Panorama of the Russian-Byzantine War (941-944). Virtual tour Russian-Byzantine war (941-944). Attractions, map, photo, video. Why this war ended with Napoleon's attack on Russia 941 944 campaigns

In 941, according to Greek sources - "The Life of Basil the New", the chronicle of the successor of George Amartol, the message of the Cremona bishop Liutprand, as well as the Russian chronicles 1 that followed the Greek messages 2, a new Russian-Byzantine strife for a long time disrupted the course of peaceful relations between the two countries ... The new peace was concluded only in 944.

The Life of Basil the New says that the Bulgarians and the strategists of Chersonesos informed Constantinople about the movement of the Russian army, the Russ entered the empire, fought its lands up to Paphlagonia (Asia Minor), brutally ruining everything in its path. The 40,000-strong army of the domestic Pamphira, who approached from the east, the army of the patrician Phocas from Macedonia and the strategus Theodore from Thrace, pushed the Russians, and they, plunging into the boats, “fought back”. This was followed by a naval battle, in which the Greeks burned the Russian ships with “Greek fire”. Some of the Russians burned down, some drowned in the sea, the survivors moved back, but on the way many of them fell ill “from a terrible relaxation of the stomach” and died. Those who reached Russia told their relatives about the ordeals that befell them 3.

Georgy Amartol's successor narrates that in mid-June the Russians arrived at the Greek shores on 10 thousand ships and that the Russian fleet also included “skedi, a verb, from the Varangian clan,” that is, ships of Varangian origin. The Russ entered the Bosphorus and here, on the near approaches to the Byzantine capital, near the town of Ieron, they were met by Greek ships that used “fire”. Igor's fleet was defeated, after which the remaining Russian ships withdrew towards Asia Minor. Only in September did the Greek generals manage to oust the Russians from Asia Minor, and they were defeated in the second naval battle, when they tried to escape from the Greeks who were pursuing them 4.

Liutprand is very brief in his message, but he also notes the plight of Byzantium and the enormous efforts that the empire had to make to repel the Russian attack. The Byzantine fleet at that time went to fight the Arabs, and the Greeks had to practically form the fleet anew, reviving already abandoned ships. Everything was decided by a naval battle, where the Greeks used fire 5.

"The Tale of Bygone Years" also reports that in 941, for 10 thousand ships "Igor is ideally on the Greeks." The Bulgarians sent news to Constantinople about the movement of the Russian army. While Byzantium was gathering forces, the Russians fought the "Bithynian countries", devastated and captured the lands along the "Pontus" up to Paphlagonia, devastated the suburbs of Constantinople, located on the shores of the Bosphorus, and cruelly dealt with the overwhelmed population. In fierce battles on land and at sea, the Russians were defeated by the troops who had approached from the provinces and "returned to their own" 6.

The Russian chronicle, softening the story of the defeat of Igor's army, conveys it very close to the text of the life. However, both The Tale of Bygone Years and the First Novgorod Chronicle did not report the fact of the defeat of the Russians at Hieron immediately upon their arrival at Constantinople, they passed over in silence the history of the subsequent long and stubborn struggle of a part of the Russian army against the Greeks in Asia Minor until September and presented the entire campaign in such a way that the defeat of Igor's fleet from the "Greek fire" allegedly was the end of the campaign.

N. Ya. Polovoy and especially Ya. N. Shchapov convincingly showed the meaning of the persistent upholding by the Russian chroniclers of a different version of the campaign, different from those of the Greek chronicles. They included in the chronicles the official, princely concept of the campaign (Ya. N. Shchapov), which was probably created in the 10th century. and within the framework of which the fact of Igor's flight to his homeland with part of the troops did not fit, while a significant part of the Russian forces continued to fight in Asia Minor 7.

The subsequent account of events - the story of Igor's second campaign against Byzantium - and the text of the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944 were preserved only as part of the Tale of Bygone Years 8, although echoes of Igor's two campaigns against the Greeks, as we wrote about this above, are also available in "Novgorod First Chronicle". The agreement of 944, while not causing such stormy and uncompromising disputes in historiography as the previous diplomatic agreements between Russia and Byzantium, nevertheless gave rise to many controversial problems, hypotheses, and conjectures in historical science.

In domestic historical works of the 18th - first half of the 19th century. the history of Igor's two campaigns against Byzantium and the conclusion of the Russian-Byzantine treaty in 944 was presented mainly informatively, in full agreement with the chronicle data 9. But already at that time in some works there is a desire to research approach to the solution of unclear aspects of the events of 941-944. Thus, V. N. Tatishchev tried to substantiate the reason for the new Russian-Byzantine strife, noting that Igor moved on the Greeks because they “did not want to pay what was due with Olga.” MM Shcherbatov expressed the idea that the initiative for the negotiations in 944 came from Igor, as evidenced by the dispatch of the Russian embassy to Constantinople; the articles of the same treaty in 944 only confirmed "the previous ones, perpetrated under Oleg with additions." IN Boltin did not agree with this interpretation of the treaty of 944 and noted that it was actually a different agreement, it contained many new articles.

At the beginning of the XIX century. A. A. Shletser, true to his “skeptical” concept of the Russian-Byzantine treaties of the 10th century, tried to cast a shadow of falsification on the 944 treaty. primarily the Byzantine chronicles; the strange mess he found in the articles of the agreement; The "dark text" to which we owe the "stupidity and negligence of the writers."

However, Schletser's doubts were not supported by Russian historians of the 19th century. NM Karamzin believed the chronicles and noticed that relations between Byzantium and Russia were broken only after 935, since this year Russian soldiers still participated in the expedition of the Greek fleet to the West "2.

G. Evers considered the treaty of 944 (as well as 911) in terms of the general development of diplomatic norms of the 10th century. He noted that both agreements were preceded by preliminary agreements on their account. Such negotiations with Igor in Kiev were conducted by Greek ambassadors sent to Russia by Roman I Lacapenus, and already in Constantinople a "formal peace treaty" was concluded, the registration of which took place according to the same international scheme as the registration of the 911 agreement. However, in 944 BC. "The Greeks alone are introduced by the speakers and proposing terms", it is they, as winners, who prescribe the terms, and the agreement of 944 reflects only the interests of Byzantium; it was an addendum to the “main treaty” - 911. Duplicate clauses, which remained in force, were not included in the 944 agreement.

N. A. Lavrovsky, like G. Evers, believed that the treaty of 944 was a reflection of the development of international diplomatic practice at that time, but drew attention to some of the features of this charter. It is not as accurate as the act of 911: the Russian side speaks in the introduction and conclusion, and the entire article-by-article text comes from the name of the Greeks.

Lavrovsky noted both a smaller number of Greekisms in the text of the agreement, and - unlike Schletzer - a greater word order in sentences, which, in his opinion, indicates either the richer experience of the drafters and translators of the agreement, or that he was an addition to the act 911, which was hastily compiled. That is why there are no strict formalities of strict translation in it, its language is simple and natural 14.

V.V.Sokolsky did not agree with G. Evers, who noted that the agreement of 944 cannot be considered an addition to the act of 911, that it is completely independent, since it included the articles of previous agreements in its entirety, but the articles were not included in the treaty of 944, should, in his opinion, be considered not in effect and canceled 15.

I.I. Sreznevsky also viewed the 944 treaty as a stereotypical international agreement. It was originally written in Greek, and then translated into Russian, which to a certain extent limited the manifestation of the Russian language element in the text of the treaty. I. I. Sreznevsky considered many of the terms of the treaties to be translated, and referred to purely Russian only those that were repeated in other Russian monuments 16.

S. A. Gedeonov paid much attention to the document. Following G. Evers and N. A. Lavrovsky, he considered it from the point of view of the international diplomatic system, but also revealed some of the features of the monument. The text reflected in the chronicle, S.A. Gedeonov believed, is a Greek copy from a copy going from Russia to the Greeks, and a Bulgarian translation of a copy from the Greeks to Russia. The unification of two different letters by the chronicler constituted, in his opinion, the agreement of 944; this is evidenced by the fact that at the beginning and at the end of the treaty Russia speaks, and the entire specific part of the act is stated on behalf of Byzantium 17.

D.I. Ilovaisky tried to determine the cause of the Russian-Byzantine conflict in 941, suggesting that it was the beginning of the struggle between Russia and Byzantium for Bulgaria, where civil strife was taking place at that time. He believed that the cause of the collision could have arisen due to the contradictions in the Crimea. As for the agreement of 944, according to D.I. Ilovaisky, “confirmation of Oleg's agreements” was combined in it with a number of “new conditions, in particular about the“ Korsun country. ”“ Obviously, enterprising Igor, ”the historian notes,“ managed to spread Russian domination in this region ... "18

SM Soloviev believed that the agreement only confirmed the brief, perhaps oral, conditions concluded on the Danube immediately after the end of the campaign. It was not as beneficial for Russia as the treaty of 911: “... the preponderance is clearly visible on the side of the Greeks; it has more constraints, restrictions for Russians ”19.

V. I. Sergeevich agreed that the treaty of 944 was created on the model of other international diplomatic documents of the early Middle Ages. Using the comparative historical method, he compares the Russian-Byzantine treaties of 911, 944, 971. with the crucifixion letters of the Russian princes of a later time, as well as with the sacra of the Greco-Persian treaty of 562. He considers the letter of 944 to be the first such Russian document.

A. Dimitriou's principled position on the Russian-Byzantine treaties is stated above. He considered the agreement of 944 as a type of imperial khrisovul, however, he believed that the khrisovul itself was not preserved, and only a separate charter came to us, going from the Russian side to the Greeks. Treaty of 944 A. Dimitriu interpreted as beneficial for the empire. He emphasized that the text of this document is simpler and more understandable than the text of the 911 agreement, and explained this by the higher level of translation 21.

D. Ya. Samokvasov was the first to express an opinion about the treaty of 944 as equal and mutually beneficial, confirming and renewing the agreement of 907. He saw this update in a number of additional ones - in comparison with the treaties of 907 and 911. - articles; the same articles of theirs, which were omitted in the document of 944, continued, in his opinion, to act unchanged. D. Ya. Samokvasov considered one of the main arguments in favor of such an assumption that the source was silent about the resumption of the payment by Byzantium of the annual tribute - the "orders" of Russia, as is evident from the chronicle text under 941: if the article on the payment of tribute - "orders" , not indicated in the treaty of 944, then this indicates the possible effect of other omitted articles 22.

A.V. Longinov believed that the 944 agreement was built on the same principles as the 911 agreement: it was preceded by preliminary negotiations, as in the conclusion of the 911 agreement; two authentic charters were developed, coming from the Greek and Russian sides; there is a coincidence of the introductory and concluding parts of the documents, where the Russian side takes the floor; the final version of the agreement, as in 911, was carried out in Byzantium, which was the initiator of the conclusion of the agreement; the execution of treaties is the same: a duplicate of the charter coming from the Greeks was delivered to Kiev for ratification, with its translation into Russian, and the original remained in Constantinople. The Russians swore an oath on the text coming from the Russian side, which was preserved in the prince's archives. The very same treaty of 944, according to A.V. Longinov, is a confirmation of the agreement of 907. This is a bilateral, equal treaty. Like D. Ya. Samokvasov, A.V. Longinov considered the articles of the previous agreements that were not included in this agreement to be valid. Comparing the treaty of 944 with the diplomatic acts of the XII-XIII centuries, he noted that some international stereotypes can be traced in it, indicating the commonality of this document with the monuments of Eastern European diplomacy of the early Middle Ages 2.

D. M. Meichik, analyzing the legal foundations of the treaties of 911 and 944, admitted that they expressed a synthesis of Russian and Byzantine law with the leading role of the Greek element, reflected mainly the guiding significance of Byzantine diplomacy and the range of its “moral feelings and legal concepts”. In contracts 911 and 944. he saw an inept attempt by the Russians to master diplomatic concepts and categories unfamiliar to them 24.

A. A. Shakhmatov considered the contracts of 911 and 944. as a result of the compiler's work of the chronicler. And to the letter of 944 he transferred his method of analysis in connection with the study of the formula “Equally different messages ...”, which goes at the beginning of the document. A. A. Shakhmatov believed that on the basis of these words the chronicler created an artificial version of the appearance of Byzantine ambassadors in Kiev and the sending of the Russian embassy to Constantinople. A "deliberate alteration" of the text about the events of 944 and the treaty itself - this is the conclusion of A. A. Shakhmatov. The dark passages of the document, the confusion with possessive pronouns in the text, in his opinion, indicate that “the translators had difficulty coping with the editorial task that lay before them - to change the form of contracts”. AA Shakhmatov also believed that the chronicler invented Igor's second campaign against the Greeks in order to explain the subsequent appearance of the Russian-Byzantine treaty, and that the second campaign itself is a borrowing from the Life of Vasily the New 25.

An assessment of the treaty of 944 was given in the general courses of Russian history by M.K.Lubavsky (1916) and A.Ye. Presnyakov (1918). MK Lyubavsky considered the letter of 944 a trade agreement, which with “some minor changes” repeated Oleg's agreement. AE Presnyakov 26 expressed the same idea in essence.

Soviet historiography, to a certain extent, reflected the different points of view on the 944 treaty that existed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Thus, VM Istrin in 1924 repeated the idea that the norms of Greco-Roman international law are inapplicable to ancient Russia: the treaty of 944, like 911, was translated from Greek much later - already in the 11th century. , and in the X century. it had no practical value for the Kiev princes and was needed only by the Greeks. V. M. Istrin considered the letter of 944 to be a copy going from Rus to the Greeks; the Greek original, in his opinion, was irretrievably lost, which is also explained by the lack of interest among the Russians in these documents 27.

SP Obnorskiy, having studied the linguistic basis of the 911 and 944 treaties, convincingly refuted the point of view of VM Istrin about the later translation of these documents and proved that the translations appeared simultaneously with the drafting of the acts themselves. At the same time, he showed how the level of translation has changed for more than 30 years: the treaty of 944 was translated relatively well, the Russians of that time had already mastered many stereotypical international concepts and terms, and the latter were no longer translated from Greek; the Bulgarian linguistic element is less perceptible here, "but the Russian linguistic element makes itself felt noticeably in it." MA Shangin, analyzing individual articles of the document, came to the conclusion that "almost every article of the Greco-Russian treaties is substantiated in Byzantine law." He showed how international legal norms were reflected in articles devoted to Kherson fishermen, issues of assistance in shipwrecks 28.

BD Grekov in his book "Kievan Rus" outlined the chronicle version of the two campaigns of Rus against Byzantium in 941 and 944. and. analyzing the agreement of 944, he came to the conclusion that it expressed "a new balance of power between the contracting parties." Russia, in his opinion, was forced to abandon its former advantages, had to henceforth pay trade duties and assumed a number of obligations in relation to the Greeks: the protection of Byzantium from enemies, and in particular the defense of the Crimea. Thus, B. D. Grekov considered the agreement of 944 a diplomatic act, beneficial only to Byzantium, a document reflecting the advantages of only one side.

A year later, in his comments to the academic edition of The Tale of Bygone Years, DS Likhachev approached the question differently. Objection to A. A. Shakhmatov in connection with his assumption that Igor's second campaign against Byzantium was invented by the chronicler, D. S. Likhachev pointed out that the treaty of 944 just testifies in favor of the reality of the second campaign, since it “is beneficial for the Russian side ”. As for the coincidence of individual phrases in the “Life of Vasily the New” and the chronicle text about the events of 944, as pointed out by A. A. Shakhmatov, then, according to D. S. Likhachev, “does not testify to anything” 30.

Two years later, A.A. Zimin again supported the version that the 944 treaty reflected the failure of the Russian campaign in 941 31

A number of historians (A. Yu. Yakubovsky, V. V. Bartold, B. N. Zakhoder, N. Ya. Polovoy, M. I. Artamonov, A. P. Novoseltsev and some others), as noted above, considered the events of 941 -944 in close connection with the eastern policy of Russia, and in particular with the attitude of Kiev to the Khazar Kaganate, the peoples of the North Caucasus, the Muslim states of Transcaucasia and Iran. So, N. Ya. Polovoy believed that Igor organized “two grandiose campaigns” against the Greeks and “concluded a treaty beneficial for Russia with Byzantium”. In combination with the aggressive campaign against Ber-daa, these events “then placed the Russian state at the center of the entire political life of Eastern Europe” 32.

By the way, N. Ya. Polovoy not only, in our opinion, convincingly proved the reality of the message of the Russian chronicle about the second campaign against Byzantium, but also brought interesting considerations regarding the dating of this campaign, referring it to 943. This year, N. Y. Polovoy, Byzantium suffered a serious diplomatic defeat, as it was forced to agree to the conclusion of an unprofitable and little-honorable peace. Since the campaign in 943 was not over, he, in his opinion, was not reflected in the Byzantine chronicles 33.

MI Artamonov, analyzing the same events and also through the prism of the eastern policy of Russia, came to a completely opposite conclusion. He believed that the military action of Russia against Byzantium in the 40s of the X century. was undertaken with the knowledge and sympathy of the Khazars, whose conflict with the empire took place from the 30s of the 10th century. protracted nature; but this offensive ended in the complete defeat of Rus, and the treaty of 944 reflected the empire's political superiority. In it, Byzantium dictated its terms to Rus; the latter's obligations are “unilateral,” and the very tone of the document is “directive” in relation to Kiev. This is how MI Artamonov assessed, in particular, the articles related to the fate of Chersonesos: they speak of the obligations of Rus “to break the alliance with the Khazars and act against them on the side of Byzantium” 34.

MV Levchenko tried to identify the reasons for the new Russian-Byzantine conflict, pointing out the strengthening of the empire's foreign policy positions in the 20-30s of the 10th century. and its possible desire to free itself from the heavy obligations of the 907 treaty, and above all the provision of duty-free trade to the Russians on the territory of Byzantium. He came to a strange, in our opinion, conclusion that the campaign of 941 "cannot be regarded as an aggressive act on the part of Russia", which was forced to take retaliatory measures "to protect vital economic interests." M.V. Levchenko noted the large scale of the campaign in 941 (by sea and by land), the great tension of the Byzantine military machine to repel the invasion, but he was skeptical about the version of the chronicle that the Russians eventually achieved the renewal of the payment of the annual tribute by Byzantium, since in the treaty of 944 there is no information on this score. MV Levchenko assessed the agreement of 944 as a completely independent document, only including a number of previous articles. It is less beneficial to Russia than the 911 treaty, but it does not at all bear the character of unilateral Russian obligations, as A. Dimitriou and some other scholars argued; it also contains direct obligations of Byzantium: on the reception of Russian ambassadors and merchants, allocating them a place for accommodation, providing servicing and monthly equipment for the return journey; here it also includes the obligation of Byzantium to provide military assistance to Rus. It is impossible to say, notes MV Levchenko, that the Igor Pact is limited only to trade subjects: “... it contains articles regulating foreign policy relations between Byzantium and Russia” 35.

Detailed analysis of the events of 941-944. and the analysis of the 944 treaty was given by VT Pashuto. He believed that Igor had violated the previous union relations. Based on the negotiations of the Greeks with Igor, the proposal of the Byzantines to pay more tribute than Oleg took, the direction of expensive gifts to the Pechenegs - Igor's allies, VT Pashuto came to the conclusion that "Byzantium's interest in maintaining peaceful trade and political ties with Russia is obvious." He views the agreement of 944 as "a treaty for eternal peace, mutual assistance and trade." The obligation of mutual assistance is formulated in the articles on the provision of warriors to the Russian prince, "he will need very much," and, accordingly, help from the Russians to the emperor at a written request. VT Pashuto assessed articles about the "Korsun country" from the standpoint of a general strengthening of the influence of Russia in Crimea, and he saw the strengthening of relations between the two states, the further development of political and economic ties between them in articles on the regulation of embassy and trade contacts. VT Pashuto assessed the treaty of 944 as an independent, equal bilateral agreement 36.

SM Kashtanov, based on the classification of F. Delger and I. Karayannopoulos, compares the act of 944 with the scheme of the Khrisoulov drawn up by Byzantium after negotiations of its ambassadors in another country. SM Kashtanov brings the first part of the letter of 944 closer to the definition of the powers of ambassadors of another country, characteristic of the Khrisovul of this type. One piece of text in the initial part of the letter and one piece of text in its final part, containing the oath of baptized and unbaptized Russia to keep and abide by the treaty, S.M.Kashtanov interprets as an oath promise to abide by the terms of the agreement that was given to the Byzantine emperor by the other side. According to S. M. Kashtanov's observation, the texts that are written on behalf of the Russians form, in the aggregate, the oath and credentials of the ambassadors. The text coming on behalf of the Greeks contains, first of all, the terms of the contract and information about the methods of its approval. Thus, in the text of the oath and credentials there are no treaty clauses, which is typical for the Khrisovul, where the terms of the treaty are outside the text of the oath record of foreign ambassadors. With this circumstance, he also connects the nature of the exchange of copies of the agreement of 944. Since the ambassadors' oath and credentials did not contain the terms of the agreement, it means that the copy of the agreement needed confirmation of the Russian government and was sent to Igor to take the oath on it. Further, S. M. Kashtanov suggests (and this, in our opinion, is the most important thing in the author's construction), after the prince had fastened this copy, “the Byzantine ambassadors took it and handed it to the Russians ... Some copy from the approved diploma of the ambassadors could stay in Russia ”37.

A.G. Kuzmin in one of his last works also touched upon the events of 941-945. and again he was skeptical about a number of news from the Russian chronicle. So, he noted: "The indication that the Greeks agreed to pay an even greater tribute than Oleg, clearly contradicts the content of the real treaty." Without questioning the credibility and integrity of the treaty, A.G. Kuzmin believes that the confusion with pronouns occurred in it because the chronicler “seemed unable to keep his sources under control”. At the same time, this very confusion of the Greek and Russian contrary to the treaty is, in his opinion, an indirect sign of the originality of the sources 38.

In the Soviet generalizing works, the agreement of 944 also did not receive an unambiguous consideration. “Essays on the history of the USSR. The period of feudalism ”reflected the point of view of BD Grekov. In the "History of Byzantium" it is noted that the initiative to conclude an agreement belongs to Byzantium, whose ambassadors, having met Igor's army on the Danube, were able to persuade the Russians to peace; that the content of the 944 treaty is more favorable for the empire than the 911 agreement. The multivolume History of the SSSD mentions two campaigns of Rus against Byzantium in the 40s (941 and 944) and it is noted that in both cases Igor went to Greeks at the head of the Russian troops, "reinforced by mercenary Pechenegs and Varangians." About the treaty of 944, it is said that it provided for broad trade relations with the empire and relied, like the agreement of U11, on the "Russian Pocon".

Foreign historiography devoted the events of 941 to 944. incomparably less attention than the history of the attacks of the Russians on Constantinople in 860 and 907. In general courses and special works on this subject, there are informative messages. Articles or sections of articles by K. Bartova, A. Boak, I. Svencitsky, S. Mikutsky, A. Gregoire and P. Orgels, I. Sorlen, D. Miller, are devoted to the assessment of the Russian-Byzantine war of 941 and the treaty of 944. as well as sections in the books of D. Obolensky, articles by D. Shepard, F. Wozniak 40.

K. Bartova, who paid attention to the well-known Jewish-Khazar correspondence of the 10th century, draws a connection between the data of the so-called Cambridge document and the events of 941- 944, believing that the mysterious Helgu is one of Igor's governors, who continued to fight after the return of the prince to his homeland ... A. Boak notes the grandeur of the 941 campaign, the secrecy of its preparation, the “specific” goal - the capture of Constantinople - and the elimination of the threat of a new invasion by the Emperor Roman I Lacapenus through diplomatic means. He considers the 944 treaty to be a full-fledged, detailed treaty, "widely renewing the early treaties." It, according to A. Boak, reflected the interest of the Kiev princes in trade with Byzantium 4.

I. Svencicki, comparing treaties 907, 911, 944, shows that the agreement of 944 was closely connected with the previous acts, developed and supplemented the diplomatic norms of the previous treaties. In his opinion, the Greek ambassadors brought a ready-made draft agreement to Kiev, and Igor, in response, sent an embassy to Constantinople, which had a Russian draft agreement in hand. I. Svencitsky believes that we have before us an equal interstate agreement, in the development of which both sides took an active part.

S. Mikutsky, analyzing the text of the treaty of 944, drew attention to the fact that the beginning of the document and its conclusion go on behalf of Russia, while the main text - the articles of the agreement - on behalf of Byzantium; that the text of the treaty at the same time mentions its drafting in two charters - Russian and Greek. In this regard, S. Mikutsky suggests that the Russian charter is essentially a reworking of the Greek original: the imperial formula at the beginning of the document and in its conclusion has been omitted and replaced by the text coming from the Russian side, a list of ambassadors has been added to the initial part of the document and preamble of the Russian author. The main part - the articles of the treaty - remained unchanged, as well as the confirmation of the imperial charter. And all this is tied together with the Russian additions at the end - Igor's oath and sanctions. Since the articles, writes S. Mikutsky, reflect the interests of the Greeks, have the character of mercy on their part, do not give any rights to Russia, but only impose obligations on it, the document approaches the imperial hrisovul in its content. However, S. Mikutsky draws attention to the fact that the confirmation formula, which is available in the 944 treaty, is not found in the Khrisovuli 43.

A. Gregoire and P. Orgels analyze the history of the 941 campaign in accordance with the data of Byzantine sources and show that after the defeat in the naval battle at Hieron, Russian troops withdrew to the south-west of Asia Minor and continued military operations there. The authors noted the scale of the campaign and the stress that the empire had to endure to overcome the Russian invasion 44.

I. Sorlen supports those scholars who are inclined to distrust the Tale of Bygone Years regarding the message about the second Russian campaign to Constantinople and consider it the fruit of a compilation of information from the chronicle of George Amartol about the campaign of the Ugrians against the Byzantine capital in 943 and the data from the Life of Vasily the New ... She is convinced of the authenticity of the treaty of 944 and notes that it is an undeniable translation from Greek, and more correct than in the case of the treaty of 911. In her opinion, both charters were drawn up in the imperial chancellery, as evidenced by the mention of Russian Christians, who were allegedly given an advantage over the pagans, and the presence in the charter of obligations not only of Russia, but also of Byzantium (regarding the granting of trade rights to the Russians). The main part of the agreement - the obligations of Russia - was taken from the imperial hrisovul, to which, at the request of the Russians, a preamble and a concluding part were added. Thus, I. Sor-len also adheres to the opinion of the artificial origin of the text of the treaty placed in the chronicle, compiling it from heterogeneous parts 45.

Based on the analysis of the articles of the treaty, I. Sorlen quite rightly asserts that they reflect the development of the Russian diplomatic tradition: the mention of Russian written documents-certificates testifies, in her opinion, that the Russian princes in the middle of the 10th century. “They began to create chanceries,” took control of trade with Byzantium. She believes that the new treaty abolished trade duty privileges for the Russians and introduced some trade restrictions as a result of Igor's defeat. I. Sorlen considers the article of the 944 treaty on military assistance to Russia from Byzantium to be the fruit of the negligence of the translator who distorted the text, since here, according to the author, it should be about the obligations of Russia not to attack the possessions of Byzantium in the Crimea and to help the empire in this area ... At the same time, she rightly points out that the treaty of 944 reflected a change in the nature of relations between Russia and Byzantium in comparison with 911: Russia for the empire becomes an "allied power", I. Sorlen defends the very controversial thesis that in the treaty of 944 The parties pursued primarily economic goals 46.

D. Miller in the generalizing article "Byzantine treaties and their development: 500-1025." considered the Russian-Byzantine treaties, including the agreement of 944, on an equal footing with the Byzantine-Arab, Bulgarian and other agreements of the early Middle Ages, defining them as "trade and political treaties of the 10th century." He showed that the Russian-Byzantine treaties include all the most significant components of the diplomatic agreements concluded by Byzantium with other states, and some aspects of these agreements in the Russian-Byzantine treaties are most vividly presented, and in particular they provide “the most complete description of trade rights ”As a means of Byzantine diplomacy to regulate relations with another power. D. Miller also highlights such features of these acts as the precise definition of the parties involved in the negotiations and their representatives, who are named by name; a statement of the intentions of the negotiators; their vows; detailed content of articles; information on the procedure for ratifying the agreement. In his opinion, only the Byzantine-Persian treaty of 562 can, to some extent, be compared in this sense with the Russian-Byzantine treaties.

Analyzing such an aspect of the diplomatic agreements of Byzantium with the "barbarian" states, as an agreement on alliance and mutual assistance, D. Miller showed that the treaty of 944 made a step forward compared to the agreement of 911 and Russia from a state that allows the hiring of its people for military service in Byzantium, became a true and equal military ally of the empire. He notes the international character of other articles included in the agreement of 944, and in particular the article on the procedure for registering the Russians coming to Byzantium. The procedure for ratifying the treaty in 944 reminds D. Miller of the procedure that accompanied the conclusion of the Byzantine-Arab treaty in 687: then two copies of the treaty letters were also drawn up; Rus, there is no question of any comparison with Khrisovula in the work of D. Miller.

D. Obolensky, true to his idea of ​​drawing neighboring countries and peoples into a certain Byzantine community of states 49 by the empire, viewed the Russian-Byzantine treaties through this prism. He considered the Russian campaign in 941 to be an expedition in the style of the Vikings, unexpected and insidious, he was silent about the second campaign; naturally bypasses the issues of negotiations on the Danube, tribute, etc. The Treaty of 944 D. Obolensky considers as a major success of Byzantium on the way to eliminate the Russian danger, which was growing from the 9th century. The empire gradually mitigated this danger with the help of skillful diplomacy. In his opinion, the treaty of 944 reflected the concerns of Byzantium about their Crimean possessions and showed how the empire in relations with Russia changed the balance of power in its favor.

Thus, a review of the literature concerning the events of 941-944. and the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944, states serious and fundamental disagreements between historians on the key problems of this aspect of the history of ancient Russia.

It is noteworthy that the study of the history of the 941 campaign is carried out in isolation from the history of the development and content of the 944 treaty, which, as a rule, is associated only with the history of Igor's second (in 944 or 943) campaign against Byzantium.

There is a lack of unity on issues such as: is the 944 treaty just an addition to the 911 agreement, or is it a politically independent and integral diplomatic document? Is it a semblance of an imperial khrisovul, or is it a bilateral, equal interstate treaty? Was this text set aside in the chronicle in its entirety, or was it compiled by later scribes, editors who cut out from various documents what was included in the Tale of Bygone Years as the Russian-Byzantine treaty of 944?

There is no clarity as to who benefits from this agreement - Byzantium? Rus? What “new balance of power” (“changed balance of power”) did this treaty reflect?

Some particular issues related to the history of the drafting of the document also remain controversial: on whose initiative it was concluded - the Russians or the Greeks? Did the previous clauses of treaties 907 and 911, which were not specified in the 944 treaty, continue to be in force? Can the obligation of Byzantium to pay tribute to Rus to be referred to these articles not included in the treaty?

Finally, researchers, as a rule, did not ask themselves the following questions: what is the place of the 944 treaty in the system of both Byzantine and Russian diplomacy? How does it compare with the Russian-Byzantine treaties of the 60s of the 9th century, 907, 911? What is the level of diplomacy of ancient Russia in comparison with its shoots in the 9th - early 10th century? reflected this diplomatic act?

It is the consideration of these controversial or insufficiently studied issues that this chapter is devoted to.

In 915, moving to the aid of Byzantium against the Bulgarians, the Pechenegs first appeared in Russia. Igor chose not to interfere with them, but in 920 he himself conducted a military campaign against them.

“On the eleventh of June of the fourteenth indicta (941), on ten thousand ships, the dews sailed to Constantinople, which are also called Dromites, and they come from the Franks. The patrician [Theophanes] was sent against them with all the dromons and triremes that had just appeared in the city. He equipped and put in order the fleet, strengthened himself with fasting and tears and prepared to fight the dew. "

The raid did not come as a surprise to Byzantium. The Bulgarians and later the strategists of Kherson sent the news about him in advance. However, the Byzantine fleet fought against the Arabs and defended the islands in the Mediterranean, so that, according to Liutprand, there were only 15 dilapidated Helandia (a type of ship) left in the capital due to their dilapidation. The Byzantines calculated the number of Igor's ships at an incredible 10 thousand. Liutprand Kremonsky, passing on the story of an eyewitness, his stepfather, named a thousand ships in Igor's fleet. According to The Tale of Bygone Years and Liutprand's testimony, the Russians first rushed to plunder the Asia Minor coast of the Black Sea, so that the defenders of Constantinople had time to prepare a rebuff and meet Igor's fleet at sea at the entrance to the Bosphorus, near the city of Hieron.

“Roman [the Byzantine emperor] ordered the shipbuilders to come to him, and said to them: 'Go now and immediately equip those Helandia that remained [at home]. But place the fire thrower not only at the bow, but also at the stern and on both sides. " So, when the Helandia were equipped according to his order, he put the most experienced men in them and ordered them to go to meet King Igor. They set sail; seeing them at sea, King Igor ordered his army to take them alive and not kill them. But the kind and merciful Lord, wanting not only to protect those who worship Him, worship Him, pray to Him, but also honor them with victory, tamed the winds, thereby calming the sea; because otherwise it would have been difficult for the Greeks to throw fire. So, having taken up a position in the middle of the Russian [army], they [began] to throw fire in all directions. The Russians, seeing this, immediately began to rush from the ships into the sea, preferring to drown in the waves rather than burn up in the fire. Some, weighed down by chain mail and helmets, immediately went to the bottom of the sea, and they were no longer seen, while others, having swam, continued to burn even in the water; no one was saved that day if they could not escape to the shore. After all, the ships of the Russians, due to their small size, also sail in shallow water, which the Greek Helandia cannot because of their deep draft. "

Amartol adds that the defeat of Igor after the attack of the fiery Helandia was completed by a flotilla of Byzantine warships: dromons and triremes. It is believed that on June 11, 941, the Russians faced Greek fire for the first time, and the memory of this was preserved for a long time among the Russian soldiers. An ancient Russian chronicler of the beginning of the XII century rendered their words as follows: “As if the Greeks had heavenly lightning and, letting it go, they burned us; that's why they did not overcome them. " According to the PVL, the Russians were first defeated by the Greeks on land, only then there was a brutal defeat at sea, but, probably, the chronicler brought together the battles that took place at different times in different places.

According to the chronicle in 944 (historians consider 943 proven), Igor gathered a new army from the Vikings, Rus (Igor's tribesmen), Slavs (glades, Ilmen Slovenes, Krivichi and Tivertsy) and Pechenegs and marched to Byzantium by cavalry by land, and most of the army sent by sea. The Byzantine emperor Roman I Lacapenus, warned in advance, sent ambassadors with rich gifts to meet Igor, who had already reached the Danube. At the same time, Roman sent gifts to the Pechenegs. After consulting with the squad, Igor, satisfied with the tribute, turned back. Theophanes' successor reports a similar event in April 943, only the opponents of the Byzantines, who made peace and turned back without a fight, were called "Turks". The Byzantines usually called the Hungarians "Turks", but sometimes they widely applied the name to all nomadic peoples from the north, that is, they could also mean the Pechenegs.

In the next year 944, Igor entered into a military-trade agreement with Byzantium. The agreement mentions the names of Igor's nephews, his wife Princess Olga and son Svyatoslav. The chronicler, describing the approval of the treaty in Kiev, reported about the church in which the Varangians-Christians took an oath.

In the fall of 945, Igor, at the request of the squad, dissatisfied with their content, went to the Drevlyans for tribute. The Drevlyans were not included in the army that was defeated in Byzantium. Perhaps that is why Igor decided to improve the situation at their expense. Igor arbitrarily increased the amount of tribute from previous years; when collecting it, the vigilantes committed violence against the inhabitants. On the way home, Igor made an unexpected decision:

“On reflection, he said to his squad: 'Go home with a tribute, and I will return and look again.' And he sent his squad home, and he returned with a small part of the squad, wanting more wealth. The Drevlyans, having heard that they were coming again, held council with their prince Mal: ​​“If a wolf gets into the habit of the sheep, he will carry out the whole flock until they kill him; so this one: if we do not kill him, then we will all be destroyed “[…] and the Drevlyans, leaving the city of Iskorosten, killed Igor and his warriors, since there were few of them. And Igor was buried, and his grave is at Iskorosten in the Derevskaya land to this day. "

25 years later, in a letter to Svyatoslav, the Byzantine emperor John Tzimiskes recalled the fate of Prince Igor, calling him Inger. In the account of Leo the Deacon, the emperor reported that Igor went on a campaign against some Germans, was captured by them, tied to the tops of trees and torn in two.

Princess Olga is the first Christian ruler and the first reformer on the Kiev throne. The tax reform of Princess Olga. Administrative transformations. Baptism of the princess. The spread of Christianity in Russia.

Having conquered the Drevlyans, Olga in 947 went to the Novgorod and Pskov lands, appointing lessons there (a kind of tribute), after which she returned to her son Svyatoslav in Kiev. Olga established a system of "graveyards" - centers of trade and exchange, in which the collection of taxes took place in a more orderly manner; then temples began to be built around the graveyards

In 945, Olga established the size of the "polyudya" - taxes in favor of Kiev, the timing and frequency of their payment - "dues" and "statutes". The lands subject to Kiev were divided into administrative units, in each of which a princely administrator, "tiun", was appointed.

Despite the fact that the Bulgarian preachers had been spreading Christianity in Russia for a long time, and the fact of Olga's baptism, most of the inhabitants of Russia remained pagans.

2.2) Svyatoslav is a warrior prince. War with the Khazar Kaganate. The prince's expeditions to the Danube Bulgaria. Conclusion of treaties with Byzantium. Expansion of the borders of Kievan Rus and strengthening of international authority.
In the "Tale of Bygone Years" it is noted that in 964 Svyatoslav "went to the Oka River and the Volga, and met the Vyatichi." It is possible that at this time, when Svyatoslav's main goal was to strike at the Khazars, he did not subdue the Vyatichi, that is, he had not yet imposed a tribute on them.
In 965 Svyatoslav attacked Khazaria:

“In the summer of 6473 (965) Svyatoslav went to the Khazars. Hearing, the Khazars went out to meet him with their prince Kagan and agreed to fight, and in the battle Svyatoslav the Khazars defeated, and took their capital and Belaya Vezha. And he defeated the Yases and Kasogs. "

A contemporary of events Ibn-Haukal refers the campaign to a slightly later time and also reports on the war with the Volga Bulgaria, the news of which is not confirmed by other sources:

“Bulgar is a small city, there are no numerous districts in it, and was known for being a port for the above-mentioned states, and the Rus devastated it and came to Khazaran, Samandar and Itil in the year 358 (968/969) and set off immediately after to the country of Rum and Andalus ... And al-Khazar is a side, and there is a city called Samandar in it, and it is in the space between it and Bab al-Abwab, and there were numerous gardens in it ..., but the Russians came there, and did not there were neither grapes nor raisins left in the city ”.

Having defeated the armies of both states and ruined their cities, Svyatoslav defeated the Yases and Kasogs, took and destroyed Semender in Dagestan. According to one version, Svyatoslav first took Sarkel on the Don (in 965), then moved east, and in 968 or 969 he conquered Itil and Semender. MI Artamonov believed that the Russian army was moving down the Volga and the capture of Itil preceded the capture of Sarkel. Svyatoslav not only crushed the Khazar Kaganate, but also tried to secure the conquered territories for himself. On the site of Sarkel, the Russian settlement Belaya Vezha appeared. Perhaps, at the same time, Tmutarakan also came under the rule of Kiev. There is information that Russian troops were in Itil until the beginning of the 980s.

In 967, a conflict broke out between Byzantium and the Bulgarian kingdom, the reason for which the sources set out in different ways. In 967/968, the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus Phocas sent an embassy to Svyatoslav. The head of the embassy, ​​Kalokir, was given 15 centinarii of gold (approximately 455 kg) to direct the Russians to raid Bulgaria. According to the most common version, Byzantium wanted to crush the Bulgarian kingdom with someone else's hands, and at the same time weaken Kievan Rus, which, after the victory over Khazaria, could turn its eyes to the Crimean possessions of the empire.

Kalokir agreed with Svyatoslav about an anti-Bulgarian alliance, but at the same time asked to help him take the Byzantine throne from Nikifor Phocas. For this, according to the Byzantine chroniclers John Skilitsa and Leo the Deacon, Kalokir promised "great, countless treasures from the state treasury" and the right to all conquered Bulgarian lands.

In 968 Svyatoslav invaded Bulgaria and after the war with the Bulgarians settled at the mouth of the Danube, in Pereyaslavets, where "tribute from the Greeks" was sent to him. During this period, relations between Russia and Byzantium were most likely tense, but the Italian ambassador Liutprand in July 968 saw Russian ships in the Byzantine fleet, which looks somewhat strange.

The attack on Kiev by the Pechenegs dates back to 968-969. Svyatoslav with a horse squad returned to the defense of the capital and drove the Pechenegs to the steppe. Historians A.P. Novoseltsev and T.M. Kalinina suggest that the Khazars contributed to the attack of the nomads (although there are reasons to believe that Byzantium was no less profitable), and Svyatoslav, in response, organized a second campaign against them, during which Itil was captured , and the kaganate was finally defeated.

During the prince's stay in Kiev, his mother, Princess Olga, who actually ruled Russia in the absence of her son, died. Svyatoslav arranged government in a new way: he put his son Yaropolk on the Kiev reign, Oleg - on the Drevlyanskoye, Vladimir - on the Novgorod one. After that, in the fall of 969, the Grand Duke again went to Bulgaria with an army. The Tale of Bygone Years recounts his words:

“I don’t like to sit in Kiev, I want to live in Pereyaslavets on the Danube - for there is the middle of my land, all the benefits flow there: from the Greek land, gold, poultry, wine, various fruits; from the Czech Republic and from Hungary silver and horses; from Russia furs and wax, honey and slaves. "

The chronicle Pereyaslavets has not been precisely identified. Sometimes it is identified with Preslav or referred to the Danube port of Preslav Small. According to unknown sources (as presented by Tatishchev), in the absence of Svyatoslav, his governor in Pereyaslavets, Voivode Volk, was forced to withstand a siege from the Bulgarians. Byzantine sources sparingly describe Svyatoslav's war with the Bulgarians. His army on boats approached the Bulgarian Dorostol on the Danube and after the battle captured it from the Bulgarians. Later, the capital of the Bulgarian kingdom, Preslav the Great, was also captured, after which the Bulgarian king entered into a forced alliance with Svyatoslav.

Soon he returned to the Balkans, again took from the Bulgarians the Pereyaslavets he liked so much. This time, the Byzantine emperor John Tzimiskes spoke out against the presumptuous Svyatoslav. The war went on for a long time with varying success. All new Scandinavian detachments approached Svyatoslav, they won victories and expanded their possessions, reaching Filippol (Plovdiv). It is curious that in that war of conquest, far from his homeland, Svyatoslav uttered before the battle the catchphrase of the Russian patriot, which later became the catch phrase: "We will not shame the Russian land, but we will lie down with our bones, for the dead have no shame." But the troops of Svyatoslav and other kings melted away in battles, and in the end, surrounded in 971 in Dorostol, Svyatoslav agreed to make peace with the Byzantines and leave Bulgaria.

In the spring of 970, Svyatoslav, in alliance with the Bulgarians, Pechenegs and Hungarians, attacked the possessions of Byzantium in Thrace. According to Byzantine sources, all the Pechenegs were surrounded and killed, and then the main forces of Svyatoslav were defeated. The Old Russian chronicle presents events differently: according to the chronicler, Svyatoslav won a victory, came close to Constantinople, but retreated, only taking a large tribute, including on the dead soldiers. According to the version of Syuzumov M. Ya. And Sakharov A. N., the battle, which the Russian chronicle tells about and in which the Russians won a victory, was separate from the battle of Arkadiopol. One way or another, in the summer of 970, major hostilities on the territory of Byzantium ceased.In April 971, Emperor John I of Tzimiskes personally opposed Svyatoslav at the head of the land army, sending a fleet of 300 ships to the Danube to cut off the retreat of the Rus. On April 13, 971, the Bulgarian capital Preslav was captured, where the Bulgarian Tsar Boris II was captured. Part of the Russian soldiers, led by the voivode Sfenkel, managed to break through to the north to Dorostol, where Svyatoslav was with the main forces.

On April 23, 971, Tzimiskes approached Dorostol. In the battle, the Russians were thrown back into the fortress, and a three-month siege began. The parties suffered losses in continuous skirmishes, the leaders of Ikmor and Sfenkel perished among the Russians, the military leader Ioann Kurkuas fell among the Byzantines. On July 21, another general battle took place, in which Svyatoslav, according to the Byzantines, was wounded. The battle ended in vain for both sides, but after it Svyatoslav entered into peace negotiations. John Tzimiskes unconditionally accepted the conditions of the Rus. Svyatoslav with the army had to leave Bulgaria, the Byzantines provided his soldiers (22 thousand people) with a supply of bread for two months. Svyatoslav also entered into a military alliance with Byzantium, and trade relations were restored. On these conditions, Svyatoslav left Bulgaria, which was greatly weakened by the wars on its territory.

3.1) The main directions of state activities of Yaroslav the Wise. Socio-economic system of Kievan Rus. Formation of large land ownership. The folding of the estate system. The main categories of the free and dependent population. "Russian Truth" and "Pravda Yaroslavichi". The reign of the sons of Yaroslav and the princely feuds. Board of Vladimir Monomakh.

After the death of Yaroslav, as before, after the death of his father Vladimir, strife and strife reigned in Russia. As N. M. Karamzin wrote: "Ancient Russia buried her power and prosperity with Yaroslav." But this did not happen immediately. Of the five sons of Yaroslav (Yaroslavich), three survived the father: Izyaslav, Svyatoslav and Vsevolod. Dying, Yaroslav approved the order of succession to the throne, according to which power passes from the elder brother to the younger. At first, the children of Yaroslav did just that: the golden table went to the eldest of them, Izyaslav Yaroslavich, and Svyatoslav and Vsevolod obeyed him. They lived with him amicably for 15 years, together they even supplemented "Yaroslav's Pravda" with new articles, focusing on raising fines for an attempt on the prince's property. This is how Pravda Yaroslavichi appeared.
But in 1068 the peace was broken. The Russian army of the Yaroslavichs suffered a heavy defeat from the Polovtsians. The Kievites, dissatisfied with them, expelled the Grand Duke Izyaslav and his brother Vsevolod from the city, plundered the princely palace and declared the ruler of the Polotsk prince Vseslav released from the Kiev prison - during the campaign against Polotsk, the Yaroslavichs seized him and brought him as a prisoner to Kiev. The chronicler considered Vseslav to be bloodthirsty and evil. He wrote that Vseslav's cruelty came from the influence of a certain amulet - a magic bandage, which he wore on his head, covering an unhealed ulcer with it. The Grand Duke Izyaslav, expelled from Kiev, fled to Poland, taking the princely wealth with the words: "With this I will find soldiers," meaning the mercenaries. And soon he really appeared at the walls of Kiev with a hired Polish army and quickly regained power in Kiev. Vseslav, without offering resistance, fled home to Polotsk.
After the flight of Vseslav, a struggle began already within the clan of the Yaroslavichs, who had forgotten the commandments of their father. The younger brothers Svyatoslav and Vsevolod overthrew the elder Izyaslav, who again fled to Poland, and then to Germany, where he could not find help in any way. The middle brother Svyatoslav Yaroslavich became the Grand Duke in Kiev. But his age turned out to be short-lived. Active and aggressive, he fought a lot, had immeasurable ambitions, and died from the knife of a clumsy surgeon, who in 1076 tried to cut out some kind of tumor from the prince.
The younger brother Vsevolod Yaroslavich who came to power after him, married to the daughter of the Byzantine emperor, was a God-fearing and meek man. He also ruled for a short time and innocently yielded the throne to Izyaslav, who had returned from Germany. But he was chronically unlucky: Prince Izyaslav died on Nezhatina Niva near Chernigov in 1078 in a battle with his nephew, the son of Svyatoslav Oleg, who himself wanted to take the throne of his father. The spear pierced his back, therefore, either he fled, or, most likely, someone struck the prince with a treacherous blow from behind. The chronicler tells us that Izyaslav was a prominent man, with a pleasant face, had a rather quiet disposition, and was kind-hearted. His first deed on the Kiev table was the abolition of the death penalty, replaced by vira - a fine. His kindness was, apparently, the reason for his misadventures: Izyaslav Yaroslavich all the time longed for the throne, but was not cruel enough to establish himself on it.
As a result, the Kiev gold-table again went to the youngest son of Yaroslav Vsevolod, who ruled until 1093. Educated, endowed with intelligence, the Grand Duke spoke five languages, but he ruled the country poorly, unable to cope with either the Polovtsy, or hunger, or the pestilence that devastated Kiev and surrounding lands. On the magnificent Kiev table, he remained a modest appanage prince Pereyaslavsky, as the great father Yaroslav the Wise made him in his youth. He could not bring order to his own family. The grown-up sons of his siblings and cousins ​​fought desperately over power, continuously fighting each other over the lands. For them, the word of their uncle - Grand Duke Vsevolod Yaroslavich - no longer meant anything.
Strife in Russia, then smoldering, then breaking out into war, continued. Intrigue and murder became common among the princely environment. So, in the fall of 1086, the nephew of the Grand Duke Yaropolk Izyaslavich during the campaign was suddenly killed by his servant, who stabbed the master in the side with a knife. The reason for the atrocity is unknown, but, most likely, the basis was a strife over the lands of Yaropolk with his relatives - the Rostislavichs, who were sitting in Przemysl. Prince Vsevolod's only hope was his beloved son Vladimir Monomakh.
The reign of Izyaslav and Vsevolod, the feuds of their relatives took place at a time when for the first time a new enemy came from the steppes - the Polovtsy (Turks), who drove out the Pechenegs and began to attack Russia almost continuously. In 1068, in a night battle, they defeated the princely regiments of Izyaslav and began to boldly plunder the Russian lands. Since then, not a year has passed without Polovtsian raids. Their hordes reached Kiev, and once the Polovtsians burned down the famous princely palace in Berestovo. For the sake of power and wealthy estates, the Russian princes at war with each other entered into agreements with the Polovtsy and led their hordes to Russia.
July 1093 turned out to be especially tragic, when the Polovtsy on the banks of the Stugna River defeated the united squad of Russian princes, who acted unfriendly. The defeat was terrible: the whole Stugna was filled with the corpses of Russian soldiers, and the field was smoking with the blood of the fallen. “On the morning of the 24th,” the chronicler writes, “on the day of the holy martyrs Boris and Gleb, there was a great cry in the city, and not joy, for our great sins and injustices, for the multiplication of our iniquities.” In the same year, Khan Bonyak nearly captured Kiev and ravaged its formerly inviolable shrine - the Kiev Caves Monastery, and also burned down the outskirts of the great city.

The reasons for the war between Prince Igor and Byzantium

The reasons for the campaign in Constantinople in 941 remained a mystery for the Old Russian chronicle, which was limited to a simple registration of the fact: "Igor's Idea against the Greeks." This is natural, since it remained out of sight of the compilers of the Tale of Bygone Years. Historiography also did not say anything significant about this. As a rule, the 941 campaign was simply put in a row with other Rus raids on Byzantium and was viewed as a continuation of the Russian expansion in the Black Sea, which began in the first third of the 9th century. At the same time, they lost sight of the fact that it fully satisfied the political ambitions and trade interests of the Rus, in connection with which it was pointless to seek its revision on their part. Indeed, the subsequent Russian-Byzantine treaties did not show any "progress" in the field of state-trade conditions for "Rus", reproducing, with a few exceptions, the text of the 911 agreement.

The opinion was expressed that thirty years (from 911 to 941) was the time period for which the action of "eternal peace" extended in accordance with the traditions of Byzantine diplomacy, after which the Russians had to force the renewal of the trade agreement with an armed hand ( Petrukhin V.Ya. Slavs, Varangians and Khazars in the south of Russia. On the problem of the formation of the ancient Russian state // The most ancient states of Eastern Europe. M., 1995.S. 73). But this conjecture is not supported by facts. A simple glance at the chronology of the Rus campaigns against Byzantium (860, 904, 911, 941, 944, 970-971, 988/989, 1043) immediately reveals that the thirty-year interval is as random as any other. In addition, the 911 treaty does not contain even a hint of a definite period of its validity, and the 944 treaty was concluded "for the whole summer, the sun shines until the sun and the whole world stands."

The campaign of 941 will look like an unreasonable aggression until the Russian land of Prince Igor ceases to be identified with the power of the "light princes", and Oleg II will not be given a place in Russian history. The events of 941 are directly related to. The Kiev princely family took advantage of the opportunity to put an end to the formal dependence of the Russian land on the "bright prince". To do this, Igor needed to receive international recognition of his status as a sovereign ruler - the great Russian prince, "the archon of Russia." The best patent for this title at that time was an agreement with Byzantium, but that, apparently, delayed its issuance or put forward some conditions unacceptable for Kiev. That is why Igor was about to disturb the borders of the empire. In the same way, Otto I in the second half of the 60s and the beginning of the 70s. X century it was necessary to forcefully wrest from Byzantium the recognition of his imperial title.

The size of the Russian fleet

Most sources grossly exaggerate the size of the Russian fleet that raided Constantinople. Our chronicles, based on the information of the Successor of Theophanes and George Amartol, call an unthinkable figure - 10,000 boats. The German ambassador Liutprand, who visited Constantinople several years after the defeat of the Russian flotilla, learned from conversations with eyewitnesses that the Rus had "a thousand and even more ships." The Byzantine writer Lev Grammatik, who writes about the invasion of the 10-thousandth Russian army, evaluates the forces of the Rus even more modestly. From the "Tale of Bygone Years" it is known that the Russian boat could accommodate about forty people. The construction of large military ships, which could accommodate up to four dozen soldiers, is the distinguishing feature of the Slavic maritime traditions. So, characterizing the armed forces of Croatia, Konstantin Porphyrogenitus writes that in addition to a very numerous foot troops, the Croatian ruler can put up 80 sagens (large boats) and 100 kondurs (boats). In each sagena, according to the emperor, there were about 40 people, in large kondurs up to 20, in small - up to 10 ("On the management of the empire").

So the 10 thousandth Russian flotilla is reduced to 250 boats. But here it should be borne in mind that a significant part of the Rus flotilla was made up of the allied naval squads of the princes. Igor was not at all eager to get involved in a real war with Byzantium. The raid undertaken by a small force was to be of a demonstrative nature. It was not the intention of the Kiev prince to inflict serious military and material damage on the empire, which could prevent the immediate resumption of friendly relations immediately after the end of the campaign.

Defeat at the walls of Constantinople

The hike began in the spring of 941.

Around the middle of May, Igor sailed from Kiev on his boats. Keeping to the coastline, he reached the Bulgarian coast three weeks later, where he was joined by a flotilla of Taurian Rus, who had arrived here from the eastern Crimea. The reliability of this route of the Russian army is confirmed in the Greek Life of Basil the New. The report of the Kherson strategist, it says there, “declaring their [Rus] invasion and that they had already approached these [Kherson] regions”, reached Constantinople a few days after the news of this “spread ... in the palace and between residents of the city. " Consequently, the mayor of Kherson was late in announcing the danger and someone else was the first to raise the alarm in Constantinople.
The “Tale of Bygone Years” says that the news of the invasion of Russia was first brought to Roman I by the Bulgarians (Byzantium was then on friendly terms with Bulgaria; the Bulgarian Tsar Peter was the son-in-law of Roman I (after his granddaughter) and received from him the title of “Basileus of the Bulgarians”) , and then the Korsuns (Chersonesos). These testimonies are especially interesting because the ancient Russian chronicler attributes the raid on Constantinople to Igor alone. But then what does the Kherson strategy have to do with it? After all, Kherson did not lie on the way from the mouth of the Dnieper to Constantinople, and Igor had absolutely no reason to "approach these regions." The apparent contradiction, however, is easily eliminated if we consider that in the campaign of 941 the Rus had not one, but two starting points: Kiev and eastern Crimea. The sequence of notification of the Rus invasion testifies that the Kherson stratig was alarmed only when he saw the ships of the Taurian Rus sailing past his city, en route to join the Kiev flotilla, which, having left the Dnieper into the Black Sea, immediately headed for the shores of Bulgaria. Only with such a development of events could the Bulgarians turn out to be more agile messengers of trouble than the head of the Byzantine outpost in the Northern Black Sea region.

On June 11, the Russians camped near Constantinople, in full view of the inhabitants of the city. Talking about the beginning of the campaign, Greek sources are silent about the usual Russian violence against the civilian population. Nothing is also said about the plundered goods, while regarding the previous forays of the Rus on Constantinople, there are concordant reports from various sources about the general robbery and "huge booty". Apparently, Igor kept his soldiers from robbery and murder, so that excessive cruelty would not close for himself the paths to a speedy, as he hoped, reconciliation with Roman.

So several days passed in inactivity. The Rus remained in their camp, doing nothing. They seemed to suggest that the Greeks be the first to attack them. However, the Greeks had nothing to oppose them from the sea side, since Roman I sent the Greek fleet to defend the Mediterranean islands from the attacks of the Arabs. Of course, Igor was well aware of this, and his slowness is most likely due to the fact that he was expecting a response from the Greeks to the proposals that had already been transmitted to him "to renew the old world."

However, Constantinople was in no hurry to enter into negotiations with the newly-minted "Archon of Russia". According to Liutprand, the Roman Emperor spent many sleepless nights "in a state of contemplation." Shortly before that, he was not averse. Since then, his views on the expediency of using the military resources of the Russian land to protect the interests of the empire in the Northern Black Sea region have hardly changed (a number of articles from the 944 treaty confirm this). But considerations of prestige, presumably, kept Roman from succumbing to open pressure. The divine basileus romeev could not afford to talk to himself in the language of dictatorship. He feverishly sought funds to lift the siege of the city. Finally, he was informed that a dozen and a half were found in the port of Constantinople helandium(large military ships that could accommodate about 100 rowers and several dozen soldiers), written off ashore due to their dilapidation. The emperor immediately ordered the ship's carpenters to refurbish these vessels and put them in order as soon as possible; in addition, he ordered to place flamethrower machines ("siphons") not only on the bows of ships, as was usually done, but also at the stern and even along the sides. Patrician Theophan ( patrician- a court title of the highest rank, introduced in the IV century. Constantine I the Great and existed until the beginning of the 12th century).

Siphon

The half-rotten squadron did not look very impressive even after being repaired. Theophanes decided to take her out to sea not earlier than "strengthened himself with fasting and tears."

Seeing the Greek ships, the Rus raised their sails and rushed to meet them. Theophanes was waiting for them in the Golden Horn Bay. When the Russians approached the Pharos lighthouse, he gave the order to attack the enemy.

Igor must have been amused by the pitiful appearance of the Greek squadron. It seemed that the victory over her was a matter of some half an hour. Filled with contempt for the Greeks, he moved one Kiev squad against Theophanes. The destruction of the Greek flotilla was not part of his intentions. Liutprand writes that Igor "ordered his army not to kill them [the Greeks], but to take them alive." This order, very strange from a military point of view, could only be motivated by political considerations. Probably, Igor was going to return to Byzantium its captured soldiers at the end of the victorious battle in exchange for concluding an alliance treaty.

Igor's Rus bravely went to the rapprochement with the Greek ships, intending to take them on board. Russian boats stuck around the ship of Theophanes, which went ahead of the battle formation of the Greeks. At this moment, the wind suddenly died down, the sea was completely calm. Now the Greeks could use their flamethrowers without hindrance. The instantaneous change in the weather was perceived by them as help from above. Greek sailors and soldiers perked up. And now from the ship of Theophanes, surrounded by Russian boats, fiery streams poured in all directions *. A flammable liquid has spilled over the water. The sea around the Russian ships seemed to suddenly flare up; several rooks blazed at once.

* The basis of "liquid fire" was natural pure oil. However, his secret “consisted not so much in the ratio of the ingredients included in the mixture, but in the technology and methods of its use, namely: in the precise determination of the degree of heating of the hermetically sealed boiler and in the degree of pressure on the surface of the mixture of air injected with the help of bellows. At the right moment, the tap, locking the exit from the boiler to the siphon, was opened, an icon lamp with an open fire was brought to the outlet, and the flammable liquid thrown out with force, ignited, erupted onto ships or siege machines of the enemy "( Konstantin Porphyrogenitus. On the management of the empire (text, translation, commentary) / Ed. G.G. Litavrina and A.P. Novoseltsev. M., 1989, note. 33, p. 342).

The action of "Greek fire". Miniature from "Chronicle" of John Skilitsa. XII-XIII centuries

The action of the terrible weapon shook the Igor Warriors to the core. In an instant, all their courage disappeared, the Russians were seized by panic fear. “Seeing this,” Liutprand writes, “the Russians immediately began to rush from the ships into the sea, preferring to drown in the waves rather than burn up in flames. Others, burdened with shells and helmets, went to the bottom, and they were no longer seen, while some kept afloat burned even in the middle of the sea waves. " The Greek ships arrived in time "to complete the rout, many ships were sunk together with the crew, many were killed, and even more were taken alive" (Theophan's successor). Igor, as Leo the Deacon testifies, escaped "with hardly a dozen boats" (these words should hardly be taken literally), which managed to land on the shore.

The rapid death of Igor's troops demoralized the rest of the Rus. The Black Sea princes did not dare to come to his aid and took their boats to the coast of Asia Minor, in shallow waters. Heavy Greek Helandia, which had a deep landing, could not pursue them.

Separation of the army of the Rus

Contrary to the triumphant tone of the Byzantine chronicles, the Greek victory in the strait was more spectacular than decisive. Only one part of the Russian fleet, the Kiev part of the Russian fleet, was defeated - a quick but hardly final one, the other, the Tauride, survived and did not cease to be a serious threat for the Greeks. No wonder the Life of Vasily the New ends the description of the first stage of the Russian campaign with a simple remark that the Russians were not allowed to reach Constantinople. However, the jubilation of the Constantinople was genuine. The general holiday was enlivened by an exciting spectacle: by order of Roman, all captured Rus were beheaded - perhaps as violators of the oath promises of 911.

Both parts of the divided Russian army lost all contact with each other. Apparently, this explains the strange contradiction that is revealed when comparing the coverage of the events of 941 in Old Russian and Byzantine sources. According to the latter, the war with the Rus falls into two stages: the first ended with the June defeat of the Russian fleet at Constantinople; the second continued in Asia Minor for another three months and ended in September with the final defeat of the Rus. Old Russian sources telling about Igor's campaign against the Greeks date back to Byzantine sources (mainly to the Chronicle of George Amartolus and the Life of Basil the New). But in this case, this is not a simple compilation, so common for the ancient Russian annals. It turns out that “the compilers of the first Russian chronographs, who used the Chronicle of Amartol and the Life of Vasily the New, not only copied information about Igor's first campaign from them, but considered it necessary to supplement this information from some Russian source (which partly already took place during the translation of the Life of Vasily the New into Russian) and make such rearrangements in the text of the Chronicle and Life, which changed them beyond recognition "( Polovoy N.Ya. On the question of Igor's first campaign against Byzantium (Comparative analysis of Russian and Byzantine sources) // Byzantine time book. T. XVIII. M., 1961.S. 86). The essence of these changes and rearrangements boils down to the fact that the Byzantine news of the second stage of the 941 campaign (in Asia Minor) was either completely discarded or explained in its own way. In the "Tale of Bygone Years" the second stage of the war is obscured by the annexation of the Asia Minor provinces of Byzantium to the list of those regions that were devastated from the very beginning of the campaign: Igor "often fought the Vithynian country, and fought along Pontus to Irakli and to the Faflogonsky land [Paphlagonia], and the whole country of Nicomedia became more subdued, and the whole Court was burnt. " The "Jellin chronicler" forces Igor to make two campaigns - first to Constantinople, then to Asia Minor. Thus, the Russian chronicles finish the description of Igor's first campaign with the only naval battle at Constantinople and the return of the prince to Kiev. Obviously, the chroniclers, correcting the information of the Greek monuments about the 941 campaign, relied on the stories of only Kiev participants, preserved in oral traditions.

So, Igor with the remnants of his army, barely recovering from the defeat, immediately began to retreat. There was no trace of the peace-loving mood of the Russians. They vented their rage from the defeat they had suffered in a Byzantine village called Stenon *, which was plundered and burned to the ground. However, Igor's army was not capable of causing major destruction to the Greeks due to his small number. The news of Russian robberies on the European coast of Pontus in the Byzantine chronicles is limited to the message about the burning of Stenon.

* In Byzantine sources Stenon is called: 1) a village on the European coast of the Bosphorus; 2) the entire European coast of the Bosphorus ( Polovoy N.Ya. On the question of Igor's first campaign against Byzantium. P. 94). In this case, the first value is meant. The attack on Stenon could not have been carried out by the Taurian Rus, who sailed, according to Theophan's Successor, "to the Burning Mountain", the area on the Asia Minor coast of the Bosphorus - another evidence of the division of the Russian fleet.

In July Igor with the remnants of his squad arrived at the "Bospor of Cimmerian", that is, in the "Russian" Tavrika, where he stopped awaiting news of his Black Sea comrades-in-arms.

War off the coast of Asia Minor

Meanwhile, the rest of the Russian fleet scurried along the coast of Bithynia, locked in the shallow water by Theophanes squadron. To help the Byzantine naval commander in Constantinople, the land army was hastily equipped. But before his arrival, the inhabitants of the Asia Minor coast, among whom were many descendants of the Slavs, who formed here in the VIII-IX centuries. numerous Bithynian colony *, were at the mercy of the Rus. According to the "Tale of Bygone Years", the extreme eastern regions that were raided by the Rus were Nicomedia and Paphlagonia. One Byzantine document, dating from about 945, confirms the chronicle information. In a letter from the disgraced Metropolitan of Nicea Alexander to the new Metropolitan of this city Ignatius, the former bishop recalls his "help to your [Ignatius] Nicomedians in the name of philanthropy during the invasion ..." ( Litavrin G.G. Byzantium, Bulgaria, Ancient Russia (IX - early XIII centuries). SPb., 2000.S. 75).

* In the middle of the 7th century. many Slavic tribes that invaded the Balkans recognized the supremacy of the Byzantine emperor. A large Slavic colony was placed by the imperial authorities in Bithynia as liable for military service.

And help to the inhabitants of the local cities and villages in the summer of 941 was absolutely necessary, for the Rus finally gave themselves full freedom. Their cruelty, fueled by the thirst for revenge for the burned and executed comrades, knew no bounds. The follower of Theophanes writes with horror about their atrocities: the Russians set the entire coast on fire, “and some of the prisoners were crucified on a cross, others were hammered into the ground, others were set as targets and shot from bows. For the captives from the priesthood, they tied their hands behind their backs and drove iron nails into their heads. They also burned many holy churches. "

The blood of civilians flowed like a river until the patrician Varda Foka arrived in depopulated Bithynia "with horsemen and elite warriors." The situation immediately changed not in favor of the Russians, who began to suffer defeat after defeat. According to the Successor of Theophanes, "the dew sent a large detachment to Bithynia to stock up on food and everything necessary, but this detachment overtook Varda Fock, utterly defeated him, put him to flight and killed his soldiers." At the same time, the domestic schol * John Curkuas “came there at the head of the entire eastern army” and, “appearing here and there, he killed many who had broken away from their enemies, and the dew retreated in fear of his onslaught, not daring to leave their ships anymore. and make sorties. "

* Domestic schol - the title of the governor of the eastern (Asia Minor) provinces of Byzantium.

About a month passed in this way. The Rus could not find a way out of the sea trap in any way. Meanwhile, September was running out, "the dew was running out of food, they were afraid of the advancing troops of the domestic schol Curkuas, his intelligence and ingenuity, no less afraid of naval battles and the skillful maneuvers of Patrician Theophanes, and therefore decided to return home." One dark September night, the Rus fleet tried to slip unnoticed by a Greek squadron to the European coast of the Bosphorus. But Feofan was on the alert. A second naval battle ensued. However, to be precise, there was no battle in the proper sense of the word: the Greek Helands simply chased after the fleeing Russian boats, pouring liquid fire on them - “and he launched many ships to the bottom, and the mentioned man [Theophanes] killed many dews”. The life of Vasily Novy states: "Those who escaped from the hands of our fleet died on the way from a terrible relaxation of the stomach." Although Byzantine sources tell of the almost total extermination of the Rus, some part of the Russian fleet, apparently, still managed to snuggle up to the Thracian coast and hide in the darkness.

The defeat of the Russian flotilla. Miniature from the "Chronicle" of John Skilitsa. XII-XIII centuries

"Olyadny" (Olyadiya (Old Russian) - boat, ship) fire, the effect of which the Russians experienced for the first time in 941, became the talk of the town for a long time in Russia. The Life of Basil says that the Russian soldiers returned to their homeland, "to tell what happened to them and what they suffered at the behest of God." The "Tale of Bygone Years" brought the living voices of these people scorched by fire to us: "Those who returned to their land told about what happened; and about the old fire they said that the Greeks had this lightning from heaven; and, letting it go, they burned us, and for this reason they did not overcome them. " These stories are indelibly engraved in the memory of the Russians. Leo the Deacon reports that even thirty years later, Svyatoslav's soldiers still could not recall the liquid fire without trembling, since “they heard from their elders” that with this fire the Greeks had turned Igor's fleet into ashes.

Introduction

The Russian-Byzantine war of 941-944 was an unsuccessful campaign of Prince Igor against Byzantium in 941 and a repeated campaign in 943, which ended with a peace treaty in 944.

On June 11, 941, Igor's fleet was scattered at the entrance to the Bosphorus by the Byzantine squadron, which used Greek fire, after which the hostilities continued for another 3 months on the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor. On September 15, 941, the Russian fleet was finally defeated off the coast of Thrace while trying to break through to Russia. In 943, Prince Igor gathered a new army with the participation of the Pechenegs and led a campaign on the Danube to the northern borders of the Byzantine Empire. This time it did not come to military clashes, Byzantium concluded a peace treaty with Igor, paying tribute.

1. Background and role of the Khazar Kaganate

The Cambridge document (a letter from a Khazar Jew of the 2nd half of the 10th century) links the campaign of Russia to Constantinople with the events that took place in Khazaria shortly before that. Around the 930s, the Byzantine emperor Roman launched a campaign against the Jews. In response, the Khazar kagan, who professes Judaism, “ overthrew the multitude of uncircumcised". Then Roman, with the help of gifts, persuaded no one Halgu named " tsar of Russia", To raid the Khazars.

Khalga captured Samkerts (near the Kerch Strait), after which the Khazar military leader Pesach came out against him and Byzantium, who destroyed three Byzantine cities and laid siege to Chersonesos in the Crimea. Then Pesach attacked Khalga, fought off the spoil of that one from Samkerts and from the position of the winner entered into negotiations. Halga was forced to agree to Pesach's demand to start a war with Byzantium.

The further development of events in the Cambridge Document generally coincides with the description of Prince Igor's campaign against Byzantium, known from Byzantine and Old Russian sources, but with an unexpected ending:

“And he went against his will and fought against Kustantina [Constantinople] at sea for four months. And his heroes fell there, because the Macedonians overpowered [him] with fire. And he fled, and was ashamed to return to his country, but went by sea to Persia, and there he and all his camp fell. Then the Rus became subordinate to the power of the barracks. "

There were attempts to identify Khalga with Oleg Veshchiy (S. Shekhter and P. K. Kokovtsov, later D. Ilovaisky and M. S. Hrushevsky) or Igor himself (Helgi Inger, “Oleg the Younger” by Yu. D. Brutskus). Such identifications, however, led to a contradiction with all other reliable sources on the 941 campaign. According to the Cambridge document, Russia fell into dependence on the Khazars, but the ancient Russian chronicles and Byzantine authors do not even mention the Khazars when describing the events. ...

N. Ya. Polovoy proposes the following reconstruction of events: Khalga was one of Igor's governors. While he was fighting Pesach, Igor decided to make peace with the Khazars, recalled Khalgu from Tmutarakan and set out on a campaign against Constantinople. That is why Halga so firmly holds the word given to Passover to fight with Roman. Part of the Russian army with the voivode Khalga sailed past Chersonesos, and the other part with Igor along the coast of Bulgaria. From both places, news of an approaching enemy came to Constantinople, so Igor did not manage to catch the city by surprise, as happened during the first foray of the Rus in 860.

2. Igor's first campaign. 941 year

2.1. Sources for the 941 campaign

The raid on Constantinople in 941 and subsequent events of the same year are reflected in the Byzantine Chronicle of Amartolus (borrowed from the Continuer of Theophanes) and the Life of Basil the New, as well as in the historical work of Liutprandus of Cremona (Book of Retribution, 5.XV). The messages of the Old Russian chronicles (XI-XII centuries) are generally based on Byzantine sources with the addition of individual details preserved in Russian legends.

2.2. Defeat at Hieron

Theophan's successor begins the story of the raid in the following way:

“On the eleventh of June of the fourteenth indicta (941), on ten thousand ships, the dews sailed to Constantinople, which are also called Dromites, and they come from the Franks. The patrician [Theophanes] was sent against them with all the dromons and triremes that had just appeared in the city. He equipped and put in order the fleet, strengthened himself with fasting and tears and prepared to fight the dew. "

The raid did not come as a surprise to Byzantium. The Bulgarians and later the strategists of Kherson sent the news about him in advance. However, the Byzantine fleet fought against the Arabs and defended the islands in the Mediterranean, so that, according to Liutprand, there were only 15 dilapidated Helandia (a type of ship) left in the capital due to their dilapidation. The Byzantines calculated the number of Igor's ships at an incredible 10 thousand. Liutprand Kremonsky, passing on the story of an eyewitness, his stepfather, named a thousand ships in Igor's fleet. According to The Tale of Bygone Years and Liutprand's testimony, the Russians first rushed to plunder the Asia Minor coast of the Black Sea, so that the defenders of Constantinople had time to prepare a rebuff and meet Igor's fleet at sea at the entrance to the Bosphorus, near the city of Hieron.

The most detailed account of the first naval battle was left by Liutprand:

“Roman [the Byzantine emperor] ordered the shipbuilders to come to him, and said to them:“ Go now and immediately equip those Helandies that remain [at home]. But place the fire throwing device not only on the bow, but also on the stern and on both sides”. So, when the Helandia were equipped according to his order, he put the most experienced men in them and ordered them to go to meet King Igor. They set sail; seeing them at sea, King Igor ordered his army to take them alive and not kill them. But the kind and merciful Lord, wanting not only to protect those who worship Him, worship Him, pray to Him, but also honor them with victory, tamed the winds, thereby calming the sea; because otherwise it would have been difficult for the Greeks to throw fire. So, having taken up a position in the middle of the Russian [army], they [began] to throw fire in all directions. The Russians, seeing this, immediately began to rush from the ships into the sea, preferring to drown in the waves rather than burn up in the fire. Some, weighed down by chain mail and helmets, immediately went to the bottom of the sea, and they were no longer seen, while others, having swam, continued to burn even in the water; no one was saved that day if they could not escape to the shore. After all, the ships of the Russians, due to their small size, also sail in shallow water, which the Greek Helandia cannot because of their deep draft. "

Amartol adds that the defeat of Igor after the attack of the fiery Helandia was completed by a flotilla of Byzantine warships: dromons and triremes. It is believed that on June 11, 941, the Russians faced Greek fire for the first time, and the memory of this was preserved for a long time among the Russian soldiers. An ancient Russian chronicler of the beginning of the XII century rendered their words as follows: “ As if the Greeks have heavenly lightning and, letting it go, they burned us; that is why they did not overcome them."According to the PVL, the Russians were first defeated by the Greeks on land, only then there was a brutal defeat at sea, but, probably, the chronicler brought together the battles that took place at different times in different places.

According to PVL and Liutprand, the war ended on this: Igor returned home with the surviving soldiers (according to Leo the Deacon, he had hardly 10 ships left). Emperor Roman ordered the execution of all captured Rus.

2.3. Fighting in Asia Minor

Byzantine sources (Chronicle of Amartol and the life of Basil the New) describe the continuation of the 941 campaign in Asia Minor, where part of the Russian army retreated after the defeat at Iero. According to the Successor of Theophanes, hostilities on the southern coast of the Black Sea developed as follows:

“The survivors sailed to the eastern shore, to the Sgora. And then the patrician Varda Foka with horsemen and elite warriors was sent by them to intercept from the stratigs. Dew sent a large detachment to Bithynia to stock up on provisions and everything necessary, but this detachment overtook Varda Foka, defeated him completely, put him to flight and killed his soldiers. Came there at the head of the entire eastern army and the cleverest domestic schol John Curkuas, who, appearing here and there, killed a lot of those who had broken away from their enemies, and the dew receded in fear of his onslaught, they did not dare to leave their ships and make sorties anymore.

Many atrocities were committed by the dew before the approach of the Roman army: they burnt the coast of the Wall (Bosphorus), and of the prisoners, some were crucified on a cross, others were hammered into the ground, others were set as targets and shot from bows. For the captives from the priesthood, they tied their hands behind their backs and drove iron nails into their heads. They also burned many holy temples. However, winter was approaching, the dews were running out of food, they were afraid of the advancing troops of the domestic schol Curkuas, his mind and ingenuity, they were no less afraid of sea battles and the skillful maneuvers of Patrician Theophanes and therefore decided to return home. Trying to pass unnoticed by the fleet, in September of the fifteenth indicta (941) they set sail at night to the Thracian coast, but were met by the aforementioned patrician Theophanes and were unable to hide from his vigilant and valiant soul. Immediately a second battle ensues, and many ships have sunk to the bottom, and many dews have been killed by the mentioned husband. Only a few managed to escape on their ships, approach the coast of Kila (Thrace) and escape at nightfall. "

Thus, throughout the summer, 941 Russian troops plundered the Asia Minor coast of the Black Sea until the main forces of the Byzantine army approached. The PVL reports about 40 thousand soldiers in the eastern army of the Domestic Kurkuas, in addition to the detachments of Varda Phocas (from Macedonia) and the stratilates Fedor (from Thrace). The fighting was carried out by the Rus' raids from boats, which were inaccessible to Byzantine warships in the shallow waters of Asia Minor. In an attempt to break through to Russia, undertaken on the evening of September 15, 941, the Rus fleet was found at sea and destroyed near the city of Kila (Κοιλία) near the entrance to the Bosphorus. The fate of the Russian army after the second defeat at sea remained unknown. It is unlikely that many managed to return to Russia, since the Russian chronicles are silent about such a development of events.

Old Russian sources rebuilt the narrative in such a way that all hostilities ended in the first and only naval defeat. The historian N. Ya. Polovoy explains this fact by the fact that after the defeat at Hieron the Russian army was divided. Part of the army with Igor returned to Russia, only their fate was reflected in the Russian chronicles, but most of the fleet escaped in shallow water off the coast of Asia Minor, where Greek ships could not get close because of the deep draft. As the commander of the part of the Russian army that remained in Asia Minor, N. Ya. Polovoy considers Khalgu, known from the aforementioned Khazar source, who fought with Byzantium for 4 months. Also for 4 months, from June to September 941, hostilities continued on Amartol.

The historian G. G. Litavrin suggests that the Rus also penetrated the Bosporus and the Sea of ​​Marmara through shallow water and completely dominated there, which led to a break in communication between the European and Asian coasts.

3. Igor's second campaign. 943 year

All information about Igor's 2nd campaign and the subsequent peace treaty is contained only in Russian chronicles.

PVL refers the trip to 944: “ In the year 6452. Igor gathered many soldiers: Varangians, Rus, and Polyans, and Slovens, and Krivichi, and Tivertsy, and hired the Pechenegs, and took hostages from them, and went to the Greeks in boats and on horses, trying to take revenge for myself. »

The Byzantine emperor was warned of the attack and sent ambassadors to meet the Rus and Pechenegs. The negotiations took place somewhere on the Danube. Igor agreed to take a rich tribute and returned to Kiev, sending his allies, the Pechenegs, to fight against the Bulgarians. The decision was influenced by the recent defeat at sea, the warriors at the council said: “ Does anyone know who will defeat whom: should we, should they? Or who is in alliance with the sea? We do not walk on the ground, but in the depths of the sea: we all share death.»

Historians date the campaign to 943 (N.M. Karamzin, B.A.Rybakov, N.Ya. Polovoy). The Novgorod First Chronicle of the younger edition, which contains fragments of the chronicle of the 11th century, erroneously dates Igor's campaign to 920 and reports a repeated campaign a year later, which corresponds to 943 according to a more accurate Byzantine chronology. The successor of Theophanes under the same year mentions the great campaign of the "Turks", which ended in a peace treaty with Byzantium. By "Turks" the Greeks usually meant the Hungarians, who began to raid Byzantium in 934, and it is possible that the ancient Russian chronicler confused the Hungarians with the Pechenegs. At least the Follower of Theophanes reports that after the treaty with the "Turks" in 943, peace was preserved for 5 years.

4. Russian-Byzantine treaty. 944 year

The next year after Igor's campaign, Emperor Roman sent ambassadors to Igor to restore peace. PVL dates the peace treaty to 945, but the mention of Roman's name in the treaty indicates 944. In December 944 Roman was overthrown by his sons, Stephen and Constantine, who were immediately removed from power by the new emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus.

The text of the Russian-Byzantine treaty, which has a military-commercial character, is fully cited in the PVL. First of all, he regulates the conditions of stay and trade of Russian merchants in Byzantium, determines the exact amount of monetary fines for various misdemeanors, sets the ransom amount for prisoners. It also formulates a provision on mutual military assistance between the Russian Grand Duke and the Byzantine tsars.

The next year after the conclusion of the treaty, Grand Duke Igor was killed by the Drevlyans.

Bibliography:

Knyazkin I.O. Russian-Byzantine war 941-944 and Khazaria // Khazars. Second International Colloquium. Abstracts. M., 2002.

Polovoy N. Ya. On the question of Igor's first campaign against Byzantium (comparative analysis of Russian and Byzantine sources) // Byzantine time-book, vol. XVIII, 1961, pp. 85-104.

Based on the thousands of ships in Igor's fleet, it is possible to estimate the number of his troops at 40 thousand soldiers, according to the data on the capacity of the ships of the Prophetic Oleg. However, the round number 1000 indicates its highly judgmental nature.

Litavrin G.G. Little-known evidence of the campaign of Prince Igor in 941 // Eastern Europe in a historical retrospective. M., 1999, pp. 38-44.