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  • Consequences of the conclusion of the Brest peace. Peace of Brest-Litovsk - conditions, reasons, significance of signing a peace treaty. Cancellation of the Brest Peace

    Consequences of the conclusion of the Brest peace.  Peace of Brest-Litovsk - conditions, reasons, significance of signing a peace treaty.  Cancellation of the Brest Peace

    Contrary to the promises of the Bolsheviks, the Brest Peace Treaty was concluded on the terms of Germany and her allies, which are extremely difficult for Russia. Most of Ukraine, Estland, Livonia and Courland provinces, as well as the Grand Duchy of Finland became German protectorates or became part of Germany. The Baltic Fleet left its bases in Finland and the Baltic States. Russia paid 6 billion marks in reparations.

    Peace treaty
    between Germany, Austria-Hungary,
    Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand
    and Russia on the other

    Since Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other agreed to end the state of war and end peace negotiations as soon as possible, they were appointed plenipotentiaries:

    from the Imperial German Government:
    Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Imperial Real Privy Councilor, Mr. Richard von Kühlmann,
    Imperial Envoy and Plenipotentiary Minister, Dr. von Rosenberg,
    Royal Prussian Major General Hoffmann,
    Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern Front, Captain I Rank Horn,

    from the Imperial and Royal General Austro-Hungarian Government:
    Minister of the Imperial and Royal House and Foreign Affairs, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Privy Councilor Ottokar Count Czernin von and zu Hudenitz,
    Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty's Privy Counselor, Cayetan Merey von Kapos-Mere,
    General of Infantry, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty's Privy Counselor, Mr. Maximilian Chicherich von Bachani,

    from the Royal Bulgarian Government:
    Royal Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister in Vienna, Andrey Toshev,
    Colonel of the General Staff, Royal Bulgarian Military Commissioner under His Majesty the German Emperor and Adjutant Wing of His Majesty the King of Bolgar, Peter Ganchev,
    Royal Bulgarian First Secretary of the Mission, Dr. Teodor Anastasov,

    from the Imperial Ottoman Government:
    His Highness Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, Former Grand Vizier, Member of the Ottoman Senate, Plenipotentiary Ambassador of His Majesty the Sultan in Berlin,
    His Excellency, General of the Cavalry, Adjutant General of His Majesty the Sultan and Military Commissioner of His Majesty the Sultan under His Majesty the German Emperor, Zeki Pasha,

    from the Russian Federative Soviet Republic:
    Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikov, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,
    Lev Mikhailovich Karaxan, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies,
    Georgy Vasilievich Chicherin; assistant to the people's commissar for foreign affairs and
    Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, People's Commissar for Internal Affairs.

    The plenipotentiaries gathered in Brest-Litovsk for peace negotiations and, after presenting their credentials, recognized as drawn up in a correct and proper form, came to an agreement on the following resolutions.

    Article I

    Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other declare that the state of war between them has ended. They decided to continue to live among themselves in peace and friendship.

    Article II

    The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the government or government and military institutions of the other party. Since this obligation concerns Russia, it also extends to the areas occupied by the powers of the quadruple alliance.

    Article III

    Areas to the west of the line established by the contracting parties and formerly belonging to Russia will no longer be under its supreme authority: the established line is indicated on the attached map (Appendix 1), which is an essential part of this peace treaty. The exact definition of this line will be worked out by the German-Russian commission.

    For the aforementioned regions, no obligations towards Russia will follow from their former belonging to Russia.

    Russia refuses any interference in the internal affairs of these areas. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of these areas by demolishing their populations.

    Article IV

    Germany is ready, as soon as a general peace is concluded and a completely Russian demobilization is carried out, to clear the territory lying to the east of the line indicated in paragraph 1 of Article III, since Article VI does not state otherwise.

    Russia will do everything in its power to ensure the prompt cleansing of the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their orderly return to Turkey.

    The districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum are also immediately cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the new organization of state-legal and international-legal relations of these districts, but will allow the population of these districts to establish a new system in agreement with neighboring states, especially Turkey.

    Article V

    Russia will immediately carry out a complete demobilization of its army, including the military units newly formed by the current government.

    In addition, Russia will either transfer its warships to Russian ports and leave there until a general peace is concluded, or it will immediately disarm. Military courts of states that are still at war with the powers of the quadruple alliance, since these ships are in the sphere of power of Russia, are equated to Russian military courts.

    The restricted area in the Arctic Ocean remains in effect until the conclusion of a general peace. In the Baltic Sea and in the parts of the Black Sea subject to Russia, the removal of minefields should begin immediately. Merchant shipping in these maritime areas is free and immediately resumes. Mixed commissions will be set up to work out more precise regulations, in particular for the publication of safe routes for merchant ships to the general public. Navigation lanes must be kept free of floating mines at all times.

    Article VI

    Russia undertakes to immediately conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the peace treaty between this state and the powers of the quadruple alliance. The territory of Ukraine is immediately cleared of Russian troops and Russian Red Guards. Russia stops all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

    Estland and Livonia are also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern border of Estonia generally runs along the Narva River. The eastern border of Livonia generally passes through Lake Peipsi and Lake Pskov to its southwestern corner, then across Lake Luban in the direction of Livengof on the Western Dvina. Estland and Livonia will be occupied by the German police power until public safety is ensured there by the country's own institutions and state order is established there. Russia will immediately release all the arrested and taken away inhabitants of Estland and Livonia and will ensure the safe return of all the taken away Estonians and Livonians.

    Finland and the Aland Islands will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guards, and the Finnish ports of the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces. As long as the ice makes it impossible to transfer warships to Russian ports, only minor crews should be left behind. Russia stops all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of Finland.

    The fortifications erected on the Aland Islands should be demolished as soon as possible. As for the prohibition to erect further fortifications on these islands, as well as their general provisions in relation to military and navigation technology, a special agreement should be concluded regarding them between Germany, Finland, Russia and Sweden; The parties agree that other states adjacent to the Baltic Sea may be involved in this agreement at Germany's request.

    Article VII

    Based on the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties undertake to respect the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of Persia and Afghanistan.

    Article VIII

    Prisoners of war on both sides will be released to their homeland. The settlement of related issues will be the subject of special treaties provided for in Article XII.

    Article IX

    The contracting parties mutually refuse to reimburse their military expenses, that is, state costs of waging a war, as well as from reimbursing military losses, that is, those losses that were caused to them and their citizens in the war zone by military measures, in including all requisitions made in the enemy country.

    Article X

    Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties are resumed immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty. With regard to the admission of the consuls, both sides reserve the right to enter into special agreements.

    Article XI

    Economic relations between the powers of the quadruple alliance and Russia are determined by the regulations contained in Appendices 2-5, with Appendix 2 defining relations between Germany and Russia, Appendix 3 - between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Appendix 4 - between Bulgaria and Russia, appendix 5 - between Turkey and Russia.

    Article XII

    The restoration of public law and private law relations, the exchange of prisoners of war and civil prisoners, the issue of amnesty, as well as the issue of the attitude towards merchant courts that have fallen into the power of the enemy, are the subject of separate treaties with Russia, which constitute an essential part of this peace treaty. and, as far as possible, take effect at the same time.

    Article XIII

    When interpreting this treaty, the authentic texts are for relations between Germany and Russia - German and Russian, between Austria-Hungary and Russia - German, Hungarian and Russian, between Bulgaria and Russia - Bulgarian and Russian, between Turkey and Russia - Turkish and Russian.

    Article XIV

    This peace treaty will be ratified. The exchange of the instruments of ratification should take place as soon as possible in Berlin. The Russian government undertakes to exchange the instruments of ratification at the request of one of the powers of the quadruple alliance within two weeks. A peace treaty comes into force from the moment of its ratification, since otherwise does not follow from its articles, annexes to it or additional treaties.

    In witness to this, the delegates have signed this agreement with their own hands.

    The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 was a peace treaty between representatives of Soviet Russia and representatives of the Central Powers, which marked the defeat and withdrawal of Russia from the First World War.

    The Brest Peace was signed on March 3, 1918 and canceled in November 1918 by the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR.

    Prerequisites for the signing of a peace treaty

    In October 1917, another revolution took place in Russia. The Provisional Government, which ruled the country after the abdication of Nicholas II, was overthrown and the Bolsheviks came to power, and the Soviet state began to form. One of the main slogans of the new government was "peace without annexations and indemnities", they advocated an immediate end to the war and Russia's entry into a peaceful path of development.

    At the very first meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolsheviks presented their own decree on peace, which assumed an immediate end to the war with Germany and an early armistice. The war, according to the Bolsheviks, dragged on too long and became too bloody for Russia, so its continuation is impossible.

    Peace talks with Germany began on November 19 at the initiative of Russia. Immediately after the signing of the peace treaty, Russian soldiers began to leave the front, and this did not always happen legally - there were many volunteers. The soldiers were simply tired of the war and wanted to return to a peaceful life as soon as possible. The Russian army could no longer participate in hostilities, as it was exhausted, just like the whole country.

    Signing of the Brest Peace Treaty

    The negotiations on the signing of the peace proceeded in several stages, since the parties could not reach an understanding in any way. The Russian government, although it wanted to get out of the war as soon as possible, did not intend to pay an indemnity (ransom), since this was considered humiliating and had never been practiced before in Russia. Germany did not agree to such conditions and demanded payment of indemnity.

    Soon, the allied forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary presented Russia with an ultimatum, according to which it could withdraw from the war, but at the same time lose the territories of Belarus, Poland and part of the Baltic states. The Russian delegation found itself in a difficult situation: on the one hand, such conditions did not suit the Soviet government, as they seemed humiliating, but, on the other hand, the country, exhausted by revolutions, did not have the strength and means to continue its participation in the war.

    As a result of the meetings, the councils made an unexpected decision. Trotsky said that Russia does not intend to sign a peace treaty drawn up on such conditions, however, the country will also not participate in the war further. According to Trotsky, Russia is simply withdrawing its armies from the battlefield and will not offer any resistance. The surprised command of Germany announced that if Russia did not sign the peace, they would start the offensive again.

    Germany and Austria-Hungary again mobilized their troops and launched an offensive on Russian territory, however, contrary to their expectations, Trotsky kept his promise, and the Russian soldiers refused to fight and did not offer any resistance. This situation caused a split within the Bolshevik party, some of them understood that they would have to sign a peace treaty, otherwise the country would suffer, while others insisted that peace would be a shame for Russia.

    Terms of the Brest Peace

    The terms of the Brest Peace Treaty were not very favorable for Russia, since it was losing many territories, but the ongoing war would cost the country much more.

    • Russia lost the territory of Ukraine, partly Belarus, Poland and the Baltic states, as well as the Grand Duchy of Finland;
    • Russia also lost a fairly significant part of the territory in the Caucasus;
    • The Russian army and navy had to be immediately demobilized and completely had to leave the battlefield;
    • The Black Sea Fleet was to retreat to the command of Germany and Austria-Hungary;
    • The treaty obliged the Soviet government to immediately stop not only hostilities, but also all revolutionary propaganda on the territory of Germany, Austria and the allied countries.

    The last point caused a lot of controversy in the ranks of the Bolshevik party, since it actually forbade the Soviet government to carry out the ideas of socialism in other states and interfered with the creation of the socialist world, which the Bolsheviks so dreamed of. Germany also obliged the Soviet government to pay all the losses incurred by the country as a result of revolutionary propaganda.

    Despite the signing of a peace treaty, the Bolsheviks feared that Germany might resume hostilities, so the government was urgently transferred from Petrograd to Moscow. Moscow has become the new capital.

    Results and significance of the Brest Peace

    Despite the fact that the signing of the peace treaty was criticized by both the Soviet people and representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the consequences were not as dire as expected - Germany was defeated in the First World War, and Soviet Russia immediately annulled the peace treaty.

    Negotiations with Germany on an armistice began in Brest-Litovsk on November 20 (December 3) 1917. On the same day, N.V. Krylenko arrived at the headquarters of the supreme commander of the Russian army in Mogilev, who took over as Commander-in-Chief. November 21 (December 4) 1917 Soviet the delegation set out its terms:

    the truce is concluded for 6 months;

    hostilities are suspended on all fronts;

    German troops are withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;

    any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.

    As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:

    the troops remain in their positions;

    all troop transfers are terminated, except for those that have already begun.

    On December 2 (15), 1917, a new stage of negotiations ended with the conclusion of an armistice for 28 days, while, in the event of a break, the parties were obliged to warn the enemy 7 days in advance; an agreement was reached that new transfers of troops to the Western Front would not be allowed.

    First stage

    Peace negotiations began on December 9 (22), 1917. The delegations of the states of the Quadruple Alliance were headed by: from Germany - State Secretary of the Foreign Office R. von Kuhlmann; from Austria-Hungary - the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count O. Chernin; from Bulgaria - Popov; from Turkey - Talaat Bey.

    The Soviet delegation proposed to adopt the following program as a basis for negotiations:

    1) No violent annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.

    2) The full political independence of the peoples is restored, which were deprived of this independence during the war.

    3) National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide whether they belong to a state or their state independence through a free referendum.

    4) Cultural-national and, subject to certain conditions, administrative autonomy of national minorities is ensured.

    5) Refusal of contributions.

    6) Solving colonial issues on the basis of the above principles.

    7) Avoiding indirect constraints on the freedom of weaker nations by stronger nations.

    After a three-day discussion by the countries of the German bloc of the Soviet proposals on the evening of December 12 (25), 1917, R. von Kühlmann made a statement that Germany and its allies accept these proposals. At the same time, a reservation was made that nullified Germany's consent to a peace without annexations and indemnities: “It is necessary, however, with complete clarity to point out that the proposals of the Russian delegation could be implemented only if all the powers involved in the war , without exception and without reservations, within a certain period of time, pledged to strictly observe the conditions common to all peoples ”.

    Noting the joining of the German bloc to the Soviet formula of peace "without annexations and indemnities," the Soviet delegation proposed to declare a ten-day break, during which it would be possible to try to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.

    During a break in the work of the conference, the NKID again appealed to the governments of the Entente with an invitation to take part in the peace negotiations and again did not receive an answer.

    Second phase

    At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky, A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E. G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, Art. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altfater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky.

    Opening the conference, R. von Kuhlmann said that since during the break in the peace negotiations none of the main participants in the war had received an application to join them, the delegations of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance abandon their previously expressed intention to join the Soviet peace formula " without annexations and indemnities ”. Both von Kühlmann and the head of the Austro-Hungarian delegation, Czernin, spoke out against postponing the negotiations to Stockholm. In addition, since the allies of Russia did not respond to the offer to take part in the negotiations, now, in the opinion of the German bloc, it should not be about general peace, but about a separate peace between Russia and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

    On December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), von Kühlmann turned to Leon Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation at the second stage of negotiations, with the question of whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered part of the Russian delegation or whether it represents an independent state. Trotsky actually followed the lead of the German bloc, recognizing the Ukrainian delegation as independent, which made it possible for Germany and Austria-Hungary to continue contacts with Ukraine, while negotiations with Russia were marking time.

    On January 30, 1918, negotiations in Brest resumed. When the head of the delegation, Trotsky, left for Brest, there was a personal agreement between him and Lenin: to drag out the negotiations until Germany presented an ultimatum, and then immediately sign a peace. The negotiating environment was very difficult. On February 9-10, the German side conducted negotiations in an ultimatum tone. However, no official ultimatum was presented. On the evening of February 10, Trotsky, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, announced a declaration of withdrawal from the war and refusal to sign the annexation treaty. The lull at the front was short-lived. February 16 Germany announced the beginning of hostilities. On February 19, the Germans occupied Dvinsk and Polotsk and moved in the direction of Petrograd. The few detachments of the young Red Army fought heroically, but retreated under the onslaught of the 500,000-strong German army. Pskov and Narva were left. The enemy came close to Petrograd, advancing on Minsk and Kiev. On February 23, a new German ultimatum was delivered to Petrograd, containing even more stringent territorial, economic and military-political conditions on which the Germans agreed to sign a peace treaty. Not only Poland, Lithuania, Courland and part of Belarus, but also Estonia and Livonia were torn away from Russia. Russia was to immediately withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine and Finland. In total, the country of the Soviets lost about 1 million square meters. km (including Ukraine) .There were 48 hours to accept the ultimatum.

    On February 3, a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) took place. Lenin demanded the immediate signing of the German peace terms, declaring that otherwise he would resign. As a result, Lenin's proposal was accepted (for-7, against-4, abstained - 4). On February 24, the German peace terms were accepted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee by the Council of People's Commissars. On March 3, 1918, the peace treaty was signed.

    Terms of the Brest Peace Treaty

    Consisted of 14 articles, various appendices, 2 final protocols and 4 According to the terms of the Brest Peace:

    The Vistula provinces, Ukraine, the provinces with a predominantly Belarusian population, the Estland, Courland and Livonia provinces, the Grand Duchy of Finland were torn away from Russia. In the Caucasus: Kars region and Batumi region

    The Soviet government ended the war with the Ukrainian Central Council (Rada) and the Ukrainian People's Republic and made peace with it.

    The army and navy were demobilized.

    The Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from its bases in Finland and the Baltic States.

    The Black Sea Fleet with all the infrastructure was transferred to the Central Powers. Additional treaties (between Russia and each of the states of the Quadruple Alliance).

    Russia paid 6 billion marks of reparations plus payment of losses incurred by Germany during the Russian revolution - 500 million gold rubles.

    The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central Powers and the allied states formed on the territory of the Russian Empire.

    The victory of the Entente in the First World War and the signing of the Armistice of Compiegne on November 11, 1918, according to which all agreements previously concluded with Germany were declared invalid, allowed Soviet Russia to annul the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on November 13, 1918 and return most of the territories. German troops withdrew from the territory of Ukraine, the Baltic States, Belarus.

    Consequences

    The Brest-Litovsk Peace, as a result of which vast territories were seized from Russia, consolidating the loss of a significant part of the country's agricultural and industrial base, caused opposition to the Bolsheviks from almost all political forces, both right and left. The treaty for betraying the national interests of Russia almost immediately got the name of the "obscene peace". Allied with the Bolsheviks and part of the "red" government, the Left SRs, as well as the formed faction of "left communists" within the RCP (b) spoke of "betrayal of the world revolution", since the conclusion of peace on the Eastern Front objectively strengthened the conservative imperial regime in Germany ...

    The Brest-Litovsk Peace not only allowed the Central Powers, which were on the brink of defeat in 1917, to continue the war, but also gave them a chance to win, allowing them to concentrate all their forces against the Entente forces in France and Italy, and the elimination of the Caucasian Front freed Turkey's hands for action against the British on The Middle East and Mesopotamia.

    The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk served as a catalyst for the formation of a "democratic counter-revolution", expressed in the proclamation of Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik governments in Siberia and the Volga region, and the uprising of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in July 1918 in Moscow. The suppression of these uprisings, in turn, led to the formation of a one-party Bolshevik dictatorship and a full-scale civil war.

    On March 3, 1918, 95 years ago, a peace treaty was concluded between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey.

    A number of events preceded the conclusion of the agreement.
    On November 19 (December 2), a delegation of the Soviet government, headed by A.A. Ioffe, arrived in the neutral zone and proceeded to Brest-Litovsk, where the Headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front was located, where it met with a delegation of the Austro-German bloc, which included also included representatives from Bulgaria and Turkey.

    Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Arrival of Russian delegates. In the middle A. A. Ioffe, next to him secretary L. Karakhan, A. A. Bitsenko, right L. B. Kamenev


    Arrival of the German delegation to Brest-Litovsk

    On November 21 (December 4), the Soviet delegation outlined its conditions:
    the truce is concluded for 6 months;
    hostilities are suspended on all fronts;
    German troops are withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;
    any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.

    An unpleasant surprise awaited Soviet diplomats in Brest. They hoped that Germany and her allies would gladly seize every opportunity for reconciliation. But it was not there. It turned out that the Germans and Austrians were not going to leave the occupied territories, and according to the right of nations to self-determination, Russia would lose Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Transcaucasia. A dispute began over this right. The Bolsheviks argued that the expression of the will of peoples under occupation would be undemocratic, while the Germans objected that under the Bolshevik terror it would be even less democratic.

    As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:
    the truce is concluded for the period from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17);
    the troops remain in their positions;
    all troop transfers are terminated, except for those that have already begun.


    Hindenburg headquarters officers meet on the platform of Brest the arrived delegation of the RSFSR in early 1918

    Proceeding from the general principles of the Decree on Peace, the Soviet delegation, already at one of the first meetings, proposed to adopt the following program as the basis for negotiations:
    No violent annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.
    The full political independence of the peoples, which were deprived of this independence during the war, is being restored.

    National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide whether they belong to a state or their state independence through a free referendum.

    Noting the joining of the German bloc to the Soviet formula of peace "without annexations and indemnities," the Soviet delegation proposed to declare a ten-day break, during which it would be possible to try to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.



    Trotsky L.D., Ioffe A. and Rear Admiral Altfater V. go to the meeting. Brest-Litovsk.

    During the break, however, it became clear that Germany understands the world without annexations differently than the Soviet delegation - for Germany it is not at all about the withdrawal of troops to the borders of 1914 and the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of the former Russian Empire, especially since, according to the statement Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Courland have already spoken out in favor of secession from Russia, so if these three countries now enter into negotiations with Germany about their future fate, then this will by no means be considered annexation by Germany.

    On December 14 (27), the Soviet delegation at the second meeting of the political commission made a proposal: “In full agreement with the open statement of both contracting parties that they have no plans of conquest and desire to conclude peace without annexations. Russia is withdrawing its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia it occupies, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. " Soviet Russia promised, in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations, to provide the population of these regions with the opportunity to decide on their own the question of their state existence - in the absence of any troops other than the national or local militia.

    The German and Austro-Hungarian delegations, however, made a counter-proposal - the Russian state was asked to “take note of the statements expressing the will of the peoples inhabiting Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estonia and Livonia, about their desire for full state independence and the separation of from the Russian Federation ”and admit that“ these statements under the present conditions should be considered as an expression of the people's will ”. R. von Kühlmann asked if the Soviet government would agree to withdraw its troops from all of Livonia and from Estonia in order to give the local population the opportunity to unite with their fellow tribesmen living in the areas occupied by the Germans. The Soviet delegation was also informed that the Ukrainian Central Rada was sending its own delegation to Brest-Litovsk.

    On December 15 (28), the Soviet delegation left for Petrograd. The current state of affairs was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), where by a majority vote it was decided to drag out the peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of an early revolution in Germany itself. In the future, the formula is refined and takes the following form: "We hold on until the German ultimatum, then we surrender." Lenin also offers the People's Commissar Trotsky to leave for Brest-Litovsk and personally lead the Soviet delegation. According to Trotsky's recollections, "the very prospect of negotiations with Baron Kuhlmann and General Hoffmann was not very attractive, but" in order to drag out the negotiations, a delayer is needed, "as Lenin put it."


    Further negotiations with the Germans hung in the air. The Soviet government could not accept the German conditions, fearing that it would be overthrown on the spot. Not only the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, but also the majority of the Communists stood for the "revolutionary war." But there was no one to fight! The army has already fled home. The Bolsheviks proposed to move the negotiations to Stockholm. But the Germans and their allies refused this. Although they were desperately afraid - what if the Bolsheviks broke off the negotiations? It would be a disaster for them. They were already starting to starve, and food could only be obtained in the East.

    At the union meeting, it sounded in panic: “Germany and Hungary are giving nothing more. In a few weeks, there will be a massive pestilence in Austria without an outside supply. ”


    At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky (leader), A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E. G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, Art. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altfater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky.

    The head of the Austrian delegation, Ottokar von Czernin, wrote when the Bolsheviks returned to Brest: "It was curious to see what joy the Germans were overwhelmed with, and this unexpected and so violently manifested gaiety proved how hard it was for them to think that the Russians might not come."



    The second composition of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Sitting, from left to right: Kamenev, Ioffe, Bitsenko. Standing, from left to right: Lipsky V.V., Stuchka, Trotsky L. D., Karakhan L. M



    During negotiations in Brest-Litovsk

    The impressions of the head of the German delegation, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry Richard von Kühlmann, about Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation, were preserved: “the not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses looked at his counterpart with a piercing and critical gaze. The look on his face clearly indicated that he [Trotsky] would have been better off ending the negotiations that he did not like with a pair of grenades, throwing them across the green table, if it had somehow been coordinated with the general political line ... sometimes I wondered if I had arrived he generally intends to conclude peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagandize the Bolshevik views. "


    General Max Hoffmann, a member of the German delegation, ironically described the composition of the Soviet delegation: “I will never forget my first dinner with the Russians. I was sitting between Ioffe and Sokolnikov, the then Commissioner of Finance. Opposite me was a worker who, apparently, was very uncomfortable with the multitude of utensils and utensils. He grabbed at one thing or the other, but he used the fork exclusively for brushing his teeth. The terrorist Bizenko was sitting across from me next to Prince Hohenloe [sic], on the other side of her was a peasant, a real Russian phenomenon with long gray curls and a beard overgrown like a forest. He caused a kind of smile from the staff, when, when asked whether he prefers red or white wine for dinner, he answered: "Stronger" "


    On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), German Chancellor H. von Gertling announced in his speech at the Reichstag that a delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada had arrived in Brest-Litovsk. Germany agreed to negotiate with the Ukrainian delegation, hoping to use this as a lever both against Soviet Russia and against its ally, Austria-Hungary.



    Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, from left to right: Nikolai Lyubinsky, Vsevolod Golubovich, Nikolai Levitsky, Lussenti, Mikhail Polozov and Alexander Sevryuk.


    The arriving Ukrainian delegation from the Central Rada behaved scandalously and arrogantly. The Ukrainians had bread, and they began to blackmail Germany and Austria-Hungary, demanding for food to recognize their independence and give Ukraine Galicia and Bukovina, which belonged to the Austrians.

    The Central Rada did not want to know Trotsky. It was very good for the Germans. They huddled around the self-styled people this way and that. Other factors were superimposed. A famine strike broke out in Vienna, followed by a strike in Berlin. 500 thousand workers went on strike. The Ukrainians demanded more and more concessions for their bread. And Trotsky cheered up. It seemed that the Germans and Austrians were about to start a revolution, and they just had to wait for it.


    Ukrainian diplomats, who conducted preliminary negotiations with the German General M. Hoffmann, the chief of staff of the German armies on the Eastern Front, first announced claims to annex the Kholmshchyna (which was part of Poland) to Ukraine, as well as the Austro-Hungarian territories - Bukovina and Eastern Galicia. Hoffmann, however, insisted that they reduce their demands and confine themselves to one Kholmsk region, agreeing that Bukovina and Eastern Galicia form an independent Austro-Hungarian crown territory under the rule of the Habsburgs. It was these requirements that they defended in their further negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian delegation. Negotiations with the Ukrainians dragged on so that the opening of the conference had to be postponed until December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918).

    Ukrainian delegates talk to German officers in Brest-Litovsk


    At the next meeting, held on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918), the Germans invited the Ukrainian delegation. Its chairman V.A.Golubovich announced the declaration of the Central Rada that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia does not extend to Ukraine, and therefore the Central Rada intends to independently conduct peace negotiations. R. von Kühlmann asked L.D. Trotsky whether he and his delegation intend to continue to be the only diplomatic representatives of all of Russia in Brest-Litovsk, and whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered a part of the Russian delegation or whether it represents an independent state. Trotsky knew that the Rada was actually at war with the RSFSR. Therefore, by agreeing to consider the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada as independent, he actually played into the hands of the representatives of the Central Powers and provided Germany and Austria-Hungary with the opportunity to continue contacts with the Ukrainian Central Rada, while negotiations with Soviet Russia stalled for two more days.

    Signing of documents on the armistice in Brest-Litovsk


    The January uprising in Kiev put Germany in a difficult position, and now the German delegation demanded a break in the meetings of the peace conference. On January 21 (February 3), von Kuehlmann and Chernin left for Berlin for a meeting with General Ludendorff, where they discussed the possibility of signing peace with the Central Rada government, which does not control the situation in Ukraine. The decisive role was played by the dire food situation in Austria-Hungary, which, without Ukrainian grain, was threatened with famine.

    In Brest, during the third round of negotiations, the situation changed again. In Ukraine, the Reds smashed the Rada. Now Trotsky refused to recognize the Ukrainians as an independent delegation, calling Ukraine an integral part of Russia. The Bolsheviks, however, were clearly betting on the imminent revolution in Germany and Austria-Hungary, trying to gain time. One fine day in Berlin, a radio message was intercepted from Petrograd to German soldiers, where they were called upon to assassinate the emperor, generals, and fraternize. Kaiser Wilhelm II was furious and ordered to break off the negotiations.


    Signing a peace treaty with Ukraine. Sitting in the middle, from left to right: Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Hudenitz, General Max von Hoffmann, Richard von Kühlmann, Prime Minister V. Rodoslavov, Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat Pasha


    The Ukrainians, in proportion to the success of the Red troops, sharply reduced their insolence and, flirting with the Germans, agreed to everything. On February 9, when the Bolsheviks entered Kiev, the Central Rada concluded a separate peace with Germany and Austria-Hungary, saving them from the threat of hunger and riots ...

    In exchange for military assistance against the Soviet troops, the UPR pledged to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary by July 31, 1918, one million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, up to 50 thousand tons of cattle meat, lard, sugar, hemp, manganese ore, etc. Austria-Hungary also pledged to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in Eastern Galicia.



    The signing of a peace treaty between the UPR and the Central Powers on January 27 (February 9) 1918

    On January 27 (February 9), at a meeting of the political commission, Chernin informed the Russian delegation about the signing of peace with Ukraine represented by the delegation of the Central Rada government.

    Now the position of the Bolsheviks has become desperate. The Germans spoke to them in the language of ultimatums. The Reds were "asked" to leave Ukraine, as from the territory of a state friendly to Germany. And to the previous demands, new ones were added - to give up the unoccupied parts of Latvia and Estonia, to pay a huge indemnity.

    At the insistence of General Ludendorff (even at a meeting in Berlin, he demanded that the head of the German delegation break off negotiations with the Russian delegation within 24 hours after the signing of peace with Ukraine) and on the direct order of Emperor Wilhelm II, von Kühlmann presented Soviet Russia in an ultimatum to accept the German conditions of peace.

    On January 28, 1918 (February 10, 1918), at the request of the Soviet delegation how to solve the issue, Lenin confirmed the previous instructions. Nevertheless, Trotsky, violating these instructions, rejected the German conditions for peace, putting forward the slogan "Neither peace, nor war: we do not sign peace, we end the war, and demobilize the army." The German side stated in response that the non-signing of the peace treaty by Russia automatically entails the termination of the ceasefire.

    In general, the Germans and Austrians received very clear advice. Take what you want - but yourself, without my signature and consent. After this statement, the Soviet delegation defiantly left the negotiations. On the same day, Trotsky gives the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Krylenko an order with the demand to immediately issue an order to the army to end the state of war with Germany and on general demobilization(although he had no right to do so, since he was not yet people's commissar for military affairs, but for foreign affairs). Lenin canceled this order after 6 hours. Nevertheless, the order was received by all fronts on 11 February andfor some reason was accepted for execution. The last units still in positions flowed to the rear ...


    On February 13, 1918, at a meeting in Homburg with the participation of Wilhelm II, Reich Chancellor Gertling, Head of the German Foreign Office von Kühlmann, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Chief of Naval Staff and Vice-Chancellor, it was decided to interrupt the truce and launch an offensive on the Eastern Front.

    On the morning of February 19, the offensive of the German troops rapidly developed along the entire Northern Front. Troops of the German 8th Army (6 divisions), a separate Northern Corps stationed on the Moonsund Islands, as well as a special army unit operating from the south, from Dvinsk, moved through Livonia and Estonia to Revel, Pskov and Narva (the ultimate goal is Petrograd) ... In 5 days, German and Austrian troops advanced 200-300 km deep into Russian territory. “I have never seen such a ridiculous war,” wrote Hoffmann. “We drove it practically on trains and cars. You put a handful of infantry with machine guns and one cannon on the train and drive to the next station. You take the station, you arrest the Bolsheviks, put more soldiers on the train and move on. " Zinoviev was forced to admit that "there is information that in some cases unarmed German soldiers dispersed hundreds of our soldiers." "The army rushed to run, abandoning everything, sweeping away in its path," the first Soviet commander-in-chief of the Russian front-line army NV Krylenko wrote about these events in the same 1918.


    On February 21, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger", but at the same time informed Germany that it was ready to resume negotiations. And the Germans decided to bang their fists on the table in such a way as to discourage the Bolsheviks from being stubborn in the future. On February 22, an ultimatum was dictated with a response time of 48 hours, and the conditions were even more difficult than before. Since the Red Guard showed absolute non-combat capability, on February 23, a decree was adopted on the creation of a regular Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army. But on the same day, a stormy meeting of the Central Committee took place. Lenin persuaded his comrades-in-arms to peace, threatening with his resignation. And this did not stop many. Lomov declared: “If Lenin threatens to resign, then they are in vain to be scared. We must take power without Lenin. " Nevertheless, some were embarrassed by the demarche of Vladimir Ilyich, others were sobered by the light march of the Germans to Petrograd. 7 members of the Central Committee voted for peace, 4 abstained against 4 and 4.

    But the Central Committee was only a party organ. The decision was to be made by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. It was still multi-party, and the factions of the Left SRs, Right SRs, Mensheviks, anarchists, a significant part of the Bolsheviks, stood for the war. The acceptance of the world was ensured by Yakov Sverdlov. He knew how to preside over meetings like no other. I very clearly used, for example, such a tool as regulations. I cut off an unwanted speaker - the time limit was out (and who is watching, is there still a minute left?). He knew how to play casuistry, procedural intricacies, manipulated, whom to give the floor, and who "not to notice."

    At a meeting of the Bolshevik faction, Sverdlov emphasized "party discipline." He pointed out that the Central Committee has already made a decision, the entire faction must comply with it, and if someone thinks differently, he must submit to the "majority." At 3 am the factions of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee came together. If we counted all the opponents of the world - the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, "Left Communists", they would have accumulated a clear majority. Knowing this, the Left SR leaders demanded a roll-call vote. But ... the "left communists" were already bound by the decision of their faction. Vote only for peace. The All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the German ultimatum by 116 votes to 85, with 26 abstentions.

    After the decision to accept peace on German terms was made by the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), and then passed through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the question arose about the new composition of the delegation. As noted by Richard Pipes, none of the Bolshevik leaders was eager to go down in history by putting their signature on the shameful treaty for Russia. Trotsky by this time had already resigned from the post of People's Commissar, G. Ya. Sokolnikov proposed the candidacy of G. Ye. Zinoviev. However, Zinoviev refused such an "honor", proposing in response the candidacy of Sokolnikov himself; Sokolnikov also refuses, promising to resign from the Central Committee in the event of such an appointment. A.A. Ioffe also flatly refused.After long negotiations, Sokolnikov nevertheless agreed to head the Soviet delegation, the new composition of which took the following form: Sokolnikov G. Ya., Petrovsky L.M., Chicherin G.V., Karakhan G.I. and a group of 8 consultants (among them the former chairman of the delegation Ioffe AA). The delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk on March 1, and two days later, without any discussion, signed an agreement.



    Postcard depicting the signing of a ceasefire by the German representative, Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Russian delegation: A.A. Bitsenko, next to her A. A. Ioffe, as well as L. B. Kamenev. Behind Kamenev in the form of captain A. Lipsky, secretary of the Russian delegation L. Karakhan

    The German-Austrian offensive, which began in February 1918, continued even when the Soviet delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk: on February 28, the Austrians occupied Berdichev, on March 1, the Germans occupied Gomel, Chernigov and Mogilev, and on March 2, the bombing of Petrograd was carried out. On March 4, after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was signed, German troops occupied Narva and stopped only on the Narova River and the western shore of Lake Peipsi, 170 km from Petrograd.




    Photocopy of the first two pages of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, March 1918



    Postcard with the image of the last page with the signatures on the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty

    The annex to the treaty guaranteed the special economic status of Germany in Soviet Russia. Citizens and corporations of the Central Powers were removed from the action of the Bolshevik decrees on nationalization, and persons who had already lost their property were restored to their rights. Thus, German citizens were allowed to engage in private entrepreneurship in Russia against the background of the general nationalization of the economy taking place at that time. This state of affairs for some time created an opportunity for Russian owners of enterprises or securities to avoid nationalization by selling their assets to the Germans. Fears of Dzerzhinsky F.E. that "Having signed the conditions, we do not guarantee ourselves against new ultimatums" are partially confirmed: the advance of the German army was not limited to the limits of the zone of occupation defined by the peace treaty.

    The struggle for the ratification of the peace treaty unfolded. At the 7th Congress of the Bolshevik Party on March 6-8, the positions of Lenin and Bukharin clashed. The outcome of the congress was decided by the authority of Lenin - his resolution was adopted by 30 votes to 12, with 4 abstentions. Trotsky's compromise proposals to make peace with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance as the last concession and to prohibit the Central Committee from making peace with the Central Rada of Ukraine were rejected. The controversy continued at the IV Congress of Soviets, where the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries and Anarchists opposed the ratification, while the Left Communists abstained. But thanks to the existing system of representation, the Bolsheviks had an obvious majority at the Congress of Soviets. If the left-wing communists had decided to split the party, the peace treaty would have failed, but Bukharin did not dare to do so. On the night of March 16, the peace was ratified.

    Austro-Hungarian troops enter the city of Kamenets-Podolsky after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty



    German troops under the command of General Eichhorn occupied Kiev. March 1918.



    Germans in Kiev



    Odessa after the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Dredging works in the port of Odessa German troops captured Simferopol on April 22, 1918, Taganrog on May 1, and Rostov-on-Don on May 8, causing the fall of Soviet power on the Don. In April 1918, diplomatic relations were established between the RSFSR and Germany. On the whole, however, Germany's relations with the Bolsheviks were not ideal from the very beginning. According to N. N. Sukhanov, “the German government feared its“ friends ”and“ agents ”quite thoroughly: it knew perfectly well that these people were just as“ friends ”to it as they were to Russian imperialism, to which the German authorities were trying to“ slip ”them keeping them at a respectful distance from their own loyal subjects. " Since April 1918, the Soviet ambassador A. A. Joffe began active revolutionary propaganda already in Germany itself, which ends with the November Revolution. The Germans, for their part, are consistently liquidating Soviet power in the Baltic States and Ukraine, helping the "White Finns" and actively promoting the formation of the center of the White movement on the Don. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks, fearing a German offensive against Petrograd, moved the capital to Moscow; after the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, they did not trust the Germans and did not cancel this decision.

    Lübeckischen Anzeigen Special Edition


    While the German General Staff came to the conclusion that the defeat of the Second Reich was inevitable, Germany managed to impose on the Soviet government, in the conditions of the growing civil war and the outbreak of the Entente intervention, additional agreements to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. On August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, the Russian-German additional treaty to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and the Russian-German financial agreement were signed, which on behalf of the government of the RSFSR was signed by Plenipotentiary A.A. Ioffe, and from Germany - von P. Hinze and I. Kriege. Under this agreement, Soviet Russia pledged to pay Germany, as compensation for damage and expenses for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war, a huge indemnity - 6 billion marks - in the form of "pure gold" and credit obligations. In September 1918, two "gold echelons" were sent to Germany, containing 93.5 tons of "pure gold" worth over 120 million gold rubles. It did not come to the next dispatch.

    Extraction

    Article I

    Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, declare that the state of war between them has ended; they decided to continue to live. among themselves in peace and harmony.

    Article II

    The contracting parties will refrain from any agitation or propaganda against the governments or government and military institutions of the other party. Since this commitment concerns Russia, it also extends to the areas occupied by the powers of the quadruple alliance.

    Article III

    Areas lying to the west of the line established by the contracting parties and belonging before Russia will no longer be under her supreme authority ...

    For the aforementioned regions, no obligations towards Russia will follow from their former belonging to Russia. Russia refuses any interference in the internal affairs of these areas. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of these regions in accordance with their populations.

    Article IV

    Germany is ready, as soon as a general peace is concluded and a completely Russian demobilization is carried out, to clear the areas lying to the east of the line indicated in paragraph 1 of Article III, since Article IV does not state otherwise. Russia will do everything, the provinces of Eastern Anatolia and their lawful return to Turkey. The districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops.Russia will not interfere in the new organization of state-legal and international-legal relations of these districts, but will leave them to the population to establish a new system in agreement with neighboring states, especially Turkey.

    Article V

    Russia will immediately carry out a complete demobilization of its army, including the military units newly formed by its current government. In addition, Russia will either transfer its warships to Russian ports and leave there until a general peace is concluded, or it will immediately disarm. Military courts of states that are still at war with the powers of the quadruple alliance, since these ships are in the sphere of power of Russia, are equated to Russian military courts. ... In the Baltic Sea and in the parts of the Black Sea subject to Russia, the removal of minefields should begin immediately. Merchant shipping in these maritime areas is free and immediately resumes ...

    Article VI

    Russia undertakes to immediately conclude peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic and recognize the peace treaty between this state and the powers of the quadruple alliance. The territory of Ukraine is immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. Russia stops all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

    Estland and Livonia are also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern border of Estonia generally runs along the Narva River. The eastern border of Livonia generally passes through Lake Peipsi and Lake Pskov to its southwestern corner, then across Lake Luban in the direction of Livengof on the Western Dvina. Estland and Livonia will be occupied by the German police power until public security is ensured there by the country's own institutions and until state order is restored there. Russia will immediately release all arrested or taken away inhabitants of Estland and Livonia and will ensure the safe return of all taken away Estonians and Livonians.

    Finland and the Aland Islands will also be immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard, and the Finnish ports - of the Russian fleet and Russian naval forces ... the government or public institutions of Finland. The fortifications erected on the Åland Islands should be demolished as soon as possible.

    Article VII

    Based on the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent states, the contracting parties undertake to respect the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of Persia and Afghanistan.

    Article VIII

    Prisoners of war on both sides will be released home

    Article IX

    The contracting parties mutually refuse to reimburse their military expenses, that is, from state costs of waging a war, as well as from reimbursing military losses, that is, from those losses that were caused to them and their citizens in the war zone by military measures, including and all requisitions made in the enemy country ...

    ORIGINAL

    In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, G. Nikolnikov, N. Yakupov, A. Bovin), the Decree on Peace was traditionally regarded as the first and important stage in the formation and development of the “Leninist peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state” based on the cornerstone of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In reality, Lenin's "Decree on Peace" could in no way lay the foundations for a new foreign policy doctrine for Soviet Russia, since:

    He pursued a purely pragmatic goal - the withdrawal of dilapidated and exhausted Russia from the state of war;

    The Bolsheviks viewed the revolution in Russia not as an end in itself, but as the first and inevitable stage in the beginning of the world proletarian (socialist) revolution.

    On November 8, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky sent the text of the "Decree on Peace" to the ambassadors of all the allied powers, inviting the leaders of these states to immediately stop hostilities at the front and sit down at the negotiating table, but this call was completely ignored by the Entente countries. On November 9, 1917, the commander-in-chief N.N. Dukhonin was instructed to immediately contact the command of the countries of the Quadruple bloc with a proposal to end hostilities and begin peace negotiations with them. General N.N. Dukhonin refused to carry out this order, for which he was immediately declared an "enemy of the people" and removed from his post, which was occupied by ensign N.V. Krylenko. A little later, upon the arrival of N.V. Krylenko to Mogilev, General N.N. Dukhonin was first arrested and then killed at the headquarters carriage by drunken sailors, and the new commander-in-chief immediately carried out the instructions of the Central Committee on this issue.

    On November 14, 1917, representatives of the German and Austro-Hungarian military leaders informed the Soviet side of their agreement to end hostilities on the Eastern Front and begin the process of peace negotiations. On November 20, 1917, the first round of negotiations between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple bloc began in Brest-Litovsk, at which the leadership of the Soviet delegation, represented by A.A. Ioffe (head of the mission), L.B. Kamenev, G. Ya. Sokolnikov and L.M. Karakhan immediately read out a declaration of principles, in which they again proposed to conclude a democratic peace treaty without annexations and indemnities. Having received no response to its proposal, the Soviet side refused to conclude a formal truce and took a week-long timeout.

    On November 27, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR approved the "Outline of the program of negotiations for peace," drawn up by V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and L.B. Kamenev, in which the idea of ​​concluding a general democratic peace was reaffirmed, and three days later the negotiation process resumed in Brest-Litovsk. The result of new negotiations was the signing on December 2, 1917 of an armistice agreement for a period of one month, until January 1, 1918.

    On December 9, 1917, a new round of negotiations began, at which the head of the Soviet delegation, A.A. Ioffe read out the declaration "On the principles of universal democratic peace", consisting of six main points. This declaration, based on the main provisions of the Peace Decree and the Outline of the Peace Negotiation Program, once again specified the main components of a democratic peace: "Refusal of annexations and indemnities" and "Complete self-determination of peoples."

    On December 12, 1917, Austrian Foreign Minister O. Chernin read out a note in reply to the Soviet side, which said that the countries of the Quadruple bloc agreed to immediately conclude a peace treaty with all the Entente countries without annexations and indemnities. But for the Soviet delegation, such a turn of events was so unexpected that its head A.A. Ioffe proposed to declare a ten-day break. The opposing side rejected this proposal, and three days later the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kühlmann, who, by the way, holding the post of State Secretary (Minister) of Foreign Affairs, was personally involved in financial support of the Bolshevik Pravda, directly made claims to the possession of all of Poland, Lithuania , Courland, part of Estonia and Livonia, whose peoples "They themselves expressed a desire to go under the patronage of Germany." Naturally, the Soviet delegation categorically refused to discuss this proposal, and a break was announced in the work of the peace conference.

    People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky once again tried to give the peace negotiations a general character and sent a second note to the governments of the Entente countries to sit down at the negotiating table, but received no response to his message. In this situation, fearing that the negotiations in Brest will take an openly separate character, at the suggestion of V.I. Lenin's Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to move the peace negotiations to the capital of neutral Sweden, the city of Stockholm. The Austro-German side rejected this ploy of the Soviet government, and Brest-Litovsk remained the place for the continuation of the negotiations. At the same time, representatives of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, referring to the fact that the Entente countries remained deaf to the proposal to conclude a "universal democratic peace", rejected their own declaration on December 12, which seriously aggravated the negotiation process itself.

    On December 27, 1917, the second round of the peace conference began in Brest-Litovsk, at which the Soviet delegation was already headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky. A new round of negotiations, at the suggestion of the oracle of the revolution, began with an empty theoretical dispute about the state and the right of nations to self-determination. This political chatter, which had annoyed the opposing side, was soon stopped, and on January 5, 1918, the delegation of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance in an ultimatum form presented to the Soviet side new conditions for a separate peace - the rejection from Russia not only of the entire Baltic region and Poland, but also of a significant part of Belarus.

    On the same day, at the suggestion of the head of the Soviet delegation, a break was announced in the negotiations. L. D. Trotsky, having received a letter from V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, was forced to urgently leave for Petrograd, where he had to give his explanations about his new position regarding the further negotiation, which he set out in a letter addressed to V.I. Lenin on January 2, 1918. The essence of the new position of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was extremely simple: "We are stopping the war, we are demobilizing the army, but we are not signing peace." In Soviet historical science, the position of L.D. Trotsky has always been interpreted in derogatory tones and expressions, as the position of a "political prostitute" and a traitor to the interests of the working class and the working peasantry. In reality, this position, which was initially supported by V.I. Lenin, was absolutely logical and extremely pragmatic:

    1) Since the Russian army cannot, and most importantly, does not want to fight, it is necessary to completely dissolve the old imperial army, and stop fighting at the front.

    2) Since the opposing side categorically advocates a separate peace treaty, which threatens the Bolsheviks with the loss of reputation in the eyes of the world proletariat, a separate treaty with the adversary should never be concluded.

    3) It is necessary to delay the negotiation process as long as possible, in the hope that the fire of the world proletarian revolution will soon break out in Germany and in other European powers, which will put everything in its place.

    4) Refusal to sign a separate treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance will not formally give the Entente countries a reason to begin military intervention against Soviet Russia, which has violated its allied duty.

    5) Finally, the refusal to sign a peace treaty will significantly smooth out the contradictions that have already arisen both within the ruling Bolshevik party and in relations between the Bolsheviks and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries.

    The latter circumstance by mid-January 1918 began to acquire paramount importance. At this time in the leadership of the party more and more solid positions began to be taken by "left communists" headed by N.I. Bukharin, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.S. Uritskiy, K.B. Radek and A.M. Kollontai. This rather noisy and influential faction of the Bolsheviks, which was supported by a number of leaders of the Party of Left SRs (B.D. Kamkov, P.P. Proshyan), categorically opposed any agreements with the enemy and declared that only a "revolutionary war" with the German imperialism will save the Bolsheviks from the universal shame of the accomplices of world capital and create the necessary conditions for kindling the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Moreover, at this time B.D. Kamkov and P.P. Proshyan turned to K.B. Radek, N.I. Bukharin and G.L. Pyatakov with a proposal to arrest the entire Council of People's Commissars headed by V.I. Lenin and form a new government consisting of Left Social Revolutionaries and Left Communists, which could be headed by Georgy Leonidovich Pyatakov, but this proposal was rejected by them.

    In the meantime, another principled approach to solving this problem emerged in the party leadership, which was expressed by V.I. Lenin. The essence of his new position, to which he arrived at the end of December 1917, was also extremely simple: to conclude a separate peace with Germany and her allies at any cost.

    Historical science has long been discussing the question of the incentives that prompted the leader of the revolution to a political conclusion that ran counter to all the postulates of orthodox Marxism.

    Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, A. Bovin) argued that V.I. Lenin came to this conviction under the pressure of harsh objective circumstances, namely, the complete disintegration of the old Russian army and uncertainty about the timing of the proletarian revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany itself.

    Their opponents, mainly from the liberal camp (D. Volkogonov, Yu. Felshtinsky, O. Budnitsky), are sure that, while extremely tough in advocating a separate peace with Germany, V.I. Lenin only fulfilled his obligations to his German sponsors, who generously forked out for the October Revolution.

    On January 8, 1918, after the discussion of the new Leninist theses at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee, an open vote was held, which clearly showed the balance of power in the top party leadership: the position of N.I. Bukharin was supported by 32 participants of this meeting, for the proposal of L.D. Trotsky was voted by 16 participants, and the position of V.I. Lenin was supported by only 15 members of the Central Committee. On January 11, 1918, the discussion of this issue was submitted to the Plenum of the Central Committee, where the position of L.D. Trotsky. This situation forced V.I. Lenin to make partial adjustments to his previous position: no longer insisting on the immediate conclusion of peace, he proposed in every possible way to delay the process of negotiations with the Germans. The next day, the Trotskyist slogan "no war, no peace" was approved by a majority vote at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and the PLSR, which was immediately formalized as a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Thus, all supporters of the conclusion of peace in both ruling parties, in particular, members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) V.I. Lenin, G.E. Zinoviev, I.V. Stalin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, I. T. Smilga, A.F. Sergeev, M.K. Muranov and E.D. Stasov, and members of the Central Committee of the PLSR M.A. Spiridonova, A.L. Kolegaev, V.E. Trutovsky, B.F. Malkin and A.A. Bidenko again remained in the minority. On January 14, 1918, the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved a resolution that reflected the position of L.D. Trotsky, and on the same day the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs left for Brest-Litovsk, where on January 17 the third round of peace talks began.

    Meanwhile, in Brest itself, negotiations of the Austro-German representatives with the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Rada (N.A.Lublinsky) were in full swing, the government of which was recognized by the Bolsheviks back in December 1917. On January 27, 1918, immediately after the signing of a separate agreement with the government of the Ukrainian People's Council gladly, the delegation of the Quadruple Alliance in an ultimatum demanded that the Soviet side immediately give an answer to its terms of the peace treaty.

    The next day, L.D. Trotsky, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, read out a declaration in which:

    1) it was announced about the end of the state of war between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple bloc - Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as well as about the complete demobilization of the old Russian army;

    In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev), this ultimatum of the head of the Soviet delegation has always been regarded as another act of heinous betrayal on the part of "Trotsky the Jew" who violated the oral agreement with V.I. Lenin that after the new "We sign a peace treaty of the German ultimatum."

    Contemporary Russian historians, including outspoken apologists L.D. Trotsky (A. Pantsov), they say that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs acted in strict accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of both ruling parties and the resolution of the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and their oral agreement with V.I. Lenin clearly contradicted them.

    On February 14, 1918, L.D. Trotsky received official support at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its chairman Ya.M. Sverdlov, and a day later the German command in the person of Leopold of Bavaria and Max Hoffmann announced the end of the armistice and the resumption of hostilities along the entire front from noon on February 18. In this situation, on the evening of February 17, 1918, an emergency meeting of the Central Committee was convened, at which six of the eleven members of the highest party Areopagus, namely L.D. Trotsky, N.I. Bukharin, M.S. Uritsky, G.I. Lomov, N.N. Krestinsky, A.A. Ioffe, spoke out against the resumption of the negotiation process in Brest.

    The Germans launched an offensive at the front and by the end of February 19 had occupied Polotsk and Dvinsk. In this critical situation, at a new meeting of the Central Committee, with seven votes in favor, it was decided to immediately resume the peace process. In this situation, L.D. Trotsky announced his resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the leader of the left communists N.I. Bukharin - about his resignation from the Central Committee and the editorial board of Pravda.

    On February 23, 1918, the Soviet government was presented with new conditions for a separate peace treaty and a very strict framework for its signing and ratification. In particular, the German side demanded that all of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Estonia and part of Belarus be torn away from Russia, as well as the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Finland and Ukraine, and the signing of a similar peace treaty with the government of the Central Rada.

    On the same day, a new meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) was convened, at which the votes on the German ultimatum were distributed as follows: seven members of the Central Committee - V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, G.E. Zinoviev, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G. Ya. Sokolnikov, I. T. Smilga and E.D. Stasov, "against" - four members of the highest party Areopagus - N.I. Bukharin, A.S. Bubnov, G.I. Lomov and M.S. Uritsky, and "abstained" - also four members of the Central Committee - L.D. Trotsky, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, A.A. Ioffe and N.N. Krestinsky. Thus, at the most critical moment, when the question of retaining their own power was being decided, the majority of the members of the Central Committee "wavered" and voted to conclude an "obscene" peace with the Germans.

    On February 24, at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, after an extremely tense discussion, the Bolshevik resolution on the adoption of the new terms of the peace treaty was approved by an insignificant majority of votes. And late in the evening of the same day, a new Soviet delegation consisting of G.Ya. Sokolnikova, L.M. Karakhan, G.V. Chicherin and G.I. Petrovsky.

    On March 3, 1918, the leaders of both delegations signed Brest Peace Treaty, according to the terms of which:

    A huge territory of more than 1 million square meters was torn away from Soviet Russia. kilometers, on which more than 56 million people lived - the entire territory of Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, part of Belarus and Turkish Armenia;

    Soviet Russia had to pay the countries of the Quadruple Alliance a huge military contribution in the amount of six billion gold marks and agree to the complete transfer of all industrial enterprises and mines, where 90% of all coal was mined before the war and more than 70% of pig iron and steel were smelted.

    According to V.I. Lenin, in such humiliating and "obscene" conditions of the Brest Peace Treaty, which the Soviet government was forced to sign, were to blame, first of all, “Our unfortunate leftists Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co.”. Moreover, a number of Soviet and Russian historians (Yu. Yemelyanov) argue that not a single theoretical or political mistake of N.I. Bukharina did not have such catastrophic consequences for our country and tens of millions of its citizens.

    On March 8, 1918, at the emergency VII Congress of the RCP (b), the conditions of the Brest Peace Treaty after a sharp polemic between V.I. Lenin and N.I. Bukharin was accepted by a significant majority of votes, since the majority of his delegates agreed with Lenin's argument that the international world revolution is still just a beautiful fairy tale and nothing more. On March 15, 1918, after a no less heated and heated discussion at the IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, the Brest Peace Treaty was ratified by a roll-call vote and entered into force.

    In historical science, there are still diametrically opposite assessments of the Brest Peace Treaty, which largely depend on the political and ideological views of their authors. In particular, V.I. Lenin, who had no sympathy for the patriarchal thousand-year-old Russia, directly called the Treaty of Brest "Tilsit" and "Bawdy" peace, but vital to save the power of the Bolsheviks. Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, A. Bovin, Y. Yemelyanov) adhered to the same assessments, who were forced to talk about the brilliant vision and political wisdom of the leader, who foresaw the imminent military defeat of Germany and the annulment of this treaty. In addition, the Brest Peace Treaty was traditionally assessed as the first victory of young Soviet diplomacy, which laid the foundations for the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR.

    In modern science, assessments of the Brest Treaty have changed significantly.

    Liberal historians (A. Pantsov, Y. Felshtinsky) believe that this treaty was not a victory, but the first major defeat of the Bolshevik course towards preparing the world proletarian revolution. At the same time, this peace became a kind of tactical maneuver and a short-term retreat of the Bolsheviks along the tortuous and difficult path of the struggle for the victory of the world socialist revolution.

    Patriotic historians (N. Narochnitskaya) are convinced that for V. Lenin and other leaders of Bolshevism, the Russian proletarian revolution was a kind of "bundle of brushwood" capable of igniting the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Therefore, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk became a direct betrayal of the national interests of Russia, which marked the beginning of its disintegration and the most difficult Civil War.

    2. "Left SR revolt" and its political consequences

    After the ratification of the Brest Peace Treaty, the "left communists" did not give up hope of its denunciation. In particular, in May 1918 at the Moscow conference of the RCP (b) N.I. Bukharin, N.V. Osinsky and D.B. Ryazanov (Goldenbach) again made an appeal to denounce the Brest Treaty, but the majority of the delegates to this party forum did not support their proposal.

    Another attempt to denounce the Brest Treaty was the "Left SR mutiny", which took place in Moscow on July 6-7, 1918. The events associated with this mutiny were as follows: on July 6, 1918, two prominent Left SRs, Yakov Blumkin and Nikolai Andreev, who were employees The VChK, under a plausible pretext, entered the German embassy and, having killed the German ambassador, Count W. Mirbach, hid in the headquarters of the VChK troops, which was headed by their fellow party member Dmitry Popov.

    After the completion of this terrorist act, V.I. Lenin and Ya.M. Sverdlov went to the German embassy, ​​and the chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest Ya. G. Blumkin and N.A. Andreeva. Upon arrival at the place of F.E. Dzerzhinsky was taken into custody, and the headquarters of the Cheka troops, on the orders of D.I. Popov was turned into an impregnable fortress, where more than 600 well-armed Chekists dug in.

    Upon learning of the arrest of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.I. Lenin gave instructions to arrest the entire faction of the Left SRs that took part in the work of the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and to take their leader Maria Spiridonova hostage in exchange for saving F.E. Dzerzhinsky. At the same time, the commander of the division of Latvian riflemen I.I. Vatsetis was ordered to storm the mansion of the Cheka troops and suppress the "Left SR revolt." On the night of July 7, 1918, a division of Latvian riflemen, with the support of field artillery, began an assault on the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which ended in the complete defeat of the rebels and the liberation of F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

    The trial of the rebels was swift and right: several hundred people, including Ya.G. Blumkin and N.A. Andreev, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and the direct inspirer and leader of this rebellion, Deputy Chairman of the Cheka V.A. Alexandrovich was shot. The same result ended in a new "Left SR revolt" raised in Simbirsk by the commander of the Eastern Front, Left SR MA. Muravyov, who was shot dead on July 10, 1918, upon his arrival for negotiations at the building of the provincial executive committee.

    In Soviet and Russian historical science (K. Gusev, A. Velidov, A. Kiselev) it was traditionally stated that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk were deliberately organized by the leadership of the party of the Left Social Revolutionaries (M.A.Spiridonova, P.P. Proshyan), who not only wished to denounce the Brest Peace Treaty, but also, having provoked a government crisis, remove the Bolshevik Party from power, which, imposing kombeda, began to pursue a disastrous economic course in the countryside.

    In foreign historiography (Yu. Felshtinsky), there is a rather exotic version, which says that the so-called "Left SR mutiny" was organized by "left communists", in particular, the head of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky, who also sought to denounce the "obscene" Brest-Litovsk Peace and ignite the fire of the world proletarian revolution.

    In our opinion, in the history of this rebellion there are much more white spots and unsolved secrets than it seems at first glance, since the researchers could not really answer even two completely obvious questions:

    1) why exactly the chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky personally went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest the murderers of the German ambassador;

    2) if the decision to assassinate the German ambassador was sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, then why its entire faction, including M.A. Spiridonov, calmly awaited her isolation and arrest on the sidelines of the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

    In essence, it should be recognized that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk drew a line under the period of development of Soviet statehood on a two-party basis and became the starting point for the formation of a one-party Bolshevik system in the country. During this period, the activity of all Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik and anarchist groups and parties was banned, the existence of which still created the illusion of proletarian-peasant democracy in the country.

    The Brest Treaty itself was denounced by the Soviet government on November 13, 1918, that is, exactly one day after the surrender of Germany and its military allies to the Entente countries, which put the long-awaited end to the First World War.

    The immediate result of the Brest-Litovsk Peace and the suppression of the "Left SR rebellion" was the adoption of the first Constitution of the RSFSR. According to the majority of authors (O. Chistyakov, S. Leonov, I. Isaev), for the first time the issue of creating the first Soviet Constitution was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 30, 1918. On April 1, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee formed a constitutional commission, in The composition of which included representatives of its three party factions (Bolsheviks, Left SRs, Maximalist SRs) and representatives of six leading People's Commissariats - for military and naval affairs, for nationalities, internal affairs, justice, finance and the Supreme Council of the National Economy. Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlov.

    During the work on the draft Constitution, which lasted more than three months, a number of fundamental disagreements arose on the following issues:

    1) the federal structure of the state;

    2) the system of local authorities of Soviet power;

    3) the social and economic foundations of Soviet power, etc.

    In particular, representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (V.A.Algasov, A.A.Shrader) and the maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries (A.I.Berdnikov) very persistently suggested:

    1) to make the basis of the Soviet federation the administrative-territorial principle of state structure with the provision of the widest possible rights to all subjects of the federation to manage their own territories;

    2) liquidate the lower levels of the Soviet state system and replace them with traditional rural gatherings, which, having lost their political functions, turned into municipal authorities;

    3) carry out a total socialization of property and tighten the principles of universal labor service, etc.

    During a heated and lengthy debate, in which many prominent Bolsheviks took part, including V.I. Lenin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, I.V. Stalin, N.I. Bukharin, L.M. Reisner, M.F. Latsis and M.N. Pokrovsky, these proposals were rejected. The final draft of the Soviet Constitution was approved by a special commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by V.I. Lenin.

    On July 4, 1918, this project was submitted for consideration to the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and on July 10, the delegates to the congress approved the first Constitution of the RSFSR and elected a new composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, consisting entirely of Bolsheviks.

    The main provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were enshrined in six separate sections:

    2) general provisions of the Constitution of the RSFSR;

    3) the construction of Soviet power;

    4) active and passive suffrage;

    5) budget law;

    6) on the coat of arms and flag of the RSFSR.

    The Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which was fully incorporated into the Constitution of the RSFSR, determined the political and social basis of the new Soviet statehood - the power of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies and "The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry in order to completely suppress the bourgeoisie, abolish the exploitation of man by man and establish socialism in the country."

    The state structure of the RSFSR was based on the principles of a national federation, the subjects of which were the national republics, as well as various regional unions, consisting of several national regions. The supreme body of state power in the country was the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossack's Deputies, whose exclusive competence included all issues of state building: approval and amendment of the Constitution of the RSFSR; declaration of war and conclusion of peace; ratification of peace treaties, general management of foreign and domestic policy of the state; the establishment of national taxes, duties and fees; the foundations of the organization of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and legal proceedings; federal law, etc.

    For day-to-day and operational work, the congress elected from among its members the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK of the RSFSR), which formed the Council of People's Commissars (SNK RSFSR), which consisted of people's commissars who headed the branch people's commissariats (people's commissariats). The All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the Council of People's Commissars alike had the right to issue legislative acts, which was a direct consequence of the Bolsheviks' complete rejection of the well-known bourgeois principle of separation of powers. Regional, provincial, uyezd and volost congresses of Soviets, as well as city and village councils, which formed their own executive committees (executive committees), became local government bodies.

    It should be emphasized that the organization of Soviet power at all levels was based on the well-known principle of "democratic centralism", in accordance with which the subordinate bodies of Soviet power were strictly subordinated to the higher ones, who were obliged to execute all decisions of the higher Soviets that did not violate their competence.

    The Constitution of the RSFSR legislated not only a new type of Soviet statehood, but also a new type of Soviet democracy, since it openly proclaimed the class principle of democratic rights and freedoms. In particular, all “socially alien class elements” were deprived of the right to vote, and the representation from social groups of workers entitled to the right to vote was far from equal. For example, in the elections to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the city councils had a fivefold advantage over the provincial congresses of Soviets, etc.

    In addition, the Soviet electoral system retained the principle of indirect elections that existed in Tsarist Russia. Only elections to the grassroots city and village Soviets were direct, and deputies of all subsequent levels were elected at volost, uyezd, provincial and regional congresses of Soviets.