local command “not to succumb to provocations,” which negatively affected the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border. Apparently, the interaction and mutual information between the organs of the NKGB, the NKVD and the headquarters of the Red Army were poorly established.

Although it should be admitted that the activities of the NKVD, aimed at strengthening the protection of the border, were carried out. So, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belorussian district in order to strengthen the protection of the state border on June 20, 1941 issued a special order. In accordance with this order, it was prescribed “to build the calculation of people for service so that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people, with the exception of those returning from the detachments, would carry out service at the border. In some, the most vulnerable flank directions, post posts for ten days under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost. "

Thus, the opinion is created that the Soviet leadership deliberately ignored the intelligence information abundantly received from various sources about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. Some researchers say that this was a special line of behavior of the top Soviet leadership, who in every possible way tried to delay the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the Red Army. Others argue that in 1940 - early 1941, the Soviet leadership was more concerned with internal problems that arose in the new territories annexed to the USSR in 1939–1940 than with external threats. In recent years, there have been authors who write that the behavior of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and in particular the position of I.V. Stalin, was a manifestation of the leader's hatred of his people.

Of course, all these are only subjective conclusions of various researchers. What do the facts say? Before me is an extract from the instructions of the Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army dated May 15, 1941. It says:

“At present, the USSR is the only European power that, with its powerful armed forces, is not drawn into the world conflict. In addition, the volume of Soviet economic resources is so great that Europe, in the face of the ongoing naval blockade, can be provided with raw materials and food from this reserve.

It seems that until now the USSR, following survival tactics, seeks to use the exhaustion of the forces of both belligerents to strengthen its own position ... However, the turn of events over the past two months makes one think that the USSR will not be able to carry out its plans in their original form and, probably will be dragged into the war earlier than he thinks.

Indeed, according to numerous reports received recently, the capture of South Russia and the overthrow of the Soviet regime is now part of the plan developed by the "axis" countries ...

Other reports suggest that Russia, worried that it is alone in the face of Germany, whose funds have not yet been touched, is seeking to buy time to keep its dangerous neighbor. The Russians satisfy all the requirements of Germany of an economic nature ... "

On the same day, a memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry on German-Soviet relations was adopted. It notes that, "as in the past, difficulties arose in connection with the fulfillment of German obligations on the supply of the USSR, especially in the field of weapons." The German side admits: “We will not be able to adhere to the delivery dates in the future. However, Germany's failure to fulfill its obligations will begin to affect only after August 1941, since until then Russia is obliged to make deliveries in advance. " It was stated below: “The situation with the supply of Soviet raw materials still presents a satisfactory picture. In April, the following most important raw materials were delivered:

grain - 208,000 tons;

oil - 90,000 tons;

cotton - 8300 tons;

non-ferrous metals - 6340 tons of copper, tin and nickel ...

Total deliveries in the current year are calculated:

grain - 632,000 tons;

oil - 232,000 tons;

cotton - 23,500 tons;

manganese ore - 50,000 tons;

phosphates - 67,000 tons;

platinum - 900 kilograms. "

Of course, these supplies stopped with the outbreak of hostilities. But there is ample evidence that trains with Soviet raw materials followed to Germany at the beginning of June 22, 1941. Some of them were captured by German troops in the border areas in the early days of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, there was more than enough intelligence information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. GK Zhukov also writes in his memoirs "Memoirs and Reflections" that this information was known to the General Staff, and immediately admits: "During the period of maturation of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I. V. Stalin in the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and to prove the need to carry out urgent measures provided for by the operational mobilization plan. Of course, these measures would not guarantee complete success in repelling the enemy onslaught, since the forces of the parties were far from equal. But our troops could enter the battle in a more organized manner and, consequently, inflict significantly greater losses on the enemy. This is confirmed by the successful defensive actions of units and formations in the regions of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russkaya, Przemysl and in the sectors of the Southern Front. "

Below G.K. Zhukov writes: “Now there are different versions about whether or not we knew the exact date of the start of the war.

I cannot say for sure whether I.V. was truthfully informed. Stalin may have received it personally, but he did not tell me.

True, he once told me:

- One person gives us very important information about the intentions of the German government, but we have some doubts ...

Perhaps it was about R. Sorge, whom I learned about after the war.

Could the military leadership independently and in a timely manner uncover the exit of enemy troops directly to the initial areas, from where their invasion began on June 22? In those conditions, it was extremely difficult to do this.

In addition, as it became known from the captured maps and documents, the command of the German troops carried out a concentration on the borders at the very last moment, and its armored troops, which were at a considerable distance, were transferred to their original areas only on the night of June 22. "

The closest deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was the chief of the Operations Directorate. On the eve of the war, this position was occupied by Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin. He was a relatively young general (born in 1901), who graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze studied for a year at the Academy of the General Staff, from which he was released ahead of schedule in 1937 in connection with the arrests of many military leaders.

He served as chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District during the liberation campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, and since 1940 he headed the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. According to the memoirs of many contemporaries, N.F. Vatutin was a literate and thinking person, capable of solving voluminous and complex problems. He had some experience in planning military actions in the framework of the ending operations of the Soviet-Finnish war and the actions of the military district troops during the liberation campaign. But this experience was clearly insufficient for solving problems on the scale of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, even from the available reports, the correct conclusions were not always drawn, which could promptly and authoritatively guide the top management. In this connection, here are some documents from the military archive.

On March 20, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General F.I. Golikov presented to the management a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined options for possible directions of strikes by fascist German troops in an attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the "Barbarossa" plan by the Hitlerite command, and in one of the options, in essence, the essence of this plan was reflected.

... According to the report of our military attaché on March 14, the report further indicated, the German major said: “We are heading east, towards the USSR. We will take grain, coal and oil from the USSR. Then we will be invincible and can continue the war with England and America. "

N.F. Vatutin - Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1939-1941)

However, the conclusions from the information given in the report, in essence, removed all their significance. At the end of his report, General F.I. Golikov wrote:

"1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring should be regarded as misinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence. "

So, F.I. Golikov served as Chief of the Intelligence Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff since July 1940. His report was being prepared for the country's top leadership and was classified as "of exceptional importance." Such reports are usually prepared very carefully and cannot be based on the words of some "German major". They require the collection and analysis of dozens, or even hundreds of different sources of information, and, as other military leaders testify, such information was, including from the military attaché in Berlin, agents of intelligence agents in the countries - allies of Germany.

Now about the agents of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate itself (now the Main Intelligence Directorate). This body exists mainly in order to conduct military intelligence in the interests of the country's security and carefully study a potential enemy. The arrival of German troops on the territory of Poland created ideal conditions for organizing intelligence work in this country. Czechoslovakia, occupied by Germany, was also a good field for the activities of Soviet military intelligence. For many years Hungary was considered by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, which required an expanded intelligence network there. The Soviet Union had only recently ended the war with Finland and had no reason to trust its government. Romania was also offended by the rejection of Moldavia and Bessarabia and therefore demanded constant close attention. And there is no doubt that the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff had its own agents in these countries and received relevant information from it. We have to doubt the quality of this agency, information and the correctness of the reaction to it by F.I. Golikov and G.K. Zhukov.

Secondly, since January 14, 1941 G.K. Zhukov had already worked in the General Staff (Resolution of the Politburo No. P25 / 85 of 14.01.41 on the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of military districts), was in the know, got acquainted with his deputies, heads of directorates and departments. Twice - on January 29 and 30 - he, together with the People's Commissar of Defense, was at the reception of I.V. Stalin. He constantly received alarming information from the Soviet-German border, knew about the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war with Germany, and in early February gave instructions to the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General G.K. Malandin, by March 22, prepare an updated operational plan in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Then, on February 12, together with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko and the head of the Organizational and Mobilization Directorate, Major General Chetvertikov G.K. Zhukov was represented by I.V. Stalin's mobilization plan, which was approved with virtually no amendments. Thus, it turns out that the General Staff was thoroughly preparing to repel the fascist aggression.

The meeting, at which the report of the head of the RKKA Intelligence Directorate was made, took place on March 20, 1941, when G.K. Zhukov had been in the post of chief of the General Staff for almost two months and had done some work to improve the combat capability of the Red Army. At the same meeting, of course, was also the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko. Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.I. Golikov reports to the country's leadership conclusions that are fundamentally at odds with the conclusions of his direct superiors, and S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov does not react to this in any way. To admit this situation, knowing the cool character of G.K. Zhukov, it is absolutely impossible.

Before me is the major work of retired Colonel-General Yuri Alexandrovich Gorkov "Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff", which the author has been developing for seven years as a consultant to the Historical Archive and War Memorial Center of the General Staff. In the appendix, he gives an extract from I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office, starting in 1935. It follows from this journal that S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov and P.V. Rychagov (head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force) were at the reception of I.V. Stalin on February 2 and deliberated for almost two hours.

Next time they, as well as S.M. Budyonny and Chetverikov visited this high office on February 12 to approve the mobilization plan.

On February 22, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, except for S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukova, S.M. Budyonny, K.A. Meretskova, P.V. Rychagov was also attended by G.I. Kulik (head of the Main Directorate of Artillery of the Red Army) and renowned test pilot General M.M. Gromov (head of the Flight Research Institute), as well as all members of the Politburo of the RCP (b). This meeting was held from 5.15 pm to 9 pm.

On February 25, an appointment with I.V. Stalin again invited S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, as well as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, General F.A. Astakhov. The presence of two leading military pilots at the meeting with the head of state speaks either of special tasks for this service of the Armed Forces, or of some important information received from aerial reconnaissance. It took almost two hours to discuss these issues.

On March 1, an appointment with I.V. Stalin again invited S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.I. Kulik, as well as the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P.F. Zhigarev and member of the Economic Council for the defense industry under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR P.N. Goremykin. The meeting takes 2 hours and 45 minutes.

On March 8, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin arrived at 20.05 S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, S.M. Budyonny, P.V. Levers and consulted until 23 o'clock.

The next meeting with the military at I.V. Stalin took place on March 17, 1941, and was attended by S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, P.F. Zhigarev. We met from 15.15 to 23.10, but, apparently, did not finally agree. Therefore, the next day, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, P.V. Rychagov and G.I. Kulik, who were in I.V. Stalin from 19.05 to 21.10, and as a result of this meeting, a Politburo resolution on mobilization fees No. 28/155 was adopted, prepared on March 3, 1941.

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A.M. Vasilevsky: “RESPONSIBILITY IS BECAUSE AND THE LEADERS OF THE GENERAL STAFF” Who doubts what a courageous person Marshal Vasilevsky was. And he sometimes had tears in his eyes. In August 1943, Alexander Mikhailovich was in the army of General V.V.

The Red Army was created by the Bolsheviks together with the former officers of the tsarist army. These class enemies of the "world proletariat" became the foundation for the new army.

According to some estimates, about 200 officers of the tsarist army of various ranks served in the Red Army during the Civil War.

Among them, the most prominent were Egorov, Brusilov and Boris Shaposhnikov.

These people were driven by different motives, for example, among them were opportunists like M. Tukhachevsky who, having joined the Red Army, immediately joined the Bolshevik Party.

Others like B. Shaposhnikov did not join the Bolshevik Party for a long time in principle, adhering to monarchist ideals.

Such was Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. Trotsky called him a Russian chauvinist who denied proletarian internationalism and the ideology of Bolshevism.

Three times he became the head of the General Staff of the Red Army, the author of new concepts of military operations and the author of the monumental work "The Brain of the Army"

STUDIES

Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov was born into a large family. Father, Mikhail Petrovich, served as a private employer, mother, Pelageya Kuzminichna, worked as a teacher. At his birth on September 20 (October 2, New Style), 1882, the family lived in Zlatoust, then moved to Belebey.

The childhood and adolescence of Boris Mikhailovich is associated with the Urals, in 1898 he began to study at the industrial school of Krasnoufimsk. At the end of the XIX century. the family moved to Perm, where in 1900 B.M. Shaposhnikov graduates from a real school and decides to enter military school.

The choice of a military profession was made for very mundane reasons - training in a military school is free.

In order not to burden the parents who had two younger children - Eugene and Yulia - and four already adults from his father's first marriage, and Boris decided to go along the army line. In 1900, due to illness, Shaposhnikov missed exams and was unable to enter a military school.

In 1901, the young man achieved his goal and entered the Moscow Infantry School (later named Alekseevsky), from which he graduated in 1903 in the 1st category.

Education at the school was not easy, but Shaposhnikov was not burdened by either the severity of discipline or the richness of each day of classes. The craving for knowledge, inner composure helped him somehow immediately, without friction, to enter the intense rhythm of the educational process.

Shaposhnikov wrote:

"The subjects we were taught not only provided special training for the platoon commander, but also contributed to our purely military and general development."

In addition, the school was located in Moscow, which made it possible to raise the intellectual level of the cadet. There he became involved in art.

In his senior year, B.M. Shaposhnikov was promoted to an army non-commissioned officer, his skillful actions on maneuvers near Kursk in 1902 were taken into account. He was also assigned to command a platoon of a newly recruited junior class.

This is how he described it:

“It used to be difficult, but I worked on my own, made a schedule of classes and was engaged in the daily education of young cadets.

This was of great benefit to my subsequent service. Having appeared in the company as a second lieutenant (after graduating from college), I was not like a puppy thrown into the water, unable to swim, but immediately took up a familiar business. "

The cadets had little free time, however, it did not go to waste. Boris's cherished desire to join the theatrical art came true.

He recalled:

“In the winter of 1902/03, I became interested in theater. And how could one not get carried away when this season the talent of Chaliapin, Sobinov and other young talents flourished. The Art Theater, headed by Stanislavsky, also expanded its work. A good operatic composition was in the then private troupe of Solodovnikov. Many of us were fans of Petrova-Zvantseva, one of the best singers in Russia as Carmen. Geltser shone in the ballet ... My studies were still going well, the theater did not diminish my points, and I got a lot of pleasure. "

Before graduation from the school B.M. Shaposhnikov again took part in the maneuvers near Zvenigorod. This time he commanded a platoon, with which he was engaged for the entire academic year.

ISSUE & SERVICE

Two years of study are over.

Boris Shaposhnikov scored 11.78 in the final exams with a 12-point grading system and turned out to be the best. His name was inscribed on the marble board. In addition, he received a privilege in the distribution of vacancies and chose the 1st Turkestan Rifle Battalion, stationed in Tashkent, where the young second lieutenant went, having spent the allotted vacation with his relatives.

Later, recalling the four years of his stay in Turkestan, he paid attention to three details.

First, only six of the battalion's officers were relatively young.

“Therefore,” Shaposhnikov recalled, “we went on tiptoe in the battalion, and although by law we had the right to vote at officers' meetings, we never gave it up, listening to what the elders were saying.”

Secondly, the relationship with the sergeant-major, which was often a thunderstorm not only for the soldiers. I had to call for help not only all my knowledge - here the cadets' eccentricities came in handy.

Thirdly, when asking his subordinates, Boris Mikhailovich never gave himself any relief in anything: at 8:30 in the morning he appeared in the battalion, stayed there until the lunch break, and then, at the prescribed evening hours, spent the prescribed classes in his company, supervised the noncommissioned officer. -officers.

The exactingness of the young second lieutenant found an appropriate response among the recruits and helped them quickly learn the soldier's wisdom.

During the summer shooting in the camp, carried out under the supervision of a general who had arrived from St. Petersburg, the 3rd company showed an excellent result. And the entire battalion was recognized as the best in the Tashkent garrison.

Already in the first year of the officer's service B.M. Shaposhnikov was noticed by the authorities.

He is taken to the district headquarters for two months to prepare a new mobilization schedule, then he is sent to Samarkand to the district school of fencing instructors, where he simultaneously learns horseback riding and equestrian formation.

In the future, they offer a place of service at the headquarters of the district, but Boris Mikhailovich refuses, since in his thoughts he already had the Academy of the General Staff, and for those who did not serve in the ranks for 3 years, the road there was closed.

Upon returning from Samarkand to his battalion, B.M. Shaposhnikov received a promotion - he was appointed head of the training team with the rights of a company commander.

In 1906 he was promoted to lieutenant, and in January 1907 Boris Mikhailovich was preparing to enter the Academy of the General Staff.

After passing the district tests, he goes to the capital and surrenders entrance exams, gaining 9.82 points (for admission it was enough to score 8 points).

Already in the 1st year, he acquired thorough knowledge, passed the transfer exams well, but most importantly, he “matured” spiritually, began to understand people better, to appreciate their actions.

Both in the school and in the academy, his officer formation was greatly influenced by experienced and talented teachers, among whom were professors Colonels A.A. Neznamov, V.V. Belyaev, N.A. Danilov and others.

Before getting the corresponding post on the line of the General Staff, it was necessary to serve as a company commander in the troops for another 2 years, and Shaposhnikov again went to Tashkent.

When the time came to choose a new duty station, already through the General Staff, he preferred to transfer to the Western District, but not to the district headquarters, but to the division. The position of senior adjutant of the 14th Cavalry Division, which was part of the Warsaw Military District and

quartered in Czestochowa.

He arrived there at the end of December 1912, having just received the next rank of captain.

The position of the senior adjutant of the General Staff is actually the position of the chief of the operational department, whose duties included operational, mobilization issues and combat training of divisional units.

Parts of the 14th Cavalry Division were located not only in Czestochowa (regiment and horse battery), but also in other cities and villages.

FIRST WORLD

It was an alarming time. The fighting was going on in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary and Germany strengthened the border garrisons.

After reviewing the operational plan in case of war, B.M. Shaposhnikov saw what a difficult task was assigned to the 14th Cavalry Division. Located directly at the border, it was supposed to be the first to repel the enemy's attack, to cover the strategic deployment of the Russian armies.

And Boris Mikhailovich tried to do everything in his power to strengthen the regiments and batteries, increase their mobility and training. Inspecting units, he conducted classes with officers, encouraging them to be more active, to better prepare soldiers for battle.

In the spring of 1913, the check of reconnaissance squadrons at the 30-verst crossing (32 km) was completed, artillery fire was carried out. In the summer, a general divisional cavalry gathering took place, then the exercises of the cavalry and the rifle brigade.

Shaposhnikov develops a new mobilization plan for the division headquarters, often goes to the regiments and brigades of his division with checks, establishes intelligence intelligence, remains in charge of the chief of staff and performs his duties.

From the very beginning of the First World War, the cavalry division, the strengthening of which B.M. Shaposhnikov gave a lot of strength and energy, came into contact with the Austro-Hungarian units and showed commendable stamina.

Holding back the enemy's pressure, the division covered the flank of a large operational grouping of the Southwestern Front. And then the famous Battle of Galicia unfolded. In the fall, the Russian army achieved impressive success in this area, and the 14th Cavalry Division made a significant combat contribution to it.

True to the principle of "being closer to the troops," Captain B.M. Shaposhnikov shared with his superiors and subordinates all the difficulties of the big operation. The headquarters was located next to the advanced regiments.

On October 5, 1914, in the battle of Sochaczew, the captain was wounded in the head by a close burst of an artillery shell, but did not leave the combat post. For more than three years B.M. Shaposhnikov spent on the fronts of the First World War. Thanks to his contribution, the division became one of the best on the Southwestern Front.

REVOLUTION AND JOINING THE RED ARMY

February Revolution of 1917 B.M. Shaposhnikov met with the rank of colonel and chief of staff of the Cossack division.

And in September he was appointed commander of the 16th Mengrel regiment, which had a rich military history. They met him in the regiment with caution, since everyone remembered the Kornilov revolt, and the soldiers greeted each new officer with suspicion.

But soon everything worked out. B.M. Shaposhnikov took care of the needs of the soldiers, attended all meetings of the regimental committee. And when, at a committee meeting after the October Revolution of 1917, he was asked about his attitude to the socialist revolution, he answered bluntly that he recognized and was ready to continue serving.

In December, a congress of the Caucasian Grenadier Division, which included his regiment, took place, where the issue of choosing a new division commander was discussed. B.M. Shaposhnikov.

He managed to do a lot in a month, during which he commanded a division. Checking the supply of units, demobilization and seeing-off of the older age groups were organized, and revolutionary discipline was strengthened. But illness broke him down.

After a two-month stay in the hospital, B.M. Shaposhnikov was demobilized on March 16, 1918, after which he became a judicial officer. He performed his duties quickly and punctually, which pleased both the judge and the assessors.

Dissatisfied with a quiet civilian life, thinking about his future fate, Boris Mikhailovich came to the firm conviction that it was necessary to return to the army.

Having found out that the head of the newly established Volga Military District was appointed N.V. Pnevsky, former major general, B.M. Shaposhnikov wrote the last letter on April 23, 1918, in which there were the following lines:

"As a former colonel of the General Staff, I am keenly interested in the issue of creating a new army and as a specialist I would like to bring all possible assistance in this serious matter."

Boris Mikhailovich's letter did not go unanswered.

Voluntary entry into the ranks of the Red Army in May 1918 was for B.M. Shaposhnikov not only a return to his usual profession, but also the beginning of a new stage in his life. He was appointed to the Operations Directorate of the Supreme Military Council as an assistant to the head of the department.

By the fall of 1918, it became apparent that the first organizational form control of Soviet troops has outlived its usefulness. In early September, the Supreme Military Council ceased to exist. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (PBCR) was formed as the supreme military body. B.M. Shaposhnikov, transferred to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR, headed the intelligence department there. Keeping in touch with the fronts, carefully studying the intercepted enemy documents, he strove to penetrate as deeply as possible into the enemy's plans, to more accurately determine the location of his main forces and reserves.

This painstaking, inconspicuous work was reflected in the instructions to the troops and had a beneficial effect when units of the Red Army resisted the onslaught of the enemy or went on the offensive themselves.

For several months he served under N.I. Podvoisky - first in the Supreme Military Inspectorate, then in Ukraine: there Nikolai Ilyich held the post of People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, B.M. Shaposhnikov was the first assistant to the chief of staff. Boris Mikhailovich learned from him to assess the situation not only from the purely military, but also from the political side.

In August 1919 B.M. Shaposhnikov returns to the Field Headquarters of the RVSR to his former position. And later he was appointed chief of the Operations Directorate of the Field Headquarters of the RVS of the Republic.

In this difficult time for the young state, he had to work with such military leaders as P.P. Lebedev and E.M. Sklyansky, here he met M.V. Frunze.

The result of B.M. Shaposhnikov in the Red Army during the Civil War, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in October 1921.

B.M. Shaposhnikov, M.V. Frunze and M.N. Tukhachevsky. 1922 g.

INCREASING PROFESSIONALISM

The Civil War was going on, but even during this tense time B.M. Shaposhnikov thought about the future, and his first step was to generalize the combat experience of the Red Army.

I remembered:

“The Academy instilled in me a love for military history, taught to draw conclusions from it for the future.

In general, I have always gravitated towards history - it was a bright lamp on my way. It was necessary to continue to study this storehouse of wisdom. "

The first period of service in the Red Army turned out to be very fruitful in this respect. In 1918-1920. B.M. Shaposhnikov prepared and published in journals and collections a number of works that brought undoubted benefit to the young Soviet commanders.

After the war, Boris Mikhailovich served for more than four years as an assistant chief of staff of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). At the same time, he invested a lot of energy and knowledge in solving the issue of transferring the army and navy to a peaceful track.

Then a period came in his life when he held the highest command posts and was directly associated with the troops.

As commander of the Leningrad (1925-1927), Moscow (1927-1928) military districts, chief of the Red Army Staff (1928-1931), commander of the Volga (1931-1932) military district, chief and military Commissioner of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze (1932-1935), Commander of the Leningrad Military District (1935-1937), B.M. Shaposhnikov strove to ensure that military units and staff offices, every commander and Red Army soldier in peacetime were in constant combat readiness, as required in a war.

For the first time in the Red Army, he applied the methodology of conducting exercises and maneuvers with the participation of intermediaries and neutral communication, often visited the troops on training fields, shooting ranges, training grounds, commanding classes, and at the same time never checked the regiment in the absence of its commander.

He was an adherent of strict discipline, but an enemy of shouting.

THE BRAIN OF THE ARMY

In the mid-20s of the XX century. B.M. Shaposhnikov began to create the main book of his life, which he called "The Brain of the Army."

This major military scientific work covered a wide range of issues of command and control of troops, substantiated the need for a single governing body in the Red Army - the General Staff.

The first book of capital labor was published in 1927, the second and third in 1929. Many of the recommendations set out in this work have been implemented and are still valid.

In other words, we can safely say that the three-volume work "The Brain of the Army" was very relevant. Its publication caused a great resonance in the press.

It said that this major study "showed all the features of Boris Mikhailovich as a major military specialist: an inquisitive mind, extreme thoroughness in processing and defining formulations, clarity of perspectives, depth of generalizations."

At the same time, Boris Mikhailovich developed the country's military doctrine, participated in the work of statutory commissions, and solved many other issues, which made him one of the prominent military theorists of his time.

The idea of ​​B.M. Shaposhnikova on the creation of the General Staff in the Red Army had both supporters and opponents.

Different points of view could not but collide.

Chief of Staff of the Red Army M.N. Tukhachevsky entered the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR with a proposal to carry out such a reorganization so that the Headquarters of the Red Army could really influence the development of the Armed Forces, being a single planning and organizing center. This proposal, like a number of previous ones, was not accepted. One of the reasons was the fear that

“There will be one speaker who plans, conducts, and inspects, therefore, has all the criteria in his hands. In the hands of the leadership there is almost nothing: agree and follow the lead of the headquarters. "

CHIEF OF THE RKKA STAFF

The selection of a candidate for the post of Chief of Staff of the Red Army was a serious problem. And not at all because there was not enough experienced military leaders, but not everyone was suitable for such a post.

The Chief of Staff must have, not to mention deep military knowledge, combat experience and a sharp critical mind, also a number of specific qualities.

The choice fell on Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. Solid theoretical training, combat experience, the practice of commanding troops, knowledge of the staff service and the specifics of work in the center made him the most suitable candidate.

In May 1928, at the suggestion of I.V. Stalin's Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR approved B.M. Shaposhnikov as Chief of Staff of the Red Army.

Boris Mikhailovich, shortly after his appointment, made proposals for the reorganization of the central apparatus.

Twice he turns to the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs K.E. Voroshilov with a report in which he asked to reconsider the distribution of responsibilities of the Headquarters and the Main Directorate of the Red Army (GU Red Army). B.M. Shaposhnikov wrote that the Headquarters of the Red Army should become the leading link in the general system of military control.

Presenting his projects, developed on the basis of a thorough study of the state of affairs in the Armed Forces, he should receive confirmation or rejection of them only from the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, and not from certain directorates of the People's Commissariat.

The headquarters of the Red Army should be the main planning and administrative body in the hands of the Revolutionary Military Council.

The report indicated that the combat training of troops in peacetime should also be organized and controlled by the Headquarters of the Red Army, for it is he who will lead them in case of war.

Deficiencies were also noted in mobilization work, from which the Red Army Headquarters was actually removed, while only he, developing plans for strategic deployment, can assess the state of the mobilization business and lead it.

Shaposhnikov saw a way out of this situation at that stage in the transfer of troop control from the General Directorate of the Red Army to the Red Army Headquarters.

"The opinion of the Chief of Staff," wrote Boris Mikhailovich, "should be listened to on this or that issue without fail, and the departments of the People's Commissariat should be taken into account as one of the main."

In January 1930, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted a resolution on the transfer of all mobilization work to the Headquarters of the Red Army.

In the future, centralization continued until in 1935, instead of the Headquarters of the Red Army, a single and comprehensive body was created to guide the life and combat activities of the Red Army - the General Staff.

Boris Mikhailovich was one of those Soviet military leaders who, clearly understanding that the command cadres constitute the core of the army, took care of their education and training. He always did this, regardless of what position he held - whether it was a staff position or a command position.

But there were also periods in his life when personnel training became a direct official duty.

The principles of training and education of personnel, which B.M. Shaposhnikov adhered to, he persistently and consistently carried out, when for 3.5 years (1932-1935) he was the head of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

Teaching and scientific activities of B.M. Shaposhnikov received a proper assessment - in June 1935 he was awarded the academic title of professor. The Higher Attestation Commission, making its decision, noted that he was a military scientific worker of exceptional erudition and great generalizations, who was famous not only in the USSR, but also abroad.

The merits of B.M. Shaposhnikov in this field are indisputable.

But the academy also gave him a lot. In the ongoing theoretical discussions, his views on the nature of possible military operations of the Red Army were formed, ideas about the likely forms of operations, strategic interaction of the fronts took shape.

The leadership of the academy was for B.M. Shaposhnikov, an important step towards further military activity.

AGAIN IN THE HEAD OF THE GENERAL STAFF

In the spring of 1937, after a second two-year command of the Leningrad Military District, B.M. Shaposhnikov was appointed Chief of the General Staff

And in 1938 he was introduced to the Main Military Council. This made it possible for the Chief of the General Staff to directly influence the adoption of the most important decisions in matters of the country's defense.

For three years Boris Mikhailovich served as chief of the General Staff, and during this time he had many students and followers who helped him turn the General Staff into the brain of the army.

The result of the tremendous work of the entire staff under the leadership of B.M. Shaposhnikov, a report to the country's leadership on the strategic deployment of the Red Army in the Western and Eastern theaters of military operations appeared, which received full approval in 1938 at the Main Military Council.

Subsequently, the students and followers of B.M. Shaposhnikov, after his retirement from the General Staff due to illness, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin called "Shaposhnikov's school".

Workers in the General Staff of B.M. Shaposhnikov chose from among the excellent graduates of military academies and who have established themselves as thoughtful commanders in the army.

Such employees, with a relatively small number of staff, successfully coped with difficult duties.

The proposals and plans emanating from the General Staff during these years were distinguished by reality, foresight and comprehensive validity. Undoubtedly, the personal example of Boris Mikhailovich had a great influence.

His consistency and politeness in relations with people, regardless of their rank, discipline and utmost diligence when receiving instructions from managers - all this brought up in employees the same consciousness of responsibility for the assigned task.

The well-coordinated work of the General Staff headed by B.M. Shaposhnikov, contributed to the successful implementation of suchnnh operations in 1938-1940, such as the defeat of the Japanese militarists at Khalkhin-Gol, the campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, etc.

The hard work of B.M. Shaposhnikova was highly appreciated. In May 1940 he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. But illness again served as the reason that he left the post of chief of the General Staff.

IN THE YEARS OF WAR

With the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, the question of the chief of the General Staff was again raised. K.A. Meretskov and G.K. Zhukov, who headed the General Staff after B.M. Shaposhnikov, were quite mature generals with the skills of commanding large military formations.

However, they did not have time to acquire the experience necessary for the General Staff.

Therefore, at the end of July 1941 B.M. Shaposhnikov again headed the General Staff and became a member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

At this most difficult time for the country, in the days of the Smolensk battle, the defense of Kiev and the battle of Moscow, working practically without sleep or rest, the 60-year-old marshal finally undermined his health.

In May 1942, he was forced to apply to the State Defense Committee with a request to transfer him to a less critical area.

The request was granted, instructing Boris Mikhailovich to observe the activities of military academies, to organize the collection of materials for the future history of the war, to organize the development of new regulations and instructions.

But even in that short time, which was given to him, he did a lot. These are the new Combat and Field Manuals, a series of articles devoted to the operations of the Red Army, and the management of the publication of a three-volume monograph on the battle of Moscow.

Under the direct leadership of Shaposhnikov, the work of all large headquarters was reorganized. All large-scale operations in the initial period of the war were developed with his direct participation.

He warned of destructiveness military operation near Kharkov and his warnings did not heed, which ended in disaster

In June 1943, Boris Mikhailovich received a new and, as it turned out, the last appointment, becoming the head of the Academy of the General Staff, which was then called the K.E. Voroshilov.

Not for a minute did he stop a lot of organizational and military-theoretical work, carefully educating officers and generals capable of operational work in headquarters and commanding large formations and large formations of troops.

In a short time, the academy trained more than one hundred highly qualified general staff officers and military leaders who showed high combat and moral qualities on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

His selfless work as a tireless warrior was marked by high awards

In February 1944 B.M. Shaposhnikov was awarded the order Suvorov 1st degree, in November - the Order of the Red Banner (a second time), in February 1945 - the third Order of Lenin. Previously, he was also awarded two Orders of the Red Star, medals "XX Years of the Red Army" and "For the Defense of Moscow".

DEATH

Giving the outstanding military leader the highest military honor, Moscow said goodbye to him with 24 artillery volleys, as if merged with the thunder of the decisive offensives of the Red Army at the front.

The name of B.M. Shaposhnikov was awarded the Vystrel Higher Shooting and Tactical Courses, the Tambov Infantry School, the streets in Moscow and in the city of Zlatoust. He was buried in Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

CONCLUSION

Such a unique person was the Russian patriot Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov

In 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, headed by G.K. Zhukov carried out his work in parallel in several directions.

Measures continued to strengthen the Red Army, increase its combat power, primarily due to the arrival of new types of weapons and military equipment in the troops.

Tanks. In this regard, much attention was paid to the creation of large formations of tank forces and equipping them with new military equipment. After the February conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1941, the creation of large tank formations went faster. New mechanized corps began to deploy. For their armament in the first half of the same year, 1,500 tanks of new designs were manufactured. All of them entered the troops, but due to lack of time they were not properly mastered. The human factor also played a significant role - many military commanders did not dare to launch new models of tanks into intensive operation without a command from above, but such a command was not received.

Artillery. By the beginning of the war, the leadership of the artillery was carried out by the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, which was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Sandpiper. His deputy was Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev. Directly in the troops there were chiefs of artillery of districts, armies, corps, divisions. Troop artillery was subdivided into regimental, divisional and corps artillery. There was also the artillery of the RKG, which consisted of cannon and howitzer regiments, separate high-power divisions and anti-tank artillery brigades. The cannon artillery regiment had 48 122-mm cannons and 152-mm howitzers-guns, the high-power cannon regiment had 24 152-mm cannons. The howitzer artillery regiment had 48 152 mm howitzers, and the high power howitzer regiment had 24 152 mm howitzers. The armament of individual high-power divisions consisted of five 210-mm cannons, or 280-mm mortars, or 305-mm howitzers.

Characteristics of the manning of the mechanized corps of the western border military districts on June 22, 1941

By June 1941, prototypes of rocket launchers, the future "Katyushas", were manufactured. But their mass production has not yet been established. There were also no specialists capable of effectively controlling this new weapon.

With anti-tank artillery in the Red Army, there was a great lag. Only in April 1941, the Soviet command began to form the artillery brigades of the RGK. According to the state, each brigade was supposed to have 120 anti-tank guns and 4,800 anti-tank mines.

Cavalry. Despite the addiction to cavalry of some Soviet military leaders, its share in the structure of the ground forces by the beginning of the war had significantly decreased, and it was only 5% of their total number. Organizationally, the cavalry consisted of 13 divisions, eight of which were part of the four cavalry corps. The cavalry division had four cavalry and one tank regiment (almost 7.5 thousand personnel, 64 tanks, 18 armored vehicles, 132 guns and mortars). If necessary, the cavalry division could fight hastily, like an ordinary rifle unit.

Engineering troops. Engineering support was handled by the Main Engineering Directorate, which until March 12, 1941 was headed by Major General of the Engineering Troops A.F. Khrenov, and from March 20 - Major General of the Engineering Troops L.Z. Kotlyar. Engineering units were deployed in the troops, but their technical support was very weak. Basically, the calculation was made for a shovel, an ax and improvised building materials. In peacetime, sappers almost did not deal with questions of mining and demining of the terrain. Since 1940, almost all the engineering units of the border military districts were constantly involved in the construction of fortified areas on the new border of the USSR and were not engaged in combat training.

Connection. All issues of strategic communications and the supply of communications equipment were assigned to the Communications Directorate of the Red Army, which from July 1940 was headed by Major General N.I. Gapich. By that time, frontline, army, corps and divisional radio communication kits were developed and entered into the troops, but not all of them were sufficiently mastered. In addition, many commanders did not trust radio communications, and also did not know how to use it from the point of view of ensuring the secrecy of control.

Air defense. To solve the problems of air defense on a strategic scale, the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country was created in 1940. Its chief was initially Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, and from March 19, 1941 - Colonel-General G.M. Stern. On June 14, 1941, Colonel-General of Artillery N.N. Voronov.

To solve air defense tasks, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into air defense zones in accordance with the boundaries of military districts. The zones were headed by assistant district commanders for air defense. To solve specific tasks, the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Forces of the country had anti-aircraft artillery forces, searchlight, balloon units, as well as fighter aviation units.

To solve air defense missions, 39 regiments of fighter aviation were allocated from the air formations of military districts, which organizationally remained subordinate to the commanders of the air forces of the districts. In this regard, the assistant commander of the military district for air defense, in whose subordination were units of anti-aircraft artillery, all questions of the use of aviation for air defense purposes had to be coordinated with the commander of the air force.

The military air defense was equipped with anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, but in rifle and tank formations these means were few, and in practice they could not provide reliable cover for the entire area of ​​concentration of troops.

Aviation. Aviation was mainly equipped with aircraft of outdated designs. There were very few new combat vehicles. So, an armored attack aircraft designed by A.S. Ilyushin Il-2, created in 1939, began to enter the troops only in 1941. Fighter designed by A.S. Yakovlev Yak-1, which was put into serial production in 1940, also began to enter the troops in 1941.

From April 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force was Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev, who from November 1937 to September 1938 commanded a group of Soviet "volunteer" pilots in China.

Flight technical and combat characteristics of Soviet aircraft

Then, as a result of massive purges among the highest command personnel of the Air Force, he made a quick career and in December 1940 became the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force.

There was an increase in the total number of personnel of the Red Army. As of June 22, 5 million people were already under arms in the USSR Armed Forces. Of this number, the Ground Forces accounted for 80.6%, the Air Force - 8.6%, the Navy - 7.3%, the Air Defense Forces - 3.3%. In addition, numerous reserves were prepared. At the same time, the level of specialization of reservists was not very high. They proceeded from the fact that more than 1.4 million tractor drivers and car drivers work on collective farms alone, who could be quickly transferred to combat vehicles if necessary. Throughout the country, the Osoaviakhim system trained pilots, radio operators, parachutists, infantry riflemen.

Reconnaissance of a potential enemy. Having barely entered into a new position, G.K. Zhukov summoned the head of the Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova. He arrived exactly at the appointed time and entered the office of the Chief of the General Staff with a large folder in his hands. In a well-trained voice, he began to report confidently ...

In the last months before the start of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet intelligence worked quite actively. Already on January 12, 1941, in the reconnaissance report No. 2 of the Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, it was reported that on December 9, the commander-in-chief of the German land army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, visited the area of ​​the city of Sanok, who inspected the troops and fortifications in the area. In the same report, it was reported about the arrival of new German units in the border zone, the construction there of barracks for personnel, concreted firing points, loading and unloading areas on the railway and airfields.

Following this, there are frequent cases of violation by the German side of the State border of the USSR. So, the chief of the border troops of the NKVD of the BSSR on January 24, 1941, in his report also reports on the deployment in Warsaw of the army headquarters, and on the territory of the border districts - the headquarters of the army corps, eight headquarters of the infantry and one cavalry division, 28 infantry, seven artillery, three cavalry and one tank regiment, two aviation schools.

F.I.Golikov - Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army

It was reported below: “From the time of the conclusion of the Convention to January 1, 1941, a total of 187 various conflicts and incidents arose on the border with Germany ... During the reporting period, 87 cases of border violations by German aircraft were recorded ... Three German aircraft, after crossing the border, were landed ... which were subsequently released to Germany.

One German plane was shot down on March 17, 1940, at the site of the 10th outpost of the Avgustov border detachment as a result of the use of weapons.

In connection with the need to maximize the intelligence and operational work of the state security organs and the increased volume of this work, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Bolsheviks), on February 3, 1941, adopts a special Resolution on the division of the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs into two People's Commissariats: the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). The NKGB is entrusted with the tasks of conducting intelligence work abroad and combating the subversive, espionage, sabotage, terrorist activities of foreign intelligence services within the USSR. He is also instructed to conduct the operational development and liquidation of the remnants of all anti-Soviet parties and counter-revolutionary formations among various strata of the population of the USSR, in the system of industry, transport, communications, agriculture, etc., as well as to protect the leaders of the party and government. The same Resolution ordered the organization of republican, regional, regional and district bodies of the NKGB and the NKVD.

On February 8, 1941, the following Decree was adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the transfer of a special department from the NKVD of the USSR to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy. “To assign to special departments of the NKO and the NKVMF (Third Directorates) the following tasks: to combat counter-revolution, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and all kinds of anti-Soviet manifestations in the Red Army and the Navy; identifying and informing, respectively, the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar of the Navy about all the shortcomings and condition of the army and navy units and about all available compromising materials and information on the army and navy servicemen. "

The same document determined that "all appointments of the operational staff of the Third Directorates of the NKO and the NKVMF, starting with the operative regiment and the corresponding unit in the fleet, are made by orders of the People's Commissars of Defense and the Navy." Thus, in the structure of the Red Army and the Navy, powerful punitive bodies emerged, possessing enormous powers and not accountable to the commanders and commanders of the formations under which they operated. It was determined that the head of the 3rd department of the corps is subordinate to the chief of the 3rd department of the district (front) and the commander of the troops of the district (front), and the head of the 3rd department of the division is subordinate to the head of the 3rd department of the corps and the corps commander.

On February 7, 1941, the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR reported on the spreading rumors among the diplomatic corps in Moscow about the impending German attack on the USSR. At the same time, it was indicated that the purpose of the German attack was the southern regions of the USSR, rich in bread, coal and oil.

Around February 8, this information was confirmed by an agent of the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican", and on March 9, 1941, a telegraphic report was received from Belgrade from the military attaché to the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. It reported that "the German General Staff refused to attack the British islands, the immediate task is set - the capture of Ukraine and Baku, which should be carried out in April-May this year, for which Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are now preparing."

In March 1941, two more secret messages came from Berlin from an agent named "The Corsican." The first reported on the preparation of the German Air Force for military action against the USSR.

In the second, Germany's plans for a war against the USSR were once again confirmed. At the same time, it was indicated that the main target of the aggressor could be grain Ukraine and the oil regions of Baku. Also cited were the statements of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, General F. Halder, about the low combat effectiveness of the Red Army. Both of these messages were reported by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On March 24, 1941, a message was received from the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR about the preparation of the General Staff of Aviation for military operations against the USSR. And this document emphasizes that “the aviation headquarters regularly receives photographs of Soviet cities and other objects, in particular of Kiev.

Among the officers of the aviation headquarters, there is an opinion that the military action against the USSR was supposedly timed to end April or early May. These terms are associated with the intention of the Germans to preserve the harvest for themselves, hoping that the Soviet troops during the retreat will not be able to set fire to green bread. "

On March 31, 1941, the head of the foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR about the advance of German troops to the border of the Soviet Union. They talked about the transfer of specific formations and units of the German army. In particular, he reported that "in the border points of the General Governorship against the Brest region, the German authorities proposed to vacate all schools and additionally prepare premises for the arrival of the expected military units of the German army."

In early April 1941, the head of the foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR informed the higher authorities that, on his instructions, in Berlin, an agent named "Sergeant Major" had met with another agent named "Corsican". At the same time, "Sergeant Major", referring to other sources, announced the complete preparation and development of a plan for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. According to the available information, “the operational plan of the army consists in a lightning-fast surprise attack on Ukraine and advance to the east. From East Prussia, a blow to the north is simultaneously struck. German troops advancing in the northern direction must join up with the army coming from the south, by doing this they cut off the Soviet troops located between these lines, closing their flanks. The centers are ignored following the example of the Polish and French campaigns ”.

S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov on exercises (spring 1941)

On April 5, 1941, the Directorate of the Border Troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR announced the construction of airfields and landing sites by the Germans in the strips bordering the USSR. In total, from the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built and restored in Poland. Directly on the territory of Germany itself during this time, 250 airfields and 150 landing sites were built.

On April 10, the chief of foreign intelligence of the NKGB of the USSR reports to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army with specific data on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border and the transfer of new formations and units there. At the same time, an agent of the Berlin station "Yuna" reported about the plans of German aggression against the USSR.

On April 21, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the NKO of the USSR received another message from the NKVD of the USSR signed by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria on the receipt of new intelligence information by the border detachments of the NKVD on the concentration of German troops on the Soviet-German border.

At the end of April 1941, Moscow received another message from Berlin from an agent working in Germany under the name of "Sergeant Major", with the following content:

“A source working at the headquarters of the German army reports:

1. According to information received from the liaison officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headquarters of the German aviation Gregor, the question of Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally resolved, and it should start from day to day. Ribbentrop, who until now was not a supporter of opposing the USSR, knowing Hitler's firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR.

2. According to information received at the aviation headquarters, in recent days there has been an increase in activity in cooperation between the German and Finnish General Staffs, expressed in the joint development of operational plans against the USSR ...

The reports of the German Aviation Commission, which visited the USSR, and Aschenbrenner's Air Attaché in Moscow, made a depressing impression at the Aviation Headquarters. However, they expect that, although Soviet aviation is capable of delivering a serious blow to German territory, the German army will nevertheless quickly be able to suppress the resistance of the Soviet troops, reaching the strongholds of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.

3. According to information received from Leibrandt, who is an assistant for Russian affairs at the foreign policy department, Gregor's message is confirmed that the issue of opposing the Soviet Union is considered resolved. "

The postscript to this message indicates that it was reported to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria as the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin on April 30, 1941, but the resolutions of none of the named persons are not contained in the document.

On the same day, April 30, 1941, an alarming message arrived from Warsaw. It stated: “According to intelligence information received from various sources, it has been established in recent days that military preparations in Warsaw and on the territory of the General Government are being conducted openly, and German officers and soldiers speak quite frankly about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union, as about the case already decided. The war supposedly should begin after the end of the spring field work ...

From April 10 to 20, German troops moved eastward through Warsaw continuously, both during the night and during the day ... On the railways in the eastern direction there are trains loaded mainly with heavy artillery, trucks and aircraft parts. Since mid-April, a large number of trucks and Red Cross vehicles have appeared on the streets of Warsaw.

The German authorities in Warsaw have given an order to urgently put in order all the bomb shelters, darken all the windows, and create Red Cross sanitary squads in every house. All vehicles of private individuals and civilian institutions, including German ones, were mobilized and selected for the army. Since the beginning of April, all schools and courses have been closed, and their premises are occupied by military hospitals. "

This message was also reported by I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and L.P. Beria.

On May 6, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army F.I. Golikov made a special report "On the grouping of German troops in the east and southeast on May 5, 1941". This message directly indicated on many points about Germany's preparation for war against the USSR. The conclusions read: “In two months, the number of German divisions in the border zone against the USSR increased by 37 divisions (from 70 to 107). Of these, the number of tank divisions increased from 6 to 12 divisions. With the Romanian and Hungarian armies, this will amount to about 130 divisions. "

On May 30, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army received a telegraphic report from Tokyo. It reported:

“Berlin informs Ott that the German offensive against the USSR will begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% confident that the war will begin. The circumstantial evidence that I see for this is currently:

The technical department of the German air force in my city received instructions to return shortly. Ott demanded that BAT not send any important messages through the USSR. The transport of rubber through the USSR has been reduced to a minimum.

Reasons for the German action: The existence of a powerful Red Army does not give Germany an opportunity to expand the war in Africa, because Germany must keep a large army in Eastern Europe. In order to completely eliminate any danger from the USSR, the Red Army must be driven back as soon as possible. That's what Ott said. "

The message was signed: "Ramsay (Sorge)". But even this message does not contain a resolution of any of the leaders of the Soviet state.

On May 31, 1941, on the table of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov received a special message from the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 660569 as follows:

During the second half of May, the main German command, at the expense of the forces liberated in the Balkans, produced:

1. Restoration of the Western grouping to fight England.

2. Increase of forces against the USSR.

3. Concentration of reserves of the main command.

The general distribution of the German armed forces is as follows:

- against England (on all fronts) - 122-126 divisions;

- against the USSR - 120-122 divisions;

- reserve - 44–48 divisions.

Specific distribution of German forces against England:

- in the West - 75–80 divisions;

- in Norway - 17 divisions, of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway and can be used against the USSR ...

The distribution according to the directions of the German forces against the USSR is as follows:

a) in East Prussia - 23-24 divisions, including 18-19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction against the ZAPOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - 35–36 divisions, including 24–25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry regiments;

d) in Slovakia (area Zbrov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

e) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

f) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;

g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment.

The reserves of the main command are concentrated:

a) in the center of the country - 16-17 divisions;

b) in the area of ​​Breslau, Moravska Ostrava, Kattovice - 6–8 divisions;

c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and west of it) - 11 divisions ... "

This document says: "Zhukov read 11.6.41."

On June 2, on the concentration of large formations of the German and Romanian armies on the border with the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) receives information from the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the authorized person of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in Moldova. Then, certificates of the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Ukraine about the military activities of Germany on the border with the USSR are received almost every day. On June 11, an agent of the Berlin station of the NKGB of the USSR, acting under the name of "Sergeant Major", informs about the impending German attack on the USSR. On June 12, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) received a message from the NKVD of the USSR about the strengthening of intelligence activities by the German side on the border with the USSR and in the border areas. In accordance with this message, from January 1 to June 10, 1941, 2080 border trespassers were detained by Germany.

On June 16, NKGB agents working in Berlin under the nicknames "Old Man", "Sergeant Major" and "Corsican" received messages about the timing of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union in the coming days. At the same time, the structural divisions of the NKGB and the NKVD of the USSR, in parallel with reports on the state of affairs at the border, continue to engage in routine paperwork.

On June 19, the NKGB of Belarus sends a special message to the NKGB of the USSR about the military mobilization preparations of Nazi Germany for a war against the USSR. This message contains extensive information on the redeployment and deployment of German troops to the Soviet border. It is said about the concentration in the border areas of a large number of formations, units, combat aircraft, artillery pieces, boats and motor vehicles.

On this day, the resident of the NKGB "Titus", who worked in Rome, reports that the military operations of Germany against the USSR will begin between June 20 and 25, 1941.

On June 20, 1941, a telegraphic report came to the head of the intelligence department of the Red Army from Sofia. It read literally the following: “The source said today that a military clash is expected on June 21 or 22, that there are 100 German divisions in Poland, 40 in Romania, 5 in Finland, 10 in Hungary and 7 in Slovakia. motorized divisions. A courier who arrived by plane from Bucharest says that mobilization in Romania is over and military action is expected at every moment. Currently, there are 10 thousand German troops in Bulgaria. "

There is no resolution on this message either.

On the same day (June 20, 1941), a telegraphic report also came to the head of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate from Tokyo from Sorge. In it, the intelligence officer writes: “The German ambassador to Tokyo, Ott, told me that a war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. German military superiority makes it possible to defeat the last large European army as well as it was done at the very beginning (of the war), because the strategic defensive positions of the USSR are still no more combat-ready than they were in the defense of Poland.

Insest told me that the Japanese General Staff is already discussing the position to be taken in case of war.

The proposal for Japanese-American negotiations and the internal struggle between Matsuoka, on the one hand, and Hiranuma, on the other, have stalled because everyone is waiting for a solution to the question of relations between the USSR and Germany. "

This report was received by the 9th squad at 17 o'clock on June 21, 1941, but there is no resolution on it either.

In the evening of June 20, another intelligence report of the NKGB of the USSR No. 1510 about Germany's military preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union is being compiled. It states the concentration of German troops near the border with the USSR and the preparation of fascist troops for military operations. In particular, it is said that machine guns and anti-aircraft guns are installed in some houses of Klaipeda, that in the area of ​​Kostomolota a forest has been prepared for building bridges across the Western Bug River, that in the Radom district of 100 settlements the population has been evicted to the rear, that German intelligence is sending its agents to USSR for a short time - three to four days. These measures cannot be regarded as anything other than direct preparation for the aggression, which should take place in the coming days.

As a result of the analysis of all these documents, it can be concluded that Soviet intelligence on the territory of Germany and its allies worked quite successfully. Information about Hitler's decision to attack the USSR and the beginning of preparations for this action began to arrive in the Soviet Union more than a year before the start of the aggression.

Simultaneously with intelligence through the Foreign Ministry and the GRU, the Western military districts were also conducting intelligence, which constantly and in sufficient detail reported on the preparation of Germany and its allies for a war against the USSR. Moreover, as we approached the fateful date, these reports became more frequent and more specific. From their content, there was no doubt about Germany's intentions. The measures that were carried out on the other side of the border no longer had a reverse course, but inevitably had to result in a military operation of a strategic scale. This concerned the resettlement of the local population from the border strip, saturation of this strip with troops, clearing the border strip from mine and other engineering barriers, mobilizing vehicles, deploying field hospitals, storing a large number of artillery shells on the ground, and much more.

The top Soviet leadership and the command of the Red Army had information about the composition and deployment of the troops of the border military districts of the Soviet Union by the fascist command, which were obtained and summarized already at the beginning of February 1941, almost 5 months before the start of the aggression, and practically corresponded to reality.

However, the fact that on many intelligence reports there are no signatures of the highest leaders of the state and the highest ranks of the country's military leadership suggests that they were either not communicated to these persons or were ignored by these persons. The first is virtually excluded by the practice of the Soviet bureaucratic machine of that time. The second is possible in two cases: first, mistrust of information sources; secondly, the stubborn unwillingness of the country's top leadership to abandon the vision it has developed for the upcoming course of events.

As you know, in the last peace months only general orders were received from the General Staff to the troops. No specific reaction of the Soviet government and the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense to the situation developing near the borders of the USSR was indicated. Moreover, the Soviet leadership and the General Staff constantly warned the local command “not to succumb to provocations,” which negatively affected the combat readiness of the troops covering the state border. Apparently, the interaction and mutual information between the organs of the NKGB, the NKVD and the headquarters of the Red Army were poorly established.

Although it should be admitted that the activities of the NKVD, aimed at strengthening the protection of the border, were carried out. So, the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Belorussian district in order to strengthen the protection of the state border on June 20, 1941 issued a special order. In accordance with this order, it was prescribed “to build the calculation of people for service so that from 23.00 to 5.00 all people, with the exception of those returning from the detachments, would carry out service at the border. In some, the most vulnerable flank directions, post posts for ten days under the command of the assistant chief of the outpost. "

Thus, the opinion is created that the Soviet leadership deliberately ignored the intelligence information abundantly received from various sources about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. Some researchers say that this was a special line of behavior of the top Soviet leadership, who in every possible way tried to delay the start of the war in order to prepare the country and the Red Army. Others argue that in 1940 - early 1941, the Soviet leadership was more concerned with internal problems that arose in the new territories annexed to the USSR in 1939–1940 than with external threats. In recent years, there have been authors who write that the behavior of the Soviet government on the eve of the war, and in particular the position of I.V. Stalin, was a manifestation of the leader's hatred of his people.

Of course, all these are only subjective conclusions of various researchers. What do the facts say? Before me is an extract from the instructions of the Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army dated May 15, 1941. It says:

“At present, the USSR is the only European power that, with its powerful armed forces, is not drawn into the world conflict. In addition, the volume of Soviet economic resources is so great that Europe, in the face of the ongoing naval blockade, can be provided with raw materials and food from this reserve.

It seems that until now the USSR, following survival tactics, seeks to use the exhaustion of the forces of both belligerents to strengthen its own position ... However, the turn of events over the past two months makes one think that the USSR will not be able to carry out its plans in their original form and, probably will be dragged into the war earlier than he thinks.

Indeed, according to numerous reports received recently, the capture of South Russia and the overthrow of the Soviet regime is now part of the plan developed by the "axis" countries ...

Other reports suggest that Russia, worried that it is alone in the face of Germany, whose funds have not yet been touched, is seeking to buy time to keep its dangerous neighbor. The Russians satisfy all the requirements of Germany of an economic nature ... "

On the same day, a memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry on German-Soviet relations was adopted. It notes that, "as in the past, difficulties arose in connection with the fulfillment of German obligations on the supply of the USSR, especially in the field of weapons." The German side admits: “We will not be able to adhere to the delivery dates in the future. However, Germany's failure to fulfill its obligations will begin to affect only after August 1941, since until then Russia is obliged to make deliveries in advance. " It was stated below: “The situation with the supply of Soviet raw materials still presents a satisfactory picture. In April, the following most important raw materials were delivered:

grain - 208,000 tons;

oil - 90,000 tons;

cotton - 8300 tons;

non-ferrous metals - 6340 tons of copper, tin and nickel ...

Total deliveries in the current year are calculated:

grain - 632,000 tons;

oil - 232,000 tons;

cotton - 23,500 tons;

manganese ore - 50,000 tons;

phosphates - 67,000 tons;

platinum - 900 kilograms. "

Of course, these supplies stopped with the outbreak of hostilities. But there is ample evidence that trains with Soviet raw materials followed to Germany at the beginning of June 22, 1941. Some of them were captured by German troops in the border areas in the early days of the Great Patriotic War.

Thus, there was more than enough intelligence information about Germany's preparations for a war against the USSR. GK Zhukov also writes in his memoirs "Memoirs and Reflections" that this information was known to the General Staff, and immediately admits: "During the period of maturation of a dangerous military situation, we, the military, probably did not do everything to convince I. V. Stalin in the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future and to prove the need to carry out urgent measures provided for by the operational mobilization plan. Of course, these measures would not guarantee complete success in repelling the enemy onslaught, since the forces of the parties were far from equal. But our troops could enter the battle in a more organized manner and, consequently, inflict significantly greater losses on the enemy. This is confirmed by the successful defensive actions of units and formations in the regions of Vladimir-Volynsky, Rava-Russkaya, Przemysl and in the sectors of the Southern Front. "

Below G.K. Zhukov writes: “Now there are different versions about whether or not we knew the exact date of the start of the war.

I cannot say for sure whether I.V. was truthfully informed. Stalin may have received it personally, but he did not tell me.

True, he once told me:

- One person gives us very important information about the intentions of the German government, but we have some doubts ...

Perhaps it was about R. Sorge, whom I learned about after the war.

Could the military leadership independently and in a timely manner uncover the exit of enemy troops directly to the initial areas, from where their invasion began on June 22? In those conditions, it was extremely difficult to do this.

In addition, as it became known from the captured maps and documents, the command of the German troops carried out a concentration on the borders at the very last moment, and its armored troops, which were at a considerable distance, were transferred to their original areas only on the night of June 22. "

The closest deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was the chief of the Operations Directorate. On the eve of the war, this position was occupied by Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin. He was a relatively young general (born in 1901), who graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze studied for a year at the Academy of the General Staff, from which he was released ahead of schedule in 1937 in connection with the arrests of many military leaders.

He served as chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District during the liberation campaign of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, and since 1940 he headed the Operations Directorate of the General Staff. According to the memoirs of many contemporaries, N.F. Vatutin was a literate and thinking person, capable of solving voluminous and complex problems. He had some experience in planning military actions in the framework of the ending operations of the Soviet-Finnish war and the actions of the military district troops during the liberation campaign. But this experience was clearly insufficient for solving problems on the scale of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

Unfortunately, even from the available reports, the correct conclusions were not always drawn, which could promptly and authoritatively guide the top management. In this connection, here are some documents from the military archive.

On March 20, 1941, the head of the Intelligence Directorate, General F.I. Golikov presented to the management a report containing information of exceptional importance. This document outlined options for possible directions of strikes by fascist German troops in an attack on the Soviet Union. As it turned out later, they consistently reflected the development of the "Barbarossa" plan by the Hitlerite command, and in one of the options, in essence, the essence of this plan was reflected.

... According to the report of our military attaché on March 14, the report further indicated, the German major said: “We are heading east, towards the USSR. We will take grain, coal and oil from the USSR. Then we will be invincible and can continue the war with England and America. "

N.F. Vatutin - Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1939-1941)

However, the conclusions from the information given in the report, in essence, removed all their significance. At the end of his report, General F.I. Golikov wrote:

"1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR this spring should be regarded as misinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence. "

So, F.I. Golikov served as Chief of the Intelligence Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff since July 1940. His report was being prepared for the country's top leadership and was classified as "of exceptional importance." Such reports are usually prepared very carefully and cannot be based on the words of some "German major". They require the collection and analysis of dozens, or even hundreds of different sources of information, and, as other military leaders testify, such information was, including from the military attaché in Berlin, agents of intelligence agents in the countries - allies of Germany.

Now about the agents of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate itself (now the Main Intelligence Directorate). This body exists mainly in order to conduct military intelligence in the interests of the country's security and carefully study a potential enemy. The arrival of German troops on the territory of Poland created ideal conditions for organizing intelligence work in this country. Czechoslovakia, occupied by Germany, was also a good field for the activities of Soviet military intelligence. For many years Hungary was considered by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, which required an expanded intelligence network there. The Soviet Union had only recently ended the war with Finland and had no reason to trust its government. Romania was also offended by the rejection of Moldavia and Bessarabia and therefore demanded constant close attention. And there is no doubt that the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff had its own agents in these countries and received relevant information from it. We have to doubt the quality of this agency, information and the correctness of the reaction to it by F.I. Golikov and G.K. Zhukov.

Secondly, since January 14, 1941 G.K. Zhukov had already worked in the General Staff (Resolution of the Politburo No. P25 / 85 of 14.01.41 on the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of military districts), was in the know, got acquainted with his deputies, heads of directorates and departments. Twice - on January 29 and 30 - he, together with the People's Commissar of Defense, was at the reception of I.V. Stalin. He constantly received alarming information from the Soviet-German border, knew about the unpreparedness of the Red Army for war with Germany, and in early February gave instructions to the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General G.K. Malandin, by March 22, prepare an updated operational plan in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union. Then, on February 12, together with the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko and the head of the Organizational and Mobilization Directorate, Major General Chetvertikov G.K. Zhukov was represented by I.V. Stalin's mobilization plan, which was approved with virtually no amendments. Thus, it turns out that the General Staff was thoroughly preparing to repel the fascist aggression.

The meeting, at which the report of the head of the RKKA Intelligence Directorate was made, took place on March 20, 1941, when G.K. Zhukov had been in the post of chief of the General Staff for almost two months and had done some work to improve the combat capability of the Red Army. At the same meeting, of course, was also the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko. Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.I. Golikov reports to the country's leadership conclusions that are fundamentally at odds with the conclusions of his direct superiors, and S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov does not react to this in any way. To admit this situation, knowing the cool character of G.K. Zhukov, it is absolutely impossible.

Before me is the major work of retired Colonel-General Yuri Alexandrovich Gorkov "Kremlin, Headquarters, General Staff", which the author has been developing for seven years as a consultant to the Historical Archive and War Memorial Center of the General Staff. In the appendix, he gives an extract from I.V. Stalin in his Kremlin office, starting in 1935. It follows from this journal that S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov and P.V. Rychagov (head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force) were at the reception of I.V. Stalin on February 2 and deliberated for almost two hours.

Next time they, as well as S.M. Budyonny and Chetverikov visited this high office on February 12 to approve the mobilization plan.

On February 22, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, except for S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukova, S.M. Budyonny, K.A. Meretskova, P.V. Rychagov was also attended by G.I. Kulik (head of the Main Directorate of Artillery of the Red Army) and renowned test pilot General M.M. Gromov (head of the Flight Research Institute), as well as all members of the Politburo of the RCP (b). This meeting was held from 5.15 pm to 9 pm.

On February 25, an appointment with I.V. Stalin again invited S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, as well as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, General F.A. Astakhov. The presence of two leading military pilots at the meeting with the head of state speaks either of special tasks for this service of the Armed Forces, or of some important information received from aerial reconnaissance. It took almost two hours to discuss these issues.

On March 1, an appointment with I.V. Stalin again invited S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, G.I. Kulik, as well as the first deputy commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P.F. Zhigarev and member of the Economic Council for the defense industry under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR P.N. Goremykin. The meeting takes 2 hours and 45 minutes.

On March 8, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin arrived at 20.05 S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, S.M. Budyonny, P.V. Levers and consulted until 23 o'clock.

The next meeting with the military at I.V. Stalin took place on March 17, 1941, and was attended by S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, K.A. Meretskov, P.V. Rychagov, P.F. Zhigarev. We met from 15.15 to 23.10, but, apparently, did not finally agree. Therefore, the next day, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov, P.V. Rychagov and G.I. Kulik, who were in I.V. Stalin from 19.05 to 21.10, and as a result of this meeting, a Politburo resolution on mobilization fees No. 28/155 was adopted, prepared on March 3, 1941.

And now we read from G.K. Zhukov on the report of the chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff to the country's leadership on March 20, 1941. Prior to that, S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov was shown in the office of I.V. Stalin at various meetings for a total of more than 30 hours each. Was this time really not enough to discuss the issues of the country's defense and the combat readiness of the Red Army?

V.D.Sokolovsky - Deputy Chief of the General Staff

So, according to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov, at a meeting on March 20, based only on the report of General F.I. Golikov's threat of an attack by Nazi Germany on the USSR in 1941 was dispelled. But further in the same work Georgy Konstantinovich writes: “On May 6, 1941 I.V. Stalin was sent a note by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov: “The naval attaché in Berlin, Captain 1st Rank Vorontsov, reports that, according to a German officer from Hitler's Headquarters, the Germans are preparing an invasion of the USSR through Finland, the Baltic States and Romania by May 14th. At the same time, powerful air raids on Moscow and Leningrad and the landing of parachute troops in the border centers are planned ... I think the note said that the information was false and was specially directed along this channel in order to check how the USSR would react to it.

And again we return to the monograph by Yu.A. Gorkova. According to her data, S.K. Timoshenko, G.K. Zhukov and other senior military leaders conferred with I.V. Stalin on April 5, 9, 10, 14, 20, 21, 23, 28, 29. At the last meeting, a note from the People's Commissariat of Defense on the combat readiness of the western border military districts was discussed. And again a completely natural question arises: what did the top military leaders talk about with the head of state for many hours, if not about the growing threat of war? Why then, according to G.K. Zhukova, “... the tension was growing. And the closer the threat of war approached, the more intensely the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense worked. The leadership of the People's Commissariat and the General Staff, especially Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko, at that time worked 18-19 hours a day. Often the People's Commissar stayed in his office until morning. "

The work, judging by the notes of Yu.A. Gorkova, and in fact was conducted tense. In May 1941 S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov confers with I.V. Stalin on the 10th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23rd. On May 24, in addition to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, commanders, members of the Military Council and air force commanders of the Western Special, Kiev Special, Baltic, Odessa military districts are invited to a meeting with the head of state. This meeting has been going on for over three hours.

At the beginning of June 1941, on the 3rd, 6th, 9th and 11th, I.V. Stalin at the meeting were S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov, and also often the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, General N.F. Vatutin. The presence of the latter indicates the preparation of the most important operational documents, probably related to bringing the troops to combat readiness.

But here we open again the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and read: “June 13 S.K. Timoshenko called I.V. in my presence. Stalin and asked permission to give instructions on bringing the troops of the border districts on alert and deploying the first echelons according to cover plans.

- Let's think about it, - I.V. Stalin.

The next day we were again at I.V. Stalin and reported to him about the alarming mood in the districts and the need to bring the troops to full combat readiness.

- Do you propose to carry out mobilization in the country, raise troops now and move them to the western borders? This is war! Do you both understand this or not ?! "

According to G.K. Zhukov, I.V. Stalin and on June 14 resolutely rejected the proposal of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to put the troops on alert.

But according to Yu.A. Gorkov, in the period from 11 to 19 June, neither S.S. Tymoshenko, nor G.K. Zhukov was not with the head of state. But it is known that at the end of the first half of June 1941, the advancement of military units located in the inner regions of the western border military districts, closer to the state border, began. Some of these formations were transferred by rail, and a significant number of them were put forward in marching order at night crossings.

Also, in mid-May 1941, a gradual transfer by rail and partly a marching movement of individual rifle corps and divisions from the internal military districts: Ural, Volga, Kharkov and North Ural to the border of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers began. In the first half of June, the transfer of six divisions from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Right-Bank Ukraine began in the areas of Shepetovka, Proskurov and Berdichev.

Planning of military operations. By June 22, 1941, preparing to repel the fascist aggression, the Soviet leadership deployed troops of three military districts and part of the forces of the Odessa military district on the western border from the Baltic to the Black Sea, which, in the event of the outbreak of war, were to be transformed into fronts and a separate army. To bring this entire mass of troops into full combat readiness and use it to defeat the enemy, mobilization and operational plans were developed.

The mobilization plan for 1938-1939 (from November 29, 1937 - MP-22), developed by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces under the leadership of B.M. Shaposhnikov, envisaged in the event of war, due to additional conscription, the growth of rifle troops by 1.7 times, tank brigades by 2.25 times, an increase in the number of guns and tanks by 50%, as well as an increase in the Air Force to 155 air brigades. Particular hopes were pinned on the tank forces. It was envisaged that eight of the 20 light tank brigades, consisting of BT tanks, would be withdrawn. They were to be reduced to four tank corps. The remaining six brigades of BT tanks and the same number of brigades of T-26 tanks remained separate. In addition to the three existing motorized rifle brigades, it was planned to form another brigade, so that in the future there would be one such brigade in each tank corps.

The mobilization plan, adopted in the USSR in 1938, began to be revised by B.M. Shaposhnikov in connection with the change in the territory of the USSR in 1939-1940, the reorganization of the Red Army, the experience of the Soviet-Finnish and the outbreak of World War II. But he did not have time to complete this work until the end. This is evidenced by the acts of the transfer of the People's Commissariat of Defense K.E. Voroshilov and the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov to the new People's Commissar S.K. Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff K.A. Meretskov in the summer of 1940. They stated: "By the time of admission, the NCO does not have a Mobplan, and the army cannot systematically mobilize itself." And further: “In connection with organizing events, redeployment of units and changes in the boundaries of military districts, the current mob-plan is fundamentally violated and requires a complete revision. Currently, the army does not have a mobilization plan. "

But B.M. Shaposhnikov, together with the post, handed over to K.A. Meretskov has a practically ready mobilization plan, which Kirill Afanasyevich only has to approve. A new version of the mobilization plan by the General Staff of the Red Army was prepared by September 1940. But then it turned out that it had to be linked to other documents, so the revision of the mobilization plan was delayed until February 1941.

However, this plan did not receive approval from the political leadership of the country. He also had opponents in the highest military circles, who considered it necessary to have a much larger number of large mechanized formations. Therefore, the General Staff had to sit down to work again.

The draft of a new mobilization plan was presented by S.K. Timoshenko and K.A. Meretskov for consideration by the government of the USSR on February 12, 1941, when G.K. Zhukov. The submitted project was almost immediately approved by I.V. Stalin.

Based on the experience of the outbreak of the First World War, the Soviet leadership believed that a considerable time would pass from the declaration of war to the actual start of hostilities. Based on this, it was supposed to carry out mobilization by echelon within one month. The first echelon on the first or third day after the declaration of war was supposed to mobilize units and formations of the armies covering the state border of the border military districts, which constituted 25-30% of the combat formations and were contained in peacetime in a reinforced composition. In the same echelon, the Air Force, air defense troops and fortified areas were put on alert. In the second echelon, on the fourth or seventh day of the war, it was envisaged to mobilize the remaining combat formations, combat support units, army rear units and institutions. In the third echelon, on the eighth-fifteenth day of the war, it was necessary to deploy front-line rear services, repair bases, and front-line spare parts. In the fourth echelon, on the sixteenth and thirtieth days, it was planned to deploy spare parts and inpatient hospitals.

The deployment of rifle, tank, cavalry and motorized divisions of the border military districts, contained in a reinforced composition (70-80% of the wartime states), was supposed to be carried out in two echelons. The first echelon (permanent personnel) was to be ready to march in two to four hours after receiving the order, and tank units in six hours. The second echelon had to be ready to march by the end of the third day.

For the deployment of new formations and units, reserves were created in advance in the troops and in warehouses. As of June 22, 1941, all border formations were provided with small arms and machine guns by 100%, machine guns, large-caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft machine guns - by 30%, artillery guns of all systems - by 75–96%, tanks of all types - by 60% , including heavy - by 13%, medium (T-34 and T-36) - by 7%, light - by 133%. The provision of the Air Force with aircraft was about 80%, including combat aviation - 67%.

Thus, the predecessors of G.K. Zhukov managed to develop such an important document as a mobilization plan in case of war. Georgy Konstantinovich had only to bring this plan to the attention of the executors and ensure its implementation. But here the incomprehensible begins.

After that, in order to develop private plans for mobilization, directives were immediately sent to the headquarters of the military districts, which indicated the mobilization tasks, the calendar dates for the implementation of the main measures and the deadlines for the development of the district mobilization plans (June 1, 1941). In the military districts, according to these directives, meetings of military councils were held, the decisions of which were immediately communicated to the troops.

But this is where the strangest begins. Due to the fact that the mobilization plan was subsequently changed and refined several times, directives that had not been finally approved were constantly sent to the troops, and the military headquarters did not have time to work them out. Frequent changes in directive documents also led to the fact that many of them were simply not worked out. There were other reasons for the delay in working out the mobilization documents. So, it is known that the meeting of the Military Council of the Western Special Military District was held with a delay in comparison with the calendar period by twenty days, and the directive was sent to the troops only on March 26, 1941. With this directive, the deadline for the development of a mobilization plan for the district was postponed until June 15, 1941.

But developing a mobilization plan is only part of the story. It was necessary to ensure its implementation, but here the matter was not very important. The workers of the military enlistment offices of the border districts did not know well the mobilization capabilities of their regions, as a result of which many scarce specialists could not arrive at the troops on time. The air forces of the districts also had a low combat readiness - they were not staffed with personnel and military equipment of 12 air regiments and 8 air bases.

The condition of the mechanized corps was not the best either. So, in the Western Special Military District, only one of the mechanized corps was equipped with tanks by 79%, the remaining five - by 15-25%. Due to the lack of the necessary military equipment, the 26th, 31st and 38th tank divisions, as well as the 210th motorized division, were armed with 76-mm and 45-mm cannons in order to further act as anti-tank formations.

The combat readiness and combat training of a number of units of the Western Special Military District were unsatisfactory. The air force of the district received an unsatisfactory rating during an inspection check in the fall of 1940. During a repeated check of the district's air force by the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force, Lieutenant General P.F. Zhigarev in March - April 1941 again noted low combat readiness, poor maintenance of weapons, insufficient level of flight training of personnel of aviation regiments.

In the Baltic Special Military District, the situation was even worse. The deployment of the district to the states of wartime was supposed to be carried out at the expense of local resources, but for this it was necessary to create a network of military commissariats in the Baltic republics, then it was necessary to determine the availability of these resources at the enterprises of the national economy and only then to paint them by formations and units. And this despite the fact that in May 1941, universal conscription, determined by the law in September 1940, had not yet been introduced there.

In a number of military districts, poor combat readiness of air defense forces and means was noted. Thus, the Air Defense Control Commission, headed by Colonel-General G.M. Stern, following the results of the check, indicated that “the combat readiness of the air defense of Leningrad is in an unsatisfactory state ... The combat readiness of the 3rd and 4th air defense divisions of the Kiev Special Military District is in an unsatisfactory state. The air defense units of Kiev are almost not preparing for night defense ... The combat training of the 4th Air Defense Division, as well as the air defense system of Lvov as a whole, is in an unsatisfactory state. "

The second extremely important document developed by the General Staff was the Considerations on the Basics of the Strategic Deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and East for 1940 and 1941 dated September 18, 1940. They indicated that on the western borders the most likely enemy of the USSR would be Germany, with which Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland could also act in an alliance. In total, according to the developers of this document, “taking into account the above probable adversaries, the following can be deployed against the Soviet Union in the West: Germany - 173 infantry divisions, 10,000 tanks, 13,000 aircraft; Finland - 15 infantry divisions, 400 aircraft; Romania - 30 infantry divisions, 250 tanks, 1,100 aircraft; Hungary - 15 infantry divisions, 300 tanks, 500 aircraft. In total - 253 infantry divisions, 10 550 tanks, 15 100 aircraft. "

To fight the indicated enemy, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff proposed to deploy the main forces of the Red Army in the west, “or south of Brest-Litovsk, so that a powerful blow in the direction of Lublin and Krakow and further to Breslava (Bratislava) in the first stage of the war cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive her of her most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war; or north of Brest-Litovsk with the task of defeating the main forces of the German army within East Prussia and capturing the latter. "

A.M. Vasilevsky in his book "The Work of All Life" writes that he began work on the Considerations in mid-April 1940. At the same time, he admits that “the main thing had already been fulfilled by that time. During all recent years the preparation of the plan was directly supervised by B.M. Shaposhnikov, and by that time the General Staff had completed its development for presentation and approval in the Central Committee of the party. "

K.A. Meretskov found many shortcomings in the State Border Covering Plan developed by his predecessor. Their elimination was carried out by N.F. Vatutin, G.K. Malandin and A.M. Vasilevsky. The latter writes that this project and the plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army troops were reported directly to I.V. Stalin on September 18, 1940 in the presence of some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party. From the People's Commissariat of Defense, the plan was presented by S.K. Timoshenko, K.A. Meretskov and N.F. Vatutin. The General Staff believed that the main attack of the enemy could be delivered in one of two ways: south or north of Brest-Litovsk (Brest). Thus, the final point on this issue was to I.V. Stalin.

When considering this plan, according to A.M. Vasilevsky, referring to the testimony of K.A. Meretskova (Kirill Afanasyevich himself does not write anything about this), I.V. Stalin expressed the opinion that in the event of war, the German troops would inflict the main blow in the Ukraine. Therefore, the General Staff was instructed to develop a new plan, providing for the concentration of the main grouping of Soviet troops in the South-West direction.

On October 5, 1940, the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces was reviewed by the leaders of the party and state. During the discussions, it was found expedient to emphasize once again that the main grouping of Soviet troops should be deployed in the South-West direction. Based on this, it was supposed to further strengthen the composition of the troops of the Kiev Special Military District.

The plan, revised taking into account the comments received on the deployment of the Red Army near the western borders of the USSR, was submitted for approval by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Government on October 14, 1940. All questions concerning the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff were to be completed no later than December 15, 1940. From January 1, the headquarters of the military districts were to start developing the corresponding plans.

But at the end of 1940, new information was received about Germany's preparation for war in the East and about the grouping of its forces and means. Based on this, according to A.M. Vasilevsky, "The General Staff and our Operational Directorate as a whole made adjustments to the operational plan for the concentration and deployment of the Armed Forces developed during the fall and winter of 1940 to repel an enemy attack from the west." At the same time, it was envisaged that "our troops would enter the war in all cases fully prepared and as part of the groupings provided for in the plan, that the mobilization and concentration of troops would be carried out in advance."

With the arrival of G.K. Zhukov's considerations radically change on March 11, 1941, taking into account the increased role of the Kiev Special Military District. It is believed that "Germany, most likely, will deploy its main forces in the southeast - from Sedlec to Hungary, in order to seize Ukraine by attacking Berdichev and Kiev." At the same time, it is assumed that "this blow, apparently, will be accompanied by an auxiliary attack in the north - from East Prussia to Dvinsk and Riga, or concentric attacks from Suwalki and Brest to Volkovysk, Baranovichi."

At the same time, Georgy Konstantinovich made a number of significant comments on the Deployment Plan worked out by his predecessors. MV Zakharov writes: “With the appointment of General of the Army G.K. Zhukov as Chief of the General Staff, the strategic deployment plan in the spring of 1941 again became the subject of discussion and clarification. "

As you can see, the revision of the State Border Covering Plan was carried out in February - April 1941 with the participation of the General Staff and the leadership of the military district headquarters (commander, chief of staff, member of the Military Council, head of the Operations Department). “At the same time, it was envisaged that the troops of the covering echelons by the beginning of the enemy's actions, being fully staffed in wartime, would deploy on prepared defensive lines along the border and, together with fortified areas and border troops, would be able, in case of emergency, to cover the mobilization of troops of the second echelons of border districts, which, according to the mobilization plan, were allocated for this from several hours to one day. "

M.V. Zakharov writes that the last correction of this document was carried out in May - June 1941. The document was written, as before, by A.M. Vasilevsky, and then corrected by N.F. Vatutin. The idea of ​​concentrating the main efforts on Ukraine remains valid.

The views in the new edition are signed by the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Tymoshenko, Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov and its developer, Major General A.M. Vasilevsky.

Only a few months remain before the start of the war, but G.K. Zhukov is not appeased. On May 15, 1941, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was offered new Considerations for the strategic deployment plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, developed by his order.

In them, the chief of the General Staff warned that "Germany is currently keeping its army mobilized, with deployed rear areas and has the ability to warn us in deployment and deliver a surprise strike." Therefore G.K. Zhukov suggested "under no circumstances give initiative to the German command, preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the deployment stage and does not have time to organize the front and interaction of troops."

To achieve this goal G.K. Zhukov proposed in the first phase of the operation to defeat the main forces of the German army deployed south of Brest - Demblin, and to ensure the exit of Soviet troops by the 30th day of the operation to the Ostrolenka, r. Narew, Lowicz, Lodz, Kreuzburg, Opel, Olomouc. Subsequently, he intended to attack from the Katowice region in the northern or northwestern direction, defeat the enemy and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.

As an immediate task, it was envisaged to defeat the German army east of the r. Vistula and in the direction of Krakow go to the border of the river. Narew, Vistula and capture the Katowice area. For this, it was proposed to deliver the main blow by the forces of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Krakow, Katowice, cut off Germany from its southern allies, and an auxiliary blow by the left wing of the Western Front in the direction of Warsaw, Demboin in order to pin down the Warsaw grouping and capture Warsaw, as well as assist Southwestern Front in the defeat of the Lublin group. At the same time, it was planned to conduct an active defense against Finland, East Prussia, Hungary, Romania and be ready, in a favorable situation, to strike against Romania.

This is how a document appeared, on the basis of which some authors later began to assert that the USSR was preparing for aggression against Germany and its allies. This document was first published in the "Military-Historical Journal" No. 2, 1992. At the same time, the author of the publication, V.N. Kiselev pointed out that it was written by the hand of A.M. Vasilevsky, but not signed by G.K. Zhukov, nor S.K. Tymoshenko, let alone I.V. Stalin. Consequently, it represented only one of the possible options for action, which was not approved and did not receive further development.

Time will pass, and researchers of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War will unanimously begin to accuse I.V. Stalin is that he incorrectly determined the direction of the enemy's main attack. At the same time, these "researchers" completely ignore the factor that since the middle of 1940, almost the entire top of the Red Army consisted of representatives of the Kiev Special Military District, and these people, quite naturally, got used to working in the interests of their region and knew its features better than others. operational directions.

It all started with the appointment of the former commander of KOVO S.K. Tymoshenko, who immediately began to drag his colleagues to Moscow. He invited the former chief of staff of this district N.F. Vatutin for the post of Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Chief of the Mobilization Department of KOVO, Major General N.L. Nikitin - for the post of chief of the Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff. Former commander of the mechanized brigade and head of the armored forces of the KVO I.Ya. Fedorenko becomes the head of the Armored Directorate of the Red Army. Former commander of the 6th Army KOVO F.I. Golikov becomes chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Former member of the Military Council of KOVO Corps Commissioner S.K. Kozhevnikov was appointed to the post of Military Commissioner of the General Staff. After the post of chief of the General Staff instead of K.A. Meretskova, the commander of the KOVO, General G.K. Zhukov, he makes N.F. Vatutin, and the vacated post of Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the KOVO Major General G.K. Malandin. The head of the fortified areas of the KOVO, Major General S.I. Shiryaev.

M.V. Zakharov writes: “The employees nominated for responsible work in the General Staff from the Kiev Special Military District, due to their previous service, continued to attach more importance to the Southwest direction. In assessing the general military-strategic situation in the Western theater of war, their attention, in our opinion, was involuntarily riveted to that which "stuck to the heart", possessed consciousness for a long time and, naturally, overshadowed and relegated to the background the most significant facts and circumstances. without which it was impossible to reproduce the correct picture of the impending events ”. Further, he concludes that “such a method of selecting the leading employees of the General Staff cannot be considered successful. There was no reason or compelling reason to widely renew it in the conditions of the approaching war, and besides, by the experience of their previous activities, there was no reason to assess the situation from the standpoint of the interests of the command of the South-West direction. "

Thus, when developing the main document for the operational use of troops, the General Staff of the Red Army, firstly represented by K.A. Meretskov, and then G.K. Zhukov showed certain hesitations and dragged on time. But on the basis of these considerations, military districts, armies, corps and divisions had to develop their plans.

Based on the Considerations, operational plans were developed to cover the state border of military districts and armies. There was very little time left for this work.

S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov in the General Staff of the Red Army

So, the plan for covering the state border, developed by the General Staff, was brought to the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District in early May 1941. On the basis of this document, the headquarters of the district was supposed to develop and bring to the armies a plan to cover the land border with East Prussia, which was done. The memories of the former commander of the 8th Army, General P.P. Sobennikov. In particular, he writes:

“The post of commander of the army of the border military district obliged me to familiarize myself, first of all, with the plan for the defense of the state border in order to clarify the place and role in this plan of the army entrusted to me. But, unfortunately, neither at the General Staff, nor upon arrival in Riga, at the headquarters of the Baltic Special Military District, I was not informed about the existence of such a plan. Upon arrival at the headquarters of the 8th Army, in Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue. I get the impression that such a plan hardly existed at that time (March 1941). Only on May 28, 1941, I was summoned with the Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General G.A. Larionov. and a member of the Military Council, divisional commissar S.I. Shabalov. to the district headquarters, where the commander of the district troops, Colonel-General F.I. literally hastily introduced me to the defense plan.

At the headquarters of the district that day I met the commander of the 11th army, Lieutenant-General V.I. Morozov, the chief of staff of this army, Major-General Shlemin I.T., the commander of the 27th army, Major-General N.E.Berzarin, his chief of staff and members of the Military Councils of both armies. The commander of the district received the commanders of the armies separately each and, apparently, gave them similar instructions - to urgently familiarize themselves with the defense plan, to make and report to him a decision. "

Further, the commander of the 8th Army recalls that the plan was a rather voluminous notebook, the text in which was typed on a typewriter. Approximately one and a half to two hours after receiving the plan, without having had time to familiarize himself with it, the army commander was summoned to the commander of the district, who in a darkened room dictated to him his decision on defense. It boiled down to concentrating the main efforts of the army on the Šiauliai - Tauragu direction (125th and 90th rifle divisions) and covering the border from the Baltic Sea (Cape Palanga) on a front of about 80 kilometers by forces of one 10th rifle division of the 11th rifle division housing. The 48th Infantry Division was supposed to be transferred to the left flank of the army and to lengthen the defensive front to the left of the 125th Infantry Division, covering the main direction. The 12th Mechanized Corps (commanded by Major General N.M. Shestopalov) was withdrawn north of Shaulai to the second echelon of the army. However, the right to issue an order to the commander of this corps was not given to the commander of the 8th Army. It was to be used by order of the front commander.

After that, workbooks with notes on the defense plan were confiscated from the army commander and his chief of staff. It was promised that these notebooks would be immediately sent to the army headquarters by special mail. “Unfortunately, after that we did not receive any instructions or even our workbooks,” the army commander admits. "Thus, the defense plan was not communicated to the troops."

The situation with operational planning in the troops of the Western Special Military District was no better. For example, the chief of staff of the 10th Army, General P. I Lyapin, writes: “We made and reworked the 1941 state border defense plan from January until the very beginning of the war, but we never finished it. Changes in the first directive for drawing up a plan were received three times during this time, and all three times the plan had to be redone. The last change in the operational directive was personally received by me in Minsk on May 14, in which it was ordered to complete the development of the plan by May 20 and submit it to the district commander for approval. On May 18, the deputy chief of the operational department of the army headquarters, Major Sidorenko, delivered the decision of the army commander on the map to Minsk, which was to be approved by the commander of the district troops. Major Sidorenko returned on the evening of May 19 and reported that Major General Semyonov, the chief of the operational department of the district headquarters, said: "Basically, it is approved, continue the development." Major Sidorenko did not bring any written document confirming the plan.

We did not expect Major Sidorenko's arrival and the instructions that he was supposed to bring from Minsk, but continued to develop a written plan for the defense of the state border, and on May 20 in the evening I reported to the chief of staff of the district: “The plan is ready; development of executive documents. We look forward to your call for a report. " But I did not wait for this challenge before the start of the war. "

In the book "Combat operations of the troops of the 4th Army in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War," the chief of staff of the 4th Army of the Western Special Military District, General L.M. Sandalov writes:

“In April 1941, the command of the 4th Army received a directive from the headquarters of the Western Special Military District, according to which it was necessary to develop a plan for covering, mobilizing, concentrating and deploying troops on the territory of the district ... The army was to form the basis of the 4th (Brest) coverage area.

In accordance with the directive received from the district, an army coverage area was developed ...

The main drawback of the district and army cover plans was their unreality. A significant part of the troops envisaged for performing cover missions did not exist ...

Most bad influence the organization of the defense of the 4th army was affected by the inclusion of half of area No. 3 in its zone ... This determined that in the event of the opening of hostilities, the units of the three divisions (42, 49 and 113) were forced to alert to a distance of 50-75 km.

The unreality of the tasks facing the troops of the RP-4 (4th Army) also consisted in the fact that the Brest fortified region did not yet exist, the field fortifications were not built; the organization of defense on the front over 150 km in a short time by the forces of three rifle divisions, a significant part of which was in the construction of the fortified area, was impracticable.

The task assigned to the 14th Mechanized Corps was also unrealistic. The corps divisions had just received a new replenishment of the rank and file, and had a shortage of tank armament. There is also a lack of the required number of means of thrust for artillery, understaffed rear units and a lack of command personnel ... ".

In his memoirs, the former chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District I.Kh. Baghramyan writes that for the first time he got acquainted with the Plan of covering the state border by the troops of this district at the end of January 1941.

In 1989, Voenizdat published a book by A.V. Vladimirsky "On the Kiev direction", compiled from the experience of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front in June - September 1941. In it, the author, on the basis of the newly discovered documents, considered this issue in some detail, made a number of competent, well-grounded conclusions. On the implementation of the plan for covering and training army troops, the author writes: “The mobilization plans in all rifle formations and units were worked out. They were systematically checked by higher headquarters, refined and corrected. The assignment to formations and units of personnel, mechanized transport, horses, transport and clothing property at the expense of the resources of the national economy was basically completed (except for the 135th rifle division). "

But it should be noted that A.V. Vladimirsky writes about a mobilization plan, not an operational plan for covering the state border, which, in terms of their tasks and content, are completely different documents. The first one talks about how to assemble troops, the second one - how to use them to solve the current combat mission.

To answer the second question, we take the memoirs of the former chief of staff of the 15th Rifle Corps, Major General Z.Z. Rogozny. This corps was supposed to form the basis of the defense sector No. 1 of the cover area of ​​the 5th Army. Z.Z. Rogozny writes that the commander, the chief of staff of the corps, as well as all division commanders who understood the combat missions facing them, were familiarized with the defense plan on the eve of the war at the army headquarters. However, the staffs of the corps and divisions did not have documents regarding defense plans, therefore, they did not develop their own plans.

The commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps, Major General G.I. Sherstyuk writes that while studying the plans for the combat readiness of the units of the 45th Infantry Division, he was surprised that the leading officers of the division headquarters (chief of staff - Colonel Chumakov) and the commanders of rifle and artillery regiments with their headquarters "did not know the line of defense of the state border" , and therefore, did not work out the issues of "advancing, occupying defensive lines and conducting a battle to hold the state border, as it was played when I was in command of the 97th rifle division of the 6th army."

Former chief of staff of the 62nd Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army P.A. Novichkov wrote that the division did not have any written document on the organization of the defense of the state border by the beginning of the war. However, he confirms the fact that in early April the commanders and chiefs of staff of the 87th and 45th rifle divisions were summoned to the headquarters of the 5th Army, where they received maps on a scale of 1: 100,000 and made copies of the battalion areas from the army plan with their own hands. engineering equipment of defense bands of formations.

In the 6th Army, on the basis of the Covering Plan for the Kiev Special Military District, the commander and headquarters developed a Covering Plan for Region No. 2. The same plans were in place in the 62nd and 12th armies of this district. But they were not communicated to the subordinate units.

Thus, the commander of the 72nd Rifle Division of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army, Colonel P.I. After the war, Abramidze wrote in his memoirs that he did not know the mobilization plan (MP-41) before the start of the war. True, after opening the package, he was convinced that all command and staff exercises and other preparatory work on the eve of the war were carried out in strict accordance with this plan.

The headquarters of the Odessa military district, according to the recollections of the head of the operational department of the 9th army G.F. Zakharova, received the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense on the development of the State Border Covering Plan on May 6, 1941. In this directive, the tasks of the district troops were formulated in general terms.

The plan for covering the state border was presented to the General Staff by the headquarters of the Odessa Military District on June 20, 1941. Colonel L.V. Vetoshnikov. He arrived in Moscow when the war had already begun. But the headquarters of the Odessa Military District, without waiting for the official approval of the plan by the General Staff, gave instructions to the corps commanders on the development of plans for the formations.

* * *

Thus, in the first half of 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army carried out a lot of work to strengthen the Red Army, to equip the theater of operations, to reconnaissance of a potential enemy and to plan military actions in the event of a war. At the same time, this work was mainly carried out at the level of the General Staff, the headquarters of the military districts and the headquarters of the armies covering the state border. This work did not go down to the level of corps, divisions and regiments in full. Therefore, it is quite appropriate to say that the Great Patriotic War was sudden only at the tactical level.

The work of the Soviet General Staff lacked the necessary clarity. Many events were planned and carried out spontaneously, without a specific assessment of the country's capabilities and conditions of the current situation. Huge efforts were spent on the engineering equipment of the new border of the USSR, despite the fact that world experience spoke of the low effectiveness of such defensive lines in the new conditions of warfare.

There are many incomprehensible things in the work of Soviet foreign intelligence. On the one hand, she received the necessary information about Germany's preparation for aggression against the USSR, on the other hand, this information was not enough to make a decision by the top Soviet leadership. This means that it was either incomplete or stuck on the way to the Kremlin and the People's Commissariat of Defense.

A lot of questions arise related to the development by the General Staff of the main guiding documents in case of war. The quality of these documents can be considered good, but the deadlines were too long, which nullified all the huge work done. As a result, the troops were forced to enter the war without the necessary combat documents.

The result of all these factors was that many defensive measures were not planned or carried out until June 21, 1941, by the time the impending war had already become a fact.

Personnel and leadership of the General Staff in the period (1941-1945)

During the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff was the main working body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for strategic planning and leadership of the armed forces at the fronts. The chiefs of the General Staff were:

Shaposhnikov B.M. (August 1941 - May 1942),

Vasilevsky A.M. (June 1942 - February 1945),

Antonov A.I. (since February 1945).

The General Staff was figuratively called the "brain of the army," and very high demands were always made on the personality of its chief. The chief of the General Staff must have extensive military knowledge, an analytical mind, and extensive experience in staff service. It takes many years to gain experience. Therefore, being in the position of chief of the General Staff for 8-10 years was considered a normal thing.

A special place among all Soviet chiefs of the General Staff was occupied by Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, a career officer in the tsarist army, a well-educated man who had served for a long time in the headquarters. The extraordinary abilities and deep military-theoretical training received by Boris Mikhailovich at the Academy of the General Staff helped him to rise to the rank of colonel while still in the tsarist army. From April 1918 he began his service in the Red Army. Commander of the troops of the Moscow, Volga, Leningrad military districts; chief and military commissar of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze; Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR - this is not a complete track record of B.M. Shaposhnikov, who received the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union in May 1940.

He was deservedly called "the patriarch of the General Staff". The legendary General Staff personality - Boris Shaposhnikov - a major tactician and strategist, a military thinker - the creator of the Soviet school of General Staff officers. Shaposhnikov B.M. made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of building the Armed Forces of the USSR, to their strengthening and improvement, to the training of military personnel. In 1923 he published a major scientific study of the tactics and organization of cavalry - "Cavalry", and a year later - the book "On the Vistula", summarizing the combat experience of the First World War and the Civil War.

In 1927-1929. published his three-volume work "The Brain of the Army", devoted to the work of the General Staff, economic and political issues of warfare. In this fundamental work, Boris Mikhailovich defined the basic provisions on the nature of a future war, revealed the features of army leadership in a war and gave a clear idea of ​​the role, functions and structure of the General Staff as the body of the Supreme Command for managing the Armed Forces. The appearance of the work "The Brain of the Army" aroused great interest, both among the command staff of the Red Army, and was highly appreciated in the pages of the military press abroad. As Chief of the General Staff, Shaposhnikov purposefully sought to implement the ideas expressed by him, consistently resolving issues related to centralization in the leadership of the Armed Forces, fought for the implementation of clear regulation of the staff service at all levels.

Back in the late 1930s, Boris Mikhailovich, who is well versed in operational and strategic issues, became one of Stalin's main advisers on military issues, being in 1937-1940. Chief of the General Staff. However, the plan for conducting a campaign with Finland, prepared by the General Staff, and suggesting the use of not only the troops of the Leningrad Military District, but also additional reserves in the upcoming war, was sharply criticized by Stalin as overestimating the capabilities of the Finnish army. As a result, Shaposhnikov was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff, and the war with the Finns that began soon showed that the General Staff was right. Thus, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the General Staff were successively led by Generals Meretskov K.A. and Zhukov G.K., who came to the highest army positions quite recently. Errors in their activities were an inevitable consequence of the lack of experience in commanding troops on a national scale. At the same time, we must not forget that a shadow of terror hung invisibly over each supreme commander. Neither Shaposhnikov, nor Zhukov, and no one else dared to argue with Stalin on issues of principle, remembering that it was very easy to get into the basement on the Lubyanka.

By order of Stalin I.V. on the very first day of the war, June 22, a group of senior officials was sent from the central office of the General Staff to help the front commanders, including the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, his first deputy, Lieutenant-General N.F. Vatutin, as well as Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov From July 1941, Shaposhnikov was chief of staff of the Western Direction, then again chief of the General Staff and a member of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov headed the General Staff of the Red Army during the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War, from July 20, 1941 to May 11, 1942.

In the General Staff, B.M. Shaposhnikov quickly carried out a number of organizational measures that improved the work of the Supreme Command Headquarters. Under his leadership, the General Staff became the center of operational and strategic planning, a true organizer of military operations of the army and navy. Gradually and far from immediately, the General Staff - the most important governing body - acquired its inherent role, becoming a working (and, in fact, an intellectual) body of the General Headquarters.

The most important issues of strategic planning were previously discussed at the Headquarters in a narrow circle of people - IV Stalin, BM Shaposhnikov, GK Zhukov, AM Vasilevsky, NG Kuznetsov. Usually, a decision in principle was first outlined, which was then considered by the Central Committee of the party or the GKO. Only after this did the General Staff begin to plan and prepare in detail a campaign or a strategic operation. At this stage, front commanders and specialists were involved in strategic planning - the chief of the rear, Khrulev L.V., the commander of the artillery of the Red Army Voronov N.N., the commander of the aviation Novikov L.A., the commander of the armored forces Fedorenko Ya.N. other.

"Staff work," Shaposhnikov said more than once, "should help the commander to organize the battle; the headquarters is the first organ through which the commander implements his decisions ... In modern conditions, without a well-organized headquarters, one cannot think of good command and control of troops." Under the leadership of Boris Mikhailovich, a regulation was developed that regulated the work of front-line directorates and directorates of the General Staff, which to a large extent ensured the reliable fulfillment of the tasks of the Headquarters. Shaposhnikov paid paramount attention to improving the strategic leadership of troops, establishing uninterrupted command and control at all levels, took energetic measures to improve the activities of front-line, armies and military headquarters.

Under his direct leadership, it was promptly carried out to pull up reserves from the depths of the country, to clarify the combat composition of the troops of the active army after the brutal blows of the enemy. In the difficult situation that developed during the first months of the war, Boris Mikhailovich did a lot for the army and the country. With his direct participation, a plan for the Battle of Smolensk, a counteroffensive near Moscow, a number of important operations during the Battle of Leningrad, planning and preparation of a general offensive in the winter of 1942 were developed. "The main burden of leadership of the General Staff lay on the shoulders of Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. he managed to carry out all the necessary work in the General Staff and, moreover, he played an important role in Headquarters. ”My heart sank every time we saw our chief: he was unusually stooped, coughed, but never complained. ", - from the memoirs of General of the Army S.M. Shtemenko.

A man of great charm, laconic, with outward restraint and striving to keep away from the political scene, Boris Mikhailovich treated his young employees with true paternal warmth: “If something went wrong with us, he did not scold, did not even raise his voice, but only asked reproachfully:

What are you, my dear?

The word "darling" was his favorite. Depending on the intonation and stress, it determined the position of the marshal, "SM Shtemenko recalled.

“His deep knowledge and erudition in various areas of military affairs sometimes simply shocked. In my opinion, this was often used by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. At meetings at Headquarters, he, before making his conclusion on some issue, suggested that Shaposhnikov speak out. using his many years of experience as a general staff officer, as a rule, he put forward reasoned proposals, "wrote Admiral N. Kuznetsov. Boris Mikhailovich had an amazing ability to memorize details, the interlocutor had the impression that he knew the work of the classic of military art Karl von Clausewitz "On War" - by heart. His great diligence and ability to work with people had a huge impact on the formation of the personalities of the employees of the General Staff. His politeness in relations with subordinates, modesty and great tact, as well as discipline and utmost diligence, personal authority - all this brought up in the people who worked with him a sense of responsibility and a high culture of behavior.

Shaposhnikov B.M. enjoyed great respect for I. Stalin. Vasilevsky A.V. He wrote about this: “When my first trips with Boris Mikhailovich to the Kremlin took place, the first meetings with members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally with Stalin, I had the opportunity to make sure that Shaposhnikov enjoyed special respect there. Stalin only called him Only he was allowed to smoke in his office, and in conversation with him he never raised his voice, if he did not share the point of view expressed by him on the issue under discussion. But this is a purely external side of their relationship. that Shaposhnikov's proposals, always deeply thought out and deeply reasoned, as a rule, did not meet with special objections. "

The hard work of the Chief of the General Staff, frequent lack of sleep - as a result of extreme fatigue at the end of November 1941, led to Boris Mikhailovich's illness, he had to interrupt work for almost two weeks. By mid-March, the General Staff completed all the justifications and calculations for the plan of operations for the spring and early summer of 1942. The main idea of ​​the plan: active strategic defense, the accumulation of reserves, and then the transition to a decisive offensive. Boris Mikhailovich reported on the plan To the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, then work on the plan continued. Stalin agreed with the proposals and conclusions of the Chief of the General Staff. At the same time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief provided for the conduct of private offensive operations in a number of areas.

Although Shaposhnikov did not consider such a solution as optimal, he did not consider it possible to further defend his opinion. He was guided by the rule: the Chief of the General Staff has extensive information, but the Supreme Commander-in-Chief assesses the situation from a higher, most authoritative position. In particular, Stalin gave Timoshenko consent to develop an operation with the aim of crushing the enemy's Kharkov grouping with the available forces and means of the South-West direction. Shaposhnikov, given the riskiness of an offensive from the operational bag, which was the Barvenkovsky ledge for the troops of the South-Western Front, intended for this operation, made a proposal to refrain from carrying it out. However, his opinion was not taken into account. The offensive of the Southwestern Front was unsuccessful. As a result, both the situation and the balance of forces in the south changed sharply in favor of the Germans, and they changed exactly where the enemy had planned his summer offensive. This ensured the success of his breakthrough to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

Shaposhnikov B.M. was ill, and hard work could not but affect his health - in the spring of 1942 his illness worsened. Boris Mikhailovich applied to the State Defense Committee with a request to transfer him to another area of ​​work. The post of Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov was replaced by his deputy, General of the Army A.M. Vasilevsky. Boris Mikhailovich was still the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, and from June 1943 - the head of the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy. On behalf of the State Defense Committee, he supervised the development of new charters and manuals. In a short time, the commission, which Shaposhnikov B.M. headed, considered the projects of the new Combat Regulations of the infantry, Field Regulations, combat regulations of the combat arms. On March 26, 1945, 45 days before the Victory, Shaposhnikov died.

Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich was born on September 18, 1895 in the village of Novaya Golchikha near Kineshma on the Volga in a large family of an Orthodox priest. Alexander Vasilevsky began his education at the theological school in Kineshma, which he finished in 1909. Then he continued his education at the theological seminary in Kostroma. Already a well-known Soviet military leader, Alexander Mikhailovich was forced to disown his parents as "alien class elements" and for many years did not even correspond with his father. Perhaps Alexander would have become a priest, although he dreamed of becoming an agronomist, but the First World War began. "In my youth, it is very difficult to solve the problem of which way to go. And in this sense, I always sympathize with those who choose the path. I, in the end, became a military man. But the passion for the earth has not disappeared. I think every person, one way or another, experiences this feeling. I really love the smell of thawed earth, green leaves and the first grass ... ", - recalled Marshal AM Vasilevsky.

After passing the exam for the fourth year of the seminary as an external student and applying for permission to volunteer to go to the front, he received a referral to the Alekseevsk military school, which at that time was preparing accelerated graduations. This school, created in 1864 in Lefortovo, was first called the Moscow infantry cadet school, and in 1906 by decree of Nicholas II it was renamed in honor of the birth of the heir to the throne. "By rank" it was considered the third - after Pavlovsky and Aleksandrovsky - and mainly children of commoners studied in it. Four months later, graduation took place in an accelerated wartime training course. In the autumn and winter of 1915, in the mud and cold, there were battles with the Austro-Hungarian army. They lived right in the trenches: they dug dugouts for two or three people, slept in an overcoat, spreading one floor and covering themselves with the other. By the spring, his company becomes the best in the regiment in discipline and combat capability. For two years on the front line, without vacations and normal rest, the real character of a warrior was forged in battles and campaigns. During the First World War, Alexander Vasilevsky commanded a company, a battalion, and rose to the rank of staff captain. He had authority with progressive-minded officers.

In the Red Army, Alexander Mikhailovich from May 1919 to November 1919 - assistant platoon commander, company commander, for two months - battalion commander: from January 1920 to April 1923 - assistant regiment commander; to September - the temporary acting commander of the regiment, to December 1924 - the head of the divisional school and until May 1931 - the commander of a rifle regiment. From 1931 to 1936 Alexander Mikhailovich went through the school of staff service at the People's Commissariat of Defense and the headquarters of the Volga Military District. In the fall of 1936, Colonel Vasilevsky was sent to the newly created Academy of the General Staff. His extraordinary abilities allowed him to successfully graduate from the Academy of the General Staff and head the department of operational training in the General Staff. Out of 137 comrades Vasilevsky in the Academy - the best of the best - who were specially selected for the course by the Central Committee of the party, only 30 graduated from the Academy, the rest were repressed.

Since October 4, 1937 Vasilevsky A.M. began service in the General Staff, under the command of Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov. A great success in life for the future marshal was a meeting with BM Shaposhnikov, who possessed the richest erudition, an excellently trained memory, worked, by his own admission, to the point of exhaustion. Outstanding theoretical knowledge was happily combined with practical experience. As a professional, Boris Mikhailovich did not like half-educated people, overlooked people, arrogant and narcissistic people. Only those who graduated with honors from military academies were invited to the General Staff. He conquered his subordinates with politeness, restraint, respect for their opinions. For these reasons, the relatively small collective of the General Staff as a whole successfully fulfilled its mission in the most difficult conditions of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In addition, Shaposhnikov enjoyed the rare confidence of I. Stalin, who highly appreciated the professional qualities of the largest General Staff officer.

Shaposhnikov introduced I.V. Vasilevsky. Stalin. His recommendation, multiplied by the talent and efficiency of Alexander Mikhailovich himself, sharply raised his authority in the eyes of the leader. After the bloody Soviet-Finnish war, it was Vasilevsky (according to the general instructions of Stalin) that develops a draft of a new border and for two months heads the commission for its implementation - negotiates with the Finnish side. It was he who, as a military expert, went to Berlin as part of the delegation of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars V.M. Molotov for talks with Hitler and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Vasilevsky was the main executor of the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in case of aggression in the West and in the East.

At the end of July 1941, Alexander Mikhailovich was appointed Chief of the Operations Directorate and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The first two months of the war, he literally did not leave the General Staff, slept there, four to five hours a day. "A distinctive feature of Alexander Mikhailovich has always been trust in his subordinates, deep respect for people, respect for their dignity. He subtly understood how difficult it is to maintain organization and clarity in a critical environment of the unfavorable start of the war for us, and tried to unite the team, create such a working a situation where the pressure of the authorities would not be felt at all, but only the strong shoulder of an older, more experienced comrade was felt, on which, if necessary, you can rely. For warmth, sincerity, and sincerity we all paid him the same. , but also with universal love ", - this is how SM Vasilevsky recalled. Shtemenko ("General Staff during the War").

Having become the second in his role in the General Staff, Vasilevsky, together with B.M. Shaposhnikov, who replaced G.K. Zhukov at the post of Chief of the General Staff, visited the Headquarters every day, and sometimes several times a day, participated in the consideration of all important issues of conducting military operations, increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces. Alexander Mikhailovich, with the participation of eight general staff officers, prepared all the necessary information about the situation at the fronts, presented recommendations on the distribution of incoming forces and equipment for the troops on the front line, proposals for the rearrangement and promotion of military personnel. The General Staff, most of the war was in Moscow on Kirov Street. The Kirovskaya metro station served as a bomb shelter for the operational staff of the headquarters. It was closed for passengers - trains passed without stopping. The station hall was fenced off from the track and divided into work rooms. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and members of the Politburo who were in Moscow also descended here during the air raid. “The work of the Headquarters was structured in a special way. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in order to work out one or another operational-strategic decision or to consider other important problems of armed struggle, summoned responsible persons who were directly related to the issue in question. members of the Politburo, leaders of industry, commanders summoned from the front. Everything that was worked out here during mutual consultations and discussions was immediately formalized in the directives of the General Headquarters to the fronts. This form of work was effective, "recalled Marshal AM Vasilevsky.

During the battle near Moscow, Alexander Mikhailovich became a lieutenant general, received the first light wound, and became even closer to the front commander G.K. Zhukov. At the most critical moments of the defense, Vasilevsky softened, as best he could, the anger of the Supreme Commander towards Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Konev. According to the memoirs of K.M. Simonov "Alexander Mikhailovich combined unswerving will and amazing sensitivity, delicacy and sincerity." On June 24, 1942, in the most difficult time for the country and the Red Army, Alexander Mikhailovich became chief of the General Staff, and from October 15, 1942 - simultaneously the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. He performed an enormous amount of work as the chief of the General Staff and at the same time as a representative of the General Headquarters on the fronts. Military statistics have calculated that during the 34 military months of being Chief of the General Staff, Alexander Mikhailovich worked for 22 months at the fronts, coordinating their actions in the most important strategic operations, and only 12 months in Moscow.

Zhukov G.K. this is what he writes in his memoirs about AM Vasilevsky: “Alexander Mikhailovich was not mistaken in assessing the operational-strategic situation. Therefore, it was him who was sent by IV Stalin to the responsible sectors of the Soviet-German front as a representative of Headquarters. Vasilevsky's talent as a military leader of a large scale and a deep military thinker unfolded in full. , should not be taken. " Front trips did not always end happily. On the day of the liberation of Sevastopol, Vasilevsky decided to see the city glorified in glory. There were a lot of cars going along it. One by one, they carried soldiers and ammunition. We arrived at the Mekenziev mountains. And suddenly under the wheels of the car - an explosion. They ran into a mine. There was a blow of such force that the engine was thrown aside. Alexander Mikhailovich was wounded in the head.

Zhukov G.K. and Vasilevsky A.M. prepared a plan for a counteroffensive, encirclement and defeat of the largest group of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad, and then successfully implemented it. A.M. Vasilevsky Stavka entrusted the coordination of the actions of all three fronts of the Stalingrad direction during the counteroffensive. With this mission, he, as a representative of the General Headquarters, will stay on the Stalingrad Front until great victory on the Volga. However, after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, the tension in Vasilevsky's activities did not subside. A.M. Vasilevsky was still torn between the leadership of the General Staff and business trips to the front. February 16, 1943 A.M. Vasilevsky was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. On behalf of the Headquarters, Alexander Mikhailovich coordinated the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in the Battle of Kursk. In the Battle of Kursk, the best military strategist of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Manstein, fought against Vasilevsky.

Then Vasilevsky A.M. supervised the planning and implementation of operations for the liberation of Donbass, Northern Tavria, the Kryvyi Rih-Nikopol operation, the operation for the liberation of the Crimea, the Belarusian operation. In Operation Bagration, he coordinated the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. For exemplary fulfillment of the Headquarters' assignments for the management of these operations, Alexander Mikhailovich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on July 29, 1944, with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. After the death of General I.D. Chernyakhovsky from February 1945 commanded the 3rd Belorussian Front in the East Prussian operation, which ended with the famous assault on Konigsberg. In four days, from 6 to 9 April, the front troops captured this "absolutely impregnable bastion of the German spirit." On April 25, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, with the active participation of the Baltic Fleet, occupied the port and the Pillau fortress - the last stronghold of Germany on the Zemland Peninsula.

In July 1945 A.M. Vasilevsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East. In just 24 days, Soviet and Mongolian troops were able to defeat the millionth Kwantung Army in Manchuria. The second medal "Gold Star" Vasilevsky A.M. was awarded on September 8, 1945 for the skillful leadership of Soviet troops in the Far East during the war with Japan.

In relation to Stalin, Vasilevsky A.M. believed that he was an "extraordinary person, with a complex, contradictory nature. Due to his position, he had a special responsibility. He was deeply aware of this responsibility. However, this does not mean that he did not make mistakes. At the beginning of the war, he clearly overestimated his strengths. and knowledge in the leadership of the war, the main issues of the extremely difficult front situation he tried to solve alone, which often led to an even greater complication of the situation and heavy losses. " Being a man of strong will, but with an extremely unbalanced and tough character, Stalin at that time of serious setbacks at the front often lost his temper, sometimes venting his anger on people who were hard to blame. But we must say frankly: Stalin not only deeply experienced his mistakes made in the first years of the war, but also managed to draw the correct conclusions from them. Since the Stalingrad operation, his attitude towards everyone who took part in the development of strategically important decisions has changed dramatically for the better. True, few dared to argue with Stalin. But he himself, listening to sometimes very heated debates, caught the truth and was able to change what seemed to be a decision that had already been made. It must be said bluntly: the Headquarters kept its finger on the pulse of the war all the time.

In March 1946, Alexander Mikhailovich again headed the General Staff, in 1949-1953. Vasilevsky - Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1953-1956. he was the first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, but on March 15, 1956 he was dismissed from his post at a personal request, but already in August 1956 he was again appointed deputy minister of defense of the USSR for military science. In December 1957, he was "dismissed due to illness with the right to wear a military uniform," and in January 1959 he was again returned to the Armed Forces and was appointed inspector general of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense (until December 5, 1977). Died A.M. Vasilevsky December 5, 1977 Vasilevsky A.M. was buried. on Red Square in Moscow near the Kremlin wall. His words sound like a parting word in life for today's youth: "I must tell young people about the main value in human life. Motherland is our main wealth. Appreciate and cherish this wealth. Think not about what the Motherland can give you. Think about that. what can you give to the Motherland. This is the main key to a well-meaningful life. "

Aleksemy Innokemnt'evich Antomnov was born on September 15, 1896 in the city of Grodno, in the family of an officer of the 26th artillery brigade. The Antonov family was an ordinary family of a battery commander with a small income. In 1915, Alexei entered the St. Petersburg University, but soon, due to material difficulties, he was forced to interrupt his studies and go to work at the plant.

In 1916, Alexei Antonov was drafted into the army and sent to the Pavlovsk military school. At the end of the training course, the newly-made warrant officer is appointed to the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment.

While participating in the battles on the fields of the First World War, a young officer A. Antonov was wounded and awarded the Order of St. Anna, IV degree with the inscription “For Bravery”. After his recovery, the soldiers elect him to be assistant regimental adjutant.

In May 1918, Warrant Officer Antonov was transferred to the reserve. He studied at the evening courses of the Forestry Institute, worked in the food committee of Petrograd, and in April 1919 he was drafted into the Red Army. From that moment, Alexey Innokentyevich devoted his whole life to serving the Motherland in the ranks of its Armed Forces. He began his service as assistant chief of staff of the 1st Moscow Workers' Division, which fought on the Southern Front. After heavy fighting in June 1919, the remnants of this division were transferred to the 15th Inza Rifle Division. In this division A.I. Antonov served until August 1928, holding various staff positions. For active participation in the crossing of the Sivash, he was awarded the Honorary Arms of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and in 1923 he was awarded the Certificate of Honor.

In 1928, the young commander entered the Frunze Academy, after which he was appointed chief of staff of the 46th rifle division in the city of Korosten. In 1933, he graduated from the operational department of the same academy and again left for his previous position. In October 1934 A.I. Antonov became chief of staff of the Mogilev-Yampolsky fortified area, and in August 1935 - chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the Kharkov military district.

In October 1936, the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army was opened. Among the first students of this educational institution were A.M. Vasilevsky, L.A. Govorov, I.Kh. Baghramyan, N.F. Vatutin and A.I. Antonov.

After graduating from the academy in 1937, Alexey Innokentievich was appointed chief of staff of the Moscow Military District.

At the end of 1938 A.I. Antonov was appointed senior teacher, and after a while - deputy head of the department of general tactics of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze. In February 1940 he was awarded the academic title of Associate Professor, and in June of the same year - military rank major general. In March 1941 A.I. Antonov was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District.

The Great Patriotic War began. In August 1941, Major General A.I. Antonov was appointed chief of staff of the Southern Front. By this time, the troops of the front were engaged in intense defensive battles. In the course of these battles, the headquarters of the Southern Front prepared and carried out the Rostov offensive operation in November, as a result of which the 1st German Panzer Army was defeated. Rostov-on-Don was liberated, and the enemy was driven back from this city for 60 - 80 kilometers. For successful actions in the Rostov operation A.I. Antonov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, he was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general. Since July 1942, Aleksey Innokentyevich consistently headed the headquarters of the North Caucasian Front, the Black Sea Group of Forces and the Transcaucasian Front. The troops of these fronts, displaying exceptional resilience, stopped the enemy, preventing him from seizing the Black Sea coast and breaking through into the Transcaucasus. For flexible and skillful leadership of the troops, Lieutenant General A.I. Antonov was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. In December 1942, by order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, Alexey Innokentyevich was appointed first deputy chief of the General Staff and chief of the Operations Directorate. From that time on, A.I. Antonov in this supreme governing body of the Red Army.

The work in the General Staff is complex and multifaceted. Its functions included the collection and processing of operational-strategic information about the situation on the fronts, the preparation of operational calculations and proposals for the use of the Armed Forces, the direct development of plans for military campaigns and strategic operations in theaters of military operations. Based on the decisions of the Headquarters and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the General Staff prepared directives for the commanders of the fronts, fleets and services of the Armed Forces and their headquarters, prepared orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, monitored their implementation, and monitored the preparation of strategic reserves and their correct use.

The General Staff was also entrusted with the task of generalizing the advanced combat experience of large formations, formations and units. The General Staff developed the most important provisions in the field of military theory, prepared proposals and applications for the production of military equipment and weapons. He was also responsible for coordinating the hostilities of partisan formations with the formations of the Red Army.

In January 1943, General A.I. Antonov, as a representative of the Headquarters, was sent to the Bryansk, and then to the Voronezh and Central fronts. The Voronezh-Kastornenskaya operation, during which Alexey Innokentyevich was coordinating the actions of the troops, was successfully completed. The cities of Voronezh and Kursk were liberated. According to A.M. Vasilevsky Lieutenant General A.I. Antonov was awarded the 1st degree Order of Suvorov. At the end of this business trip, Alexey Innokentievich began to visit Headquarters several times a day. He carefully analyzed the information coming from the fronts, listened to many generals and officers, coordinated the most important issues with the front command and reported proposals to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In April 1943 A.I. Antonov was awarded the military rank of Colonel-General, and in May he was relieved of his duties as Chief of the Operations Directorate, remaining the first deputy chief of the General Staff.

The first large strategic operation, in the planning of which A.I. Antonov was directly involved, there was the Battle of Kursk. For organizing and preparing this battle, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree. Preparing by the enemy for a powerful offensive on the Kursk Bulge, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to oppose a deeply echeloned, insurmountable defense, bleed the German troops, and then complete their defeat with a counteroffensive. As a result, the Red Army inflicted a defeat on the enemy from which Nazi Germany was no longer able to recover. A solid foundation was created for carrying out broad offensive operations along the entire front in order to completely expel the enemy from Soviet territory.

For a brilliantly planned and successfully carried out operation on the Kursk Bulge in August 1943, A.I. Antonov was awarded the military rank of General of the Army. The Belarusian operation became important in the life of Aleksey Innokentyevich. In the course of its preparation and implementation, his outstanding organizational skills and strategic talents were fully revealed. On May 20, 1944, the general presented to the Headquarters a plan for this operation, which received the code name "Bagration". A tremendous amount of work was carried out on the covert concentration of troops and military equipment, measures to misinform the enemy. The offensive that began came as a complete surprise to the Nazi troops.

As a result of powerful blows from four fronts, Soviet troops defeated Army Group Center, liberated Belarus, part of Lithuania and Latvia, entered Poland and approached the borders of East Prussia, advancing 550-600 kilometers and expanding the offensive front by more than 1000 kilometers. For organizing and conducting this operation, Alexey Innokentyevich was again awarded the Order of Suvorov, I degree.

The Belarusian operation further strengthened the business relations of A.I. Antonov with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It was during this period that I.V. Stalin more and more often entrusts Aleksey Innokentyevich with responsible tasks, listens to him attentively, especially on operational issues. Much more often the Supreme Commander-in-Chief began to turn to him on numerous problems of relations with the allies. The famous aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev wrote: "Antonov was very close to Stalin, who reckoned with his opinion, had obvious sympathy and trust for him, spent long hours with him, discussed the situation at the front and planned future operations."

The commanders of the troops who came to Headquarters, before going to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, went to A.I. Antonov and consulted with him on their plans and all questions of preparation for military operations. Representatives of the Headquarters, sending their reports to I.V. Stalin, they certainly sent a copy of them to “Comrade Antonov,” knowing that the general would undertake everything necessary according to these reports accurately and on time.

In the second half of 1944, it became clear that it was A.I. Antonov will be instructed to lead a group of Soviet military experts at the upcoming conference of the heads of three governments. The Crimean Conference began its work on February 4, 1945 with a discussion of military issues. The heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain examined the situation on the European fronts. General of the Army A.I. Antonov. During the negotiations, he was given the responsibility to coordinate actions strategic aviation allies. In February 1945, Alexey Innokentyevich was awarded the Order of Lenin. Introducing him to this award, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: “General of the Army Antonov AI, being the First Deputy of the beginning. General Staff, in fact, since the spring of 1943, bears the entire burden of the work of the beginning. Of the General Staff at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and copes with it completely. Supervises the work of the entire Central Office of NGOs ”. After the death of I.D. Chernyakhovsky, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front was appointed A.M. Vasilevsky, and A.I. Antonov became chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. At the same time, he was included in the Supreme Command Headquarters. A map of Berlin and the surrounding areas appeared on Aleksey Innokentyevich's desk in the summer of 1944, during the period of the Belarusian operation. And on April 1, 1945, at the Headquarters, his report on the general plan of the Berlin operation was heard. In ten days, Soviet troops surrounded the enemy's Berlin grouping and joined up with the Allied forces on the Elbe River. On May 8, 1945, Germany signed an act of unconditional surrender, and a few days later Soviet troops defeated a grouping of the German fascist army in Czechoslovakia. June 4, 1945 “for the skillful fulfillment of the assignments of the Supreme High Command in the conduct of large-scale combat operations” General of the Army A.I. Antonov was awarded the highest military leader's order "Victory".

In early June 1945, the General Staff under the leadership of A.I. Antonova together with A.M. Vasilevsky completed the development of a plan for a war with Japan. At the Potsdam conference, the general informed the military representatives of the United States and Great Britain about this. August 7 I.V. Stalin and A.I. Antonov signed an order to start hostilities against Japan on the morning of August 9. In the difficult conditions of this theater of war, the Red Army dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese armed forces. Soviet troops completely liberated Manchuria, the Liaodong Peninsula, North Korea, the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands. Immediately after the end of the war in Europe, the General Staff began to develop a plan for the demobilization of older soldiers from the army and navy and their quickest return home and involvement in the reconstruction of the country. During 1945, all fronts and many armies, corps and individual units were disbanded, the number of military educational institutions was reduced. In March 1946, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky again assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff, and General of the Army A.I. Antonov became his first deputy. It was he who was entrusted with all the responsibility for the implementation of the Law on demobilization and the conduct of a number of other organizational measures.

During 1945-1948, more than 8 million people were demobilized, the personnel troops were organizationally consolidated into military districts. At the end of 1948, the general was appointed first deputy, and since 1950 - the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. Now the life and activity of the troops was based not on battles and battles, but on combat training in peacetime. It was required to deal with the training of commanders and staffs of the tactical and operational level, study new military equipment and weapons. In the fall of 1953, in the Transcaucasian Military District, under the leadership of General of the Army A.I. Antonov, major maneuvers were carried out, in which the personnel showed exceptional physical endurance, moral endurance and military skill. In 1949, the military-political NATO bloc was created. The so-called "cold war" began. In response, on May 14, 1955, the Soviet Union and its allies signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Military Assistance in Warsaw. A year before the creation of the Warsaw Pact organization, General of the Army A.I. Antonov was again appointed First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and a member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense. And with the signing of the Treaty, he was elected Secretary General of the Political Advisory Committee and appointed Chief of Staff of the United Armed Forces. While in this post, Alexey Innokentyevich devoted a lot of time to the development of issues of an operational, organizational and military-scientific nature, to the implementation of measures for technical equipment troops, their combat and operational training. In a short time, the command apparatus for the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries was established, and training of troops for joint actions in modern warfare was organized. The indefatigable chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces personally participated in many exercises of the troops of the allied countries, helping our friends and sharing with them his invaluable experience. Since 1946, for 16 years A.I. Antonov was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He often met with his voters, was sensitive to their requests, suggestions and requests.

general staff war patriotic

In the first game, the North-Western Front of the “eastern” was headed by the commander of the Western Special Military District, Colonel-General of Tank Forces D. G. Pavlov, and the opposing North-Eastern Front of the “Western” was headed by the commander of the Kiev Special Military District, General of the Army G. K . Zhukov. In the second game, they were switched sides: the South-Western Front of the “Eastern” was commanded by G.K. Zhukov, from the opposite side of the South-Eastern Front - by D.G. Pavlov, and the Southern Front - by the commander of the Baltic Special Military District, Lieutenant General F.I Kuznetsov.
What did you find out as a result of the analysis of the documents of the games?
First of all, the fact that the developers of the game script from the General Staff, as it turned out, were not much mistaken with the date of the possible start of the war: according to the tasks for the games, the "western" together with their allies, without completing the deployment, carried out an attack on the "eastern" on July 15, 1941 d. This is an extremely important fact for the discussion of the events of 1941: even in documents reliably hidden from prying eyes, the games “eastern” (ie, the USSR) were viewed not as an attacker, but as an object of aggression by their western neighbors. Thus, for six months before June 22, the question of an attack on Germany was not worked out, since it was not raised. MI Meltyukhov believes that the decision on war with Germany and the plan for such a war were adopted on October 14, 1940. in view of MI Meltyukhov, all possible opponents of the USSR were considered both in the West and in the East. And although Germany was considered the main, most powerful enemy, the document does not even contain a hint that the USSR could unleash a war against it. In the event of an attack by Germany, “Considerations ...” listed as a priority task: “1. To firmly cover our borders with active defense during the period of concentration of troops. "

The beginning of the war with the USSR in Germany was viewed in a completely different way. The General Staff of the Ground Forces of the Wehrmacht on November 29 - December 7, 1940 (that is, a month earlier than the Soviet commanders did it) also played a war game on maps under the leadership of the first chief quartermaster (chief of operations department), Major General F. Paulus. But in this game, the reality of the already formed outlines for the plan of aggression against the USSR was tested: on November 29, the invasion of the German troops into the border zone of the USSR and the battle in it was played out, a "discussion of operational capabilities after the achievement of the first operational goal" was carried out. On December 3, the actions of the German troops were practiced when they advanced to the Minsk-Kiev line, and on December 7, possible options for actions beyond this line were played out. At the end of each stage of the game, the grouping of German troops, the distribution of forces in directions, the operational tasks of the formations and other issues were clarified. The results of the game were discussed with the commanders of the army groups and taken into account in the operational documents for the "Barbarossa" plan, approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

Thus, the intentions of the parties were clearly indicated in the games: the Wehrmacht was going to attack, the Red Army was planning to repel the attack and then go on the offensive. However, if the German generals considered the actions of their troops after the attack step by step, then in the games held by the General Staff of the Red Army, no tasks related to the actions of the “eastern” to repel aggression were solved, since it was the initial period of the war that was completely excluded from the drawing. It was said about him in a tongue twister in the tasks for the games as about the stage that preceded them. So, on the instructions for the first game, the “western”, having carried out an attack on the “eastern” on July 15, 1941, by July 23-25, advanced through the territory of Belarus and Lithuania 70-120 km east of the border, reaching the Osovets, Skidel, Lida, Kaunas, Siauliai. However, as a result of retaliatory strikes by the "eastern" by August 1, the "western" were thrown back to their original position, to the border. From this position, the first game itself began. On the instructions for the second game, the South-Eastern Front of the “Western” and their allies began hostilities on August 1, 1941 against the Lvov-Ternopil grouping of the “Eastern” and invaded the territory of Ukraine to a depth of 50-70 km, but at the Lvov, Kovel was met with a strong counterattack of the southwestern front of the "eastern" and, having lost up to 20 infantry divisions, by the end of August 8 withdrew to a previously prepared line. At the same time, the Southwestern Front not only threw the enemy back to the border, but also shifted military operations west of it to a depth of 90-120 km, reaching the armies of the right wing of the front of the Vistula and Dunajec rivers. the territory of Moldova and Ukraine.

Let us emphasize: that this is exactly how, according to the initial situation for the games, the initial period of the war developed, there is no merit of either G.K. Zhukov, or D.G. Pavlov, or F.I.Kuznetsov as front commanders. For them, this task was solved by the employees of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, who made up the tasks for the games. But how the “eastern” managed to repel the attack so quickly and effectively - nothing was said about this in the assignments. Contrary to the above statements of military leaders and historians, the games did not even attempt to consider the actions of the “eastern” (that is, the Red Army) in the event of an attack by a real enemy, although the opportunity to play out this situation (which, unfortunately, was the last) presented itself. Its implementation would be very timely and useful, especially in conditions when, according to the above testimony of A. M. Vasilevsky, “the proximity of war was already felt quite clearly”.
Consequently, no matter what the plan for covering the state borders was at that time - good or bad, for the games it did not matter at all: this plan, in accordance with the initial situation for the games, was successfully completed, and in a matter of days. Obviously, such an outcome of the initial period of the war was taken for granted by the game developers (ie, the General Staff), especially in conditions when the general superiority in manpower and equipment, especially in tanks and aviation, was on the side of the “eastern”. So, according to the conditions of the first game, the North-Western Front of the “Eastern” (D. G. Pavlov) had superiority over the North-Eastern Front of the “Western” (G. K. Zhukov) in all respects (except for anti-tank guns), and in terms of tanks it was superiority was expressed in a ratio of 2.5: 1, and for aircraft - 1.7: 1. And in the second game, the South-Western Front of the "Eastern" (G.K. Zhukov) surpassed the combined South-Eastern (D.G. Pavlov) and Southern (F.I.Kuznetsov) enemy fronts in terms of the number of tanks (3: 1) and aircraft (1.3: 1), and in terms of the total number of formations and artillery, the ratio of forces was approximately equal. Consequently, G.K. Zhukov was mistaken in his memoirs, claiming that the western side had superiority in manpower and equipment, especially in tanks and aviation.

And, finally, one more important feature of the games: the "eastern" practiced mainly only offensive tasks. In the first game on the topic “Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of the UR”, the “eastern” (DG Pavlov) performed the task of defeating the “western” in East Prussia and by September 3, 1941, reach the river. Vistula from Wloclawek to the mouth; The “westerners” (GK Zhukov) were the defending side for almost the entire game. And in the second game, the "eastern" (GK Zhukov) worked out mainly the issues of an offensive in the southwestern direction; defensive tasks, as already noted, they had to solve mainly on the flanks, and on the right wing of the Southwestern Front, the defense was already carried out deeply in Poland (the area of ​​Biala Podlaska, Lyubartow, Demblin), and on the left wing - in a small part of the territory of Ukraine and Moldavia (Chernivtsi region, Gorodok, Mogilev-Podolsk, Costesti), where the enemy was given a temporary "success" in the initial situation.

So, it turns out, MI Kazakov was right when he characterized the “eastern” as an advancing side in the games. But in this case, the question is pertinent: if offensive tasks for the "eastern" were worked out in them, did they have anything to do with the operational plans of the General Staff in the event of a war in the West? The answer to this question, in our opinion, is unequivocal: yes, they did.
Firstly, the groupings of the forces of the parties created in the games corresponded to the views of the Soviet military leadership, which were established in the fall of 1940, as set forth in the already mentioned "Considerations ..." of September 18, 1940. In this document, the option of concentrating Germany's main forces was considered as the main one (110 -120 infantry divisions, the bulk of tanks and aircraft) in the south, in the Sedlec region, Lublin, “to deliver the main attack in the general direction to Kiev” with the aim of capturing Ukraine; an auxiliary strike from 50-60 divisions was expected from East Prussia. It was this situation that was created in the games: up to 60 infantry divisions of the "western" launched an offensive north of Brest on July 15, 1941 (first game) "in the interests of the main operation", which began a little later (August 1-2) south of Brest, where the main forces of the "western" acted - up to 120 infantry divisions, and together with the allies - up to 150 infantry divisions (second game).
As for the grouping of Soviet troops in the West, then in "Considerations ..." it was planned to deploy here three fronts: North-West, West and South-West; 149 rifle and motorized rifle divisions, 16 tank and 10 cavalry divisions, 15 tank brigades, 159 air regiments were assigned to conduct operations in the West, and the main forces were to be deployed south of Polesie. In the games on the side of the “eastern”, the same fronts acted (albeit a slightly different composition than in “Considerations ...”) with almost the same total number of divisions (182), but with a larger percentage of formations and units of tank forces and the Air Force , with a greater number of tanks and aircraft; this took into account the tendency of an increase in the share of these means of armed struggle in the composition of the Red Army.
Secondly, in each of the operational-strategic games, offensive tasks were worked out for each of the options for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, indicated in the “Considerations ...”. When the Red Army was deployed according to the main option, that is, its main forces were concentrated south of Brest, in “Considerations ...” it was planned to “cut off Germany from The Balkan countries, to deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of their participation in the war. " Specifically, the Southwestern Front was tasked with: “firmly covering the borders of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, after concentrating troops in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Western Front, inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy's Lublin-Sandomierz grouping and reach the Vistula. In the future, strike in the directions to Kel'tse, Petrkuv and go to the river. Pilitsa and the upper course of the river. Oder ”. These tasks made up the content of the second game. The first part of them (the exit to the Vistula River), as already noted, was considered successfully resolved in the initial situation. The further task was worked out in the course of the game: in accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the "Eastern" South-Western Front (GK Zhukov) was supposed to, firmly holding the line of the river. Vistula, capture the region of Krakow, Myslenice, and then, by September 16, 1941, reach the line Krakow, Budapest, Timisoara, Craiova. In the game, the offensive of the Southwestern Front in the direction of the main attack reached the line Krakow, Katowice, Nowy Targ, Poprad, Presov, Kosice, Uzhgorod, and subsequent strikes were planned from the Krakow, Katowice area to Czestochowa (south of Petrkow) and from the Nyiregy-khaza area. Kishvarda, Matesalka - to Budapest.

When deploying the main forces of the Red Army to the north of Brest, their task in "Considerations ..." was defined as follows: "to defeat the main forces of the German army within East Prussia and capture the latter." It was this task that was set before DG Pavlov in the first game. It should be noted that when performing it, he did not look as helpless and frivolous as he is sometimes portrayed. Thus, in the article by P. A. Palchikov and A. A. Goncharov "What happened to the commander of the Western Front, General DG Pavlov in 1941?" it is argued that the Germans "took into account the lessons of the command-staff game" in which DG Pavlov made "rather timid retaliatory steps" and which he lost "with a smile." But for the Germans, the results of this game in terms of preparing for an attack on the USSR were useless, because, as noted above, the Germans had already decided in November-December 1940 where and what strikes they would deliver. The characterization of D.G. Pavlov is given, probably, already taking into account how events developed at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, and proceeding from the widespread version, according to which D.G. Pavlov defended in the game as unsuccessfully as during the war. But DG Pavlov in the game was, we repeat, not a defensive side, but an advancing side, and not unsuccessfully advancing. The game began with the fact that the North-Western Front of the "Eastern" on August 1, 1941, led by DG Pavlov, went over to the offensive and launched the "first operations" until August 7, crossing the river with its right wing. Neman, reaching the approaches to Insterburg (now Chernyakhovsk), in the center - surrounded the grouping of the 9th Army of the North-Eastern Front of the "Western" (G.K. this line is indicated in "Considerations ..."), and on the left wing - the direction of the main attack - the front troops reached the r. Narew south of Ostrolenka. On the same direction on August 11, D.G. Pavlov introduced a mechanized cavalry army into the breakthrough, which on August 13 reached the area of ​​Lyubava, Mrochno, Gilgenburg (110-120 km west of the USSR border). However, by this time, GK Zhukov, having concentrated at the expense of reserves a strong (mainly tank) grouping in the Mazurian Lakes region, struck a sudden flank attack in the general direction of Lomzha, under the base of the ledge formed by the "eastern" grouping that had advanced far to the west. The mediators “played along” to G.K. Zhukov, indicating another - oncoming - strike of the Eastern Front of the “Western” from the opposite side of the salient from the Kossy region, Malkin Gurna in the general direction to Zambrow. ”. It was, of course, a dramatic situation. DG Pavlov had to suspend a successful offensive on the left wing of the front and urgently transfer from here to the places of enemy breakthroughs several rifle divisions, most of the artillery and all tank brigades, leaving only 4 rifle corps on the line reached Myshinets, Grudusk, Pultusk, Serotsk. The course of events in this situation and the decisions made did not play out, however, the chances of success became noticeably greater for the “western” than for the “eastern”. But all this, we note, did not take place in the area of ​​Baranovichi or Lida (as stated in some publications), but at the very border and beyond. And, consequently, the version that GK Zhukov “defeated” DG Pavlov in the same place and in the same way as the Germans did six months later, is devoid of any foundation.
So, as a result of checking the operational plan during the games, it turned out that the offensive in East Prussia turned out to be a difficult task due to the presence of powerful fortifications in this area; DG Pavlov's offensive in the directions of Konigsberg and Rastenburg did not bring the expected success. The offensive of the Southwestern Front (G.K. Zhukov) in the second game turned out to be successful and promised more favorable prospects. The direct connection between the results of the games and the provisions that were included in the "Revised Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East" drawn up on March 11, 1941 is clearly noticeable. This plan deserves special attention, since it was it, in connection with the mistakes inherent in it, that led, in our opinion, to dire consequences in preparing for the war, which, as it later turned out, was only three months away.

First, in the "Revised Plan ..." it was almost without a shadow of doubt believed that "Germany will most likely deploy its main forces in the southeast from Siedlec to Hungary in order to attack Ukraine with a blow on Berdichev and Kiev." Secondly, it was noted that “the most advantageous (emphasized by us. - P. B.) is the deployment of our main forces to the south of the r. Pripyat so that with powerful blows on Lublin, Radom and Krakow, we set ourselves the first strategic goal: to defeat the main forces of the Germans and in the very first stage of the war cut off Germany from the Balkan countries, deprive it of its most important economic bases and decisively influence the Balkan countries in matters of participation them in the war against us ... ”.
Consequently, in the "Revised Plan ..." the priority of the direction to the south of Polesie was finally consolidated both for the enemy and for the Red Army. Whatever reasons this provision of the plan was justified then (the main of the arguments will be discussed in more detail below), reality has shown that this was a serious mistake by the General Staff of the Red Army. As you know, on June 22, Germany struck the main blow north of Polesie. Thus, in January 1941, the operational-strategic link of the command staff of the Red Army played on maps such a variant of the start of hostilities that the real "western" (Germany) did not envisage, and in March the same erroneous version remained unchanged in the "Revised Plan … ”.

True, according to the plan, the deployment of the main grouping of the Germans in East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction was not ruled out. It is logical to assume that the plan provides for a variant of the deployment of the Red Army forces corresponding to such a situation. This was done, for example, in the draft operational plan drawn up under the Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov (before August 1940), where it was reasonably stated: “Considering that the main attack of the Germans will be directed north of the mouth R. Sun, it is also necessary to have the main forces of the Red Army (emphasized by us. - PB) deployed to the north of Polesie. " But there is nothing of the kind in the “Revised Plan ...”. Moreover, it (obviously, not without the influence of the results of the first game) contains the following provision: lead to protracted battles "(emphasized by us. - PB). Consequently, the authors of the "Revised Plan ..." (it, like the previous one, was executed by A.M. Vasilevsky), not excluding the deployment of its main grouping to the north of Polesie for Germany, at the same time denied the expediency of deploying the main forces of the Red Army in the same direction. Let us ponder this alarming position of the plan of the side that expected to repel potential aggression, but did not consider it necessary to create an appropriate grouping in one of the probable directions of the enemy's main attack. The references to the difficult natural conditions of the area and the presence of strongly fortified regions in East Prussia, which were cited by Yu. A. Gor'kov, are valid, but they hardly explain this paradox. Under B. M. Shaposhnikov, all the conditions were the same, but the solution, as noted above, was proposed differently, since in order to repel the attack of the aggressor from this direction, it is not so important what fortifications the aggressor himself has in the rear.
The key to understanding such a strange situation lies in the same phrase of the plan: it turns out that in the spring of 1941 the General Staff was not afraid of the enemy strikes from East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction, but the possible "protracted battles" here. But for the defender, protracted battles are not the worst option: if with the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War such battles really unfolded in these areas, the Germans would not have advanced here to a depth of 450-600 km in three weeks.
The whole point, in our opinion, is that the authors of the "Revised Plan ...", as well as the authors of the tasks for the operational-strategic games, proceeded from the presumption of an unconditionally successful repulse of the enemy's attack in the initial period of the war, after which the Red Army's offensive was to unfold. And for the success of such an offensive on foreign territory, protracted battles were useless. Therefore, East Prussia was assessed as an unpromising direction for possible offensive actions of the Red Army. The southwestern direction was characterized as "the most profitable" precisely because an offensive in this direction would take place over a territory that was poorly prepared in terms of defensiveness, which, moreover, allowed the use of large formations of mechanized troops and cavalry.
Thus, in the "Revised Plan ...", as in the operational-strategic games, the focus was not on defense, but on the offensive, but again after successfully repelling the aggression.
And, finally, thirdly, one more feature of this plan, which GK Zhukov self-critically testified to, appointed on February 1, 1941, Chief of the General Staff (he set the task of the Chief of the Operations Directorate, Lieutenant General G.K. clarification of the plan): “During the revision of operational plans in the spring of 1941, the peculiarities of modern warfare in its initial period were practically not fully taken into account. The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing scheme: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles. Fascist Germany was placed in the same conditions with us in terms of the time of concentration and deployment. "
In the previous operational plans for 1940 and 1941. it was invariably pointed out: Germany could deploy its grouping on the western border of the USSR 10-15 days after the start of concentration. Let us recall that in the operational-strategic games the “western” attacked the “eastern” without completing the deployment. However, it was already known that Germany attacked Poland in 1939 with its armed forces fully deployed. This feature of unleashing a war did not go unnoticed by Soviet military theory; in particular, she took a central place in the book of brigade commander GS Isserson "New forms of struggle". The question of the initial period of the war also arose at the December (1940) meeting of the highest command personnel of the Red Army. The chief of staff of the Baltic Special Military District, Lieutenant General P. S. Klenov, in his speech sharply criticized the book by G. S. Isserson. “There,” said PS Klenov, “hasty conclusions are being made, based on the war between the Germans and Poland, that there will be no initial period of the war, that the war is solved today simply by the invasion of ready-made forces, as was done by the Germans in Poland, who deployed one and a half million people. I think this conclusion is premature. " He proposed to raise the question of organizing a special kind of offensive operations in the initial period of the war, “when the enemy armies have not yet finished concentrating and are not ready for deployment,” with the aim of influencing the mobilization, concentration and deployment of enemy troops to disrupt these measures. Thus, it was a question of a preemptive strike against the enemy, while a defensive operation of the initial period of the war by P.S. Maples did not touch.
This speech at the meeting with a mention of the initial period of the war was the only one. No one touched on this topic anymore, no one objected to PS Klenov, no one supported him, including the People's Commissar of Defense, who delivered his closing speech. Moreover, SK Timoshenko expressed the following opinion in it: "In the sense of strategic creativity, the experience of the war in Europe, perhaps, does not give anything new." This conclusion undoubtedly weakened attention to the problems of the initial period of the war. Since the final speech of S.K. Timoshenko was sent to the troops as a directive document, it can be argued that in this part of it had negative consequences for the formation of the views of the command staff of the Red Army on the possible start of a war if it was unleashed against the USSR.
In any case, the General Staff and in the "Revised Plan ..." left the previous scheme of the beginning of the war: active defense of the cover unit provides mobilization, concentration and deployment of the main forces of the Red Army, which then go over to a decisive offensive with the transfer of hostilities to enemy territory. The term for the deployment of the German armies was supposed to be the same - 10-15 days from the beginning of the concentration; the same period, as GK Zhukov testified, was also allocated for the Soviet troops.

Consequently, the General Staff of the Red Army completely ignored the experience of Germany's attack on other countries, deliberately planning measures to mobilize, concentrate and deploy troops for the period after the start of border battles. This was the second major mistake of the General Staff, requiring colossal efforts not only by the army, but also by the country, as well as considerable time to eliminate it. It was necessary to correct this error very soon, but, as it turned out, there was almost no time left for this ...

Within a few weeks, the situation on the western borders of the USSR became so complicated that the General Staff was forced to urgently make significant adjustments to the "Revised Plan ..." This is evidenced by "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of Soviet forces in the event of a war with Germany and its allies," dated May 15, 1941 in content. At least two features of this document draw close attention to it.
Firstly, unlike other operational plans of this kind, these "Considerations for the plan ..." are drawn up only in the event of a war with Germany and its allies; the sections that dealt with the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war with other potential adversaries are missing in the document.

And this suggests that the General Staff, analyzing the situation on the borders of the USSR, came to the conclusion that there is an imminent danger of war with Germany in the near future.
Secondly, if in the previous plans and in the operational-strategic games the concept of the Red Army's transition to the offensive after repelling the enemy's attack was laid down, then in “Considerations according to the plan ...” for the first time the idea was put forward “to preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at that moment when it will be at the stage of deployment and will not have time to organize the front and interaction of the combat arms. " In essence, a preemptive strike against the German army was proposed. And for such a proposal, which contradicted the previously adopted concept of war, the General Staff had good reasons. The information about the state of the German army given in the “Considerations for the Plan ...” showed that the deployment and actions of the Red Army according to the old scheme - the main forces enter the battle 10-15 days after the start of border battles, and the terms of deployment of the main forces for the countries are approximately the same - no longer matched the situation: it turned out that Germany "currently keeps its army mobilized, with deployed rear services, it has the ability to warn us in deployment and strike a surprise blow." Although it was too late - just five weeks before the war, as it turned out - the General Staff was forced to admit its mistake in ignoring the experience of the Second World War, which spoke of the possibility of a sudden transition of the enemy to the offensive "with all available forces, moreover, deployed in advance in all strategic directions." ...
Given the current situation.

The General Staff proposed to carry out in advance the same measures that Germany had already taken and without which "it is impossible to deliver a surprise strike on the enemy both from the air and on the ground": covert mobilization (under the guise of training camps) and concentration of troops (under the guise of entering camps) to the western border, hidden concentration of aviation on field airfields, deployment of the rear and a hospital base. Upon completion of these measures - to inflict a sudden preemptive strike on the German army in order to defeat its main forces deployed south of the Brest-Demblin line, and to reach the Ostrolenka, r. Narew, Lowicz, Lodz, Kreuzburg, Oppeln, Olomouc. As an immediate task, it was planned to defeat the German army east of the r. Vistula and in the direction of Krakow, get off at pp. Narew, Vistula and capture the Katowice area, after which, advancing in the northern or northwestern direction, "crush the large forces of the center and northern wing of the German front and seize the territory of former Poland and East Prussia." Note: these are actually the same tasks, the solution of which was practiced in operational-strategic games.
Undoubtedly, the provision on a preemptive strike by the Red Army, completely unambiguously formulated in "Considerations for the Plan ...", is a fundamentally new fact for those studying the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War. It does not at all fit into the already established concept of this war, and therefore, probably, with such zeal it is denied. Even Yu. A. Gorkov, who himself was the first to fully publish this document, in which things are called by their proper names, immediately tried to prove that in “Considerations according to the plan ...” it allegedly is more about defense than about offensive, and if about offensive , then not preemptive and not in 1941. In particular, Yu.A. offensive actions were supposed ”. But in the plan, by hand of NF Vatutin, a generalizing paragraph was clearly added: “The Red Army will begin offensive operations from the front of Chizhev, Lyutoviska by forces of 152 divisions against 100 German ones. Active defense is envisaged in the remaining sections of the state border ”. It follows from this that the preemptive strike was planned to be inflicted by the main forces of the Red Army (over 70% of the divisions that were part of the fronts planned for deployment on the western border of the USSR). And the strip of this blow from Chizhev (65 km west of Bialystok) to Lyutovisk (60 km south of Peremyshlyar reached 650-700 km, that is, almost a third of the length of the western border from Memel (Klaipeda) to the mouth of the Danube.
Further in the article by Yu. A. Gor'kov it is stated that "the plan of May 15, 1941 did not provide for a preemptive strike precisely in 1941." The underlining made by Yu. A. Gorkov when publishing the plan should obviously testify in favor of such a statement. But the order on the complete completion of the development of plans for the defense of the state border and air defense by June 1, 1941 had the purpose, as can be seen from the document, "to secure ourselves from a possible surprise attack by the enemy, to cover the concentration and deployment of our troops and prepare them for the transition to the offensive" and in no way removed the issue of a preemptive strike. And the order in question belongs to the section, the title of which speaks for itself: “VI. Cover for concentration and deployment ”. The information on the non-combatability of 115 air regiments given in the plan, "which can be counted on to be fully ready by 1.1.42." , they say only one thing: what additional aviation forces can be counted on and when, for the war, of course, did not seem to the General Staff to be a fleeting affair. The paragraph on the need to build and arm fortified areas, including on the border with Hungary in 1942, as well as the point with a request to approve the proposal to build new fortified areas, should be viewed from the same point of view. in addition, on the border with Hungary, according to the plan of May 15, 1941, an active defense was envisaged.
The most important evidence in favor of preparing a preemptive strike precisely in 1941 is that everything said in “Considerations for the Plan ...” about the German army was assessed from the standpoint of “the political situation of the day” (emphasized by us - PB). And it is clear that it was pointless to postpone the implementation of the measures proposed in the plan until 1942, since the situation on the western border of the USSR was changing not in its favor every day. The General Staff believed that Germany, whose troops were completely mobilized, and 120 of the 180 divisions that it could deploy against the USSR, were already concentrated on its western border, there was only one step left before the start of hostilities, namely, to deploy its groupings in accordance with plan of war against the USSR. It was necessary, firstly, to urgently liquidate this advantage of Germany (therefore, in the "Considerations for the plan ..." and were proposed as priority measures for the covert mobilization and concentration of troops), and secondly, in no case to give up the initiative of action in hands of the German command and themselves to attack the German army in the stage of its deployment.

Thus, "Considerations for the plan ..." are valuable and convincing evidence of the reaction of the General Staff of the Red Army to the actions of Germany at that time. We emphasize this especially in connection with attempts to view this document as confirmation of the preparation of the Soviet side for the implementation of the long-standing idea of ​​a "world revolution." It was also not the fruit of someone's idle exercises on a strategic topic, for those who were directly involved in drawing up previous plans for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces: Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff Major General A.M. Vasilevsky and Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin. Thus, the document was a clearly expressed position of the General Staff on the issue of the war with Germany. And this position was that a German attack on the USSR could take place in the near future, that is, in the summer of 1941.
The plan of May 15, 1941 clearly shows that the General Staff viewed a preemptive strike as a way to thwart the German attack on the USSR, which, according to many reports, became inevitable. It is pertinent to note here that the directive on the Barbarossa plan specifically emphasized: "The decisive importance must be given to the fact that our intentions to attack (emphasized by us. - PB) are not recognized." However, in the plan for the transfer of troops to the borders of the USSR, signed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht's Ground Forces, Colonel-General F. Halder on February 12, 1941, it was quite accurately predicted that in the period from April 25 to May 15, the Wehrmacht's offensive intentions would become clearer and “hide the deployment of troops for conducting offensive operations is not possible, "and from May 6 there will be" no doubts about the offensive intentions "of the German troops. Indeed, by the beginning of May, the secret finally became clear, as a result of which the Soviet plan of May 15, 1941 was born.The General Staff of the Red Army proposed a reasonable solution to the problem from a military point of view, leaving aside all its political, diplomatic and other nuances, for it was impossible not to take into account the fact that the Germans in the past 20 months of the Second World War four times succeeded in preempting the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the states subjected to aggression from Germany. “There was enough evidence that Germany was prepared for a military attack on our country - in our age it is difficult to hide them,” recalled A. M. Vasilevsky. - Fears that there would be an uproar in the West about the allegedly aggressive aspirations of the USSR had to be dropped. We approached the rubicon of war by the will of circumstances beyond our control, and it was necessary to firmly take a step forward.

So, a preemptive strike against Germany was proposed. But in this case, one cannot ignore the version of the Nazi leadership revived by V. Suvorov about Germany's “preventive war” against the USSR. This version has long been exposed, but V. Suvorov is once again trying to shift the blame for unleashing the war from Germany to the USSR. At the same time, the dispute about “prevention” is not at all so fruitless, as M.I. “The starting point of mutual claims” that led to the war: it is important to determine the moment of translating these claims into concrete military-strategic decisions.
It would seem that V. Suvorov also proceeds from this. “Historians,” he declares, “have not yet answered the question: who started the Soviet-German war of 1941? When solving this problem, communist historians propose the following criterion: whoever fired first is the culprit. Why not use a different criterion? Why not pay attention to who was the first to start mobilization, concentration and operational deployment, that is, who was the first to reach for the pistol? " But V. Suvorov deliberately avoids facts that do not fit into the version he is defending. Otherwise, it is easy to see that according to his “other criterion,” Germany was the first to “reach for the pistol”. Even the plan of the Soviet command of May 15, 1941, despite the proposal it contains for a preemptive strike against the German army, does not add any arguments in favor of Hitler's version of a “preventive war”.

For Hitler and his accomplices, this Soviet plan, like the previous ones, did not play any role in the decision to attack the USSR. This decision was made back in July 1940, after which detailed planning of the war began. The main outlines of the German plan of aggression against the USSR were, as already noted, tested in the operational-strategic game in the General Staff of the Ground Forces in November - December 1940, the directive on the plan of the attack on the USSR (the "Barbarossa" plan) was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. ., the OKH directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops was issued on January 31, 1941, and its implementation began in February 1941. Even the initial readiness period for operations under the Barbarossa plan - May 15, 1941 - was determined in December 1940. in the aforementioned Hitler directive. History decreed that the date of May 15, 1941 coincided with the date of the plan of the Soviet command we were analyzing. And for this reason alone, this plan can in no way appear as a justification for Hitler's aggression. All the previous plans of the Soviet command and the operational-strategic games of January 1941 proceeded from the assumption that the USSR would not be an attacking party.
But then, what is evidenced by the measures carried out by the Soviet side in May-June 1941 (hidden partial mobilization of the military-liable reserve under the guise of training camps, the hidden advance to the western borders of a number of large formations and formations, including from internal districts, etc., which in many ways corresponded to those proposed in the plan of May 15, 1941? In our opinion (which coincides with the opinion of V.N.Kiselev, M.I. principle was approved by him.Let's say more: this plan could not remain a rough note of the Operations Directorate, could not fail to be reported to I.V. Stalin due to its extraordinary nature. , tried in every possible way at that time to avoid a war with Germany (of which the Germans themselves did not doubt, assessing the Kremlin's steps to prevent the war as "a neurosis on the basis of fear").

However, the May plan of the General Staff was a document of a special kind: it demanded immediate decisions that did not correspond to the aforementioned position of Stalin, since the General Staff proposed to strike a preemptive strike, that is, to entrust the USSR with the initiative in unleashing a war with Germany. It was simply impossible to reject this proposal as unacceptable, because in the same document it was clearly stated that Germany was actually ready to attack the USSR in the near future in favorable conditions for the Wehrmacht and extremely unfavorable for the Red Army.
As A.S. Orlov correctly noted, no one knows what Stalin was really thinking about at that time. But the totality of the facts of that time suggests that Stalin, having agreed (albeit not completely) with the proposals of the General Staff, demanded the strictest observance of secrecy and precautions so as not to give Germany a reason to start a war, at least before the measures proposed by the General Staff are completed. on the strategic deployment of the Red Army.
Supporters of the version of Germany's “preventive war” against the USSR can only declare that these measures themselves were the reason for the attack of the Wehrmacht on June 22, 1941. This is what V. Suvorov does when he says: “June 13, 1941 is the moment when 77 Soviet divisions of the internal districts "under the guise of training camps" rushed to the western borders. In this situation, Adolf Hitler ... and struck first ”.

But for such a statement, one must be sure that Hitler knew about the content of the Soviet plan or had an idea about the nature of the measures carried out by the Soviet side. However, V. Suvorov does not provide such data. “I don’t know,” he admits, “what was known to German military intelligence in the first half of June and what it did not know.” In this regard, we note that any of the measures carried out by the General Staff in May - June 1941 could be attributed by intelligence to the preparation of not only an offensive, but also a defense.

This, in particular, is evidenced by intelligence report No. 5 of the Department for the Study of Foreign Armies of the East of the General Staff of the OKH for the period from May 20 to June 13 (that is, just in time for the date that V. Suvorov is diligently exploiting!). It notes that the size of the Red Army in the European part of the USSR increased by 5 rifle, 2 tank divisions and 1 tank (mechanized) brigade and is: rifle divisions - 150, cavalry - 25.5, tank - 7, tank (motorized) brigades - 38. Further, the intelligence report stated that the situation with the conscription to the Red Army has basically not changed, that the continuing transport of Soviet troops in the western direction serves "only to replenish the formations with reserve military personnel to wartime states and train them in summer camps", that regrouping within certain groups troops are associated with the exchange of formations that local offensive strikes by the Russians in southern Bessarabia and in the region of Chernivtsi are possible. And, finally, the general conclusion of the German intelligence: "... basically, as before, defensive actions are expected" (emphasized by us - P. B.).
Thus, the German leadership did not have at its disposal convincing data to charge the Soviet Union with preparing aggression against Germany. If the Nazis had such information, they would not have hesitated to use it in official documents with the beginning of the war. But they have not collected any facts for these documents. And it is no coincidence that in the note of the German Foreign Ministry to the Soviet government of June 21, 1941, after accusations against the USSR of espionage, propaganda, anti-German orientation of Soviet foreign policy, as evidence of the "intensity of military preparations of the Soviet Union" is given ... the report of the Yugoslav military attaché in Moscow from December 17, 1940 (!). From this report, the following passage is quoted in the note: “According to information received from Soviet circles, the rearmament of the Air Force, tank forces and artillery, taking into account the experience of modern warfare, is in full swing, which will basically be completed by August 1, 1941. This period is obviously is also an extreme (temporary) point, up to which one should not expect tangible changes in Soviet foreign policy ”. It seems that there is no need to prove that on such grounds one can declare war at any time to any state that has an army and modernizes it.
Further in the same memorandum it is noted: all doubts of the German leadership regarding the intentions of the Red Army “were completely dispelled by messages received by the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht in recent days. After the general mobilization in Russia, at least 160 divisions were deployed against Germany, "and" the created grouping of Russian troops, especially motorized and tank formations, allows the Supreme High Command of Russia to start aggression at any time on various parts of the German border ", where the Red Army formations" concentrated and deployed in readiness to attack. " But it is well known that by June 22, there was no "general mobilization" in the USSR, much less concentrated and deployed "ready to attack" Soviet troops. And although the measures according to the May plan of the General Staff began to be partially implemented, by the beginning of the war, for a number of reasons (including the ones mentioned above), the Red Army was not ready for an offensive or defense and was not even put on alert.

And the German leadership, on the contrary, in June completed the preparations begun in 1940 for an attack on the USSR. As early as April 30, 1941, that is, before the Soviet command had any ideas about the Red Army's preemptive strike, and even more so before the start of any appropriate practical measures, the date of the attack on the USSR was finally set - June 22. On May 22, a schedule of accelerated movement was introduced for the German railways, along which the main forces of the Wehrmacht were already in fact openly concentrated and deployed to the border of the USSR. On June 5, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command, Field Marshal V. Keitel, sent for the executors the time calculation approved by Hitler for the operation according to the Barbarossa plan. On June 8, the army groups and armies were finally given the tasks under this plan, and on June 10, the command of the field army received an order on the day for the start of operations against the USSR - June 22, 1941. Note that the Nazis did all this before June 13, in connection with which the entire system of "argumentation" of V. Suvorov, tied to this date, collapses due to lack of foundation. On June 14, at a meeting with Hitler in Berlin, the reports of the commanders of the troops in the East on readiness for operations were heard.
On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany carried out, as established by the International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg Trials, a carefully prepared attack on the Soviet Union “without any warning and without a shadow of legal justification. It was sheer aggression. " This is also evidenced by all documents (including those mentioned above) published after the Nuremberg trials. V. Suvorov's reasoning about what would have happened if Hitler had not attacked Stalin on June 22, but, for example, decided to seize Gibraltar and, in this regard, "Operation Barbarossa" was postponed for two months "- such reasoning already belong to the field of fruitless fortune-telling arising from the absence of facts to prove the unprovable.
Of course, all that has been said cannot be a consolation in the light of the misfortune brought to our people by the day of June 22, 1941. Its reasons are manifold, diversified. It seems that the conclusions drawn from the results of the operational-strategic games in January 1941 also played a negative role: on June 22, the same commanders organized the resistance to the enemy, who, from the games mentioned, could not but endure the persistent convictions that the initial period of the war will be unconditionally successful for the Red Army, that the Soviet troops will have to basically attack, that the offensive will unfold on the territory of the attacking enemy, etc. unsuccessfully) covered up major shortcomings and even failures made at the highest military level in planning the first operations of the war, in training troops and headquarters and in solving many other issues, on which, ultimately, the country's defense capability, the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the Red Army depended. The documents published recently give grounds to assert that the date of the probable attack on the USSR by Nazi Germany - the summer of 1941 - was correctly determined by the General Staff of the Red Army, but too late. The main miscalculation was made by the General Staff, as already noted, in March 1941, when erroneous provisions were introduced into the "Revised Strategic Deployment Plan ..."

It also seems that there are no sufficient grounds to consider Stalin's miscalculation in determining the timing of Germany's attack on us (which he allegedly attributed to 1942) as the main mistake of that time, and from this to deduce shortcomings in the planning of military operations and in the implementation of measures to prepare the Red Army for reflection of aggression. But, of course, Stalin bears personal responsibility for refusing to give permission to bring the troops of the western border districts to full combat readiness, which could significantly affect the results of the Red Army's hostilities at the beginning of the war, even despite the incomplete concentration and deployment of its units and formations ...
These and other mistakes turned out to be the greatest tragedy for our people and their army. As you know, the most difficult situation at the beginning of the war arose in the zone of the Western Front. It was his command that Stalin blamed for the first failures of the Red Army. In the draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0250 of July 28, 1941, with the announcement of the verdict in the case of Generals DG Pavlov, V.E. Klimovskikh, A.T. Grigoriev and A.A. cowardice, the unauthorized abandonment of strategic points without the permission of the high command, the collapse of command and control, the inaction of the authorities, ”he himself inserted the words“ and this gave the enemy the opportunity to break through the front ”.

But on June 22, not only the Western Front collapsed: the entire concept of war, developed by the General Staff and approved at the highest level, collapsed. The unjustly accused DG Pavlov and his closest assistants were only the first to blame for everything, including the mistakes of Stalin and the leaders of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. The latter, too, very soon, under various pretexts, were dismissed from their posts, while Stalin himself, as always, did not answer to anyone. The blood of Soviet people had to pay for the mistakes made before the war. "Historians investigating the reasons for the failure of the armed struggle against Germany in the first period of the war," Zhukov noted, "will have to carefully understand these issues in order to truthfully explain the true reasons as a result of which the Soviet people and the country suffered such heavy sacrifices." The articles we have mentioned in the periodicals on this topic are a serious step in the study of these reasons. But the urgency of the task itself is by no means removed. The declassification and publication of documents still hidden from historians may shed additional light on the true background of the events of the spring and summer of 1941.
Notes.
New and recent history. 1993. No. 3. S. 29-45.
National history. 1994. No. 3. S. 4-22.
Suvorov V. Icebreaker. M., 1992.
National history. 1994. No. 3.P. 3.