When Berlin capitulated. Battle of Berlin. Summary of the last operation of the Great Patriotic War. Liquidation of the Frankfurt-Guben group

Berlin in 1945 was the largest city of the Reich and its center. The headquarters of the commander-in-chief, the Reich Chancellery, the headquarters of most of the armies and many other administrative buildings were located here. By the spring, Berlin was home to more than 3 million inhabitants and about 300 thousand of the hijacked civilian population of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

The entire top of Nazi Germany remained here: Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, Goering and others.

Preparation of the operation

The Soviet leadership planned to take the city at the end of the Berlin offensive. This task was assigned to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and Belorussian fronts. At the end of April, the advanced units met, the city was besieged.
Allies of the USSR refused to participate in the operation. Berlin in 1945 was an extremely important strategic target. In addition, the fall of the city would invariably lead to a propaganda victory. The Americans were developing an assault plan back in 1944. After the troops were consolidated in Normandy, it was planned to make a dash north to the Ruhr and begin an attack on the city. But in September the Americans suffered huge losses in Holland and abandoned the operation.
Soviet troops on both fronts had more than 2 million manpower and about 6 thousand tanks. Of course, all of them could not participate in the assault. For the strike, 460 thousand people were concentrated, Polish formations also took part.

City defense

The 1945 defense of Berlin was prepared very carefully. The garrison numbered over 200 thousand people. It is rather difficult to give an exact figure, since the civilian population was actively involved in the defense of the Nazi capital. The city was surrounded by several lines of defense. Each building was turned into a fortress. Barricades were erected in the streets. Almost the entire population was obliged to take part in the construction of engineering structures. Concrete bunkers were hastily set up on the outskirts of the city.

Berlin in 1945 was defended by the best troops of the Reich, including the SS. Also, the so-called Volkssturm was created - militia units recruited from civilians. They were actively armed with faust cartridges. It is a single-shot anti-tank gun that fires commutative rounds. Machine-gun crews were in buildings and just on city streets.

Offensive

Berlin in 1945 had been under regular bombardment for several months. In the 44th, raids by the British and Americans became more frequent. Prior to that, in 1941, on the personal order of Stalin, a number of secret operations were carried out by Soviet aviation, as a result, a number of bombs were dropped on the city.
On April 25, a massive artillery barrage began. Soviet aviation ruthlessly suppressed firing points. Howitzers, mortars, MLRS hit Berlin with direct fire. On April 26, the fiercest fighting of the entire war began in the city. For the Red Army, a huge problem was the building density of the city. The advance was extremely difficult due to the abundance of barricades and heavy fire.
Large losses in armored vehicles were caused by the many anti-tank groups of the Volkssturm. To take one city block, it was first treated with artillery.

The fire stopped only when the infantry approached the German positions. Then the tanks destroyed the stone buildings blocking the way, and the Red Army moved on.

Liberation of Berlin (1945)

Marshal Zhukov ordered to use the experience of the Stalingrad battles. In a similar situation, Soviet troops successfully used small mobile groups. Several armored vehicles, a group of sappers, mortars and artillerymen were attached to the infantry. Also, sometimes such a unit included flamethrowers. They were needed to destroy the enemy hiding in underground communications.
The rapid advance of Soviet troops led to the encirclement of the Reichstag area within 3 days after the start of active fighting. 5 thousand Nazis were concentrated in a small area in the center of the city. A moat was dug around the building, making a tank breakthrough impossible. All available artillery fired at the building. On April 30, shells broke through the Reichstag. At 14:25, a red flag was raised over the buildings.

The photograph that captures this moment will later become one of the

The fall of Berlin (1945)

After the capture of the Reichstag, the Germans began to flee en masse. Chief of Staff Krebs requested a ceasefire. Zhukov personally conveyed the proposal of the German side to Stalin. The commander-in-chief demanded only unconditional surrender Nazi Germany. The Germans rejected this ultimatum. Immediately after that, heavy fire fell on Berlin. The fighting continued for several more days, as a result of which the Nazis were finally defeated, in Europe they were over. in Berlin 1945 showed the whole world the power of the liberation Red Army and the Soviet people. Taking the Nazi lair forever remained one of the most important points in the history of mankind.

7. Broken German anti-aircraft gun on a Berlin street.

8. Soviet tank T-34-85 in a pine forest south of Berlin.

9. Soldiers and tanks T-34-85 of the 12th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army in Berlin.

10. Burned German cars on the streets of Berlin.

11. A killed German soldier and a T-34-85 tank of the 55th Guards Tank Brigade on a street in Berlin.

12. Soviet foreman-communications officer at the radio during the fighting in Berlin.

13. Residents of Berlin, fleeing street fighting, go to the areas liberated by Soviet troops.

14. Battery of 152-mm howitzers ML-20 of the 1st Belorussian Front in position on the outskirts of Berlin.

15. A Soviet soldier runs near a burning house during a battle in Berlin.

16. Soviet soldiers in the trenches on the outskirts of Berlin.

17. Soviet soldiers on horse-drawn carts passing by the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.

18. View of the Reichstag after the end of hostilities.

19. White flags on Berlin houses after the surrender.

20. Soviet soldiers listen to the accordion player, sitting on the bed of a 122-mm M-30 howitzer on a Berlin street.

21. The crew of the Soviet 37-mm automatic anti-aircraft gun model 1939 (61-K) is monitoring the air situation in Berlin.

22. Destroyed German cars outside a building in Berlin.

23. A snapshot of Soviet officers next to the bodies of the dead company commander and a Volkssturm soldier.

24. Bodies of the killed company commander and Volkssturm soldier.

25. Soviet soldiers are walking along one of the streets of Berlin.

26. Battery of Soviet 152-mm howitzer-guns ML-20 near Berlin. 1st Belorussian Front.

27. Soviet tank T-34-85, accompanied by infantry, moves along a street on the outskirts of Berlin.

28. Soviet artillerymen are firing in the street on the outskirts of Berlin.

29. A Soviet tank gunner looks out of the hatch of his tank during the battle for Berlin.

30. Soviet self-propelled guns SU-76M on a street in Berlin.

31. The facade of the Berlin hotel "Adlon" after the battle.

32. The body of a killed German soldier next to a Horch 108 on Friedrichstrasse in Berlin.

33. Soldiers and commanders of the 7th Guards Tank Corps at the T-34-85 tank with a crew in Berlin.

34. Calculation of the 76-mm gun of Sergeant Trifonov at lunch on the outskirts of Berlin.

35. Soldiers and tanks T-34-85 of the 12th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army in Berlin.

36. Soviet soldiers run across the street during a battle in Berlin.

37. Tank T-34-85 on the square in Berlin.

39. Soviet artillerymen are preparing for a salvo BM-13 Katyusha rocket launcher in Berlin.

40. Soviet 203-mm B-4 howitzer firing in Berlin at night.

41. A group of German prisoners under the escort of Soviet soldiers on the streets of Berlin.

42. Calculation of the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K of the 1937 model in battle on the streets of Berlin near the T-34-85 tank.

43. The Soviet assault group with the banner moves to the Reichstag.

44. Soviet artillerymen write on the shells "Hitler", "To Berlin", "Across the Reichstag" (1).

45. Tanks T-34-85 of the 7th Guards Tank Corps in the suburbs of Berlin. The wreck of a destroyed German car is burning in the foreground.

46. ​​A salvo of BM-13 (Katyusha) rocket launchers in Berlin.

47. Guards rocket launcher BM-31-12 in Berlin.This is a modification of the famous "Katyusha" rocket launcher (by analogy it was named "Andryusha").

48. Padded Sd.Kfz.250 armored personnel carrier from the 11th SS division "Nordland" on Friedrichstrasse in Berlin.

49. Commander of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division, three times Hero Soviet Union, Guard Colonel Alexander Ivanovich Pokryshkin at the airfield.

50. Killed German soldiers and the BM-31-12 rocket launcher (modification of the "Katyusha", nicknamed "Andryusha") on a Berlin street.

51. Soviet 152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20 on the streets of Berlin.

52. Soviet tank T-34-85 from the 7th Guards Tank Corps and captured volunteers from Volkssturm on the streets of Berlin.

53. Soviet tank T-34-85 from the 7th Guards Tank Corps and captured volunteers from Volkssturm on the streets of Berlin.

54. Soviet traffic controller in front of a burning building on a street in Berlin.

55. Soviet tanks T-34-76 after the battle on the streets of Berlin.

56. Heavy tank IS-2 at the walls of the defeated Reichstag.

57. The formation of the servicemen of the Soviet 88th separate heavy tank regiment in Berlin's Humboldt-Hein park in early May 1945. The construction is carried out by the political officer of the regiment, Major L.A. Glushkov and deputy regiment commander F.M. Hot.

58. Column of Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 on the streets of Berlin.

59. Battery of Soviet 122-mm howitzers M-30 on the streets of Berlin.

60. The crew is preparing a BM-31-12 rocket launcher (a modification of the Katyusha with M-31 shells, nicknamed "Andryusha") on a Berlin street.

61. Column of Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 on the streets of Berlin. ZiS-5 trucks from the logistic support are visible in the background.

62. Column of a unit of Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 on the streets of Berlin.

63. A battery of Soviet 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model (M-30) fires at Berlin.

64. Soviet tank IS-2 on a destroyed street in Berlin. Elements of camouflage are visible on the machine.

65. French prisoners of war shake hands with their liberators - Soviet soldiers. Copyright title: “Berlin. French prisoners of war released from Nazi camps. "

66. Tankmen of the 44th Guards Tank Brigade of the 11th Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army on vacation at the T-34-85 in Berlin.

67. Soviet artillerymen write on shells "Hitler", "To Berlin", "Around the Reichstag" (2).

68. Loading wounded Soviet soldiers onto a military ZIS-5v truck for evacuation.

69. Soviet self-propelled guns SU-76M with hull numbers "27" and "30" in Berlin near Karlshorst.

70. Soviet orderlies shift a wounded soldier from a stretcher to a cart.

71. View of the Brandenburg Gate in the captured Berlin. May 1945

72. Soviet tank T-34-85, knocked out on the streets of Berlin.

73. Soviet soldiers in battle on Moltke Strasse (now Rothko Street) in Berlin.

74. Soviet soldiers are resting on the IS-2 tank. The author's title of the photo is “Tankmen on vacation”.

75. Soviet soldiers in Berlin at the end of the fighting. In the foreground and behind, behind the car, are the ZiS-3 guns of the 1943 model.

76. Participants of the "last Berlin draft" at the collection point of prisoners of war in Berlin.

77. German soldiers in Berlin surrender to Soviet troops.

78. View of the Reichstag after the fighting. The German anti-aircraft guns 8,8 cm FlaK 18 are visible. To the right is the body of a dead German soldier. The author's name of the photo is "Final".

79. Berlin women cleaning the street. Beginning of May 1945, even before the signing of the German Surrender Act.

80. Soviet soldiers in position in a street battle in Berlin. A street barricade erected by the Germans is used as a shelter.

81. German prisoners of war on the streets of Berlin.

82. Soviet 122-mm howitzer M-30 horse-drawn in the center of Berlin. On the shield of the weapon there is an inscription: "We will avenge the atrocities." In the background is the Berlin Cathedral.

83. Soviet submachine gunner at a firing position in a Berlin tram car.

84. Soviet submachine gunners in a street battle in Berlin, taking up a position behind the fallen clock tower.

85. A Soviet soldier walks past the murdered SS Hauptsturmführer in Berlin at the intersection of Chaussestrasse and Oranienburgerstrasse.

86. Burning building in Berlin.

87. A Volkssturm militia killed in a Berlin street.

88. Soviet self-propelled guns ISU-122 in the suburbs of Berlin. Behind the SPG there is an inscription on the wall: "Berlin will remain German!" (Berlin bleibt deutsch!).

89. Column of Soviet self-propelled guns ISU-122 on one of the streets of Berlin.

90. Former British-built Estonian tanks Mk.V in Berlin's Lustgarten park. The building of the Altes Museum is visible in the background. These tanks, rearmed with Maxim machine guns, took part in the defense of Tallinn in 1941, were captured by the Germans and transported to Berlin for an exhibition of trophies. In April 1945, they allegedly participated in the defense of Berlin.

91. Shot from the Soviet 152-mm howitzer ML-20 in Berlin. The track of the IS-2 tank is visible on the right.

92. Soviet soldier with a faustpatron.

93. A Soviet officer checks the documents of the surrendered German servicemen. Berlin, April-May 1945

94. The calculation of the Soviet 100-mm cannon BS-3 is firing at the enemy in Berlin.

95. Infantrymen from the 3rd Guards Tank Army attack the enemy in Berlin with the support of the ZiS-3 cannon.

96. Soviet soldiers are hoisting a banner over the Reichstag on May 2, 1945. This is one of the banners installed on the Reistag in addition to the official hoisting of the banner by Yegorov and Kantaria.

97. Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft from the 4th Air Army (Aviation Colonel General KA Vershinin) in the skies over Berlin.

98. Soviet soldier Ivan Kichigin at the grave of a friend in Berlin. Ivan Alexandrovich Kichigin at the grave of his friend Grigory Afanasyevich Kozlov in Berlin in early May 1945. The caption on the back of the photo: “Sasha! This is the grave of Grigory Kozlov. " Such graves were all over Berlin - friends buried their comrades near the place of their death. About six months later, the reburial from such graves began to the memorial cemeteries in Treptower Park and in the Tiergarten park. The first memorial in Berlin, inaugurated in November 1945, was the burial of 2,500 Soviet soldiers in the Tiergarten park. At its opening in front of the memorial, allied troops in the anti-Hitler coalition marched in a solemn parade.

100. A Soviet soldier pulls a German soldier out of the hatch. Berlin.

101. Soviet soldiers flee to a new position in battle in Berlin. The figure of a murdered German sergeant from the RAD (Reichs Arbeit Dienst, pre-conscription labor service) in the foreground.

102. Subdivisions of the Soviet heavy self-propelled artillery regiment at the crossing of the Spree river. On the right is ACS ISU-152.

103. Calculations of Soviet 76.2-mm divisional guns ZIS-3 on one of the streets of Berlin.

104. A battery of Soviet 122-mm howitzers of the 1938 model (M-30) fires at Berlin.

105. Column of Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 on one of the streets of Berlin.

106. Captured German soldier at the Reichstag. A famous photograph that was often published in books and on posters in the USSR under the name "End" (German for "The End").

107. Soviet tanks and other equipment at the bridge over the Spree river in the Reichstag area. On this bridge, Soviet troops under the fire of the defending Germans marched to storm the Reichstag. In the photo there are tanks IS-2 and T-34-85, self-propelled guns ISU-152, cannons.

108. Column of Soviet tanks IS-2 on the Berlin highway.

109. The deceased German woman in an armored vehicle. Berlin, 1945.

110. A T-34 tank from the 3rd Guards Tank Army stands in front of a paper and stationery store on a street in Berlin. Vladimir Dmitrievich Serdyukov (born in 1920) sits at the driver's hatch.

On April 23, Hitler was informed that the commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, Weidling, had moved his headquarters and was already located west of Berlin, although he had to defend it. Based on this rumor, Hitler ordered the execution of the general. But he came straight to the bunker where the top leadership of the Nazi Reich was hiding, and reported that his headquarters was almost on the front line. Then Hitler changed his mind about shooting Weidling, and on April 24, he appointed him commander of the defense of Berlin. “It would be better if Hitler had upheld the order for my execution,” Weidling said upon hearing the news. But he accepted the appointment.

Berlin militias. (topwar.ru)

It turned out that Hitler was impressed by the courage of the general who did not flee from the front line. After all, he no longer had practically a single standing commander left for the defense of the city, which he planned to turn into a German version of the battle for Moscow: to defeat the Soviet army in a defensive battle and launch a counteroffensive. Hitler persisted to the last: "If Berlin falls into the hands of the enemy, the war will be lost." Of course, even the best commander could not have realized the crazy plans of the Fuhrer.

Day after day, the German defense forces, glued together from the remnants of broken and battered parts, from the militias and teenagers of the Hitler Youth, retreated and surrendered. Every day Weidling reported to Hitler on the situation. On April 30, when even Hitler realized that the fight was futile, he killed his beloved dog, and then he and his wife Eva Hitler (Brown) committed suicide. Upon learning of this, on the morning of May 2, General Weidling surrendered to the Russians, signed an act of surrender and ordered the remaining German troops in Berlin to cease resistance. The battle for Berlin is over. On May 3, 1945, Weidling had already testified to Soviet investigators at the Intelligence Headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Weidling, like many officers, complained about the degradation of the German command during the war, caused by Hitler's desire to personally control the actions of all troops: “I must note that the Russians have made great strides forward in the tactical sense during the war, while our command has stepped back. Our generals are "paralyzed" in their actions, the corps commander, army commander and partially the army group commander did not have any independence in their actions. The commander of the army does not have the right to transfer, at his own discretion, a battalion from one sector to another without Hitler's sanction. Such a command and control system has repeatedly led to the death of entire formations. There is no need to talk about the commanders of divisions and corps, they were generally deprived of the opportunity to act in accordance with the situation, to show initiative, everything should be done according to a plan from above, and these plans often did not correspond to the situation at the front. "

Weidling testified that although there was food and ammunition in Berlin for 30 days, it was not possible to deliver them normally, and the warehouses located on the outskirts were seized by Soviet troops. Four days after being appointed commander of the defense, Weidling's troops had practically nothing to resist.

Question: What were Hitler's orders regarding the defense of Berlin? Highlight the situation in Berlin at the time of your surrender.

Answer: When I was appointed commander of the defense of Berlin, I received an order from Hitler to defend Berlin to the last man. It was clear to me from the very first moment that there was no way to defend Berlin with the hope of success. Every day the position of the defenders worsened, the Russians squeezed the ring around us more and more, every day getting closer and closer to the center of the city. In the evening I reported to Hitler on the situation and the situation every day.

By April 29, the situation with ammunition and food was very dire, especially with ammunition. I realized that further resistance, from a military point of view, is insane and criminal. On the evening of April 29, after an hour and a half of my report to Hitler, in which I stressed that there was no way to continue the resistance, that all hopes for air supplies had collapsed, Hitler agreed with me and told me that he had given a special order for the transfer of ammunition by aircraft, and that if on April 30 the situation with the delivery of ammunition and food by air does not improve, he will authorize the abandonment of Berlin and an attempt by the troops to break through. "

This was the last meeting between Weidling and Hitler. The next day, he committed suicide and gave the general freedom of action, which he immediately took advantage of: “I gave the order to the units, who can and wants to, let them make their way, the rest lay down their arms. On May 1, at 21.00, I gathered the staff of the 56th TC and the staff of the Berlin defense headquarters in order to decide whether the headquarters would break through or surrender to the Russians. I stated that further resistance is useless, that to break out of the cauldron means, if successful, get from the “cauldron” into the “cauldron”. All the staff at the headquarters supported me, and on the night of May 2, I sent Colonel von Dufing as an envoy to the Russians with a proposal for the German troops to stop resistance. […] Although I was the commander of the defense of Berlin, the situation in Berlin was such that after I made a decision, I felt safe only with the Russians. "

Subsequently, General Helmut Weidling was caught by the Soviet investigation and confessed to the war crimes committed under his command on the territory of the USSR. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison. He died in 1955 in the Vladimir Central and was buried there.

Before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the bands of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. To this end, on April 14, after a 15 - 20-minute fire raid, reinforced rifle battalions from the divisions of the first echelon of combined-arms armies began to operate in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front. Then, in a number of sectors, the regiments of the first echelons were brought into battle. In the course of two-day battles, they managed to penetrate the enemy's defenses and capture separate sections of the first and second trenches, and in some directions advance up to 5 km. The integrity of the enemy defense was broken. In addition, in a number of places the front's troops crossed the zone of the densest minefields, which was supposed to facilitate the subsequent offensive of the main forces. Based on the assessment of the results of the battle, the front command decided to reduce the duration of the artillery preparation for the attack of the main forces from 30 to 20-25 minutes.

In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the night of April 16 by reinforced rifle companies. It was found that the enemy was firmly in defensive positions directly along the left bank of the Neisse. The front commander decided not to make changes to the developed plan.

On the morning of April 16, the main forces of the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts went over to the offensive. At 5 o'clock Moscow time, two hours before dawn, artillery preparation began in the 1st Belorussian Front. In the band of the 5th Shock Army, ships and floating batteries of the Dnieper Flotilla took part in it. The force of the artillery fire was enormous. If for the entire first day of the operation, the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front used up 1,236 thousand shells, which amounted to almost 2.5 thousand railway cars, then during the artillery preparation - 500 thousand shells and mines, or 1 thousand cars. Night bombers of the 16th and 4th air armies struck enemy headquarters, artillery firing positions, as well as the third and fourth trenches of the main defense zone.

After the final salvo of rocket artillery, the troops of the 3rd and 5th shock troops, the 8th Guards, and also the 69th armies, commanded by Generals V.I.Kuznetsov, N.E.Berzarin, V.I. Chuikov, moved forward, V. Ya. Kolpakchi. With the beginning of the attack, powerful searchlights located in the zone of these armies directed their beams towards the enemy. The 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 47th and 33rd armies of Generals S.G. Poplavsky, F.I.Perkhorovich, V.D. The bombers of the 18th Air Army under the command of Chief Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov struck the second defense zone. At dawn, the aviation of the 16th Air Army of General S. I. Rudenko intensified the fighting, which in the first day of the operation made 5342 sorties and shot down 165 German aircraft. In total, during the first day, the pilots of the 16th, 4th and 18th air armies made over 6550 sorties, dropped over 1500 tons of bombs at control points, resistance centers and enemy reserves.

As a result of powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the enemy suffered great damage. Therefore, the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully. Soon, however, the Nazis, relying on a strong, engineering-developed second line of defense, put up fierce resistance. Intense battles unfolded along the entire front. Soviet troops strove at all costs to overcome the stubbornness of the enemy, acting assertively and energetically. In the center of the 3rd Shock Army, the 32nd Rifle Corps under the command of General DS Zherebin achieved the greatest success. He advanced 8 km and reached the second line of defense. On the left flank of the army, the 301st Rifle Division, commanded by Colonel V.S.Antonov, took an important enemy stronghold and railway station Verbig. The soldiers of the 1054th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel H. H. Radaev, distinguished themselves in the battles for it. Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion, Lieutenant G.A. Avakyan with one machine gunner made his way to the building where the Nazis settled. Throwing grenades at them, the brave warriors destroyed 56 fascists and captured 14. Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

To increase the pace of the offensive in the zone of the 3rd Shock Army at 10 o'clock, General I.F.Kirichenko's 9th Panzer Corps was brought into battle. Although this increased the force of the blow, the advance of the troops continued to develop slowly. It became clear to the front command that the combined arms armies were not able to quickly break through the enemy defenses to the depths planned for the introduction of tank armies into battle. Particularly dangerous was the fact that the infantry could not capture the tactically very important Zelovsky heights, along which the leading edge of the second defensive zone passed. This natural boundary dominated the entire area, had steep slopes and in all respects was a serious obstacle on the way to the capital of Germany. The Seelow Heights were considered by the Wehrmacht command as the key to the entire defense in the Berlin direction. "By 13 o'clock," recalled Marshal G.K. Zhukov, "I clearly understood that the enemy's fire system had basically survived here, and in the battle formation in which we started the attack and are leading the offensive, we cannot take the Zelovsky Heights." (624). Therefore, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov decided to bring tank armies into battle and jointly complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone.

In the second half of the day, General M. E. Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army was the first to enter the battle. By the end of the day, all three of its corps were fighting in the zone of the 8th Guards Army. However, on this day, it was not possible to break through the defenses on the Zelovsky Heights. The first day of the operation was also difficult for the 2nd Guards Tank Army of General S. I. Bogdanov. In the afternoon, the army received an order from the commander to overtake the infantry battle formations and strike at Bernau. By 19 o'clock, its formations reached the line of the advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, but, having met fierce enemy resistance, they could not advance further.

The course of the struggle on the first day of the operation showed that the Nazis were striving to hold the Zelow Heights at any cost: by the end of the day, the Nazi command had advanced the reserves of the Vistula Army Group to reinforce the troops defending the second line of defense. The battles were extremely stubborn. During the second day of the battle, the Nazis repeatedly launched violent counterattacks. However, the 8th Guards Army of General V. I. Chuikov, which fought here, was persistently moving forward. Warriors of all types of troops displayed massive heroism. The 172nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 57th Guards Rifle Division fought bravely. During the assault on the heights covering Zelov, the 3rd battalion under the command of Captain N.N. Chusovsky especially distinguished itself. After repelling the enemy's counterattack, the battalion burst into the Zelov Heights, and then, after a heavy street battle, cleared the southeastern outskirts of the Zelov city. The battalion commander in these battles not only led the units, but also, dragging the fighters along with him, personally destroyed four Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. Many soldiers and officers of the battalion were awarded orders and medals, and Captain Chusovskaya was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Zelov was taken by the troops of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps of General V.A.Glazunov in cooperation with part of the forces of the 11th Guards Tank Corps of Colonel A. Kh.

As a result of fierce and stubborn battles, the troops of the front strike grouping by the end of April 17 broke through the second defensive zone and two intermediate positions. The attempts of the fascist German command to stop the advance of the Soviet troops by introducing four divisions from the reserve into battle were unsuccessful. The bombers of the 16th and 18th air armies attacked enemy reserves day and night, delaying their advance to the line of hostilities. On April 16 and 17, the offensive was supported by the ships of the Dnieper military flotilla. They fired until the ground forces went beyond the firing range of naval artillery. Soviet troops stubbornly rushed to Berlin.

Stubborn resistance also had to be overcome by the front troops, who were striking on the flanks. The troops of the 61st Army of General P. A. Belov, which launched an offensive on April 17, had crossed the Oder by the end of the day and seized a bridgehead on its left bank. By this time, the formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army crossed the Oder and broke through the first position of the main line of defense. In the Frankfurt area, the forces of the 69th and 33rd armies advanced from 2 to 6 km.

On the third day, heavy fighting continued in the depths of the enemy defense. The Nazis brought almost all of their operational reserves into the battle. The extremely fierce nature of the struggle affected the rate of advance of the Soviet troops. By the end of the day, with their main forces, they overcame another 3 - 6 km and reached the approaches to the third defensive zone. The formations of both tank armies, together with infantrymen, artillerymen and sappers, continuously stormed enemy positions for three days. The difficult terrain and strong anti-tank defenses of the enemy did not allow the tankers to break away from the infantry. The mobile troops of the front have not yet received operational scope for conducting swift maneuvering actions in the Berlin direction.

In the zone of the 8th Guards Army, the Nazis put up the most stubborn resistance along the highway going west from Zelov, on both sides of which they installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns.

The slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front put, in the opinion Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the execution of the plan to encircle the Berlin group of the enemy is under threat. As early as April 17, the Stavka demanded from the front commander to ensure a more energetic offensive of the troops subordinate to him. At the same time, she gave instructions to the commanders of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian fronts to facilitate the advance of the 1st Belorussian front. The 2nd Belorussian Front (after crossing the Oder) received, in addition, the task of developing the offensive to the south-west by the main forces no later than April 22, striking around Berlin from the north (625), so that in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Of the Ukrainian front to complete the encirclement of the Berlin group.

In pursuance of the Stavka's instructions, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front demanded that the troops increase the pace of the offensive, artillery, including high power, pull up to the first echelon of troops at a distance of 2 - 3 km, which was supposed to facilitate closer interaction with infantry and tanks. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in decisive directions. To support the advancing armies, the front commander ordered more decisive use of aviation.

As a result of the measures taken, by the end of April 19, the troops of the strike group broke through the third defensive zone and in four days advanced to a depth of 30 km, having the opportunity to develop an offensive on Berlin and bypassing it from the north. In breaking through the enemy's defenses, the aviation of the 16th Air Army rendered great assistance to the ground forces. Despite the unfavorable meteorological conditions, during this time she made about 14.7 thousand sorties and shot down 474 enemy aircraft. In the battles near Berlin, Major I.N.Kozhedub increased the number of enemy aircraft shot down to 62. The renowned pilot was awarded high awards- the third Gold Star. In just four days in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, Soviet aviation made up to 17 thousand sorties (626).

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front spent four days to break through the Oder defensive line. During this time, the enemy suffered great damage: 9 divisions from the first operational echelon and a division of the second echelon lost up to 80 percent of the personnel and almost the entire military equipment, and 6 divisions nominated from the reserve, and up to 80 different battalions sent from the depths - over 50 percent. However, the troops of the front also suffered significant losses and advanced more slowly than envisaged by the plan. This was primarily due to the difficult conditions of the situation. The deep construction of the enemy's defense, which was occupied in advance by the troops, the large saturation of it with anti-tank weapons, the high density of artillery fire, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, continuous counterattacks and the reinforcement of troops with reserves - all this demanded from the Soviet troops the maximum exertion of forces.

Due to the fact that the shock group of the front launched an offensive from a small bridgehead and in a relatively narrow strip bounded by water barriers and wooded and swampy areas, Soviet troops were constrained in maneuver and could not quickly expand the breakthrough strip. In addition, the crossings and rear roads were extremely congested, which made it extremely difficult for new forces to enter the battle from the depths. The pace of advance of the combined arms armies was significantly influenced by the fact that the enemy defense was not reliably suppressed during the artillery preparation. This was especially true of the second defensive zone, which ran along the Zelovsky Heights, where the enemy withdrew part of the forces from the first zone and advanced reserves from the depths. It did not have a particular effect on the pace of the offensive and the introduction of tank armies into battle to complete the breakthrough of the defense. This use of tank armies was not provided for in the operation plan, so their interaction with combined arms formations, aviation and artillery had to be organized already in the course of hostilities.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was developing successfully. On April 16, at 0615 hours, artillery preparation began, during which reinforced battalions of the first echelon divisions advanced directly to the Neisse River and, after transferring artillery fire under the cover of a smoke screen placed on a 390-kilometer front, they began crossing the river. The personnel of the forward units were transported along the assault bridges, built during the period of artillery preparation, and on improvised means. Together with the infantry, a small number of escort guns and mortars were transported. Since the bridges were not yet ready, some of the field artillery had to be forded with the help of ropes. At 07.05 a.m. the first echelons of bombers of the 2nd Air Army struck at enemy centers of resistance and command posts.

The battalions of the first echelon, quickly seizing bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. The sappers of one of the units of the 15th Guards Separate Motor Assault Engineer-Sapper Battalion showed exceptional dedication. Overcoming the obstacles on the left bank of the Neisse River, they found the property for the assault bridge, guarded by enemy soldiers. Having interrupted the guards, the sappers quickly set up an assault bridge, along which the infantry of the 15th Guards Rifle Division began to cross. For their courage and courage, the commander of the 34th Guards Rifle Corps, General G.V. Baklanov, awarded the entire personnel of the unit (22 people) with the Order of Glory (627). Pontoon bridges on light inflatable boats were built after 50 minutes, bridges for loads of up to 30 tons - in 2 hours, and bridges on rigid supports for loads of up to 60 tons - within 4 - 5 hours. In addition to them, ferries were used to ferry tanks for direct support of the infantry. In total, 133 crossings were equipped in the direction of the main attack. The first echelon of the main strike group completed the crossing of Neisse an hour later, during which the artillery fired continuously at the enemy's defenses. Then she concentrated attacks on the enemy strongholds, preparing an attack on the opposite bank.

At 8:40 am, the troops of the 13th Army, as well as the 3rd and 5th Guards armies, began to break through the main defensive zone. The fighting on the left bank of the Neisse took a fierce character. The Nazis launched fierce counterattacks, seeking to eliminate the bridgeheads captured by Soviet troops. Already on the first day of the operation, the fascist command threw into battle from its reserve up to three tank divisions and a tank-destroyer brigade.

In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defenses, the front commander used the 25th and 4th Guards Tank Corps of Generals E.I.Fominykh and P.P. armies (628). Working closely together, the combined arms and tank formations by the end of the day broke through the main defense zone on the front 26 km and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

The next day, the main forces of both tank armies were brought into battle. Soviet troops repelled all enemy counterattacks and completed the breakthrough of the second line of his defense. For two days, the troops of the front strike grouping advanced 15 - 20 km. Part of the enemy forces began to retreat across the Spree River. To support the combat operations of the tank armies, most of the forces of the 2nd Air Army were involved. Attack aircraft destroyed the enemy's firepower and manpower, and bomber aircraft attacked his reserves.

On the Dresden axis, the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army under the command of General K.K.Sverchevsky and the 52nd Army of General K.A. K. Kimbara and I. P. Korchagina also completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and in two days of hostilities advanced up to 20 km in some sectors.

The successful offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front created for the enemy the threat of a deep bypass of his Berlin grouping from the south. The Nazis concentrated their efforts with the aim of delaying the advance of Soviet troops at the turn of the Spree River. Here they also sent the reserves of Army Group Center and the retreating troops of the 4th Panzer Army. However, the enemy's attempts to change the course of the battle were unsuccessful.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the front commander on the night of April 18 assigned the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies under the command of Generals P.S. Rybalko and D. D. Lelyushenko to reach the Spree, force it on the move and develop the offensive directly to Berlin from the south. The combined arms armies were ordered to carry out the tasks assigned earlier. The military council of the front drew special attention of the commanders of the tank armies to the need for swift and maneuverable actions. In the directive, the front commander emphasized: “In the main direction, the tank fist is bolder and more decisive to push forward. Bypass cities and large settlements and not get involved in protracted frontal battles. I demand to firmly understand that the success of tank armies depends on bold maneuver and swiftness in action ”(629). On the morning of April 18, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies reached the Spree. Together with the 13th Army, they forced it on the move, broke through the third defensive zone in a 10-kilometer sector and captured a bridgehead north and south of Spremberg, where their main forces were concentrated. On April 18, troops of the 5th Guards Army with the 4th Guards Tank Army and in cooperation with the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps crossed the Spree south of the city. On this day, the planes of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division three times Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A.I. During the day, in 13 air battles, the pilots of the division shot down 18 enemy aircraft (630). Thus, favorable conditions for a successful offensive were created in the zone of operations of the front's strike grouping.

Front troops operating in the Dresden sector repulsed strong enemy counterattacks. On this day, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of General V.K.Baranov was brought into battle here.

In three days, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 30 km in the direction of the main attack. Significant assistance to the ground forces was rendered by the 2nd Air Army of General S. A. Krasovsky, which during these days made 7517 sorties and in 138 air battles shot down 155 enemy aircraft (631).

While the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were conducting intense combat operations to break through the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were completing preparations for the Oder crossing. In the lower reaches, the channel of this river is divided into two branches (Ost- and West-Oder), therefore, the troops of the front had to overcome two water barriers in succession. In order to create the best conditions for the main forces for the offensive, which was scheduled for April 20, the front commander decided on April 18 and 19 with forward units to force the Ost-Oder River, destroy the enemy outposts in the interfluve and ensure the front strike group's formations to occupy an advantageous starting position.

On April 18, simultaneously in the bands of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies under the command of generals P.I.Batov, V.S.Popov and I.T. smoke screens crossed the Ost-Oder, in a number of areas overcame the enemy defenses in the interfluve and reached the bank of the West-Oder River. On April 19, the crossed units continued to destroy enemy units in the interfluve, concentrating on dams on the right bank of this river. Substantial assistance to the ground forces was provided by the aviation of the 4th Air Army of General K.A. Vershinin. She suppressed and destroyed strongholds and firing points of the enemy.

By active operations in the Oder interfluve, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had a significant impact on the course of the Berlin operation. Having overcome the swampy floodplain of the Oder, they took an advantageous starting position for forcing the West Oder, as well as breaking through the enemy defense along its left bank, in the section from Stettin to Schwedt, which did not allow the fascist command to transfer the formations of the 3rd Panzer Army into the zone of the 1st Of the Belorussian front.

Thus, by April 20, in the zones of all three fronts, generally favorable conditions had developed for the continuation of the operation. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed the offensive most successfully. In the course of breaking through the defenses along the Neisse and Spree, they defeated the enemy's reserves, entered the operational space and rushed to Berlin, covering the right wing of the Frankfurt-Guben group of Hitler's troops, which included part of the 4th tank and the main forces of the 9th field armies. In solving this problem, the main role was assigned to tank armies. On April 19, they advanced 30-50 km in the north-western direction, reached the Lubbenau, Luccao area and cut the communications of the 9th Army. All attempts of the enemy to break through from the Cottbus and Spremberg areas to the crossings over the Spree and to reach the rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were unsuccessful. The troops of the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies under the command of Generals V.N. 45 - 60 km and go to the approaches to Berlin; General N.P. Pukhov's 13th Army advanced 30 km.

The rapid offensive of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, as well as the 13th Armies, by the end of April 20, led to the cutting off of Army Group Vistula from Army Group Center, and the enemy troops in the Cottbus and Spremberg regions were in a semi-encirclement. In the highest circles of the Wehrmacht, a commotion began when they learned that Soviet tanks had entered the Wünsdorf area (10 km south of Zossen). The headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces and the general staff of the ground forces hastily left Zossen and moved to Wanze (Potsdam region), and some of the departments and services were transferred by plane to southern Germany. In the diary of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht for April 20, the following entry was made: “For the highest command levels, the last act of the dramatic death of the German armed forces begins ... The mood is depressed ”(632).

Fast development the operation made a real quick meeting of the Soviet and American-British troops. At the end of April 20, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command sent a directive to the commander of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, as well as the commander of the Air Force, armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army. It indicated that it was necessary to establish signs and signals for mutual identification. By agreement with the allied command, the commander of the tank and combined arms armies was ordered to determine a temporary tactical demarcation line between the Soviet and American-British units in order to avoid mixing of troops (633).

Continuing the offensive in the northwestern direction, the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, by the end of April 21, overcame enemy resistance in separate strongholds and came close to the outer contour of the Berlin defense region. Given the impending nature of hostilities in such large city As Berlin, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to reinforce the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P.S. Rybalko with the 10th Artillery Corps, the 25th Artillery Breakthrough Division, the 23rd Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division and the 2nd Fighter Aviation Corps ... In addition, two rifle divisions of General AA Luchinsky's 28th Army, brought into battle from the second echelon of the front, were transferred by road.

On the morning of April 22, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, deploying all three corps in the first echelon, began an attack on the enemy fortifications. Army troops broke through the outer defensive circuit of the Berlin region and by the end of the day started fighting on the southern outskirts of the German capital. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front broke into its northeastern outskirts the day before.

Operating to the left, the 4th Guards Tank Army of General D. D. Lelyushenko, by the end of April 22, also broke through the outer defensive bypass and, reaching the Zarmund-Belits line, took an advantageous position to join up with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and complete the encirclement together with them the entire Berlin grouping of the enemy. Its 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards Armies, had by this time reached the Belitz, Tryenbritzen, Tsana line. As a result, the path to Berlin for enemy reserves from the west and southwest was closed. In Tryenbritzen, tankmen of the 4th Guards Tank Army rescued about 1600 prisoners of war of various nationalities from fascist captivity: British, Americans and Norwegians, including the former commander of the Norwegian army, General O. Ryge. A few days later, soldiers of the same army freed from a concentration camp (in the suburbs of Berlin) the former Prime Minister of France E. Herriot, a famous statesman who, back in the 1920s, advocated Franco-Soviet rapprochement.

Taking advantage of the success of the tankers, the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards armies quickly moved westward. In an effort to slow down the offensive of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front on Berlin, the fascist command on April 18 launched a counterattack from the Gorlitsa area against the forces of the 52nd Army. Having created a significant superiority in forces in this direction, the enemy tried to reach the rear of the front's strike grouping. On April 19 - 23, fierce battles unfolded here. The enemy managed to drive a wedge into the location of the Soviet and then Polish troops to a depth of 20 km. To help the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps were transferred and re-targeted to four air corps. As a result, the enemy suffered great damage, and by the end of April 24, his advance was suspended.

While the formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were carrying out a swift maneuver to bypass the German capital from the south, the shock group of the 1st Belorussian Front was advancing directly on Berlin from the east. After breaking through the Oder line, the front troops, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, moved forward. On April 20, at 13:50, the long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army fired the first two volleys at the fascist capital, and then systematic shelling began. By the end of April 21, the 3rd and 5th Shock Armies, as well as the 2nd Guards Tank Army, had already overcome the resistance on the outer edge of the Berlin Defense Region and reached the northeastern outskirts of the city. By the morning of April 22, the 9th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Havel River, which is on the northwestern outskirts of the capital, and, in cooperation with units of the 47th Army, began to force it. The 1st Guards Tank and 8th Guards Armies also successfully attacked, which had reached the outer defensive contour by April 21. On the morning of the next day, the main forces of the front's strike grouping were already fighting the enemy directly in Berlin.

By the end of April 22, Soviet troops created the conditions for the completion of the encirclement and dissection of the entire Berlin enemy grouping. The distance between the advanced units of the 47th, 2nd Guards Tank Armies, advancing from the northeast, and the 4th Guards Tank Army was 40 km, and between the left flank of the 8th Guards and the right flank of the 3rd Guards Tank Army - no more than 12 km. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, assessing the current situation, demanded from the front commanders by the end of April 24 to complete the encirclement of the main forces of the 9th Field Army and prevent it from retreating to Berlin or to the west. In order to ensure the timely and accurate implementation of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front brought into battle his second echelon - the 3rd Army under the command of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General V.V. Kryukov. In cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they were supposed to cut off the main forces of the 9th enemy army from the capital and surround them southeast of the city. The troops of the 47th Army and the 9th Guards Tank Corps were ordered to accelerate the offensive and, no later than April 24-25, complete the encirclement of the entire enemy grouping in the Berlin direction. In connection with the withdrawal of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the southern outskirts of Berlin, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command on the night of April 23 established a new demarcation line for it with the 1st Belorussian Front: from Lubben to the northwest to the Anhalt railway station in Berlin.

The Nazis made desperate efforts to prevent the encirclement of their capital. On April 22, in the afternoon, the last operational meeting was held in the Reich Chancellery, which was attended by W. Keitel, A. Jodl, M. Bormann, G. Krebs and others. Hitler agreed with Jodl's proposal to remove all troops from the western front and throw them into the battle for Berlin. In this regard, the 12th Army of General V. Wenck, which occupied defensive positions on the Elbe, was ordered to turn the front to the east and advance to Potsdam, Berlin to join the 9th Army. At the same time, an army group under the command of SS General F. Steiner, which operated north of the capital, was supposed to strike at the flank of the group of Soviet troops that bypassed it from the north and northwest (634).

To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. Completely ignoring the actual state of affairs, the German command counted on the offensive of this army from the west, and Steiner's army group from the north to prevent the complete encirclement of the city. The 12th Army, turning its front to the east, on April 24 began operations against the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies, which were defended on the Belitz-Tryenbritzen line. German 9th Army was ordered to retreat westward to join the 12th Army south of Berlin.

On 23 and 24 April, hostilities in all directions took on a particularly fierce character. Although the pace of advancement of the Soviet troops decreased somewhat, the Nazis failed to stop them. The intention of the fascist command to prevent the encirclement and dismemberment of their group was thwarted. Already on April 24, the troops of the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front linked up with the 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front southeast of Berlin. As a result, the main forces of the 9th and part of the forces of the 4th tank armies of the enemy were cut off from the city and surrounded. The next day after the connection to the west of Berlin, in the Ketzin area, the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front with the troops of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th armies of the 1st Belorussian Front was surrounded by the Berlin enemy grouping itself.

On April 25, a meeting of Soviet and American troops took place. On this day, in the Torgau area, units of the 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army crossed the Elbe and established contact with the 69th Infantry Division of the 1st American Army that had approached here. Germany was dismembered in two.

The situation on the Dresden direction also changed significantly. The counterstrike of the enemy's Görlitz grouping by April 25 was finally thwarted by the stubborn and active defense of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army. To strengthen them, the defense zone of the 52nd Army was narrowed, and to the left of it the formations of the 31st Army, which had arrived at the front, under the command of General P.G.Shafranov, were deployed. The freed rifle corps of the 52nd Army was used in the sector of its active operations.

Thus, in just ten days, Soviet troops overcame the powerful enemy defenses along the Oder and Neisse, surrounded and dismembered his grouping in the Berlin direction and created the conditions for its complete elimination.

In connection with the successful maneuver to encircle the Berlin grouping by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, there was no need to bypass Berlin from the north by the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front. As a result, on April 23, the Headquarters ordered him to develop the offensive in accordance with the original plan of the operation, that is, in the western and northwestern directions, and with part of the forces to strike around Stettin from the west (635).

The offensive of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began on April 20 with the crossing of the West Oder River. The thick morning fog and smoke sharply limited the actions of the Soviet aviation. However, after 9 o'clock, visibility improved slightly, and the aviation increased support for the ground forces. The greatest success during the first day of the operation was achieved in the zone of the 65th Army under the command of General PI Batov. By the evening, she captured several small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, ferrying there 31 rifle battalion, part of the artillery and 15 self-propelled artillery installations. The troops of the 70th Army under the command of General V.S.Popov also operated successfully. 12 rifle battalions were transferred to the bridgehead they had captured. The crossing of the West Oder by the troops of the 49th Army of General I. T. Grishin turned out to be less successful: only on the second day did they manage to capture a small bridgehead (636).

In the following days, the front's troops fought intense battles to expand bridgeheads, repel enemy counterattacks, and also continued to ferry their troops to the left bank of the Oder. By the end of April 25, the formations of the 65th and 70th armies completed the breakthrough of the main line of defense. For six days of hostilities, they advanced 20 - 22 km. The 49th Army, taking advantage of the success of its neighbors, crossed the West Oder with its main forces from the morning of April 26 along the crossings of the 70th Army and by the end of the day advanced 10-12 km. On the same day, troops of the 2nd Shock Army of General I.I. As a result of the actions of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 3rd German Panzer Army was shackled, which deprived the Hitlerite command of the opportunity to use its forces for operations directly in the Berlin direction.

At the end of April, the Soviet command focused all its attention on Berlin. Before his assault, party political work began with renewed vigor among the troops. Back on April 23, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front addressed an appeal to the soldiers, which said: “Before you, Soviet heroes, is Berlin. You must take Berlin, and take it as quickly as possible to prevent the enemy from coming to his senses. For the honor of our Motherland forward! To Berlin!" (637) In conclusion, the Military Council expressed full confidence that the glorious soldiers would honor their mission. Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations used any respite in the battles to familiarize everyone with this document. Army newspapers called on the soldiers: "Forward, for complete victory over the enemy!", "Let us raise the banner of our victory over Berlin!"

During the operation, employees of the Main Political Directorate conducted negotiations with members of military councils and heads of political directorates of the fronts almost daily, listened to their reports, and gave specific instructions and advice. The main political department demanded to bring to the consciousness of the soldiers that in Berlin they were fighting for the future of their Motherland, of all peace-loving humanity.

In newspapers, on billboards installed along the path of the movement of Soviet troops, on guns and vehicles, there were inscriptions: “Comrades! Berlin's defense has been broken! The desired hour of victory is near. Forward, comrades, forward! "," One more effort, and victory is won! "," The long-awaited hour has come! We are at the walls of Berlin! "

And the Soviet soldiers stepped up their blows. Even the wounded soldiers did not leave the battlefield. Thus, in the 65th Army, more than two thousand soldiers refused to be evacuated to the rear (638). Soldiers and commanders applied for admission to the party on a daily basis. For example, in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front only in April 11,776 soldiers (639) were admitted to the party.

In this situation, special care was shown for the further increase in the command personnel of the sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of combat missions, so that the officers did not lose leadership of the battle for a moment. The initiative of the soldiers, their resourcefulness and audacity in battle were supported by all available forms, methods and means of party political work. Party and Komsomol organizations helped the commanders to concentrate their efforts in a timely manner where success was planned, and the communists were the first to rush into attacks and drag their non-party comrades along with them. “What kind of fortitude and desire to win did you have to have in order to reach your goal through a barrage of fire, stone and reinforced concrete barriers, overcoming numerous“ surprises ”, fire bags and traps, engaging in hand-to-hand combat,” recalls a member of the Military Council 1- 1st Belorussian Front General KF Telegin. - But everyone wanted to live. But this is how the Soviet man was brought up - the common good, the happiness of his people, the glory of the Motherland is dearer to him than anything personal, dearer than life itself ”(640).

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that demanded a humane attitude towards those ordinary members of the National Socialist Party who are loyal to the Soviet Army, create local administrations everywhere, and appoint burgomasters in cities.

Solving the task of capturing Berlin, the Soviet command understood that one should not underestimate the Frankfurt-Guben grouping, which Hitler intended to use to release his capital. As a result, along with increasing efforts to defeat the Berlin garrison, the Stavka considered it necessary to immediately begin to eliminate the troops surrounded southeast of Berlin.

The Frankfurt-Guben group numbered up to 200 thousand people. It was armed with over 2 thousand guns, more than 300 tanks and assault guns. The wooded and swampy area it occupies with an area of ​​about 1,500 sq. km was very convenient for defense. Given the composition of the enemy grouping, the Soviet command attracted the 3rd, 69th and 33rd armies and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 3rd Guards and 28th Armies, as well as the rifle corps of the 13th Army to liquidate it. 1st Ukrainian Front. The actions of the ground forces were supported by seven air corps, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, artillery - by 3.7 times. Since the bulk of Soviet tanks at that time fought directly in Berlin, the forces of the sides were equal in number.

In order to prevent a breakthrough of the blocked enemy grouping in the western direction, the troops of the 28th and part of the forces of the 3rd Guards Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front went over to the defensive. On the paths of a probable enemy offensive, they prepared three defensive zones, planted mines and made obstructions.

On the morning of April 26, Soviet troops launched an offensive against the encircled group, trying to cut and destroy it in parts. The enemy not only offered stubborn resistance, but also made repeated attempts to break through to the west. Thus, units of two infantry, two motorized and a tank divisions struck at the junction of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies. Having created a significant superiority in forces, the Nazis broke through the defenses in a narrow sector and began to move westward. In the course of fierce battles, Soviet troops closed the throat of the breakthrough, and the part that had broken through was surrounded in the Barut area and almost completely eliminated. The ground forces were greatly assisted by aviation, which made about 500 sorties during the day, destroying enemy personnel and equipment.

In the following days, the Nazi troops again tried to connect with the 12th Army, which in turn sought to overcome the defenses of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies operating on the external front of the encirclement. However, all enemy attacks during April 27 - 28 were repelled. Taking into account the likelihood of new attempts by the enemy to break through to the west, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front strengthened the defenses of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies and concentrated their reserves in the areas of Zossen, Luckenwalde, Jüterbog.

At the same time (April 26 - 28), the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were pushing the encircled enemy grouping from the east. Fearing complete liquidation, the Nazis on the night of April 29 again tried to break out of the encirclement. By dawn, at the cost of heavy losses, they managed to break through the main defensive zone of the Soviet troops at the junction of two fronts - in the area west of Wendisch-Buchholz. On the second line of defense, their advance was stopped. But the enemy, despite heavy losses, stubbornly rushed to the west. In the second half of April 29, up to 45 thousand fascist soldiers resumed attacks in the sector of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 28th Army, broke through its defenses and formed a corridor up to 2 km wide. Through it, they began to retreat to Luckenwald. In the same direction from the west, the 12th German army struck. There was a threat of a combination of two enemy groups. By the end of April 29, Soviet troops with decisive actions stopped the enemy's advance on the Sperenberg-Kummersdorf line (12 km east of Luckenwalde). His troops were dismembered and surrounded in three separate areas. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of large enemy forces into the Kummersdorf area led to the fact that the communications of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, as well as the 28th armies were cut. The distance between the advanced units of the breakthrough grouping and the troops of the 12th enemy army advancing from the west was reduced to 30 km.

Particularly intense battles unfolded on April 30. Regardless of losses, the Nazis continued their offensive and advanced 10 km westward in a day. By the end of the day, a significant part of the forces that had broken through had been eliminated. However, one of the groups (numbering up to 20 thousand people) on the night of May 1 managed to break through at the junction of the 13th and 4th Guards Tank Armies and reach the Belitsa area, it was now separated from the 12th Army by only 3-4 km ... To prevent further advance of these forces westward, the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army deployed two tank brigades, a mechanized brigade and a light artillery brigade, and a motorcycle regiment. In the course of fierce battles, the 1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps rendered great assistance to the ground forces.

By the end of the day, the bulk of the enemy's Frankfurt-Guben grouping had been eliminated. All hopes of the fascist command for the liberation of Berlin were dashed. Soviet troops captured 120,000 soldiers and officers, captured more than 300 tanks and assault guns, over 1,500 field guns, 17,600 vehicles and a lot of various military equipment. Only killed the enemy lost 60 thousand people (641). Only a few scattered groups of the enemy managed to infiltrate through the forest and escape to the west. Some of the troops of the 12th Army who survived the defeat of the troops withdrew to the left bank of the Elbe along the bridges built by American troops, and surrendered to them.

On the Dresden axis, the fascist German command did not abandon its intention to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops in the Bautzen area and go to the rear of the shock group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Having regrouped their troops, the Nazis on the morning of April 26 launched an offensive with four divisions. Despite heavy losses, the enemy did not reach the goal, his offensive was stopped. Stubborn battles continued here until April 30, but there was no significant change in the position of the parties. The Nazis, having exhausted their offensive capabilities, went over to the defensive in this direction.

Thus, thanks to stubborn and active defense, Soviet troops not only thwarted the enemy's plan to go to the rear of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front, but also captured bridgeheads on the Elbe in the Meissen area, Rize, which later served as an advantageous starting area for an attack on Prague.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Berlin reached its climax. The garrison, which was continuously increasing due to the attraction of the population of the city and the withdrawing military units, already numbered 300 thousand people (642). It was armed with 3 thousand guns and mortars, 250 tanks. By the end of April 25, the enemy occupied the territory of the capital along with the suburbs with a total area of ​​325 sq. km. Most of all, the eastern and southeastern outskirts of Berlin were fortified. Streets and alleys were crossed by solid barricades. Everything adapted to the defense, even the destroyed buildings. The underground structures of the city were widely used: bomb shelters, metro stations and tunnels, sewers and other objects. Reinforced concrete bunkers were built, the largest for 300 - 1000 people each, as well as a large number of reinforced concrete caps.

By April 26, the troops of the 47th Army, the 3rd and 5th Shock Army, the 8th Guards Combined Arms, the 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in the battles to liquidate the Berlin grouping, as well as 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In total, they included about 464 thousand people, over 12.7 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers, up to 2.1 thousand rocket artillery installations, about 1,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.

The Soviet command abandoned the offensive around the entire circumference of the city, as this could lead to an excessive dispersion of forces and a decrease in the pace of advance, and concentrated efforts on certain areas. Thanks to this peculiar tactic of "hammering" deep wedges into the enemy's disposition, his defense was dismembered into separate parts, and command and control of troops was paralyzed. This method of action increased the pace of the offensive and ultimately led to effective results.

Taking into account the experience of previous battles for large settlements, the Soviet command ordered the creation of assault detachments in each division as part of reinforced battalions or companies. Each such detachment, in addition to infantry, included artillery, tanks, self-propelled artillery installations, sappers, and often flamethrowers. It was intended for action in any one direction, which usually included one street, or the assault on a large object. To capture smaller objects from the same detachments, assault groups were allocated from a rifle squad to a platoon, reinforced with 2 - 4 guns, 1 - 2 tanks or self-propelled artillery installations, as well as sappers and flamethrowers.

As a rule, the beginning of the action of the assault detachments and groups was preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation. Before attacking a fortified building, the assault force was usually divided into two groups. One of them, under cover of tank and artillery fire, burst into the building, blocked the exits from the basements, which served as shelter for the Nazis during the artillery barrage period, and then destroyed them with grenades and bottles with flammable liquid. The second group cleared the upper floors of machine gunners and snipers.

The specific conditions for conducting combat operations in a large city have led to a number of features in the use of combat arms. So, in divisions and corps, artillery destruction groups were created, and in combined-arms armies - long-range groups. A significant part of the artillery was used for direct fire. The experience of previous battles has shown that tanks and self-propelled artillery installations can only attack if they closely interact with the infantry and under its cover. Attempts to use tanks on their own led to large losses from artillery fire and faust cartridges. Due to the fact that during the assault, Berlin was shrouded in smoke, the massive use of bomber aircraft was often difficult. Therefore, the main forces of bomber and assault aviation were used to destroy the Frankfurt-Guben grouping, and fighter aircraft carried out an air blockade of the Hitler capital. The most powerful attacks on military targets in the city were delivered by aviation on the 25th and on the night of 26 April. The 16th and 18th Air Armies made three massive strikes, in which 2,049 aircraft participated.

After the seizure of the airfields in Tempelhof and Gatow by Soviet troops, the Nazis tried to use Charlottenburgstrasse for landing their aircraft. However, these calculations of the enemy were thwarted by the actions of the pilots of the 16th Air Army, who continuously patrolled over this area. Attempts by the fascists to drop cargo to the encircled troops by parachute were also unsuccessful. Most of the enemy transport planes were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery and aviation while they were still approaching Berlin. Thus, after April 28, the Berlin garrison could no longer receive any effective assistance from the outside. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. By the end of April 26, Soviet troops cut off the enemy's Potsdam grouping from Berlin. The next day, the formations of both fronts penetrated deeply into the enemy's defenses and began hostilities in the central sector of the capital. As a result of the concentric offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy group by the end of April 27 was compressed in a narrow strip (from east to west it reached 16 km). Due to the fact that its width was only 2 - 3 km, the entire territory occupied by the enemy was under the continuous influence of the fire resources of the Soviet troops. The fascist German command strove to provide assistance to the Berlin group by any means. "Our troops on the Elbe," the OKB diary noted, "turned their backs on the Americans in order to ease the position of the defenders of Berlin with their offensive from outside" (643). However, by the end of April 28, the encircled group was dismembered into three parts. By this time, the attempts of the Wehrmacht command to provide assistance to the Berlin garrison by blows from outside had finally failed. The political and moral state of the fascist troops fell sharply.

On this day, Hitler subordinated the general staff of the ground forces to the chief of staff of the operational leadership, hoping to restore the integrity of command and control. In place of General G. Heinrici, who was accused of unwillingness to provide assistance to the surrounded Berlin, General K. Student was appointed commander of Army Group Vistula.

After April 28, the struggle continued with unrelenting force. Now it flared up in the Reichstag area, the battles for which began on April 29 by the troops of the 3rd Shock Army. The garrison of the Reichstag, consisting of 1 thousand soldiers and officers, was armed with a large number of guns, machine guns and faust cartridges. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various obstacles were set up, machine-gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

The task of seizing the Reichstag building was entrusted to the 79th Rifle Corps of General SN Perevertkin. Capturing the Moltke Bridge on the night of April 29, parts of the corps on April 30 by 4 o'clock seized a large resistance center - the house where the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Nazi Germany and the Swiss embassy were located, and went directly to the Reichstag. Only in the evening after repeated attacks of the 150th and 171st rifle divisions of General V.M.Shatilov and Colonel A.I. D. Plekhodanov and the chief of staff of the regiment, Major V. D. Shatalin, burst into the building. Soldiers, sergeants and officers of the battalions of captains S.A. Neustroev and V.I.Davydov, senior lieutenant K. Ya. Samsonov, as well as individual groups of Major M.M. Cooper, Captain V. N. Makov and others.

Together with rifle units, the Reichstag was stormed by the valiant tankmen of the 23rd Tank Brigade. The commanders of tank battalions, Major I.L. Yartsev and Captain S.V. Krasovsky, the commander of a tank company, Senior Lieutenant P.E. Kapustin, tank commander senior lieutenant A.G. Gaganov, driver-mechanics senior sergeant P.E. Lavrov and foreman I.N.Kletnay, gunner senior sergeant M.G. Lukyanov and many others.

The Nazis offered fierce resistance. Hand-to-hand fights began on the stairs and in the corridors. Storming units meter by meter, room by room, cleared the Reichstag building from the Nazis. The fighting continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, entrenched in the compartments of the basements, surrendered only on the night of May 2.

Early in the morning of May 1, on the pediment of the Reichstag, near the sculptural group, the Red Banner was already fluttering, presented to the commander of the 150th Infantry Division by the Military Council of the 3rd Shock Army. It was hoisted by scouts of the 756th Infantry Regiment of the 150th Infantry Division M.A.Egorov and M.V. This Banner symbolically embodied all the banners and flags that, during the most fierce battles, were hoisted by groups of Captain V.N.Makov, Lieutenant R. Koshkarbaev, Major M. M. Bondar and many other soldiers. From the main entrance of the Reichstag to the roof, their heroic path was marked with red banners, flags and flags, as if merged now into a single Victory Banner. It was the triumph of the victory won, the triumph of the courage and heroism of the Soviet soldiers, the greatness of the feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the entire Soviet people.

“And when a red banner hoisted by the hands of Soviet soldiers hoisted over the Reichstag,” said Leonid Brezhnev, “it was not only the banner of our military victory. It was the immortal banner of October; it was the great banner of Lenin; it was the invincible banner of socialism - a bright symbol of hope, a symbol of freedom and happiness of all peoples! " (644)

On April 30, Hitler's troops in Berlin were actually dismembered into four isolated units of different composition, and command and control of the troops was paralyzed. The last hopes of the fascist German command for the liberation of the Berlin garrison by the forces of Wenck, Steiner and Busse were dispelled. Panic broke out among the fascist leadership. To evade responsibility for the atrocities committed, on April 30, Hitler committed suicide. In order to hide this from the army, the fascist radio reported that the Fuhrer had been killed at the front near Berlin. On the same day in Schleswig-Holstein, Hitler's successor, Grand Admiral Doenitz, appointed a "provisional imperial government", which, as subsequent events showed, tried to reach contact with the United States and Britain on an anti-Soviet basis (645).

However, the days of Nazi Germany were already numbered. By the end of April 30, the position of the Berlin group had become disastrous. At 3 o'clock on May 1, the chief general staff German ground forces, General Krebs, by agreement with the Soviet command, crossed the front line in Berlin and was received by the commander of the 8th Guards Army, General V.I. Chuikov. Krebs announced Hitler's suicide, and also handed over the list of members of the new imperial government and the proposal of Goebbels and Bormann for a temporary cessation of hostilities in the capital in order to prepare the conditions for peace negotiations between Germany and the USSR. However, this document did not say anything about the surrender. This was the last attempt of the fascist leaders to split the anti-Hitler coalition. But the Soviet command figured out this plan of the enemy as well.

Krebs' message was reported through Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The answer was extremely short: to force the Berlin garrison to surrender immediately and unconditionally. The negotiations did not affect the intensity of the fighting in Berlin. Soviet troops continued to actively advance, striving for complete mastery of the enemy capital, and the Nazis continued to offer stubborn resistance. At 18 o'clock it became known that the fascist leaders had rejected the demand for unconditional surrender. By this, they once again demonstrated their complete indifference to the fate of millions of ordinary Germans.

The Soviet command gave the order to the troops as soon as possible to complete the elimination of the enemy grouping in Berlin. Within half an hour, all the artillery hit the enemy. Fighting continued throughout the night. When the remnants of the garrison were dismembered into isolated groups, the Nazis realized that resistance was useless. On the night of May 2, the commander of the defense of Berlin, General G. Weidling, announced to the Soviet command the surrender of the 56th Panzer Corps, which was directly subordinate to him. At 6 o'clock, crossing the front line of the 8th Guards Army, he surrendered. At the suggestion of the Soviet command, Weidling signed an order for the Berlin garrison to cease resistance and lay down their arms. Somewhat later, a similar order on behalf of the "provisional imperial government" was signed by Goebbels' first deputy G. Fritsche. Due to the fact that the control of Hitler's troops in Berlin was paralyzed, the orders of Weidling and Fritsche could not be communicated to all units and formations. Therefore, on the morning of May 2, individual enemy groups continued to resist and even tried to break through from the city to the west. Only after the announcement of the order on the radio did the mass surrender begin. By 15 o'clock the enemy had completely stopped the resistance in Berlin. On this day alone, Soviet troops captured up to 135 thousand people in the city area (646).

The figures cited convincingly indicate that the Nazi leadership attracted considerable forces to defend its capital. Soviet troops fought with a large enemy group, and not with the civilian population, as some bourgeois falsifiers claim. The battles for Berlin were fierce and, as Hitler's general E. Butlar wrote after the war, “cost great losses not only to the Germans, but also to the Russians ...” (647).

During the operation, millions of Germans were convinced by their own experience of the humane attitude of the Soviet Army to the civilian population. Fierce fighting continued on the streets of Berlin, and Soviet soldiers were sharing hot food with children, women and the elderly. By the end of May, food cards were issued to the entire population of Berlin and the distribution of food was organized. Even if these norms were still small, the residents of the capital received more food than recently under Hitler. No sooner had the artillery salvos died down than work began to establish the city economy. Under the leadership of military engineers and technicians, Soviet soldiers, together with the population, restored the metro by the beginning of June, and trams were launched. The city received water, gas, electricity. Life went back to normal. The dope of Goebbels' propaganda about the monstrous atrocities that the Soviet Army allegedly bears to the Germans began to dissipate. “The innumerable noble deeds of the Soviet people will never be forgotten, who, while still holding a rifle in one hand, were already sharing a piece of bread with the other, helping our people overcome the terrible consequences of the war unleashed by the Hitlerite clique and take the fate of the country into their own hands, clearing the way for the enslaved and enslaved by imperialism and fascism to the German working class ... "- this is how, 30 years later, the Minister of National Defense of the GDR, General G. Hoffmann, assessed the actions of Soviet soldiers (648).

Simultaneously with the end of hostilities in Berlin, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to regroup to the Prague direction to complete the task of completing the liberation of Czechoslovakia, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were advancing in the western direction and by May 7 they had reached the Elbe on a wide front. ...

During the assault on Berlin in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg, a successful offensive was launched by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. By the end of May 2, they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and the next day, having advanced to the line Wismar, Schwerin, the Elbe River, they established contact with the 2nd British Army. The offensive operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front ended with the liberation of the islands of Wollin, Usedom and Rügen. Even at the final stage of the operation, the front forces entered into operational-tactical cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: the fleet aviation provided effective support to ground forces advancing in the coastal direction, especially in the battles for the Svinemunde naval base. The amphibious assault landed on the Danish island of Bornholm disarmed and captured the German fascist troops stationed there.

The rout Soviet Army Berlin enemy grouping and the capture of Berlin were the final act in the fight against Nazi Germany. With the fall of the capital, she lost all possibility of conducting an organized armed struggle and soon surrendered.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, have won a world-historic victory.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 12 tank, 11 motorized divisions and most of the Wehrmacht aviation. About 480 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, up to 11 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, as well as 4.5 thousand aircraft were captured as trophies.

Together with Soviet soldiers Active participation soldiers and officers of the Polish Army took part in the defeat of this group. Both Polish armies operated in the first operational echelon of the Soviet fronts, 12.5 thousand Polish soldiers took part in the storming of Berlin. Over the Brandenburg Gate, next to the victorious Soviet Red Banner, they hoisted their national banner. It was a triumph of the Soviet-Polish military community.

The Berlin operation is one of the largest operations of the Second World War. It was characterized by extremely high intensity of the struggle on both sides. Poisoned by false propaganda and intimidated by brutal repressions, the fascist troops resisted with extraordinary tenacity. The heavy losses of Soviet troops also testify to the degree of fierceness in the fighting. From April 16 to May 8, they lost more than 102 thousand people (649). Meanwhile, the American-British troops on the entire western front lost 260 thousand people during 1945 (650).

As in previous battles, in the Berlin operation, Soviet soldiers displayed high combat skill, courage and mass heroism. More than 600 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was awarded the third, and Marshals of the Soviet Union I.S.Konev and K.K.Rokossovsky the second medal "Gold Star". V. I. Andrianov, S. E. Artemenko, P. I. Batov, T. Ya. Begeldinov, D. A. Dragunsky, A. N. Efimov, S. I. Kretov, M. V. Kuznetsov, I. Kh. Mikhailichenko, M. P. Odintsov, V. S. Petrov, P. A. Plotnikov, V. I. Popkov, A. I. Rodimtsev, V. G. Ryazanov, E. J. Savitsky, V. V. Senko, Z. K. Slyusarenko, N. G. Stolyarov, E. P. Fedorov, M. G. Fomichev. 187 units and formations were named Berlin. Only from the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, 1,141,000 soldiers were awarded orders and medals, many units and formations were awarded orders of the Soviet Union, and 1 of 082,000 participants in the assault were awarded the medal "For the capture of Berlin" established in honor of this historic victory.

The Berlin operation made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of Soviet military art. It was prepared and carried out on the basis of comprehensive consideration and creative use of the richest experience of the Soviet Armed Forces accumulated during the war. At the same time, the military art of the Soviet troops in this operation has a number of features.

The operation was prepared in short time, and its main goals - the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy grouping and the capture of Berlin - were achieved in 16 - 17 days. Noting this feature, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky wrote: "The pace of preparation and implementation of final operations testifies to the fact that the Soviet military economy and the Armed Forces reached a level by 1945 that made it possible to do what would have previously seemed a miracle" ( 651).

The limited time frame for preparing such a large operation demanded new, more effective forms and methods of work from commanders and staffs of all levels. Not only in the fronts and armies, but also in corps and divisions, the parallel method of work of commanders and staffs was usually used. In all command and staff instances, the rule worked out in previous operations to give the troops as much time as possible for their immediate preparation for combat operations was unswervingly observed.

The Berlin operation is notable for the clarity of the strategic concept, which fully corresponded to the assigned tasks and the specifics of the current situation. It is a classic example of an offensive by a group of fronts carried out with such a decisive goal. During this operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of war.

The simultaneous offensive of three fronts in a 300-kilometer strip with six strikes pinned down the enemy's reserves, contributed to the disorganization of his command and control, and in a number of cases made it possible to achieve operational-tactical surprise.

The Soviet military art in the Berlin operation was characterized by a decisive massing of forces and assets in the directions of the main strikes, the creation of high densities of suppressive assets and a deep echeloning of combat formations of troops, which ensured a relatively quick breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the subsequent encirclement and destruction of its main forces and the maintenance of overall superiority over enemy during the entire operation.

The Berlin operation is very instructive for the experience of the various combat employment of armored and mechanized troops. It involved 4 tank armies, 10 separate tank and mechanized corps, 16 separate tank and self-propelled artillery brigades, as well as more than 80 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. The operation once again clearly demonstrated the expediency of not only tactical, but also operational massing of armored and mechanized troops in the most important sectors. The creation of powerful echelons of success development in the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (each consisted of two tank armies) is the most important prerequisite for the successful conduct of the entire operation, which once again confirmed that tank armies and corps, when used correctly, are the main a means of developing success.

The combat use of artillery in an operation was characterized by its skillful massing in the directions of the main strikes, the creation of artillery groups at all organizational levels - from regiment to army, centralized planning of an artillery offensive, wide artillery maneuver, including large artillery formations, and stable fire superiority over the enemy. ...

The art of the Soviet command in the use of aviation was manifested primarily in its massing and close cooperation with ground forces, to whose support the main efforts of all air armies, including long-range aviation, were directed. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation firmly maintained air supremacy. In 1317 air battles, 1132 enemy aircraft were shot down (652). The defeat of the main forces of the 6th Air Fleet and the Reich Air Fleet was completed in the first five days of the operation, and subsequently the rest of the aviation was finished off. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation destroyed the enemy's defenses, destroyed and suppressed his fire weapons and manpower. Closely interacting with combined arms formations, she struck at the enemy day and night, bombarded his troops on the roads and on the battlefield, when moving them out of the depths and when leaving the encirclement, violated control. The use of the Air Force was characterized by the centralization of their control, the timeliness of redeployment, and a continuous increase in efforts in solving basic tasks. In the end combat use aviation in the Berlin operation most fully expressed the essence of the form of warfare, which during the war years was called an air offensive.

In the operation under consideration, the art of organizing interaction was further improved. The foundations of strategic interaction were laid even during the development of its concept through careful coordination of the actions of the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces in the interests of successfully solving the main operational and strategic tasks. As a rule, the interaction of the fronts within the framework of a strategic operation was also stable.

The Berlin operation provided an interesting experience in the use of the Dnieper military flotilla. The skillfully executed maneuver from the Western Bug and Pripyat to the Oder deserves attention. In difficult hydrographic conditions, the flotilla made more than 500 kilometers in 20 days. Part of the ships of the flotilla was transported by railroad for distances exceeding 800 km. And this took place in conditions when on the way of their movement there were 75 active and destroyed crossings, railway and highway bridges, locks and other hydraulic structures, and in 48 places it was necessary to clear the passageway. In close operational and tactical cooperation with the ground forces, the ships of the flotilla solved various tasks. They took part in artillery training, assisted the advancing troops in crossing water obstacles and actively participated in the battles for Berlin on the Spree River.

Political bodies have shown great skill in ensuring the combat activity of troops. The intense and purposeful work of commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations ensured an exceptionally high moral upsurge and an offensive impulse among all soldiers and contributed to the solution of the historic task - the victorious end of the war with Nazi Germany.

The successful conduct of one of the last operations of the Second World War in Europe was also ensured by a high level of strategic leadership, military leadership skills of the commanders of fronts and armies. Unlike most of the previous strategic operations, where the coordination of front operations was entrusted to the representatives of the General Headquarters, in the Berlin operation the general command of the troops was carried out directly by the Supreme High Command. The General Staff and General Staff displayed particularly high skill and flexibility in the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. They set tasks to the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces in a timely manner, clarified them during the offensive, depending on the changing situation, organized and supported operational-strategic interaction, skillfully used strategic reserves, and continuously replenished troops with personnel, weapons and military equipment.

The successful solution of the complex problem of logistical support of the troops was evidence of the high level of Soviet military art and the skill of the military leaders in the Berlin operation. The limited terms of preparation of the operation and the large expenditure of material resources due to the nature of the hostilities demanded a great deal of tension in the work of logistic agencies of all levels. Suffice it to say that in the course of the operation the troops of the three fronts used up over 7200 wagons of ammunition and from 2 - 2.5 (diesel fuel) to 7 - 10 (aviation gasoline) front fuel stations. The successful solution of logistic support was achieved mainly due to the sharp approach of material reserves to the troops and the widespread use of road transport for the delivery of the necessary supplies. Even during the preparation of the operation, more materiel was transported by road than by rail. Thus, 238.4 thousand tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants were delivered to the 1st Belorussian Front by rail, and 333.4 thousand tons were delivered by vehicles of the front and armies.

Military topographers made a great contribution to ensuring the combat operations of the troops. The military topographic service provided the troops with topographic and special cards, prepared initial geodetic data for conducting artillery fire, took an active part in deciphering aerial photographs, and determined the coordinates of targets. Only the troops and headquarters of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were given 6.1 million copies of maps, 15 thousand aerial photographs were decoded, the coordinates of about 1.6 thousand support and artillery nets were determined, and 400 artillery batteries were geodesic. In order to support combat operations in Berlin, the topographic service of the 1st Belorussian Front prepared a relief plan of the city, which proved to be of great help to the headquarters in the preparation and conduct of the operation.

The Berlin operation went down in history as the victorious crown of the difficult and glorious path that the Soviet Armed Forces led by the Communist Party traveled. The operation was carried out with full satisfaction of the needs of the fronts with military equipment, weapons and material and technical means. The heroic rear provided its soldiers with everything that was necessary for the final defeat of the enemy. This is one of the clearest and most convincing evidence of the high organization and might of the economy of the Soviet socialist state.

The plan of the operation of the Soviet Supreme High Command was to deliver several powerful blows on a wide front, dismember the enemy's Berlin grouping, encircle and destroy it in parts. The operation began on April 16, 1945. After a powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked the enemy on the Oder River. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to cross the Neisse River. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, Soviet troops broke through his defenses.

On April 20, long-range artillery fire of the 1st Belorussian Front in Berlin began its assault. By the evening of April 21, its shock units reached the northeastern outskirts of the city.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out a swift maneuver to reach Berlin from the south and west. On April 21, having advanced 95 kilometers, the tank units of the front broke into the southern outskirts of the city. Taking advantage of the success of tank formations, the combined arms armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front's strike grouping rapidly advanced westward.

On April 25, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian fronts united west of Berlin, completing the encirclement of the entire Berlin enemy grouping (500 thousand people).

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front crossed the Oder and, having broken through the enemy's defenses, by April 25, advanced to a depth of 20 kilometers. They firmly bound the 3rd German Panzer Army, preventing its use on the approaches to Berlin.

The German fascist group in Berlin, despite its obvious doom, continued stubborn resistance. In fierce street battles on April 26-28, it was cut by Soviet troops into three isolated parts.

The fighting went on day and night. Breaking through to the center of Berlin, Soviet soldiers stormed every street and every house. On some days, they managed to clear up to 300 blocks of the enemy. Hand-to-hand fights were tied up in metro tunnels, underground communication facilities and communication passages. The basis of the battle formations of rifle and tank units during the period of battles in the city was made up of assault detachments and groups. Most of the artillery (up to 152-mm and 203-mm guns) was attached to rifle units for direct fire. Tanks operated as part of both rifle formations and tank corps and armies, being operatively subordinate to the command of combined-arms armies or operating in their own offensive zone. Attempts to use tanks on their own led to large losses from artillery fire and faust cartridges. Due to the fact that during the assault, Berlin was shrouded in smoke, the massive use of bomber aircraft was often difficult. The most powerful strikes on military targets in the city were delivered by aviation on April 25 and on the night of April 26, 2049 aircraft took part in these strikes.

By April 28, only the central part remained in the hands of the defenders of Berlin, which was shot from all sides by Soviet artillery, and by the evening of the same day, units of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Reichstag area.

The Reichstag garrison numbered up to one thousand soldiers and officers, but it continued to grow steadily. He was armed with a large number of machine guns and faust cartridges. There were also artillery pieces. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various obstacles were set up, machine-gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

On April 30, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front began fighting for the Reichstag, which immediately took on an extremely fierce character. Only in the evening, after repeated attacks, Soviet soldiers broke into the building. The Nazis offered fierce resistance. On the stairs and in the corridors, hand-to-hand fights broke out every now and then. The assault units step by step, room by room, floor by floor, cleared the Reichstag building from the enemy. The entire path of Soviet soldiers from the main entrance to the Reichstag to the roof was marked with red flags and flags. On the night of May 1, the Victory Banner was hoisted over the building of the defeated Reichstag. The battles for the Reichstag continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, entrenched in the compartments of the cellars, surrendered only on the night of May 2.

In the battles for the Reichstag, the enemy lost more than 2 thousand soldiers and officers in killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured over 2.6 thousand Nazis, as well as 1.8 thousand rifles and machine guns, 59 artillery pieces, 15 tanks and assault guns as trophies.

On May 1, units of the 3rd Shock Army, advancing from the north, met south of the Reichstag with units of the 8th Guards Army advancing from the south. On the same day, two important centers of Berlin's defense surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the Flakturm I (Zoobunker) anti-aircraft concrete air defense tower.

By 15 o'clock on May 2, the enemy's resistance had completely ceased, the remnants of the Berlin garrison surrendered to a total of more than 134 thousand people.

During the fighting, out of about 2 million Berliners, about 125 thousand died, a significant part of Berlin was destroyed. Of the 250 thousand buildings in the city, about 30 thousand were completely destroyed, more than 20 thousand buildings were in a dilapidated state, more than 150 thousand buildings were moderately damaged. More than a third of the metro stations were flooded and destroyed, 225 bridges were blown up by Nazi troops.

Fighting with individual groups breaking through from the outskirts of Berlin to the west ended on 5 May. On the night of May 9, the Act of surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was signed.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of war. They defeated 70 infantry, 23 tank and mechanized divisions of the enemy, took 480 thousand prisoners.

The Berlin operation cost the Soviet troops dearly. Their irrecoverable losses amounted to 78,291 people, and sanitary losses - 274,184 people.

More than 600 participants in the Berlin operation were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 13 people were awarded the second Gold Star medal of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

(Additional