Ship Graf Spee in German. The battleship "Admiral Graf Spee" or the lost ship of Hitler. The beginning of the war. Pirate everyday life

Let's start with the fact that Graf Spee gets to the 6-8 level of battles.

At the 6th level of battles, of course, we have a certain superiority over other ships, but we must not forget about such high explosives as Cleveland, Nuremberg, Budyonny. Once under the high-explosive fire of such ships, there is an opportunity to "enjoy their own fire" and quickly go to port. At the 8th level of battles, we are definitely assigned the secondary role of an artillery support ship, and any hit under the focus of highlevel battleships or cruisers will not give us much pleasure either. In general, the tactics of fighting on Admiral Graf Spee must be careful and thoughtful.

Combat with battleships Despite our 283mm main guns, we shouldn't forget that Spee is still a heavy cruiser. The armor of the bow plating and the bow armor belt is only 19 mm. So even following the enemy battleship strictly with the nose can bring us trouble. It is advisable to look for a joint enemy target with other allied cruisers and act at a certain safe distance. Accelerated change of the type of shells due to the skill "Master Loader" will allow us to use our excellent characteristics in a timely manner due to the excellent probability of setting fire to HE shells. Therefore, whenever possible, we conduct cascade fire with HE shells at enemy battleships that are moving forward or stern in relation to us. In the event of a frank duel at close range, of course, we use our torpedo tubes, although it may be necessary to sacrifice nose armor when aiming a TA to drop torpedoes. In any case, it would be nice to install the "Guidance System. Mod.1" upgrade, which will increase the traverse speed of our TA and the accuracy of the main battery guns. Chasing enemy battleships can be fatal as the latter will also use HE shells when firing at you.

Battle with cruisers The commander's skills "Master Gunner" and "Master Loader" will not be superfluous in a battle with a maneuverable enemy. Frank duels at close range with enemy cruisers with torpedo tubes should be excluded as much as possible because the overall maneuverability may not be enough to evade enemy torpedoes. Therefore, we try to maintain a distance of at least 10-12 km. At these distances, our armor-piercing shells of 283-mm main guns with a maximum damage of 8,400 can send an enemy cruiser to port in 3-4 aimed shots with knocked out citadels. At the same time, a positive result can be achieved with mixed fire from AP and HE shells. With the first shots of HE shells, it is advisable to disable the steering gears of the enemy cruiser, and then knock out the citadel with BB shells at a convenient angle. Sometimes a full salvo of HE shells with an aimed hit can detonate an enemy cruiser. I had such a case with the enemy Hipper, who stood at a distance of about 14 km with almost full HP and a volley carried him 38k and sent it to the port. Perhaps a bug, perhaps an accident. Well, in close combat, do not forget about the 105-mm and 150-mm secondary battery guns. In any case, we put the priority of secondary battery guns on the approaching enemy cruiser. But again, do not forget that a dangerous rapprochement with several enemy cruisers can not always lead to positive results. For a more effective fight against enemy cruisers, we need to increase our survivability by using the “Damage Fighting Basics” skill, upgrading to the third slot “Damage Fighting System. Mod. 1” and flags for survivability November Foxtrot, Juliet Yankee Bissotwo, India Delta, India Yankee.

Fight with destroyers Our weak point is the longest rudder shift time of 10.3 seconds. among all cruisers at the level. Therefore, we unambiguously put the upgrades "Steering machines. Mod.2", well, and a checkbox for increasing the speed of Sierra Mike. But even despite the presence of these modifiers, we should not forget that the dimensions of our cruiser still do not allow us to comfortably launch an aggressive close attack of enemy destroyers. Aimed fire from a safe distance of 8-10 km will allow us to maneuver from enemy torpedoes at least in time. It would be nice to use the "Hydroacoustic Search" consumable here, which will allow us to detect the direction of the enemy torpedoes from a safer distance in advance. We actively use the indication of the priority target for our secondary battery guns, which through the skills "Basic fire training", "Enhanced fire training" and the Mike Yankee Soxisix flag, which will improve the characteristics of the firing range and reloading of secondary battery guns.

Combat with air groups Even a full air defense build will not allow us to feel safe in front of attacking enemy air groups and will not be able to completely destroy the entire group of torpedo bombers or bombers. Therefore, I don't think it's worth pumping it. We will restrict ourselves to using the Defensive AA Fire consumable, learning the universal skills Basic Fire Training, Enhanced Fire Training, and setting the November Echo Setteseven flag. However, even this configuration will not be able to completely destroy the entire group of torpedo bombers or high-level aircraft carrier bombers. When approaching enemy air groups, we try, as far as possible, to go to the nearest allied cruisers and battleships with good anti-aircraft armament characteristics. But do not forget about helping the allied battleships located next to you, which come under the attack of air groups.

Hans Langsdorff - Captain of the German ship " Admiral graf spee»At the beginning of the Second World War, he sank British merchant ships without hindrance. He became Britain's enemy number 1, and the captain himself was the target of the most powerful navy in the world. 70 years of battleship Admiral graf spee"Kept his secrets at the mouth of the La Plata River, but today he can reveal secrets about his death.

Every day from the seaport of Montevideo the crew of the minesweeper goes on patrol. Their purpose is the remains of the battleship " Admiral graf spee», Which are located just 7 km east of the capital. The Uruguayan Navy "looks after" the sunken monument to the great naval battle that took place here 72 years ago. Mariners must ensure that the wreckage of the ship does not fall apart, the gun turrets do not come off and do not fall into the channel, threatening shipping. In 2006, the Uruguayan Navy declared this area closed, but the patrol ships have another goal - to prevent neo-Nazi souvenir hunters from accessing the ship. Now the 186-meter colossus covers a layer of marine organisms. Battleship lies at the mouth of the La Plata River, recalling the fatal decision taken on December 17, 1939.

the idea of ​​creating a pocket battleship

Battleship « Admiral graf spee"Became the brainchild of a dilemma. After the defeat in the First World War, Germany was prohibited from having ships with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons. The imperial shipyard engineers were tasked with developing new ships for Germany, and the result was the so-called "pocket battleships". Soon the assembly of the first three began, each of which possessed the firepower of a ship three times the displacement. Nothing like this has ever happened in the history of the navy. Thanks to pocket battleships, Germany hoped to again become a great naval power, without violating the conditions established by the winners of the First World War, and primarily Great Britain.

The strategic basis for the idea of ​​creating a battleship " Admiral graf spee"Consisted in powerful weapons, speed and purpose of conducting battles on trade routes. The idea was really revolutionary, but was there a pocket battleship capable of all this?

To understand this, it is necessary to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the ship. Battleship " Admiral graf spee"Was perfect for his role as a" sea pirate. " Even in the hull of the ship, innovative ones were used. This was the first time a ship of this size had a non-riveted but welded hull. The smoother surface meant less water resistance and, of course, a significant reduction in weight. But in order to reduce the mass of the ship, German shipbuilders also sacrificed vital armor.

Battleship powered by diesel engines rather than conventional steam engines. Eight nine-cylinder diesels produced more than 55,000 hp. sec., providing the ship with high speed and incredible power reserve. It was an efficient propulsion system, but complex and not fully tested.

Battleship " Admiral graf spee"Can be compared to a high-speed artillery platform. On board were two main turrets in the bow and stern, each with six 283 mm guns with a firing range of up to 22 km; eight guns of 150 mm caliber and six - 88 mm, completed the arsenal of ten 20 mm anti-aircraft guns and eight torpedo tubes. However, the artillery could fire simultaneously at only one target, and as a result, one side of the ship was always vulnerable, and in combination with light or almost nonexistent armor battleship « Admiral graf spee"Can be considered a" sea robber "who can strike and hide.

Even during the two-year construction of the pocket battleship, the ship suddenly had a new role - it was to become the model and pride of the Nazi regime. While storm clouds began to gather over Europe, it was not the ardent Nazi Hans Langsdorff, an award-winning World War I veteran, who took command of the ship in October 1938.

Hans Langsdorff joined the Imperial Navy as an eighteen-year-old cadet. After the First World War, he served in Berlin in the War Office and by the mid-1930s already had a reputation for being an excellent manager. Against the will of his parents (he was brought up in a strict Protestant atmosphere), he saw himself in the role of a sailor and a warrior with high moral principles. Hans Langsdorff did not particularly sympathize with the Nazi government in Berlin, so he applied for a transfer to active service as far from the capital as possible. As a result, he was entrusted with command of the most prestigious ship of the German fleet - the battleship " Admiral graf spee". The sailors greeted the captain with due respect, for he had an impressive reputation. He soon earned high praise from them for his dedication to the crew and for his ability to get along with people. From the outset, Langsdorff treated officers and rank-and-file sailors with equal respect. Casting aside the class distinction, he managed to weld 1,100 people into one team. Soon the captain had a chance to test himself and his ship.

secret battleship mission

The situation in Europe escalated and on August 21, 1939, the battleship was sent on a secret mission in the North Sea. None of the crew members knew where the ship was headed, only the captain had this information. Having received the order, battleship began his sea voyage with a deliberate false maneuver, heading for the North Atlantic, where he arrived three days later. Then the ship turned south and disappeared into the endless expanses of the ocean.

When the battleship " Admiral graf spee"Left his home port, hidden mobilization began in Germany. The ship's secret mission was to attack British merchant ships in the southern regions of the Atlantic. Having thus deprived Great Britain of sea supplies of food and raw materials, the Wehrmacht hoped to economically weaken the island state. But the ship's commander had another task - battleship was to force the Royal Navy to send warships to the South Atlantic, which would have made England weaker in the English Channel and the North Sea, where Germany was planning to invade. Therefore, the battleship " Admiral graf spee"Had orders to indiscriminately sink as many British cargo ships as possible. However, there was only one difficulty - Great Britain and Germany were not yet at war, so the battleship had to hide and wait for now.

For the crew of the ship, this trip was more like an innocent vacation under the tropical sun. Every day a ship's band played on deck, and German popular tunes were heard from the loudspeakers. Many of the sailors were away from home for the first time, and the captain allowed them to enjoy the serenity, because soon they will be fighting.

On September 1, 1939, Hitler spoke on the radio, accusing Polish troops of the attack on Germany. On the same day, German troops invaded Poland. The Second World War began. But the battleship commander " Admiral graf spee”Inactive, he was ordered to continue hiding off the African coast. Hitler was convinced that Britain would not go to war on Poland's side, but Britain's declaration of war against Germany took Hitler by surprise.

To the battleship Admiral graf spee»Did not have to wait long for the outbreak of hostilities. Crossing the British trade routes to South America, the battleship intercepted its first victim. The warning shot caused the transport ship to stop. The commander of the ship Langsdorff obeyed the laws of war, so before launching the ship to the bottom, he captured the entire crew, and so he did with every attack.

Twice a day, the commander of the ship sent out an onboard seaplane in search of new targets, which examined the path planned for the next day. Upon returning from the plane, the coordinates of any enemy merchant ships were transmitted, so all that remained for the battleship to do was to follow the instructions. Hydroplane " Arado 196”Was launched from a catapult and hoisted back onto the ship by a winch after the patrol was completed. The plane was just a prototype, so it regularly needed engine repairs. Finally, he was completely out of order, but there were enough targets for the battleship's torpedoes. During the first week of hostilities, the battleship " Admiral graf spee»Sunk ships with a total tonnage of 14,000 tons. By the end of October, that number had doubled to 28,000 tons. The Admiralty in London began to show concern - a month later, without killing a single sailor or giving away its position, the battleship sank ships with a total tonnage of 50,000 tons.

fatal error of the battleship commander

As with any ship, the commander had his own weakness - Langsdorff was demanding in the performance of his duties by each member of the crew, and he often had to take risks, which later became a fatal decision.

Pocket battleship Admiral graf spee»Always managed to disappear unnoticed, hiding in the vastness of the ocean. He maneuvered so quickly that the British could not tell if they were dealing with one or two enemy ships. British intelligence reported to the Admiralty the tragic picture of losses, and the decision was made immediately - battleship « Admiral graf spee"Must be found. Soon, the British command dispatched eight naval search groups.

On December 6, 1939, the ship's commander conducted an exercise to work with searchlights, as the crew seriously blundered during the last attempt at a night attack. Battleship lights " Admiral graf spee"That should have gone unnoticed were visible from miles away." The dazzling show put on by the captain became fatal.

Suddenly, the lookout reported that he was observing a merchant ship following without lights, but the commander, without trying to identify him, let him go. As it turned out, the Norwegian merchant ship immediately reported the coordinates of the battleship to London. The Admiralty immediately sent one heavy cruiser to the area " Exeter"And two light cruisers" Ajax" and " Achilles"To intercept the enemy battleship, which in the meantime was sent to Germany for scheduled repairs and replenishment of supplies.

battleship battle with British cruisers

On the morning of December 13, 1939, the sea was calm. At 0600 hours, a sentinel spotted pillars of smoke and mastheads on the horizon. The commander gave the order, and battleship headed for the target. The ships mistaken for merchant ships turned out to be armed with British cruisers. Captain Langsdorff decided not to retreat. In a matter of minutes, more than a thousand people took up their combat posts.

Having entered the battle with the British, Langsdorff made two serious mistakes: he violated the direct instructions of his command and gave the order to approach the enemy much closer. The fact is that the main guns of the battleship had a range of 22 km, but by reducing this distance, the British cruisers had a significant advantage. In a word, at a critical moment, the main towers of the battleship turned out to be useless, so that at the beginning of the battle at the most important moment, the ship's commander had only half of the arsenal at his disposal.

British ships opened fire, launching a massive attack. Captain Langsdorff made a desperate attempt to dodge, zigzagging, but in vain. He was throwing away real try use your main weapon - powerful weapons. The battle in the South Atlantic lasted over an hour. The pocket battleship continued to be attacked from both sides, suffering casualties. The lack of booking had an effect quickly, but the battleship also hit its targets. Several accurate attacks forced the cruiser " Exeter"Get out of the battle. Then battleship began to unfold, and at that moment the British cruisers managed to approach the German ship. It was then that several shells hit the main deck of the battleship, which caused very serious damage. By 08:00, the naval battle was over and the ships dispersed. Nobody knew who won this battle. On board the battleship Admiral graf spee"Langsdorff saw only one option for further action - to get to the nearest deep-water port, which became Montevideo. Slowly moving forward, the battleship entered the port. The cruisers chased the wounded giant like shadows, keeping a distance of more than 30 km.

battleship "Admiral Graf Spee" - an unwanted guest of Uruguay

Hans Langsdorff was confident that Uruguay would help them with the repair, but the condition of the ship was far from perfect - the diesel fuel cleaning system was damaged, the ship had holes above and below the waterline.

However, Uruguay was neutral only in theory - it was economically dependent on Great Britain, so the British embassy did everything possible to get the German ship out of the port. The next day, the bodies of the dead German sailors were delivered to the coast of Montevideo. A few hours later, British prisoners of war were also allowed to leave the battleship, and none of the prisoners died in the battle. Soon the German ambassador received an ultimatum - battleship due to leave port on December 17, 1939, just 4 days after arrival. This time was not enough for the renovation.

On December 15, the funeral of the dead German sailors took place. Another battle with the British could have only one outcome, for which there was no hope, and the sailors sat down to write letters home. The news of the departure of the battleship, which was awaiting the British fleet, spread quickly throughout the city, so on the day of departure, thousands of people gathered on the dock.

December 17, 1939 at 18:00 pocket battleship " Admiral graf spee"Slipped out of the port of Montevideo. The captain of the ship was not going to give the British victory, so 20 minutes later the battered warship exploded from six self-destructing torpedoes. The ship caught fire and continued to burn for three more days before it sank. The captain secretly transferred his crew to tugboats, which transported the sailors to a German merchant ship. So the team of the battleship reached the capital of Argentina, Buenos Aires.

The ship's commander had one more responsibility to the crew - to provide an alibi for the victims of the shipwreck, this was the only way to avoid internment. But in accordance with international law, neutral Argentina took the sailors into custody, with only one amendment - the sailors were allowed to live with German families in Buenos Aires. The battleship crew had no prospect of returning home.

Today the wreckage of a pocket battleship " Admiral graf spee»Rest immediately below the surface of the water at a point with coordinates 34 ° 30 ′ south latitude and 58 ° 14 ′ west longitude. British divers dived to the ship, hoping to find valuable military technology here, but the German demolition team did their best, all valuable equipment was destroyed by hand.

Hans Langsdorff claimed full responsibility for the loss of the ship, but South American newspapers called him a coward. Leaving a letter to his wife, Langsdorff in his suite in Buenos Aires resigned from the battleship's battle banner " Admiral graf spee". This was his last act as the commanding officer of the ship. The suicide of Hans Langsdorff was international news. At the very beginning of the war, she still had the ability to shock.

The battleship commander was buried with military honors. The streets were filled with thousands of people mourning his death. His team followed behind the coffin, Argentines, members of the German community and even a few Britons paid their respects. Hans Langsdorff was buried in a German cemetery in Buenos Aires, and the Nazis used his funeral for propaganda purposes. Hitler later accused him of cowardice for not sinking with the ship, but the lives of the crew members meant more to him than blind obedience and loyalty to the Wehrmacht. Later, representatives of the Argentine Navy helped most of the team escape and return to Germany to continue their participation in the war. Some of them stayed in Argentina forever and still thank their commander who saved their lives.

battleship photos and illustrations

battleship battle with British cruisers

battleship on fire

"Graf Spee" - ("Graf Spee"), battleship of the German Navy, the symbol and pride of the growing power of the Nazi navy. Named in honor of Count Maximilian von Spee (1861-1914) who died on the Scharnhorst flagship during World War I in the battle with the British squadron near the Falkland Islands. Built at the Wilhelmshaven shipyards and launched in 1934 in violation of the terms of the Versailles Treaty of 1919. It was armed with 6 11-inch guns, 8 6-inch and eight torpedo tubes. The speed reached 26 knots. The crew is 1107 people. For its time, "Graf Spee" was the pinnacle of design and technological thought and was considered virtually unsinkable. With the outbreak of World War II, the "Graf Spee" under the command of Captain Hans Langsdorf went to the South Atlantic to intercept British merchant ships. Hitler was not embarrassed by the fact that in this area of ​​the world there were no hostilities and not a single battleship there were no allies here. In a few months, the "Graf Spee" sank at least 8 English ships. In early December 1939, the British Admiralty demanded that the Brazilian authorities sell British oil for German tankers exclusively through Brazilian ports, since there was reason to believe that this fuel was used to refuel German destroyers in the South Atlantic. On December 13, 1939, three British cruisers - Exeter, Achilles and Ajax - blocked the Graf Spee off the coast of Uruguay. On board the German battleship were about sixty British sailors captured from previously sunk British merchant ships. During the fifteen-hour battle, the largest British cruiser Exeter was seriously damaged. The crew of the "Graf Spee" also suffered significant losses: 30 people were killed and about 60 wounded. Despite the pursuit, Captain Langsdorf managed to break out of the battle and take refuge in Montevideo Bay. The wounded and dead were transported to the shore, while the rest of the crew was busy repairing the badly damaged ship. Langsdorf asked for fifteen days to restore the battleship, but the Uruguayan authorities demanded that the "Graf Spee" leave the territorial waters of Uruguay no later than two days later, threatening to arrest the crew otherwise. Meanwhile, British cruisers were on duty at the exit from Montevideo Bay, awaiting reinforcements. At 6 pm on Sunday 17 December, the Graf Spee raised anchor and was towed out of the bay. Thousands of spectators on the shore waited at dusk for the battle to begin. Suddenly, the huge ship stopped, and the tugs accompanying it withdrew. A huge column of smoke burst from the hold of the ship and covered the sky. It was the artillery cellars that were torn. Three minutes later, the "Graf Spee" sank. Captain Langsdorf, his entire crew and captured English sailors reached the coast and were interned by the authorities. Three days later, Captain Langsdorf, wrapping himself up as an imperial naval flag, shot himself. As it turned out later, Hitler personally gave the captain the order to flood the "Graf Spee" so that it would not fall into the hands of the enemy.

"Admiral Graf Spee": history of service (chapter from the book by V.L. Kofman "Pocket battleship" Admiral Graf Spee "")

The last and most powerful of the "pocket battleships" had the shortest but brightest career. It was named in honor of Vice Admiral Count Maximilian von Spee, who commanded the German overseas cruising squadron in World War I, defeated the British in the battle at Coronel and died on December 8, 1914 aboard the armored cruiser Scharnhorst in the Battle of the Falkland Islands. The Mackensen-class battle cruiser, laid down in 1915, was supposed to be named after him, but the defeat of Germany in 1918 prevented the plan from coming to fruition. And on June 30, 1934, von Spee's daughter, Countess Hubert, smashed a traditional bottle of champagne on the side of a launching ship named after her father. In memory of the victorious battle of the admiral off the coast of Chile, the Gothic inscription "CORONEL" appeared on the tower-like superstructure.

For a year and a half, the ship was being completed afloat, on December 5, 1935, factory tests began at the wall, and on January 6, 1936, "battleship C" was accepted into service in the Kriegsmarine. Captain Zur See Patzig took over command. Tests at sea followed, which ended only by May, when the "Admiral Graf Spee" was finally put into operation. On the measured mile in Neukrug, he developed 28.5 knots with a displacement of 14,100 tons and a power of 53,650 hp. The inclining showed not quite sufficient stability: with a full supply of fuel, the metacentric height was 0.67 m - the smallest value of all units in the series. A number of defects in the diesel installation were revealed, which, however, were quickly eliminated. It was confirmed that the location of the auxiliary boiler above the armored deck and the layout of some other elements of equipment were unsuccessful. The vibration remained strong, but the noise was overcome: in this respect, the Spee turned out to be the most successful of all the pocket battleships. It turned out that additional personnel of mechanics should be taken on board for a continuous travel over 18 knots. The Commission made a few more comments, but there was no time left for their immediate implementation. The tense situation in the world and in Europe demanded the fastest possible connection of the most powerful and modern unit of the fleet, therefore, already during the tests, the battleship made several training voyages. "Spee" was immediately prepared for a high role: on May 29, he became the flagship of the Kriegsmarine on the big maritime parade with the participation of Hitler and other senior officials of the Third Reich.

The parade gave way to everyday life. From May 20, comprehensive tests of navigation equipment and electronics were carried out, and on June 6, the "pocket battleship" set out on its first long voyage to the Atlantic, to the island of Santa Cruz. During the 20-day campaign, exercises and testing of equipment and devices, in particular, artillery, continued (formally "Spee" was listed in this campaign as an experimental artillery vessel). On his return to Wilhelmshaven on 26 June, training continued. In the fall, the ship took part in maneuvers, but soon more serious tasks arose before it. On December 16, 1936, Rear Admiral von Fischel, appointed commander of the German fleet in Spanish waters, raised the flag on the Speer.

The Kriegsmarine took an active part in the Spanish Civil War. In accordance with the decisions of the international "non-intervention committee", the coastal waters of the Iberian Peninsula were divided into zones of responsibility between its members: England, France, Germany and Italy, where the navies of these countries were to prevent the supply of military supplies to both sides. The Germans got the section from the northern border of Portugal to Gijón, the middle of the eastern (Mediterranean) coast and the African coast of the Strait of Gibraltar in Spanish Morocco. Almost all combat-ready ships of the German fleet took part in the patrol, but a special role was given to "pocket battleships". While other countries limited themselves to sending secondary warships, they seemed to represent Germany's new naval power. Deutschland and Scheer were there; then it was the Count Spee's turn. Having passed the final preparations in Kiel on February 14, 1937, on March 2 he headed for the Bay of Biscay. A two-month voyage with a visit to many Spanish ports ended in Kiel on May 6 of the same year. On May 15, the most modern German ship represented Germany in the roadstead at Spithead, where a parade in honor of British King George VI was held with the participation of warships from all countries. At the end of Spithead Week, Spee returned to his homeland. After restocking and a short rest, the Spee returned to Spain on June 23rd. This time the campaign was short: on August 7, 1937, the battleship returned to Kiel. In the autumn of the same year, small trips to the northern waters took place - to Sweden (from 18 to 20 September) and Norway (1-2 November). The exit to the warm Spanish waters at the beginning of 1938 was also short-lived. Leaving Kiel on February 7, the ship returned on the 18th. On the same day, the commander of the "battleships" raised the flag on it. The rise in status coincided with the beginning of the last big rest: until the summer, "Admiral Graf Spee" was mainly in the port, making only short exits to the coastal waters. After the winter "hibernation" (rather conditional, since the exercises in the port continued), the "pocket battleship" made another exit to the North, to the Norwegian fiords (late June - early July 1938). On August 22, the flagship took part in a large naval parade, which was hosted by Reichsfuehrer Hitler and the Regent of Hungary, Admiral Horthy. During this event, the heavy cruiser "Prince Eugen" was launched. The Spee spent the autumn on long voyages, having made two exits to the Atlantic (October 6 - 23 and November 10 - 24), visiting the Spanish port of Vigo, Portuguese ports and Tangier.

Since January 1939, the ship underwent its first scheduled overhaul in Wilhelmshaven, completing it by March. And again the flag of the fleet commander fluttered on it. The command of the Kriegsmarine planned a large foreign campaign under the leadership of Admiral Bem, in which all 3 pocket battleships, the cruisers Leipzig and Cologne, as well as destroyers and submarines were to take part. With the aim of "showing the flag" "Admiral Graf Spee" stood for several days in the roadstead in Ceuta. He had just managed to return to his homeland and replenish supplies, when another exacerbation of the situation occurred. This time it did not work out - the German attack on Poland caused a chain reaction. World war broke out.

By August 1939, "Admiral Graf Spee" ceased to be the most powerful ship in the fleet, but its role in possible hostilities remained very significant. The plan, developed in complete secrecy by the leadership of the Kriegsmarine and personally approved by Hitler, provided for the dispatch of "pocket battleships" and supply ships to the sea long before the start of the attack on Poland. Their enormous range and the ability to replenish supplies made it possible to remain in the waiting areas for several months, so that, depending on the development of events, either start raider actions or quietly and peacefully return home. On August 5, 1939, almost a month before the start of the war, the Altmark supply vessel, designed to work in tandem with the Spee, sailed to the United States, where it was supposed to take diesel fuel and dissolve in the ocean before meeting the "pocket battleship ", which, in turn, on the 21st left Wilhelmshaven under the command of Captain Zursee G. Langsdorf. On 24 August, it was followed by the Deutschland, which "worked" together with the tanker Westerwald. Both sisterships became the vanguard of the German fleet in the ocean, dividing the Atlantic among themselves: "Admiral Graf Spee" headed to its southern part, and his partner - to a position south of Greenland.

"Spee" was lucky - he managed to go unnoticed, first to the shores of Norway, and then to the Atlantic south of Iceland. He became the only German raider who passed this route, which was subsequently so carefully covered by the British (their patrol cruisers took up positions only on September 6). Bad weather helped the Germans go unnoticed all the way to the waiting area. The ship was in no hurry, and by September 1, the day of the outbreak of world war, was 1000 miles north of the Cape Verde Islands. On that day, he met with the Altmark, and the commander was in for an unpleasant surprise: a brightly painted yellow and black large tanker noticed and identified its "owner" by its characteristic superstructure tower long before it was discovered itself! "Spee" transferred a military command, light weapons and two 20-mm guns to the Altmark, at the same time handing over flammable cargo and taking a full supply of fuel.

Almost the entire first month of the war passed for Spee and Altmark in silence - in the full sense of the word. The Pocket Battleship moved at a slow speed towards the equator, dodging any smoke on the horizon and remaining undetected. Langsdorf received no orders from Berlin, and he was forbidden to use his radio stations. Hitler still hoped to break up with the "ruler of the seas" in the world and did not want to annoy her with the beginning of a cruising war, at the same time not wanting to withdraw the raider who had taken a good position and was hitherto hiding. I had to be content with intercepted radiograms, of which only information about the presence of the light cruiser Ajax on the Brazilian coast was useful. September 10 Spee crossed the equator; the crew made an appropriate performance, however, very modest, since part of the team was at combat posts all the time. Langsdorf decided to go to the South Atlantic, to the conditional English Channel - the mouth of the La Plata, where he could count on a good "catch" with the least risk. For camouflage, a second tower was installed on the ship above the bow tower, made of plywood and canvas, thus turning it into a kind of Scharnhorst-class battleship. Despite the primitiveness of the scenery, this measure later allowed to deceive inexperienced merchant sailors several times.

Finally, on September 25, the long-awaited order to start operations followed. Langsdorf chose northeast Brazil, near the port of Recife, as his first area of ​​operations. On September 27, he let go of the Altmark, and after 3 days the first victim turned up. True, the first pancake almost came out lumpy: the discovered British steamer "Clement" (5051 per.t.) took off, radiating about the attack. When he was stopped, it turned out that the transport was making a coastal flight from Pernambuco to Bahia with an unimportant cargo. The attempt to sink it turned into a real farce: despite the open kingstones and the charges laid by the Germans, "Clement" stubbornly did not want to sink. I had to fire 2 torpedoes at him, and both passed by! In the end, the 150-mm cannons started working and the steamer went to the bottom. Langsdorff proved himself to be a true gentleman, contacting the radio station "Casta Luego" in Pernambuco and providing the coordinates of the English boats, although thereby discovering his location. The captain and chief engineer of the Clement took the place of the prisoners in an impromptu "cell" on board the Spee, becoming the first, not far from the last, inhabitants. However, on the same day, the Germans stopped the Greek steamer Papalenos and, after a search, handed over the captives to it. So the desire to follow the rules of "soft" cruising war in everything led to the rapid identification of the raider, since the British sailors immediately reported what had happened. The only thing that Langsdorf managed to do for disinformation was to post a false plaque with the name "Admiral Scheer", as a result of which the Allies, for a long time, up to La Plata, sort of "swapped" both "pocket battleships". The benefits of such a hoax were more than dubious. The reaction came very quickly. For operations against raiders (in mid-October, the Allies learned that two German "battleships" were operating in the ocean), 8 tactical battle groups were allocated, which nominally included 3 battle cruisers - the English "Rhinaun", the French "Dunkirk" and "Strasbourg" , aircraft carriers "Ark Royal", "Hermes" and "Bearn", 9 heavy and 5 light cruisers, not counting dozens of other combat units (up to battleships) that guarded the transatlantic convoys. However, in fact, not many ships operated against the Sheer. In the South Atlantic, there were 3 British formations: a cruising squadron under the command of Commodore Harewood (Group G), covering South American waters (heavy cruisers Exeter and Cumberland), Group H, based at Cape Town (heavy cruisers Sussex and Shropshire), Group K under Rear Admiral Wells, the most powerful of them all (battlecruiser Rhynown and aircraft carrier Ark Royal).

The "pocket battleship" found the second victim on the Cape Town - Freetown line on October 5. The British steamship Newton Beach (4651 reg.t), carrying 7200 tons of maize, barely had time to signal an attack when the prize party captured it. Here the Germans were waiting for valuable booty: from the documents they received, they managed to get a fairly complete impression of the system of radio communications with merchant ships and even get a standard English radio, removed from the ship and installed in the control room of the Graf Spee, in working order. It was a pity to sink the valuable trophy, and the raider accompanied the Newton Beach under the control of German sailors.

A new success followed 2 days later. Another "Briton" - the steamer "Ashley" (4222 per.t), which transported raw sugar to England, went to the bottom, and his crew moved to Newton Beach - albeit not for long. Now Langsdorf was at the intersection of busy sea routes and did not want to fetter his actions with the captured transport. Newton Beach followed Ashley, and the crews of both vessels found themselves in much less comfortable conditions aboard the raider.

Meanwhile, the captives had a chance to go to the bottom along with their "floating prison". The signal from Newton Beach was received by the merchant ship and relayed to the cruiser Cumberland. If the cruiser commander could have guessed that the signal would not reach the powerful radio station but Freetown, the focal point of the raider hunt in the South Atlantic, he would certainly break the prescribed radio silence. The fate of the Spee and Altmark could have been unenviable, as Rear Admiral Wells's powerful K Group was on the way to Freetown. The likelihood of detecting German ships from the air in good weather conditions was high, and the Rhynown and Cumberland could easily cope with the "pocket battleship".

Nevertheless, on October 9, "Spee" nearly lost its supply vessel. In the area west of the Cape Verde Islands, a plane from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal noticed a large tanker drifting. In response to a request for ownership, a response was received from him that it was an American transport "Delmar". Admiral Wells doubted. However, with only the battlecruiser Rhynown and Arc Royal, he could choose to inspect the suspicious vessel either a 30,000-ton giant or an even less suitable aircraft carrier, which in any case meant hundreds of tons of burned oil and the risk of distraction. from other tasks for the sake of a most likely useless check. So the Altmark, posing as Delmar, miraculously escaped, after which he went south to more desolate areas. If the British had succeeded in sinking it, the Spee's raiding could have ended much earlier.

As a result, instead of success, the British got another trouble. On October 10, the "pocket battleship" stopped a large transport "Huntsman" (8196 per.t.), carrying various food supplies, including one and a half thousand tons of tea. There was not enough space on board the raider for its crew of 84 people, and the prize had to be left afloat. However, in order to confuse the enemy's maps, Langsdorf ordered to transmit from the radio transmitter captured at Newton Beach that he was attacked by a submarine: this explained his disappearance without giving away the presence of a surface ship. "Spee" moved south, towards the happily escaped death of "Altmark". On October 14, prisoners and food captured on the Huntsman were reloaded onto the supply vessel. For the next 4 days, the battleship and the tanker followed side by side. Langsdorf waited, analyzing the intercepted and partially decoded radio messages reporting the presence of two German battleships in the ocean and the precautions for ships when approaching unknown warships. The radio exchange gave the Spee commander and his officers a lot of useful information - in particular, he suggested repainting his plane in the colors of English camouflage.

On October 22, the airborne "Arado" discovered a large transport and brought the raider to it. After warning volleys, attempts to radio from the ship about the attack were interrupted, and the prize party landed on a brand new Trivanian (8835 per.t.), transporting zinc ore from Australia to England. But the radio operator did his job: after a while, the radio intercept service ("B-Dienst") reported that the British base in Simonstown already knew about the seizure. A distress signal was also received by the Lanstiven Castle transport, which was in the vicinity of the scene.

The second time Langsdorf got his ship out of the blow. Taking a course to the west and giving full speed, "Spee" then turned sharply to the southeast. The commander first ventured to contact headquarters in Germany, warning that he was going to complete the cruise in January 1940.

The Indian Ocean, into which the Graf Spee was now heading, was also a fertile field for raiding. All trade routes that followed through it ran either to the Suez Canal, or skirted the Cape of Good Hope. Langsdorf chose the area south of the island of Madagascar, because he did not want to drag the Altmark with him, putting it at risk of being discovered off the southern tip of Africa. A convenient position in the southeastern corner of the Indian Ocean left an opportunity for a quick return to the Atlantic and at the same time would cause a severe headache for the "mistress of the seas", forcing her to expand the search area to the whole ocean!

On October 28, the Altmark was released, and on November 4, the Spee, still unnoticed, rounded the Cape of Good Hope. The first week of cruising in a new place was fruitless: the ocean remained deserted. The weather began to deteriorate, leading to an event of major consequences. On November 9, the seaplane "Arado-196", which served the raider a good service, suffered an accident and was out of order for a long time. "Pocket battleship" twice crossed the southern entrance to the Mozambique Strait, reaching the very coast of Africa - and all to no avail. It was only on November 14 that he stopped the small but new motor ship "Africa Shell", which was sailing in ballast and became the only victim of the raider in the Indian Ocean. True, the very fact that the German raider was there continued to affect shipping (primarily British) for a long time.

On November 20, the Spee circled the southern tip of Africa in the opposite direction. Bad weather and ineffectual cruising in dangerous waters greatly exhausted the crew, so the return to tropical latitudes and the meeting with the Altmark on November 26 were pleasant events. The raider replenished the supply of fuel and food, having received the opportunity to be at sea until the end of February 1940. True, after a three-month sailing in the tropics, the bottom required cleaning, and the diesel engines - preventive repairs. I had to deal with the alternate bulkhead of the engines, which took several days. At the end of the work, Langsdorf, after much deliberation, decided to return to the "happy" area between Freetown and Rio de Janeiro, where the sea routes leading to Cape Town from the USA and Europe crossed. The aircraft mechanics finally managed to somehow adjust the work of the engine of the ship's "Arado", and the raider regained his "eyes", but, as it turned out, not for long.

Things went well at first. On December 2, the Spee stopped a large turbo ship Doric Star (10,086 per.t.), en route from New Zealand with a cargo of grain, wool and frozen meat. The prize turned out to be very valuable, but Langsdorf gave the order to immediately flood it, limiting himself to mining from 19 silver bars. There were good reasons for that: the just-repaired plane radioed that it tried to make an emergency landing and damaged the left float. Realizing the importance of the Arado for further action, the commander rushed to the rescue, firing a torpedo into the Doric Star and firing several volleys. The plane was saved, but the British could gain valuable information about the location of the raider by intercepting the signal about the attack from the transport and the negotiations between the ship and the seaplane. It was necessary to change the area of ​​action. The Spee turned southwest and the next day launched another 7983-ton British steamer Tyroa, which was carrying frozen meat and wool from Australia. Thus, Britain lost 2 ships in the same area within 24 hours. Realizing that "hunters" would rush here, Langsdorf decided to change the area of ​​action again. He chose the mouth of the La Plata, as Buenos Aires was visited by up to 60 English ships a month. On December 6, "Graf Spee" met with "Altmark" for the last time, again replenishing the supply of diesel fuel and provisions and handing over the command "Doric Star" to it. As if anticipating a possible battle, the commander conducted artillery-rangefinder exercises, using his own supply vessel as a target. The senior artilleryman, frigatten-captain Asher, was dissatisfied with their result, since for more than three months of forced idleness, the main fire control system personnel were noticeably disqualified. The next day "Altmark" parted with its "master" forever, taking in the hold about four hundred captive sailors from sunken merchant ships.

In the morning the tanker disappeared over the horizon, and by evening the lookouts noticed the steamship Streonshal loaded with wheat. After the team was withdrawn, the prize was sunk. The commander and officers of the Spee were looking through the fresh newspapers with interest, in one of which they discovered extremely valuable information for themselves - a photograph of the heavy cruiser Cumberland in camouflage. Langsdorf decided to paint his ship in the same style and install additional "pipes", imitating the "Briton". He intended to go to the mouth of the La Plata, then turn north to Rio de Janeiro, and after the sinking of possible victims, head east, not hiding from neutral ships, in order to simulate a departure to the Indian Ocean. In fact, he intended to move to the north Atlantic and end the cruise, returning to Germany. But the plans remained plans. A different fate awaited the Spee.

Let us now turn to the actions of the other side. Harewood's cruisers patrolled their area unsuccessfully until October 27, when Exeter sailed to Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, for preventive maintenance. It was replaced by the light cruiser Ajax, which was part of the Naval Zealand Navy, of the same type as the Achilles. The detachment's conditions of service were perhaps the most difficult among all the search groups, since it had to operate in neutral waters, strictly adhering to international maritime law, which prohibited the use of ports of third countries as bases, in particular, for refueling. Of the British bases in the area, there was only a completely unequipped Port Stanley, more than 1,000 miles from the main sea routes, and the cruisers often had to take fuel at sea. A three month search yielded no results.

Following the enemy on the signals of the attacked ships turned out to be clearly an unsuccessful technique, since the Germans would hardly have expected the enemy while remaining in the same area. It was necessary to predict the next move of the raider commander. Commodore Harewood made such an attempt. Having received the message about the sinking of "Doric Star", he suggested that the enemy would rush from the African coast of the ocean to the South American, trying to strike at the junctions of sea routes in the Buenos Aires - Montevideo or Rio de Janeiro region. It was possible to parry such a thrust only by concentrating forces.

On December 9, Exeter was hastily recalled from base. At seven in the morning on December 12, all three of Harewood's cruisers connected at a designated location off the Uruguayan coast. The Commodore signaled his plan, which consisted in the fact that when the "pocket battleship" appeared during the day, the forces should be divided into the 1st division ("Ajax" and "Achilles") and "Exeter" for shelling the enemy from both sides, and at night all 3 ships must attack together, in an open formation. He demanded from the commanders perseverance in approaching at a distance of effective 6-inch fire. Even when he was a teacher at the courses for senior officers of the navy in Greenwich in 1936, Harewood proposed precisely this method of fighting cruisers against pickpockets. In the evening of the 12th, the detachment rehearsed the planned maneuvers several times.

At this time, "Spee" followed a 20-knot move to almost the same point. On December 11, his Arado crashed again - this time the plane could not be restored. So at a critical moment, the "pocket battleship" was deprived of the opportunity to conduct aerial reconnaissance, which played, perhaps, a fatal role in subsequent events. The commander decided to place a false pipe instead of the plane; work was supposed to start in the morning of December 13th. At 6.00 it was planned to turn to the 335 ° course and search for merchant ships. However, at 5.52 am, the observers reported that the tops of the masts were visible directly ahead on the course. Not yet identifying the target, Langsdorf ordered full speed. The transfer of diesel engines to the maximum number of revolutions always caused wild noise and the emission of a column of exhaust gases from the pipe, comparable in appearance to the sultan of smoke from some coal cruiser. Now the British have found their enemy ...

The Battle of La Plata on December 13, 1939 - the first classic battle of the Second World War and one of the few purely artillery battles of large surface ships - is generally well known. A feature film has been made about him, many books have been written. However, some of them cover events in a very one-sided, tendentious, and sometimes not entirely reliable way. In particular, in the recently published in St. Petersburg translation of A. Divine's book "In the footsteps of" pocket battleships "a vivid description of the battle, made during the war years, is in places simply fantastic. In fact, things are not so simple. It would seem that a battle that took place with excellent visibility, as a result of which all participants remained afloat, should not have “dark spots”. But after the sinking of the Spee, most of the documents were destroyed, so that later the German officers had to restore the picture of the battle from memory, and some moments forever sunk into oblivion along with its commander. On the English side, Harwood produced a detailed but very general report, containing mostly conclusions rather than descriptions. Eugene Millington-Drake, the former British Consul in Montevideo, did a great job in the 1960s, interviewing many participants on both sides in person and in writing. Nevertheless, information about the course of the battle remains largely contradictory: it is enough just to compare the plotting of courses given by various German and English sources. Let's try to give as complete a picture as possible, mainly reflecting the participation of the German "pocket battleship" in this battle, noting controversial places and established legends.

The first of them refers to the time when opponents discovered each other. It is generally believed that the British noticed the "battleship" much later than he noticed them. In fact, the difference was most likely one or two minutes. Observers on the cruisers saw a plume of smoke on the horizon and reported it, but for officers weary of many days of cruising, the message did not cause much alarm. Despite the expectation of a possible meeting with the raider in the La Plata area, they believed that another merchant ship had appeared on the horizon. The cruisers (in order: Ajax, Achilles and Exeter) continued to follow a large zigzag at a speed of 14 knots, keeping a general course of 60 °. The weather was almost perfect - a calm sea, a cloudless sky; visibility was virtually unlimited.

Meanwhile, on the Spee, which was approaching the British at a total speed of 50 km / h, the Exeter was quickly identified in one of the three ships that appeared on the horizon. Two light cruisers were mistaken for destroyers (their low superstructures played a role here). Langsdorf had a few minutes to think. The presence of destroyers could, in his opinion, mean only one thing - the presence near the convoy. Since the period of the raiding was clearly coming to an end, and his "battleship" had a full ammunition load and a supply of fuel, the Spee commander considered it possible to join the battle, hoping to easily get rid of the only cruiser, dodge a torpedo attack and, if successful, provide himself with abundant prey. Another consideration was that there was only one way to get rid of the three pursuers with great speed: by decisively attacking them before they gained speed.

It took 18 minutes from the moment of discovery, when the signalmen figured out that they had to deal not only with the Exeter, but also with two light cruisers. The opponents drew close enough that through the binoculars signals were seen rising from the masts of the British. The Spey realized that they had been found.

A number of sources criticize Langsdorf's decision to approach the enemy so decisively, instead of taking advantage of the range and accuracy of his heavy guns. In naval combat, one can almost always find an object for criticism in the actions of either side; to understand the actions of the commander of the "Spee", it is enough to remember that he was going to attack suddenly, and noticing the separation of the enemy ships - to destroy the strongest of them as soon as possible. This required getting closer: at long distances, the consumption of projectiles could be too high, but the result could not be achieved quickly enough. The 30-knot cruisers that gained speed could pursue the "battleship" for as long as necessary, "leading" it until the arrival of proper reinforcements. The actual speed of the "Graf Spee" at that time, according to its chief mechanic, did not exceed 25 knots, mainly due to the bottom overgrown during the raiding. In addition, one should be aware of the danger of 8-inch shells hitting the deck armor from long distances. So in Langsdorf's decisiveness one should see not the fervor of the former torpedo officer (in the 30s he commanded destroyers), but rather a sober calculation. Likewise, Harewood's repeatedly praised courage in dividing his forces to attack from both sides could easily turn into tragedy, which almost did not happen.

At 6.18, the Spee opened fire with semi-armor-piercing shells from its main battery guns from a distance of over 90 kbt at the just-separated Exeter. The enemy did the same a little later: Exeter responded at 6.20, firing first from the front towers, which were joined by the stern towers 2.5 minutes later. Ajax fired a volley at 6.21, and 2 minutes later, Achilles joined him. The distance to the light cruisers that separated and followed a ledge ("Achilles" slightly behind and closer to the enemy) was also about 90 kbt. From 6.25, a stable radio communication was established between them, and both ships soon conducted common centralized fire. "Spee" responded with a 150-mm port side cannon. The German fire from the side looked unhurried; according to British observers, they waited for the fall of the previous volley and only after that they fired the next one, and fired with only one turret. The Germans refute this fact, claiming that they used their traditional "ladder", that is, they fired the next salvo, without waiting for the fall of the previous one, with some deviation in range. Since the "pocket battleships" had only 6 main guns, when zeroing in, the chief artilleryman of the "Spee" frigatten-captain Paul Ascher alternated firing from both turrets, firing three-gun salvos, switching after covering to full 6-gun ones. From the outside it could look like "uncertain shooting with separate controls from different towers at different targets" (from the report of Harewood). At the same time, the British argue that the dispersion in both range and direction was very insignificant.

The German artillery officers faced the difficult question of choosing the type of ammunition. The use of armor-piercing or semi-armor-piercing projectiles with a slowdown could give decisive success if they successfully hit the vehicles or cellars of a weakly armored enemy, but bottom fuses could hardly be cocked with thin casing or superstructures, and many hits would remain almost useless. Asher chose a different path: after the first salvoes at Exeter with semi-armor-piercing grenades with a slowdown, he switched to high-explosive grenades with an instantaneous detonator. Now any shell exploded, but the vital parts of the cruisers deeply located in the hull remained relatively safe. Asher counted on the powerful fragmentation effect of 300 kg grenades (not in vain, as we will see). Subsequently, the choice of the type of ammunition was repeatedly criticized by the Germans themselves. They believed that Exeter would have been sent to the bottom by using armor-piercing shells. You can argue with that by looking at specific hits. During the battle on the Spee, the type of ammunition used was repeatedly changed; the British even note that different types of shells were used in the same salvo, which is unlikely. (It is possible that when the target was changed, shells of some type accumulated in the reloading compartment of one of the towers were "fired".)

During the entire battle, the British used only armor-piercing projectiles with a slowdown of the SRVS type (Common Pointed, Ballistic Cap - semi-armor-piercing, with a light tip to improve ballistics), with the exception of a few high-explosive (NOT). If for an 8-inch caliber there was a certain sense in this choice (which was confirmed by one of the hits), then in the case of 6-inch guns it would be much better to use 51 kg high-explosive shells without slowing down. Most of the shells, without significant damage, passed through the bulky "turret" and superstructures in the middle of the hull, would have caused fires, failure of almost unarmored 150-mm and 105-mm guns and, most importantly, numerous communication cables. As will be noted, even a slight concussion from unexploded shells led to quite unpleasant consequences; in the event of a full-fledged explosion, the situation for the Germans could be much worse. The clue to the irrational behavior of the British lies in the fact that at the beginning of the war they practically did not have high-explosive shells of instant action in the cruisers' ammunition, which turned out to be in the hands of the raider.

The shooting from both sides proved to be very accurate at first. As usual, the Germans fired first. A third volley of 11-inch guns hit the Exeter. Shrapnel from one of the shells literally wiped out the servants of the starboard torpedo tube, riddled the plane on the catapult and the entire side and superstructures, from the waterline to the top of the chimneys. The signaling circuits about the readiness of the guns were interrupted, so that the senior artilleryman had to fire blindly, not knowing whether all of his guns could fire a volley. At the same time, the fragments smashed the searchlights and caused a fire. (In general, the fragmentation effect of 300 kg shells turned out to be very strong, and in the future, some undershoots inflicted no less damage on cruisers than direct hits.) A projectile with a slowdown from the next volley passed through the bow of the cruiser hull without an explosion, without causing significant damage. Another hit into the forecastle was relatively harmless. But a couple of minutes later a fatal blow followed for the British. The 280-mm high-explosive projectile detonated when it hit the elevated 8-inch turret. By this time, tower "B" had made only 8 volleys. The tower was out of order from the terrible concussion until the end of the battle, and its personnel also suffered. A fan of debris covered the entire main superstructure. The consequences were dire: all officers on the bridge, except for the commander, Captain Bell, were killed or seriously wounded. The communication pipes and cables leading from the director and rangefinders to the computing center were broken. The cruiser lost her navigation aids and did not obey the steering wheel, yawning to the right and coming out of the firing angle of the remaining bow turret. Fortunately, the commander quickly took control of the situation and transferred control to a reserve point in the stern, which, however, for the thrifty British, was an open bridge without any essential equipment. The ship lost only a third of its artillery, but its real combat power fell to a much greater extent. In particular, Exeter did not even have time to release its seaplane into the air, which could help in adjusting the fire, and the transmission of orders to the steering compartment and the car was carried out by voice through a chain of sailors! In this case, the 280-mm guns of the "pocket battleship" fully confirmed their effectiveness against cruisers.

True, the return fire from Exeter also made a strong impression on the Spee officers, who described it as "fast and accurate." One 8-inch round pierced through the tower-like superstructure and exited without exploding. But the other, who came a little later, surprised the Germans with his action. Having penetrated the top of the 100-mm belt, it also broke through the 40-mm longitudinal bulkhead and hit the armored deck, making a dent in it "the size of a wash basin", and then exploded. Shrapnel damaged the cables and caused a fire that engulfed the dry chemical fire extinguishing storage facility. People who fought the flames received severe burns and poisoning. (In a parking lot in Montevideo, the Germans even called in Uruguayan doctors, because they assumed or pretended to assume that the British were using chemical projectiles.) If a 203-mm projectile had hit a meter below, it would have exploded right in the engine compartment, and the consequences for the "Count Spee ”could be even more difficult. Unfortunately for the British, this is Exeter's last success. The fire of the damaged cruiser became less and less effective. There were no more direct hits from him during the entire battle.

But little by little, the fire from the light cruisers began to affect. Several semi-armor-piercing shells hit the tower-like superstructure, and although most of them did not explode, some effect was achieved. The captain of the Spee Langsdorff, calmly clutching his pipe at the corner of his mouth, commanded his ship like Togo or Beatty from an open bridge. Unlike admirals of the past, he paid for his excessive bravery. Two small fragments hit the captain in the shoulder and wrist, and the blast wave threw him to the floor of the bridge with such force that he lost consciousness, and the senior officer was forced to take command for a while. Although the wounds were minor, according to the officers who were always with the commander, the concussion influenced his further behavior. Langsdorf lost his iron confidence in victory, often gave orders to change course, which negatively affected his own shooting, and made "not aggressive enough decisions."

It is difficult to judge how true this is almost 60 years later, but at about the same time (from 6.22 to 6.24), the Graf Spee began to turn to the left, turning to starboard towards the light cruisers that were bypassing it from the nose, which had already gained 25 knots. Generally speaking, the maneuvering of the "pocket battleship" in the initial period of the battle is the subject of the greatest discrepancies in descriptions. In accordance with a rough diagram sketched by the German officers from memory after the sinking of their ship, the ship turned very smoothly 90 ° to the left within 10 minutes and headed for the north. At the beginning of the turn (about 6.25, that is, immediately after hitting Exeter's B turret), he transferred main battery fire to light cruisers (distance about 85 kbt). Eyewitnesses from the "pocket battleship" and German staff officers, including Admiral Kranke, insist that he did not make any drastic maneuvers at the time. The English diagram shows two turns: one in the interval from 6.22 to 6.25 by 90 ° to the left, then the second, almost the same - to the other side (completed by 6.28). Harewood notes that the Spee's fire split at this time: the stern turret fired at Exeter, and the bow turret fired at the light cruisers that had opened, which is denied by the gunners of the battleship, who claim that the 280-mm cannons always fired centrally one at a time. goals. Modern German sources show an even deeper twist; in the book of Koop and Schmolke, it is depicted as a figure eight, that is, for some time the ship allegedly lay on the opposite course. In any case, the English scheme (generally more detailed) agrees very poorly with the course angles: it follows from it that from the moment of opening fire until turning at 6.22, the Spee could only shoot at Exeter from the bow turret, which does not correspond to the facts. Successful German shooting at 6.20 - 6.25 can hardly be evidence of any significant U-turns at this time. The apparent separation of main battery fire is most likely due to the alternation of turret volleys to zero in on a new target.

At about 6.31 "Graf Spee" quickly gave 3 covers for "Ajax". The British applied individual maneuvering, changing course each time in the direction of the fall of the previous volley of the enemy. The method of "hunting for salvos" gave good results at long distances with a high evasion rate, since in 30 s of the projectile's flight the target could move aside by 2 - 3 kbt, and the "correct" correction of the fire led to a miss.

The 1st division of Harewood and the "pocket battleship" quickly approached: by 6.33 they were separated by a distance of 65 kbt. At the same time, Langsdorf, a former torpedo officer, decided that it was time to take action against the torpedoes that the enemy could launch on converging courses. (Indeed, in 6.31, Exeter fired a three-torpedo salvo from the starboard apparatus, which, due to the evasion maneuver, was not even noticed by the Germans.) In addition, one should not get too close to 6-inch cruisers, whose rapid-fire cannons could inflict significant damage at short distances ... At 6.34 am the battleship commander gave the order to turn to the left. According to German sources, the damaged Exeter completely disappeared behind a smokescreen, from which it did not emerge until about 6.40. As a result of the turn, "Spee" lay on an approximately parallel course with it (NW) and itself was covered by a curtain that did not interfere with its own fire. Here is another intractable discrepancy. At 6.40 a shell of the main caliber exploded with an undershoot at the side of the "Achilles". Again, the fragments reached the bridge and the control tower. Four people were killed and three others were wounded, including an artillery officer. However, almost at the same time, two 280-mm shells hit Exeter, and again with dire consequences. One of them knocked out the remaining bow tower, and the second, who got into the premises of senior non-commissioned officers, destroyed the radio room, killing five radio operators, walked 18 m in the ship's hull and exploded at the right forward 102-mm gun, knocking out all the servants. The cartridges in the fenders of the first shots immediately caught fire. It remains unclear how the Spee, which had just completed the turn, could have taken aim so quickly and successfully at both targets, which were very distant from each other. Probably, the time registration of the English units was not accurate.

Noticing the Spee's turn at 6.37 to the northwest, Harewood immediately gave the order to go on the same course, although the maneuver temporarily disabled half of its artillery located in the aft towers. At the same minutes, the Sea Fox seaplane was launched from the flagship cruiser to correct the artillery fire. Unfortunately for the British, his radio station was tuned in the early morning to the frequency corresponding to radio communications during reconnaissance. For the correction, a different frequency was specially used, at which the radio operators of the Ajax and Achilles waited in vain for messages from the spotter. The breakdown of the radio station on the "Achilles" forced separate fire control, and when the "Ajax" finally established communication with the aircraft, he received constant signals of undershoots at his own expense, although they belonged to the "deaf" "Achilles". The result was an almost twenty-minute "failure" in the effectiveness of the fire of Harewood's ships.

Meanwhile, the damaged Exeter turned sharply to the right at 6.40, lay down on an eastern course and at 6.42 fired 3 torpedoes from the left-side apparatus, just like the first time, aiming "by eye". Immediately another shell hit the cruiser, and he turned to the left by 180 °. One of the results of the German fire was the complete failure of all navigational instruments and instruments, so that the effectiveness of the fire remained close to zero. However, the shooting, controlled by the senior artilleryman, first from the searchlight and then directly from the roof of the tower, continued for another half hour; 177 shells were fired from the two guns, almost 90 on the barrel. Only at about 7.30, when the water penetrating through the shrapnel holes in the side and the broken hoses of the fire lines cut off the power supply to the drive of the aft tower, Captain Bell ordered to leave the battlefield. Exeter was in a difficult position: a meter trim on the bow forced her to slow down to 17 knots, although the turbines and boilers remained intact. The cruiser had to travel more than 1,000 miles to the Falklands, guided by the only surviving compass from a lifeboat. One way or another, his participation in the battle ended at 7.40, although in reality he practically could not threaten the Spee an hour earlier. After the Exeter disappeared into the smoke, Harewood's light cruisers were left alone against the "pocket battleship", which was now firing at them with both calibers. Having completed a wide turn to the east at about 6.52, the Achilles and Ajax now followed directly behind the Spee, developing a speed of 31 knots and gradually overtaking the enemy. Fire from both sides from a distance of 85 - 90 kbt became ineffective, partly due to the fact that only half of the guns fired (the bow towers for the British and the stern towers for the "pocket battleship"). At 6.55 Harewood ordered a 30 ° turn to the left, bringing in all the artillery. After 2 minutes, the British shells covered the enemy. Langsdorf used the same method of "hunting for volleys", every minute changing the course by 15 ° - 20 °, and at about 7:00 put a smoke screen. Shortly after 7.10, Exeter reappeared from the south, to which the main battery had to be transferred. Constant shifting of the sight and maneuvers could not but affect the results of the shooting: in 40 minutes of the battle, from 6.45 to 7.25, none of the German shells reached hits. Meanwhile, the 6-inch shells of the light cruisers began to inflict significant damage on the Graf Spee. One of them pierced the thin 10-mm hull of the 150-mm installation No. 3 on the starboard side, destroying almost all the servants and incapacitating the gun. Fired in the heat of battle from the Achilles, a training round (a blank without an explosive charge) hit the area of ​​the forecastle break, killed two sailors, pierced through several cabins and got stuck in the non-commissioned officers' quarters. Several hits fell on the tower-like superstructure. One of the shells exploded under the overhead fire control post, killing two sailors and mortally wounding Lieutenant Grigat, the only German officer killed in the battle at La Plata. By a miracle, the wiring survived, and the Spee managed to escape the fate of the Exeter. Another shell casually demolished the right rangefinder on the bridge, scattered the ammunition of the 37-mm installation and exploded right on the gyroscope of anti-aircraft artillery fire control devices. The weakly armored feed of the 150-mm cannon from the bow group was out of order, finally reducing their firing to nothing. However, the most serious consequences were the termination of communication with the director and the rangefinder post on the bow superstructure. According to the memoirs of Art. Lieutenant Razenaka, the order to transfer fire to another light cruiser simply did not reach the rangefinder personnel, who continued to give the distance to the Ajax. Naturally, all the data for adjusting the fire turned out to be incorrect. "Spee" got into the same situation as "Ajax" and "Achilles", when they had a communication mismatch with the spotter plane.

Noticing a decrease in the effectiveness of enemy fire, Harwood at 7.10 turned to the left, again limiting the angles of fire with the bow turrets. According to British data, "Spee" set up smoke screens twice for 8 minutes and continuously maneuvered. At 7.22, the distance on the Ajax rangefinder was only 54 kbt. The 1st Division turned slightly to the right, as 11-inch volleys began to cover the cruiser (after 7.16, at least 9 shells fell in the immediate vicinity of the flagship). And at 7.25, retribution for courage followed: a 280-mm projectile pierced the barbet of the elevated aft tower of the "Ajax", completely knocking it out, and hit the next barbet, jamming it too. The ship lost its stern artillery group, in addition, one of the feeds in the tower "B" (elevated bow) refused. "Ajax" was left with 3 combat-ready guns, and the commander of the detachment ordered to turn 4 rumba to the north. At 07.31 a report was received from the plane about the traces of torpedoes in front of the heading. Indeed, "Spee" was in an excellent situation for using its torpedo tubes, conveniently located in the stern, however, according to German data, it managed to fire only one torpedo, because at that moment (7.17) Langsdorf laid a sharp "turn" to the left, avoiding the mythical torpedo salvo of the British. In fact, "Ajax" fired 4 torpedoes from the left vehicle only at 7.27. Avoiding torpedoes (or a single torpedo?), Both cruisers turned to the left almost 90 ° in the interval from 7.32 to 7.34.

"Graf Spee" at this time was making another evasion maneuver. According to eyewitnesses, one of the torpedoes passed just a few meters from the side. (This event refers to about 7.15, when, according to British data, none of the torpedoes had yet left the vehicle. To "arrive" by this time from a distance of 70 - 85 kbt, they should have been fired at about 7.00 - right into the stern " German. ”It is unlikely that the British would attack from such a hopeless position. Rather, eyewitnesses fell victim to an“ optical illusion ”that often occurs during intense combat.) -12 kbt, followed by another curtain and a turn to the stop. As a result, cruisers on a much straighter course at 7.34 approached the minimum distance in battle - 40 kbt, being directly behind the Spee. However, the confusion with targets for the main battery ended, and the battleship's fire became accurate again. At 7.34, debris from a nearby rupture blew the top of the Ajax mast with all the antennas. Harewood sensed that it "smelled like fried." The bridge received disappointing information: only 3 guns were in operation, and no more than 20% of the ammunition remained for them. Although the "Achilles" was in a much more combat-ready state, the commander could not help but think that only 1 hour and 20 minutes had passed since the beginning of the battle, that now it is only early morning, the enemy "showed the stern" and within the next 20 minutes there will be invulnerable to torpedoes, of which, by the way, there are not so many left. In these conditions, it is difficult to count on inflicting heavy damage on the "battleship", which retained a good move and the ability to shoot accurately. At 7.42 Harewood ordered the smoke-screen to be set and to the west course.

But Langsdorf also showed no inclination to continue the fight. The reports he received from combat posts were also not optimistic. The ammunition consumption was close to 70%, water penetrated into the hull through holes from three shells and many fragments, the course had to be reduced to 22 knots. The Spee continued to follow the eastern course, and under the cover of the English smoke screen, the opponents quickly dispersed. An observer from a British plane later recalled that the picture looked somewhat fantastic from the air: as if on command, the three ships turned around and ran away from each other in different directions!

Harewood quickly realized that the enemy would not pursue him, and at 7.54 turned around and went after him. He ordered the Achilles to take a position from the stern of the Spee in the right quarter, and the Ajax in the left. The Pocket Battleship was now escorted by light cruisers, which, however, were kept at a considerable distance. A reckless attempt by the Achilles to get closer to 10 miles at about 10:00 made it possible for the Spee to fire 3 volleys, the last of which lay just 50 meters from the pursuer. The cruiser was forced to turn away sharply.

At this time, the captain of the zursee Hans Langsdorff was making, perhaps, the most difficult decision in his life, and it turned out to be fatal for him and his ship. The choice was not great: since the British were tightly "hung" on their tail, it was necessary either to wait until darkness and try to break away from them, or to go to a neutral port, fix the damage and, breaking the blockade, hide in the ocean expanses. A former torpedo specialist, the Spee commander clearly did not want a night battle. Although the "pocket battleship" had radar, its sector of action was limited to the bow angles; moreover, it was impossible to say with certainty that the enemy did not have the same device. Artillery fire at short distances could be effective from both sides. "Spee" had a chance to sink one of the opponents with just a couple of volleys, but at the same time, he could receive a flurry of 6-inch shells, after which a safe return home became extremely problematic. The ability to hide in the dark was balanced by the likelihood of receiving an enemy torpedo from several cables, which also finally decided the fate of the raider. The night fight is always to some extent a lottery that Langsdorff wanted to avoid.

There remained a neutral port. For the same reasons, it should have been reached before dark, so that the Brazilian capital, Rio de Janeiro, disappeared. Buenos Aires was preferred. German influence in the Argentine capital remained strong, and the "pocket battleship" could count on a favorable reception.

However, the raider's commander chose Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay, instead of Buenos Aires. The final reasons for his decision will forever remain a mystery, as Langsdorf did not comment on his order. There were certain arguments against the Argentine capital.

The main one is the need to follow a narrow and shallow fairway late in the evening, risking being hit by British torpedoes at a critical moment or clogging the pump filters, finally putting the ship out of action.

And after the renovation, the Spee would have had to get out for a long time in the same way, which would have allowed the British to properly prepare for the meeting. The more open Montevideo seemed safer from this point of view. From time to time exchanging fruitless volleys with the British, the German ship dropped anchor in the roadstead of the Uruguayan capital shortly after midnight.

From a purely technical point of view, the battle at La Plata can be considered a victory for the "pocket battleship". Two 203-mm and eighteen 152-mm shells that hit him did not cause him fatal damage. The main artillery of the Spee remained fully operational: despite three direct 6-inch hits on the turrets, the solid armor was so reliable that they did not even temporarily stop firing. Light artillery suffered more severely: one 150-mm gun was completely out of order, and the hoists for supplying ammunition to others were damaged. Of the three 105-mm installations, only one remained in operation. There were also minor floods through holes in the skin in the bow, but the ship had no heel or trim, and its energy was in perfect order. Of the nearly 1200 people in the command, 1 officer and 35 privates were killed, and another 58 received wounds and poisoning, most of them light. In general, not far from the truth were those critics of Langsdorf, who argued that he took the ship to Montevideo only because an English shell destroyed the oven for baking bread.

The British suffered much more. Exeter was completely out of action, losing only 5 officers and 56 sailors killed. Another 11 people died on the light cruisers. By the end of the battle, the artillery power of Harewood's detachment had more than halved, and besides, only 360 shells remained on the most efficient Achilles. The British had only 10 torpedoes.

However, the vulnerable position of a lone raider, separated from his native shores by thousands of miles, surrounded by enemies, fell a heavy burden on the shoulders of Hans Langsdorf. He was afraid to go across the North Atlantic with an unpatched hole in the hull. In addition, the commander believed that he had too little ammunition left. (This is fundamentally wrong, since only 414 main battery shells, 377 150-mm and 80 anti-aircraft 105-mm shells were used up.) The artillerymen still had more than a third of the 280-mm and about half of the 150-mm ammunition at their disposal. Harewood, whose cruisers took up positions in two possible passages from Montevideo, estimated their chances of delaying the "pocket battleship" if it went to sea the next day as 1: 4.

But Langsdorf chose a different course. He tried to demand from the Uruguayan government 2 weeks to "eliminate damage that threaten the seaworthiness of the ship." The pretext was the story of the English light cruiser Glasgow, which was being repaired at the beginning of the First World War in a Brazilian port for about the same time. The two-week period meant not only the opportunity to patch up the holes and fix the feed mechanisms (for which an elevator specialist from a German company was urgently called from Buenos Aires!), But also to pull several submarines to the La Plata area that would help lift the blockade. However, the British understood the situation perfectly, and in the diplomatic struggle they were much stronger. The British Consul in Montevideo, Y. Millington-Drake, had a great influence in the country, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay Guani was known as his good acquaintances. The requirements of the British changed as information was received: at first they insisted on the standard 24-hour stay of the enemy in a neutral port, but after consulting with Harewood, it became clear that it was better to delay the enemy until the arrival of reinforcements. At the berths of Montevideo there were 8 British merchant ships (the closest to the "battleship" - only 300 m!), From which the assistants of the naval attaché immediately organized surveillance of the "Spee". Representatives of British intelligence skillfully misinformed the Germans by organizing open negotiations with Buenos Aires on the subject of "the possibility of urgent reception of two large warships" (which transparently meant "Rhinaun" and "Arc Royal"). But the commander of the "Count Spee" received fatal misinformation from his own officers. The day after the battle, one of them saw a ship on the horizon, identified as the battle cruiser Rhinaun. This, in fact, decided the fate of the "pocket battleship", since "Rhinaun" belonged to the number of those 5 ships in the world (3 British battle cruisers and French "Dunkirk" and "Strasbourg"), meeting with which did not leave the Germans any chance of salvation ...

The confusion with the alleged identification of the battle cruiser is not entirely clear. In fact, Harewood received the only reinforcement - late in the evening on December 14, the Cumberland, which had arrived from the Falkland Islands, joined the light cruisers. The three-tube heavy cruiser had nothing to do with the Rhynown in appearance. He went all the way with a 25-knot stroke. With his arrival, the British, as it were, restored the status quo. The balance of forces of the opponents became close to that available at the beginning of the battle. Instead of six 203-mm Exeter cannons, the British now had 8, but the combat capability of Ajax and Achilles was significantly reduced due to the failure of half of the artillery in the first and high ammunition consumption in the second. In this situation, the "Spee" still had the opportunity to break into the Atlantic.

It took another 3 days for the denouement - that is how much time was given by the Uruguayan commission, which boarded the Spee and examined its damage. During this time, Langsdorf managed to contact the Kriegsmarine headquarters several times, suggesting a choice: to intern in Argentina or to sink the ship. Interestingly, an attempt to break through or an honorable death in battle was not even considered, and Captain Zurzee missed a real chance to glorify his fleet.

The Spey issue became the subject of a difficult discussion between the fleet commander, Admiral Raeder, and Hitler. In the end, they came to the conclusion that it was preferable to sink the ship than to allow it to be interned in poorly predictable South American countries. Langsdorf received the decision of the leadership on the evening of December 16. He had 24 hours at his disposal - the term of stay of the "pocket battleship" expired at 8 pm on December 17, 1939. The commander did not wait until the last moment and made a decision on a sleepless night. Early in the morning, he woke up an artillery officer and ordered an urgent start to the destruction of the fire control system. Precision instruments were destroyed with hand grenades and hammers, the gun locks were taken to the main battery towers, which were then supposed to be blown up more thoroughly. By the evening, the preparatory work was completed, which consisted of placing numerous charges throughout the premises of the ship. The main part of the crew (900 people) was transferred to the Tacoma ship. At about 6 pm huge flags with a swastika were hoisted on the masts, and the Spee departed from the pier. His last appearance on this warm summer Sunday evening from the embankment of Montevideo was watched by a huge crowd, which, according to eyewitnesses, consisted of 200 thousand people. The ship passed the fairway and turned north, as if about to sail to Buenos Aires, but about 4 miles offshore, it dropped anchor. At about 20.00 6 explosions of the main charges were heard. Flame and smoke rose high above the masts; they could be seen even from the city. The ship landed on the ground, severe fires began on it, but the solid structure resisted for quite a long time. Explosions and fires continued for 3 days.

Langsdorf briefly outlived his ship. All 1,100 people (with the exception of the sailors buried and remaining in hospitals in Montevideo) arrived safely in Buenos Aires, and the commander was simply obliged to take care of their fate. Vain attempts to avoid interning the crew as "shipwrecked" have failed. Langsdorf summoned the team for the last time and addressed them with a speech in which there were hints of his decision. On the morning of December 20, he shot himself in a hotel room in the capital of Argentina.

The benevolent attitude of the Argentine authorities was reflected in the fact that they practically did not interfere with the flight of the officers released on parole, the overwhelming majority of whom made their way to Germany in different, sometimes very difficult ways to take part in further hostilities. So, the chief artillery officer of the "pocket battleship" Paul Asher managed to take a similar post on the "Bismarck". Its shells hit the battle cruiser Hood, and a day later Asher himself was killed along with his new ship.

The Spee sank in neutral waters in a shallow place - so that its charred superstructures towered over the waves. The British equipped a special expedition, suggesting to remove from it everything that had survived from the instruments, in particular, the radar, as well as samples of weapons (105-mm anti-aircraft guns and machine guns). It was possible to complete only part of the program, since a storm broke out shortly after the start of work, and the operation had to be stopped. The remaining pile of iron, starting in 1942, was gradually dismantled for scrap. True, it turned out to be extremely inconvenient to work on the muddy bottom, and some parts of the last "pocket battleship" are still rusting at the place of death, at 34 ° 58 "25" south latitude and 56 ° 18 "01" west longitude.

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the victorious powers decided to impose many different restrictions on its fleet. They carefully worked out the paragraphs of the agreements, according to which the displacement of the new ships, designed to replace the battleships that had served 20 years, could not exceed 10,000 tons ("long" ones, 1016 kg each). At the same time, the maximum caliber of artillery was not specified: it was believed that only a heavy cruiser or a coastal defense ship could be "shoved" into the allotted frame. At the same time, the winners themselves, when concluding the Washington Treaty, decided to establish for their cruisers not only a similar displacement limit, but also limit the caliber of their artillery - no more than 203 mm.

"Admiral Graf Spee"

When the Germans began designing ships to replace battleships, they first really followed the usual path: they developed a coastal defense ship with 38 cm cannons and a conventional Washington-type heavy cruiser with 210 mm guns. However, after several studies, they had a completely unusual project.

Firstly, they decided to use diesel engines as the main vehicles. Secondly, the main armament was to consist of six 28 cm guns in two three-gun turrets. Thirdly, great attention was paid to the fire control system, which turned out to be very successful and perfect. Fourth, armor protection has become unusually powerful for a cruiser-class ship. With the use of diesel engines, a huge cruising range was directly linked, and the desire to save weight in every possible way led to the use of a number of technological innovations during construction. True, the new battleships turned out to be expensive, and therefore in the Weimar Republic they could not immediately allocate funds for the construction of three units. As a result, the lead Deutschland was laid down in February 1928, the second in the Admiral Scheer series in June 1931, and the last Admiral Graf Spee only on October 1, 1932. it entered the system in January 1936. The construction of this most advanced of the diesel raiders was actually carried out after the Nazis came to power, who were not so afraid of international scandals due to the violation of "dastardly and criminal treaties unjustly imposed on Germany."

The ship, built at the shipyard in Wilhelmshaven, had the following tactical and technical characteristics: standard displacement - 12,100 tons, total - 16,582 tons. Waterline length - 181.7 m, maximum - 186 m, width - 21.65 m, draft the highest - 7.43 m. The total power of the eight main diesels is 56,800 hp, the speed is 26 (maximum - 28) knots, the cruising range at economic speed is 16,300 miles. Armor belt thickness - up to 100 mm, decks - up to 70 mm, towers - up to 140 mm, wheelhouse - 150 mm. The total weight of the armor was 3000 tons. The artillery armament consisted of 2? 3 28 cm (283 mm) main guns, 8 1 15 cm secondary guns, 3 2 105 mm anti-aircraft guns, and 4 2 37 mm 10 1 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The artillery was supplemented by two four-pipe 533 mm torpedo tubes in lightly armored installations. There was also a catapult and equipment to accommodate two float scouts. The crew exceeded 1000 people. It is worth noting that even before the start of World War II, "Admiral Graf Spee" received a radar, albeit rather primitive, but already quite workable.

It was quite clear to what class these ships should be attributed, the British came up with a special name for them "Pocket battleship" - "pocket battleship". In Germany, they were officially listed as battleships (Panzerschiffe).

Soon after the completion of the tests, the battleship set off on a test voyage to the Atlantic, and in December 1936 became part of the German squadron operating off the coast of the Spanish civil war. Directly in the waters off the Iberian Peninsula, the "pocket battleship" visited several times, but each time it was there for a relatively short time and was not particularly noted, but often participated in various solemn events. For example, he represented Germany during the celebrations at the Spithead Raid in May 1937.

When, in August 1939, tensions in Europe began to grow rapidly and it became clear that things were heading for another war, the command decided to take the raider out into the Atlantic ahead of time. The ship, commanded by Captain Zursee G. von Langsdorff, left Wilhelmshaven on the 21st and successfully sailed into the ocean. By September 1 - the day of the German attack on Poland - he was in the Central Atlantic, where he successfully met with the supply ship Altmark, which had also left Germany ahead of time.

On September 10, the "pocket battleship" crossed the equator and headed further south, but the order to start active operations from Germany came only on the 25th. On the last day of the month, the British steamer Clement was captured, and its sinking was accompanied by a number of "jokes": the ship did not want to sink, and two torpedoes fired passed by. I had to use artillery. Observing the laws of cruising war, Langsdorf provided the English sailors with an opportunity to escape, but unmasked his ship. The British and French immediately threw several strong formations in search of the "pickpocket". Later, operating in the South Atlantic and entering the Indian Ocean, "Admiral Graf Spee" captured eight more prizes. At the same time, the Ar-196 onboard aircraft was actively used to search for the next victims. The raider sent the last prey to the bottom on December 3, and after that he transferred the next captives to the Altmark, sending it to Germany. The fighter of trade itself moved to the mouth of La Plata.

By this time, the British were able to correctly determine the location of the battleship, and a squadron of Commodore G. Harwood arrived in the same area as part of the heavy cruiser Exeter and the light cruisers Ajax and Achilles. The opponents discovered each other in the early morning of December 13, and the Germans first mistook the light cruisers for destroyers. The commander of the "pocket battleship" decided to concentrate fire only on the heavy ship, and from 06:18 to 07:40 Exeter received several hits and dropped out of the battle. However, the light cruisers took advantage of the fact that the enemy's attention was focused on the heavy cruiser, and resolutely went for rapprochement. They got many hits and, although their six-inch rounds could not inflict too heavy damage on the battleship, forced him to abandon the intention to finish off Exeter. Although as a result of the battle all three "Britons" suffered (total losses - 72 killed), and the strongest of them was out of action, the "pocket battleship" also suffered. It killed 36 people and was damaged, but most importantly, its commander lost his confidence. Not trying to deal with the "impudent", he chose to go to a neutral port - the capital of Uruguay, Montevideo.

According to international law, the period of stay there expired on the evening of December 17, 1939. By this time, the heavy cruiser Cumberland approached the Ajax and Achilles, but the Germans overestimated the enemy's forces and decided not to go to sea for certain death. At about 6 pm "Admiral Graf Spee" left, and two hours later it was blown up by its own crew on the border of territorial waters. The ship burned for three days, and its destroyed wreck sank in shallow water. Captain zur see Langsdorf shot himself in Buenos Aires on December 20 ...

"Altmark" in Norwegian waters was intercepted by British destroyers, all prisoners were freed. Two other battleships - "Luttsov" (former "Deutschland") and "Admiral Scheer" - in December 1939 were transferred to heavy cruisers. They both died in the last month of the war. And the skeleton of "Admiral Count Spee" was partially dismantled for metal, partially left at the place of death. Already in the 2000s. underwater archaeologists have raised a lot to the surface various subjects including individual implements.