Who was the initiator of the outbreak of war. Who started the Second World War. Chief Cold War Specialist

On June 1, 1939, the French ambassador to the Nazi capital, Coulondre, told Foreign Minister Bonnet that Hitler “would risk going to war if he did not have to fight Russia. If he knows that he will have to fight with Russia, he will retreat so as not to expose the country, the party and himself to destruction.”

Coulondre added that Hitler's two top military commanders, OKW Chief of Staff Keitel and Army Chief Brauchitsch, told the Fuehrer that if Germany had to fight Russia, it would have little chance of winning the war.

Initially, the success of the military campaign against Poland outlined in the Weiss plan was directly linked by the German leader to whether it would be possible to achieve the political isolation of Poland: “The goal of our policy is to localize the war within Poland.”

There is now a popular myth in Russian history that the USSR was very afraid of a war with Germany and therefore concluded the (Molotov-Ribbentrop) pact in order to better prepare for this war. But this is a blatant lie. Now we can provide data on the Red Army: after the mobilization of 1939. In September 1939, the strength of the Red Army increased to 5.3 million people; it was armed with 43,000 guns, 18,000 tanks, and 10,000 aircraft.

Data on the German army as of September 1939, after mobilization: the entire army numbered 4,528 thousand people (of which 3.7 million were in the ground forces), there were 3,195 tanks including tankettes without guns and training vehicles (of which: 1,145 – T-I, 1223 – T-II, 98 – T-III, 211 – TIV), also armed with 4,500 aircraft, 27,000 artillery pieces and mortars. Now I will not compare tanks and artillery, but I say with confidence that the USSR has them better, for example, one fact, the German T-I tank did not have a gun at all, the T-II tank had such a weak gun that it could not hit the Soviet armored vehicles, and only 300 T-III and T-IV tanks (about 10% of the total) were relatively combat-ready.

So, at the time the pact was signed and the attack on Poland, the USSR had a superiority in men over Germany, in tanks by more than four times, in artillery by 63%, in aircraft by more than two times. In addition, between Germany and the USSR there was Poland with an army of almost a million, and therefore, as of August 1939, the German invasion of the USSR was not a threat.

On August 23, Hitler’s plan for the partial isolation of Poland was a success, the USSR and the Nazis signed a non-aggression pact, along with the non-aggression pact, a secret protocol was also signed according to which, during the reorganization of the areas that are part of the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR will approximately pass along lines of the rivers Pissa, Narew, Vistula and San.

This marked the beginning of the aggressive war against Poland and the Second World War as a legal fact. But the signing of the non-aggression pact was also important because it removed the threat of war for Germany on two fronts. According to Article 3 of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty, the USSR pledged not to take part in any agreements that were clearly hostile to the other side from an aggressive point of view. Undoubtedly, the secret agreements concluded by the USSR and Germany regarding Poland in August-October 1939 were of a nature that clearly contradicted this article.

According to V.M. Molotov, who spoke during negotiations in Berlin on November 12, 1940, the agreements of August 1939 were primarily “in the interests of Germany,” which was able to “get Poland,” and later seize France and start a serious war against Great Britain, having "a strong rear in the East."

Later, in 1946, recalling this event at the Nuremberg trials, Ribbentrop said: “When I came to Moscow in 1939 to see Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but made it clear that if he does not receive half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania with the port of Libau, then I can immediately fly back.”

Many accuse England and France of also supporting Hitler's aggressive plans in 1938, referring to the Munich Agreement of 1938 regarding the peaceful transfer of the Sudetenland by Czechoslovakia to Germany. But there are fundamental differences here: firstly, England and France did not commit actions that could be interpreted as military aggression, secondly, they did not participate in hostilities on the side of the Nazis, thirdly, they did not participate in the dismemberment of another state , with the addition of a part of it.

They tried to make concessions to Germany in terms of annexing ethnically German territories unjustly taken from the German nation, and to prevent another world war in Europe. It was England and France that declared war on Germany after the German attack on Poland, but already on September 17 the USSR officially entered the war on the side of Germany, and on September 28 it began to publicly threaten its entry into the war against England and France if they did not stop all operations against the German army in the West. Now the passive war of the Allies against Germany in the fall of 1939 is called strange, although if you look at it, everything is understandable, because they hoped that the military alliance between Germany and the USSR would quickly disintegrate, which, in principle, happened.

Starting the war against Poland, Hitler wanted to return only the original German lands occupied by the Poles, according to the Treaty of Versailles. On the remaining territory, he allowed the existence of Poland as an independent state, even taking into account the transfer of Western Ukraine and Belarus to Russia. This would be a buffer between Germany and the USSR.

But Stalin insisted on the complete liquidation of Poland. It was thanks to this decision of Stalin that Germany and the USSR received a common border. So, by concluding a pact with Germany and a secret protocol on the division of Poland and the Baltic states, Stalin acted not for defensive purposes, but solely to seize new territories and unleash a war in Europe and its subsequent Sovietization.

From September 1, the Minsk radio station began to be used as a radio beacon to support Luftwaffe raids. This was a direct violation of the V Hague Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in the Event of Land War of 1907, ratified by Russia. That is, already on the 1st day of the war the USSR was not neutral, but supported the Nazis in the war against Poland.

September 3. Ribbentrop sends telegram No. 253 to the German Ambassador in Moscow
Please discuss this with Molotov immediately and see if the Soviet Union would not consider it desirable for the Russian army to move at the appropriate moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, for its part, occupy that territory. According to our considerations, this would not only help us, but also, in accordance with the Moscow agreements, would be in Soviet interests.

4 September. All German ships in the North Atlantic were ordered to “proceed to Murmansk, keeping as far north as possible.” On September 8, Moscow gave permission for German ships to enter Murmansk and guaranteed the transportation of goods to Leningrad. In just the first 17 days of September, 18 German ships found refuge in a Soviet port.

8 September. Telegram from the German ambassador in Moscow No. 300 from, sent to the German Foreign Ministry: “I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov: “I have received your message that German troops have entered Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the government of the German Empire." Moscow gave permission for German ships to enter Murmansk and guaranteed the transportation of goods to Leningrad. In just the first 17 days of September, 18 German ships found refuge in a Soviet port.

September 14. Telegram No. 350 from the German ambassador in Moscow, sent to the German Foreign Ministry: “In response to your telegram No. 336 of September 13, Molotov called me today at 16 o’clock and stated that the Red Army had reached a state of readiness sooner than expected.

Given the political motivation for the Soviet action (the fall of Poland and the protection of Russian “minorities”), it would be extremely important for [the Soviets] not to begin to act before the fall of the administrative center of Poland - Warsaw. Molotov therefore asks that he be told as precisely as possible when he can count on the capture of Warsaw.”

September 17. A Soviet group of about 600,000 people, about 4,000 tanks, more than 5,500 artillery pieces and 2,000 aircraft struck the rear of the Polish army fighting the Nazis, which was a direct violation of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Poland (later Stalin would call it a treacherous violation of the non-aggression pacts, actions Germany in June 1941). There were more than 300 thousand Polish troops in the offensive zone of the Soviet troops.

September 25. In telegram No. 442 from the German ambassador writes to the German Foreign Ministry, “Stalin and Molotov asked me to arrive in the Kremlin today at 20 o’clock. Stalin stated the following. In the final settlement of the Polish question, it is necessary to avoid anything that could cause friction between Germany and the Soviet Union in the future.

From this point of view, he considers it wrong to leave the remainder of the Polish state independent. He proposes the following: from the territories east of the demarcation line, the entire Lublin Voivodeship and that part of the Warsaw Voivodeship that reaches the Bug should be added to our portion. For this we renounce claims against Lithuania.

September 28, 1939. The Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany was concluded, by which the territory of Poland was divided between the two aggressors in accordance with the previously signed secret protocol of August 23, 1939. At the time of the conclusion of the treaty, Germany was almost completely exhausted militarily; almost all ammunition and fuel were used up in the troops.

Germany had no opportunity to even wage a defensive war on the Western Front. To save his ally, Stalin openly supported Germany and threatened France and England with Nazi support if the war continued. It was the possibility of war against Germany and the USSR that restrained France and England from attacking Germany in the fall and winter of 1939 (the Strange War).

The results of the USSR military aggression against Poland.

The combat losses of the Red Army during the Polish campaign of 1939, according to Russian historian Grigory Krivosheev, amounted to 1,173 killed, 2,002 wounded and 302 missing. Losses in the equipment of tank and mechanized brigades of the Red Army (including irrecoverable ones) amounted to 42 armored units - of which 26 on the Belorussian Front and 16 on the Ukrainian Front.

Assessing the combat losses of the Polish army in battles with the Red Army, Russian historian Mikhail Meltyukhov puts the numbers at 3,500 killed, 20,000 missing and 454,700 prisoners. According to the Polish Military Encyclopedia, 250,000 military personnel were captured by the Soviets. Almost all of the captured officers were subsequently shot by the NKVD, including about 14,000 captured officers who were killed by Soviet executioners at Katyn.

In a statement made in October 1939, Molotov cited the following figures for captured military property: “over 900 guns, over 10 thousand machine guns, over 300 thousand rifles, more than 150 million cartridges, about 1 million shells and up to 300 aircraft.” So the USSR's invasion of Poland was an aggressive military operation, and not a liberation campaign.

JOINT STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1939
After the German government and the government of the USSR, by the treaty signed today, have finally settled the issues arising from the collapse of the Polish state, and thereby created a solid foundation for lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they mutually agree that the elimination of the present war between Germany, on the one hand, and England and France, on the other hand, would meet the interests of all peoples.

Therefore, both Governments will direct their common efforts, if necessary, in agreement with other friendly powers, in order to achieve this goal as quickly as possible. If, however, these efforts by both governments remain unsuccessful, then the fact will be established that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, and in the event of a continuation of the war, the governments of Germany and the USSR will consult each other on the necessary measures.

If we turn to the records of the conversation with Ribbentrop and Stalin on September 28, 1939, Stalin, in his first statement after Ribbentrop’s long discussions (according to the German recording), stated his point of view as follows: “The point of view of Germany, which rejects military aid, is worthy of respect .

However, a strong Germany is a necessary condition for peace in Europe - therefore, the Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union cannot agree that the Western powers create conditions that could weaken Germany and put her in a difficult position. This is the commonality of interests between Germany and the Soviet Union.”

September 30, 1939. The newspaper Pravda published Ribbentrop’s statement “...Both states want peace to be restored and for England and France to stop the absolutely senseless and hopeless struggle against Germany. If, however, warmongers gain the upper hand in these countries, then Germany and the USSR will know how to respond to this.”

The USSR not only helped the Nazis in word, but in deed, not only in September 1939, by striking in the rear of the Polish army, which accelerated the transfer of German units to the West. The “anti-fascist” socialist state did everything to weaken the trade blockade of Nazi Germany and help it as much as possible in the war against England and France, for which on February 11, 1940, an economic agreement was signed between the USSR and Germany in Moscow. It stipulated that the Soviet Union would supply Germany with the following goods:

· 1,000,000 tons of feed grains and legumes, worth 120 million Reichsmarks
· 900,000 tons of oil worth about 115 million Reichsmarks
· 100,000 tons of cotton worth about 90 million Reichsmarks
· 500,000 tons of phosphates
· 100,000 tons of chromite ores
· 500,000 tons of iron ore
· 300,000 tons of scrap iron and pig iron
· 2,400 kg of platinum

“The trade turnover between Germany and the USSR already in the first year of the agreement will reach a volume exceeding the highest levels ever achieved since the World War” [Pravda, 02/13/1940].

In 1940, open pro-Nazi propaganda was also carried out in the USSR. Articles published in the Soviet press, including in the Soviet officialdom - the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, were used by Dr. Goebbels' department for its propaganda purposes. Propaganda speeches were reproduced in the German press, including direct speeches by Hitler.

At the same time, information messages from the war front in the West, mainly about the successes of the Luftwaffe in the “Battle of Britain,” occupied a special place. According to radio broadcasts in the Latest News programs, the losses of British aviation and the destruction of English cities were described as a feeling of deep satisfaction. Wagner's music was played daily on radio stations, which was very popular among the NSDAP leadership.

The following facts are also in no way compatible with the neutral status of the state: transit through the entire territory of the USSR from the Far East to Germany of a large group of officers from the German cruiser Graf Spee sunk in the Pacific Ocean.

No circumstances can justify the agreement of the Soviet leadership to service Nazi warships in Soviet ports in the Barents Sea basin (in October 1939, the Soviet Union agreed to the use by the German Navy of the port of Teriberka east of Murmansk as a repair base and supply point for ships and submarines conducting operations in the North Atlantic).

Molotov's note on Stalin's meeting with British Ambassador Stafford Cripps in July 1940: “Stalin does not see any threat to hegemony from any country in Europe, and he is even less afraid that Europe could be absorbed by Germany. Stalin follows German politics and is well knows several German figures. He did not detect any desire on their part to swallow European countries. Stalin does not believe that Germany’s military successes pose a threat to the Soviet Union and its friendly relations with it...”

It is no coincidence that after the Second World War, at the end of November 1945, the list of issues that were not subject to discussion at the Nuremberg trials, approved by the Soviet delegation, in order to prevent counter-accusations of the defense against the governments of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition, the first point included a ban on discussing the USSR’s attitude to the Treaty of Versailles , and point nine - the issue of Soviet-Polish relations.

With the defeat of Poland by German and Soviet troops, only the first act of World War II ended. Almost immediately after the end of hostilities in Poland, the “peaceful” socialist state begins a war against Finland. The military operations, which were a completely failed blitzkrieg attempt with huge losses and ended after 3.5 months of fierce fighting with a Pyrrhic victory (on the Soviet side, up to 960 thousand people took part in them, and the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to over 131 thousand, and according to Russian military historian

Krivosheev, the total sanitary losses amounted to 264,908 people. That is, the losses of a neutral state, which supposedly did not participate in the outbreak of the world war, many times exceeded the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in the first two years of the Second World War.

Many argue that the USSR did not carry out military aggression against Poland in September 1939, but carried out some kind of liberation campaign with the goal of reuniting Belarusians and Ukrainians or even restoring the historical borders of the Russian Empire. But these arguments have no basis.

Firstly, the Belarusians and Ukrainians in the territories that were part of Poland did not ask for such a liberation campaign from the USSR; moreover, 400 thousand people were repressed in the first two years after the Soviet occupation. Secondly, according to existing international treaties, an invasion of the territory of a foreign state was aggression.

According to Art. 2 of the Convention on the Definition of Aggression, concluded in London on July 3, 1933 by the USSR with other states, not only a declaration of war on another state is recognized as aggression (this case is provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 2), but also an invasion of armed forces, even without a declaration of war , on the territory of another state (clause 2 of article 2), an attack by land, sea or air armed forces, even without a declaration of war, on the territory, sea or aircraft of another state (clause 3 of article 2).

At the same time, according to Art. 3 of the said convention, no considerations of a political, military, economic or other nature can serve as an excuse or justification for the attack provided for in article two 3. As an example of such ““considerations””, the signatories of the convention, in paragraph three of the Appendix to Article 3 of the convention named the internal situation of a state, the imaginary shortcomings of its administration.

In a conversation with Comintern Chairman Dimitrov, Stalin stated: “The destruction of this state [Poland] under current conditions would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations.” (Diary of G. Dimitrov, entry 09/07/1939).

The attack on Finland led to the fact that in December 1939 the USSR, as a military aggressor, was expelled from the League of Nations. The immediate reason for the expulsion was the mass protests of the international community over the systematic bombing of civilian targets by Soviet aircraft, including the use of incendiary bombs.

Between June 15 and June 20, 1940, the “peace-loving” Soviet Union takes decisive steps and forces the Baltic countries to create pro-Soviet governments, threatening with military force and violating previously signed treaties. Having suppressed the press, arrested political leaders and outlawed all parties except communist ones, the Russians staged mock elections in all three states on July 14th.

After the “elected” parliaments voted for the annexation of their countries to the Soviet Union, the Supreme Council (parliament) of Russia accepted them into their homeland: Lithuania on August 3, Latvia on August 5, Estonia on August 6.

But how did it happen that a military conflict began between two allies - the Nazis and the Communists in June 1941, which escalated into the so-called Great Patriotic War.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces (OKH), Colonel General F. Halder, analyzing the situation in 1940 after the war, believed that at that time Hitler believed it was possible to avoid a war with Russia if the latter did not show expansionist aspirations in a western direction. To do this, Hitler “considered it necessary to divert Russian expansion into the Balkans and Turkey, which would certainly lead to a conflict between Russia and Great Britain.”

In early 1940, Romania agreed to transfer its oil fields in Ploiesti (the only explored oil fields in Europe at that time) to the Germans in exchange for political and military protection. On May 23, at the height of the Battle of France, the Romanian General Staff sent an SOS signal to the OKW, informing the Germans that Soviet troops were massing along the Romanian border.

The next day, Jodl summarized the reaction to this message at Hitler’s headquarters: “The situation in the East is becoming threatening due to the concentration of Russian forces on the borders of Bessarabia.” However, the USSR, threatening military aggression, forced Romania to cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and the latter was not included in the circle of areas of Soviet interests agreed upon with Germany. Under the influence of these steps, a threat was created to the Romanian region of Ploesti, the only serious source of oil supplies for Germany, which could paralyze the German economy and army.

German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop: “On June 23, 1940, a telegram from our ambassador in Moscow arrived in Berlin: the Soviet Union intends to occupy the Romanian province of Bessarabia in the coming days, and is only going to inform us about it. Adolf Hitler was then amazed by the rapid Russian advance without prior consultation with us. The fact that the predominantly German-populated Northern Bukovina, the ancestral land of the Austrian crown, was to be occupied especially stunned Hitler.

He perceived this step by Stalin as a sign of the Russian onslaught on the West. The large concentration of Soviet troops in Bessarabia caused Adolf Hitler serious concerns from the point of view of further waging war against England: under no circumstances could we give up Romanian oil, which was vital for us. Had Russia advanced further here, we would have found ourselves dependent on the goodwill of Stalin in the further conduct of the war. During one of our conversations in Munich, he told me that, for his part, he was considering military measures, because he did not want to be taken by surprise by the East.

So let's give another word to the second man in Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Public Education and Propaganda:
06/25/40 Stalin informs Schulenburg that he intends to act against Romania. This again contradicts our agreement.
06/29/40 Romania lost to Moscow. Bessarabia and S. Bukovina will go to Russia. This is not pleasant in any way for us. The Russians are taking advantage of the situation.
5/07/40 Slavism is spreading throughout the Balkans. Russia is seizing the moment.
07/11/40 There is some concern among the [German] people about Russia.
07/17/40 The Russians continue to gather troops [towards Romania]. We are no less. King Carol wants German military occupation. It doesn't matter when or where. Fear of Moscow.
07/19/40 The Russians have become quite cocky."

And, finally, the Fuhrer of the German people himself, Adolf Hitler (in a conversation with Mussolini 01/19/41): “Previously, Russia would not have posed any danger to us at all, because it was not able to threaten us. Now, in the century aviation, Romanian oil fields can be turned into smoking ruins as a result of an air attack from Russia or the Mediterranean region, and yet the very existence of the Axis powers depends on these oil fields" (B. Liddell-Hart. "Second World War" M. AST 2002).

German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop: “...Molotov’s visit to Berlin (November 12–13, 1940 - Comp.) was not under a lucky star, as I wished. From these conversations with Molotov, Hitler finally formed the impression of a serious Russian aspiration to the West.” The next day, Jodl summarized the reaction to this message at Hitler’s headquarters: “The situation in the East is becoming threatening due to the concentration of Russian forces on the borders of Bessarabia.”

From Stalin’s speech to graduates of military academies in May 1941 “... Our policy of peace and security is at the same time a policy of preparing for war. There is no defense without offense. We must educate the army in the spirit of offensive. We must prepare for war." (Diary of G. Dimitrov, entry 5/5/1941).

Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov said at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on June 4, 1941: “We have become stronger, we can set more active tasks. The wars with Poland and Finland were not defensive wars. We have already taken the path of an offensive policy... There is one step between peace and war. This is why our propaganda cannot be peaceful... We had a policy of offensive before. This policy was determined by Lenin. Now we are just changing the slogan. We have begun to implement Lenin’s thesis.”

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov (in 1941 - Admiral. People's Commissar of the USSR Navy, member of the Central Committee, member of the Headquarters of the High Command since its creation): “One thing is indisputable for me: I. V. Stalin not only did not exclude the possibility of war with Hitler's Germany, on the contrary, he considered such a war... inevitable... J.V. Stalin made preparations for war - broad and versatile preparations - based on the... deadlines he himself had planned. Hitler violated his calculations" (On the Eve. P. 321).

A small touch to the overall picture.13-14/05/40. Moscow. Meeting on military ideology. Chief of the General Staff Meretskov speaks: “We can say that our army is preparing for an attack, and we need this attack for defense. Based on political conditions, we must attack, and the Government will tell us what we need to do.”

This means that Hitler was, after all, the “icebreaker” of the world socialist revolution for the communists, who had been arming Germany since the 20s. It was the fighting actions of the Nazis that provided the basis for the subsequent entry of the Red liberators into Western Europe. And there’s no getting around it. But he dealt a preemptive blow to Bolshevism, this blow, despite the defeat of Germany and the temporary victory of the communists, turned out to be fatal for communism.

I think that sooner or later we will impartially look at the actions and policies of Nazi Germany and come to the obvious conclusion that Hitler saved the modern world from the Red Plague, and the Holocaust is a primitive invention of the communists and Jewish bankers whose expansion the Germans tried to stop.

Until now, no one has found a single gas chamber or mass grave of Jews allegedly killed by the Germans. The Red Cross in official information indicated that less than 400 thousand people died in German concentration camps in 12 years, but Jews continue to tell us tales about millions of victims in Nazi concentration camps. It was the Germans who first proposed to the world to build a state for white people (now Europe and the USA contain more than 100 million black and colored dependents from the third world, who are the main source of crime and terrorist attacks), who eat up hundreds of billions annually that should have gone to scientific research. -technical development of civilization.

The Germans, by their example, demonstrated simply fantastic rates of economic growth, which no one in the world could surpass. In addition, it was Nazi Germany that gave the world an incredible amount of breakthrough technologies, which were absolutely dishonestly appropriated by the USSR and its Western allies.

For comparison, the USSR managed to organize three famines on the territory of Ukraine in 1921, 1933 and 1947, in peacetime, while under the German occupation during the war there was no famine, nor large-scale repressions. If we honestly evaluate the facts, then not a single evidence of mass repressions or murders committed by the Germans on the territory of Ukraine has yet been found, not a single mass grave of the murdered has been found.

All we have is a set of communist myths. Having honestly and impartially looked at the facts, we will understand that the Ukrainians and the West fought on the side of their enemy - the Stalinist USSR, which really brought evil and destruction to the world. And all the economic and social problems of modern Ukraine and the USA, Britain and the West as a whole are connected precisely with this civilizational choice.

3 answers

In the 1930s, world Jewry pushed Poland into war with Germany.

Forcing Germany into war

Technically, it was Hitler. Because he attacked Poland, which caused a chain reaction. In principle, you can limit yourself to this if the details do not interest you. And if you are interested, it should be noted that more or less all leading European states were to blame for the beginning of World War II. Great Britain, France and the USSR allowed Germany to swell and gain power, flirted with Hitler and pretended that they wanted to be friends. We became friends. The short-sighted and stupid policies of British, French and Soviet diplomats led to World War II.

War is almost like sex, in the sense that it also requires at least two. And in most cases, these two are responsible for the war. If only because they didn’t find a way to avoid it.

Firstly, the USSR, together with Germany, captured Poland. Secondly, Hitler was forced to start a war by international Jewry.

In the 30s, world Jewry carried out a scenario in Poland, the same as in today's Ukraine. The result was Poland's attack on Germany and World War II... It's time for us to learn from those mistakes, and not repeat the old ones...

Forcing Germany into war

How a local conflict was blown up into a World War

1930: Paul Edward Rydz-Smigli, who imagined himself to be Napoleon, declared that Poland should show its fangs to its arch-enemy. He became the new Marshal of Poland in 1936. The Polish newspaper “Liga der Grossmacht” implored its readers (3): “War against Germany to move the border to the Oder and Nysa rivers. Prussia should be captured up to the Spree River. In the war with Germany we will not take prisoners. And there will be no room for human feelings and cultural restrictions. The world will tremble from the Polish-German war. We must instill in our soldiers a spirit of superhuman sacrifice, ruthless vengeance and cruelty."

March 24, 1932: Bernard Lecache, President of the Jewish World Federation: “Germany is our enemy No. 1 in the whole world. Our goal is to organize a war against her without any regret.”

March 24, 1933: The front page of the Daily Express published a call for a boycott of German goods, which sharply undermined the standard of living in Germany, the goods-exporting country. "14 million Jews stand together as one man, declaring war on Germany."

Spring 1933: A member of the District Council (voivode) of Eastern Oberschleisen, Gracinski, declared in a propaganda speech at the Polish Foreign Ministry: “Destroy the Germans.”

January 25, 1934: Vladimir Jabotinsky, leader of the Marxists and Zionists, writes: “We will unleash a mental and material war of the whole world against Germany.”

February 1936: The murder of the German diplomat Wilhelm Gustlow in Switzerland by the Jew David Frankfuter.

1936: After the death of Marshal Pilsudski, Edward Ridz-Smigly becomes the new Marshal of Poland.

1938: Churchill's open letter to Hitler(1): "If England found itself in a national disaster similar to that of Germany in 1918, I would pray to God to send me a man of your spirit and strength."

1938: 2/3 of German estates were brutally expropriated in Poland, forcing hundreds of thousands of Germans to leave Poland.

1938: 8,000 Germans were killed in the most brutal manner, including Catholic and Protestant priests and pastors, women and children. This was followed by persecution, terror and state persecution.

October 24, 1938: Germany submitted proposals to resolve tensions in Poland to the Polish embassy in Berlin. The plan proposed to free the purely German state “Freistaat Danzig” from Polish customs controls imposed on April 1, 1922. It was also proposed to hold a referendum in East Prussia. The German-Polish non-aggression pact (“Nichtangriffspakt”) with Marshal Pilsudski from 1934 was extended for 25 years. After the death of Marshal Pilsudski, Secretary of State Beck rejected German proposals. Warsaw rejected German proposals 4 times.

The newly created Poland under the Diktat of Versailles occupied the German provinces of Westpreussen, Posen and Ost-Oberschlesien ("Polish" Corridor), which had been German for more than 800 years. Moreover, Poland intended to occupy German territories in the direction of Berlin.

November 7, 1938: Attempt on the life of German diplomat Ernst von Rath by the Polish Jew Grynszpan, who was allowed to escape from Europe and never face trial.

November 9/10, 1938: Kristallnacht rocks Germany. Jewish businesses, homes and about 12% of the 1,420 synagogues were damaged. 36 people died. Thousands were arrested. Hitler was beside himself, declaring: “My work has been set back 5 years, if not destroyed.” This proves that the incident did not happen “by command from above.” (2)

November 10, 1938: Adolf Hitler immediately orders the protection of Jews and their property.

December 19, 1938: Bernard Lecache, President of the Jewish World Federation: “Our task is to organize a moral and cultural blockade of Germany with the division of its nation into 4 parts.”

March 21, 1939: Hitler formally proclaims Germany's right to return the Free City of Danzig and open railway and road traffic through the Corridor to Danzig under guarantees from Poland.

March 23, 1939: Poland provocatively rejected German demands after announcing partial mobilization on March 23.

March 31, 1939: The Anglo-French “Declaration of Guarantee” to Poland was practically granted to destroy Germany’s work for a peaceful and fair resolution of the crisis. The Poles announced that they would expand their borders to the Elbe River and that Berlin was not a German city, but an old Polish village. Numerous Polish posters proclaimed: “To Berlin!”

April 25, 1939: American journalist Weigand was summoned to the American embassy in Paris, and Ambassador Bullitt told him: “The war in Europe is a done deal... America will enter the war after France and Great Britain.” (4) This is confirmed by White House documents from Harry Hopkins, including the following statement from Churchill at the time: “The war will begin very soon. We will go to war, and the United States must do the same. You, Baruch, will do what needs to be done, but I will keep an eye on it all.” (4)

April 26, 1939: British Ambassador Henderson told his Secretary of State: “Passage through the Corridor is an absolutely fair decision. If we were in Hitler’s place, we would demand him, at a minimum.”

April 28, 1939: The German government reacts by revoking the German-Polish Agreement of 1934 and the German-British Naval Agreement of 1935. Germany is taking a wait-and-see approach.

May 1, 1939: Mrs. Mrozowiczka appeals to the Polish people: “The Fuhrer is far away, but the Polish soldier is close and there are plenty of branches on the trees in the forest.” Thousands of innocent Germans were compiled and arrested on false charges. A great Power like Germany should not be involved in such a disgusting game for so long. Instead, Germany continues its efforts to find a peaceful solution.

May 3, 1939: (5) During a large parade of Polish troops, which took place during the Polish National Day, excited people shouted to the troops: “To Gdansk!” and “Forward to Berlin!”

Summer 1939: Marshal Ridz-Smigli: “Poland wants war with Germany, and Germany cannot avoid it even if it wants.”

After this, Hitler for the first time presented to the press the facts of the persecution of Germans in Poland. Hitler's invitation to negotiations in Berlin was not accepted, but at the same time negotiations were underway between the Western powers and the USSR. Stalin proposed a military agreement in order to completely encircle and isolate Germany. In case of war, he demanded free passage through Poland and complete freedom of action in the Balkans and against Turkey.

In response to this, Hitler called on England to maintain peace and emphasized Germany's right to Danzig and the Corridor. He predicted the collapse of the British Empire if it entered the war.

Lord Vansitargh, a sworn enemy of peaceful relations with Germany and diplomatic adviser to the State Department in London, said that the mere mention of the possibility of a German-English pact would have a devastating effect on Britain in the United States.

August 20, 1939: Graszynski openly calls for murder: “Slaughter the Germans wherever you find them.”

August 23, 1939: Germany concludes the Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact with the USSR, smashing the Anglo-French agreements to smithereens.

August 25, 1939: Hitler tells British Ambassador Neville Henderson: “The idea that Germany wants to conquer the whole world is ridiculous. The British Empire has 40 million square kilometers, the USSR - 19 million, and Germany - 600,000 square kilometers. Even from this it is clear who has intentions of conquest..."

August 25, 1939: Signing of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Agreement, which increased military euphoria in Poland. Crimes against Germans in Poland are multiplying. A resident of Slesin recalls: “Due to Poland’s repressive measures, about 80,000 Germans left Poland in 1938/39. Since May 1939, Germans living in Poland near the German border have been in particular danger. Townspeople and farmers are attacked, houses are burned, women and children are beaten..."

August 27, 1939: Excerpt from Hitler's address to French Prime Minister Deladier: “I, Mr. Deladier, am fighting with my people against the injustice committed against us, and the rest are fighting for this injustice. You and I lived through the war and are familiar with its devastating cruelty. We know of untold misfortunes befalling the masses. We must do everything in our power to prevent a new war..."

27 August 1939: Chaim Weizmann (participant in the Balfour Declaration), chairman of the Jewish Palestine Agency, told Chamberlain that the Jews were on the side of Britain and were ready to fight on the side of democracy.

August 30, 1939: Once again Adolf Hitler issues a 16-point document to avoid war and resolve the German-Polish conflict. Poland refused to send an ambassador to receive the document. On the contrary, on the same day Poland declares general mobilization, which, according to the Geneva Protocols, is tantamount to a declaration of war.

August 30, 1939: German consul August Schillinger was killed in Krakow. And still Germany does not respond with war.

August 31, 1939: Dahlerus: (6) “When on August 31 at 11:00, accompanied by the British diplomatic adviser Forbes, I visited the Polish ambassador in Berlin - Lipski, to present Hitler’s 16 points, he (Lipski) made a similar statement what is done in case of war: that Germany is in revolt and that numerous Polish troops will successfully reach Berlin ... "

September 1, 1939: Hitler gives an impromptu speech to the Reichstag at the Krolloper, in which he emphasizes that Germany has no interests in the West. He then states: “Last night there were 21 border violations, this night there are already 14, and 3 of them were very serious. For the first time, the Polish army invaded German territory. At 4:45 am we returned fire...”

September 1, 1939: 75 German divisions numbering 1.1 million men confront the Polish army numbering 1.7 million. In short-term, heavy battles, the Polish army was defeated within 18 days. The German army, having crossed the border of Poland, discovered fresh graves of Germans, and on the roads - their torn, bloody clothes and utensils. Inhumane were the bloody scenes in Bromberg and other places where German corpses were dismembered, raped, tortured and killed in inhumane ways. German troops entering Pomerania, Schlesin and Slovakia witnessed similar horrors.

September 3, 1939: First England declared war on Germany, and then France. The Reich Chancellor was horrified. Lord Helifax expressed his satisfaction: (7) “We have now forced Hitler into war so that he will no longer be able to take a single step away from the Treaty of Versailles in a peaceful manner.” Following this, Churchill declared on the radio: (8) “This war is England’s war and its goal is the destruction of Germany.”

September 17, 1939: USSR troops occupied 3/5 of Polish territory, but neither London nor Paris declared war on the Soviets or sent troops to defend Poland.

December 27, 1945: US Secretary of Defense Forrestal wrote in his diary words from a conversation with Joe Kennedy: “...neither France nor Britain had any reason to consider Poland the cause of the war, if not for constant pressure from Washington... Chamberlain explained to me that America and world Jewry pushed England into war..."

Illustration copyright PA Image caption “Moonscape”, trenches, huge casualties - this is how the First World War went down in history

As Europe prepares to mark the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, debate continues in academic circles about which country bears the blame for starting the war.

These debates have already gone beyond strictly scientific discussions. There is widespread debate in Britain about how this issue is covered in school textbooks.

These versions include all the main countries involved in the conflict: Serbia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France and Great Britain.

The BBC asked 10 leading historians to give their views on the matter.

Sir Max Hastings, military historian

- Germany

Only she alone had enough strength to stop the development of the conflict in July 1914. She could take back her “carte blanche” - Austrian support during the invasion of Serbia. I am afraid that I will not be very convinced by the argument that Serbia was at that time a rogue state and therefore deserved punishment from Austria.

I do not believe that Russia wanted a European war in 1914 - its rulers believed that the country would be much better prepared for it two years later, having completed its army rearmament program.

Whether Britain should have entered the war that became inevitable after 1 August is a separate question. In my personal judgment, neutrality is not the best position, since Germany's victories on the continent did not suit Britain, which at that moment dominated the seas and the world financial system.

Sir Richard Jay Evans, Professor of History, Cambridge

- Serbia

Serbia bears the greatest responsibility for starting the First World War. Serbian nationalism and expansionism were deeply destructive forces, and Serbian support for Black Hand terrorists was extremely irresponsible.

But Austria-Hungary bears only slightly less responsibility for its panicked and overreaction to the assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne.

Illustration copyright Getty Image caption Crossroads in Sarajevo where Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated

France in every possible way encouraged Russian aggressiveness towards Austria-Hungary, and Germany encouraged Austrian intransigence.

Britain was unable to mediate, as it had done in the previous Balkan crisis, fearing German ambitions in Europe and throughout the world. This fear was not entirely rational after Britain's victory in the naval arms race in 1910 became apparent.

The general positive attitude of European statesmen towards war, due to their concepts of honor, hopes for a quick victory and passion for the ideas of social Darwinism, became the main factor.

It is especially important to study the initial period of the war in the general context, without examining in the context of subsequent events (for example, the September program of Germany - the determination of the initial goals and objectives of the war) what happened in July-August 1914.

Dr Heather Jones, London School of Economics

- AvStro-Hungary, Germany, Russia

The First World War was sparked by a small handful of militant high-ranking politicians and military officers in Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia.

Before 1914, the murder of a royal did not usually lead to war. But hawks in the Austro-Hungarian military establishment - the main culprits of the war - perceived the murder of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb as a completely legitimate reason to seize and destroy Serbia, an unstable neighbor that was trying to expand beyond its borders into the territory of Austria-Hungary .

Serbia, devastated by the two Balkan wars of 1912–13 in which it played a key role, was reluctant to fight in 1914.

Illustration copyright Getty Image caption British soldiers at the front near Ypres

The fact that the conflict grew to the size of Europe was due to the fact that the German military and politicians pushed Austria-Hungary into war with Serbia.

This alarmed Russia, which supported Serbia, and it announced mobilization before all possibilities for a peaceful resolution of the conflict had been exhausted.

And this, in turn, pushed Germany to a preventive declaration of war on Russia, its ally France, and then to a decisive offensive, partly on Belgian territory, which also involved Britain, which acted as the guarantor of Belgium’s security and a supporter of France, into the conflict.

John Rohl, Emeritus Professor of History, University of Sussex

- Austria-Hungary and Germany

The First World War did not start because of an accident or a diplomatic mistake. It was the result of a conspiracy between the governments of Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary, who sought to start a war in the hope that Britain would stay away.

After 25 years of the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II, an aggressive, powerful, warlike man, with his faith in the foresight of royals, his contempt for diplomats, the conviction that the German god was leading him and the whole country to greatness, those 20 people whom he appointed to determine the policy of the Reich, in 1914 they chose war, considering the circumstances most favorable for it.

The German generals and admirals who dominated the Kaiser's retinue were prone to irresponsible militarism, which made war inevitable. Like their Austrian counterparts, they believed that it was better to go to war than to exercise patience, which, in their opinion, humiliated them.

In the spring of 1914, these people in Berlin decided to take a chance, realizing what a whirlwind their support for an Austrian attack on Serbia could create.

The task of “managing” the crisis fell on the shoulders of Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg - he had to undermine the efforts of diplomats so that the war began under the most favorable conditions.

He, in particular, wanted to convince his people that Germany was under attack, while at the same time keeping Britain from intervening in the conflict.

Gerhard Hirschfeld, Professor of Modern and Contemporary History, University of Stuttgart

Long before the outbreak of hostilities, the Prussian-German conservative elites were convinced that a European war would satisfy Germany’s colonial ambitions and strengthen its military and political authority in the world.

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption Austrian (left) and Russian (right) soldiers exchange cigarettes

The very decision to go to war after the not-so-serious international crisis caused by the assassination in Sarajevo was made as a result of political miscalculations, fear of losing authority, as well as a complex system of allied obligations of European states.

Historian Fritz Fischer cites military goals, in particular the famous September Program of 1914, which outlined economic and territorial demands, as the main reason for the German decision to enter the war. However, modern historians consider this approach too narrow.

They prefer to view Germany's military goals, as well as those of other belligerent countries, in the context of the course of hostilities and the political situation during the war.

Dr Annika Mombauer, Open University, UK

- Austria-Hungary and Germany

Entire libraries are dedicated to the search for a solution to the 1914 riddle. Was the war the result of an accident or a plan? Was it inevitable or was it planned? Was it set up by crazy or calculating arsonists?

I believe that it did not happen by chance, and that it could have been avoided in July 1914. In Vienna, the government and military wanted war with Serbia.

The immediate reaction to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 was to demand compensation from Serbia, which, as Vienna believed, was behind the assassination attempt and threatened Austria-Hungary's position in the Balkans.

It is important that a diplomatic victory was considered meaningless and unacceptable. At the beginning of July, Austrian politicians chose war.

But to start this war, they needed the support of their main ally - Germany. Without German support, the decision to go to war would have been impossible.

The government in Berlin gave its ally carte blanche, promising unconditional support and putting pressure on Vienna to take advantage of this opportunity.

Both countries understood that Russia would most likely stand up for Serbia, and this would turn a local conflict into a pan-European one, but they were willing to take the risk.

Germany's guarantees made it possible to implement Vienna's plans - a "no" from Berlin would have stopped the crisis.

This was done because Austria-Hungary was already leaning toward war, egged on by Germany.

The situation seemed ideal to them, victory was possible, because if they had waited a few more years, Russia and France would have become invincible.

In this atmosphere of despair and arrogance, the statesmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary went to war to maintain and expand their empires. The war that led to their collapse

Sean McMeekin, Koç University, Istanbul

- Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Britain and Serbia

It is human nature to look for simple and understandable answers to complex questions, which is why the thesis that Germany was the only culprit for the outbreak of the First World War turned out to be so tenacious.

Illustration copyright RIA Novosti Image caption The offensive of Russian troops on one of the sectors of the Southwestern Front

Without German support for Austria-Hungary's tough position towards Serbia after Sarajevo, "carte blanche", the First World War obviously would not have started. Accordingly, Germany is to blame.

But it is also true that without the terrorist plot in Belgrade, the Germans and Austrians would have had no basis for this terrible choice.

Politicians in Berlin and Vienna tried to localize the conflict in the Balkans. However, it was Russia, having received its “carte blanche” from Paris, that inflated this Austro-Serbian conflict to the size of Europe.

First, Europe burst into flames, and after Britain joined the war, the whole world.

But Russia, not Germany, was the first to announce mobilization. And the war against the two Central Powers, in which Russia and Serbia were supported by France and Britain, was the desire of Russia, not Germany.

No country can escape blame. All five great powers, together with Serbia, orchestrated Armageddon.

Gary Sheffield, Professor of Military Studies, University of Wolverhampton

- Austria-Hungary and Germany

The war was started by the leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Vienna took the opportunity provided by the assassination of the Archduke to try to destroy its Balkan rival Serbia.

This was done with the full knowledge that Serbia's ally Russia was unlikely to stand by, and this, in turn, could lead to a European war.

Illustration copyright Getty Image caption German artillery in Africa

Germany guaranteed Austria unconditional support - again, fully understanding what this would lead to. Germany, seeking to destroy the French-Russian alliance, was fully prepared to take the risk that this would lead to a major war.

Some in German ruling circles were happy at the prospect of an expansionist war on foreign soil.

The reaction of Russia, France, and later Britain was reactive and defensive.

Dr Catriona Pennell, Senior Lecturer in History, University of Exeter

- Austria-Hungary and Germany

In my opinion, it is the politicians and diplomats in Germany and Austria-Hungary who should bear the burden of responsibility for the spread of the local conflict in the Balkans to European and then global proportions.

Germany, suffering from a "junior child" complex in the family of European empires, saw an opportunity to change the balance of power in its favor through a war of conquest. On July 5, 1914, she handed over “carte blanche” to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was trying to restore dominance over rebellious Serbia.

Germany promised her support - despite the high likelihood of war with Russia, an ally of France and Great Britain.

But the role of Austria-Hungary should not be underestimated. The Serbian ultimatum of July 23 was drafted in such a way that the likelihood of its acceptance was negligible. And Serbia’s refusal gave Austria-Hungary the opportunity to declare war on July 28.

David Stevenson, Professor of International History, London School of Economics

- Germany

The greatest responsibility lies with the German government. Germany's rulers made the Balkan War possible by encouraging Austria-Hungary to invade Serbia, knowing full well what such a conflict would lead to. Without German support, it is unlikely that Austria-Hungary's position would have been so harsh.

They also began fighting in the great European theatre, sending ultimatums to Russia and France and declaring war when those ultimatums were rejected - and, in fact, fabricating the pretext that French planes had allegedly bombed Nuremberg.

Finally, they violated international treaties by invading Luxembourg and Belgium, knowing that this would involve Britain in the conflict.

This, however, does not exclude the possibility that there were mitigating circumstances, and does not mean that responsibility lies with Germany alone.

Serbia staged a provocation against Austria-Hungary because both countries wanted an armed conflict.

Although the Central Powers initiated the conflict, the Russian authorities, encouraged by France, responded readily.

Britain could perhaps have prevented the conflict by making its position clear in advance. This position, even taking into account the difficult internal political situation, was more passive than active.

The Second World War began on September 1, 1939 with the German attack on Poland and ended on September 2, 1945 with the surrender of Japan. 72 states were involved in this most destructive, bloodiest war in the entire history of mankind, and 55 million people died. Who untied her? Hitler and his entourage? And no one else is to blame? For many years, the media have been introducing lies into the public consciousness about the responsibility of the Soviet government for starting this war. In the textbook by A. Kreder “Modern History. XX century", the publishers of which announced that he had won the competition for the program "Renewal of Humanitarian Education", the USSR was declared "an accomplice in unleashing a new war." The blame for its beginning is shifted to the USSR in a number of programs and articles in the media, in the films “The Last Myth” and “The World Revolution for Comrade Stalin.” The German historian W. Glasebock and other Nazi followers conducted a campaign under the slogan “The war caused by Germany is a lie.” Yu. Levitansky stated: “It is now completely clear that if it had not been for the insane policies of Stalin and “our party,” this war might not have happened” (Lg. 02/13/1991). In fact, the Soviet government did everything in its power to prevent the war, and enormous responsibility for its outbreak lies with the leaders of England and France. Pushing Germany to a campaign against the USSR, they, yielding to its arrogant claims, did not accept his proposals for collective security, on which our government relied on back in the mid-thirties.

Statements about Stalin's guilt, such as the one above, are usually limited to emotional outbursts, presented as indisputable axioms, no actual evidence is provided, and in reality they are links to cynical lies of global significance. If facts are presented, then when checked they turn out to be completely fictitious. V. Bryukhanov supported the lie of the traitor Rezun-Suvorov that “even before 1933, Stalin was planning the defeat of Germany, and therefore contributed to Hitler’s coming to power. After all, Thälmann, who could well have acted towards the USSR, as Tito later did, suited Stalin less "(LR. 06.16.2000). This nonsense was reinterpreted by F. Shakhmagonov: “From the end of 1934, in the deepest secrecy, Stalin began to probe the possibility of an agreement with Hitler on the redistribution or division of the world, looking for ways to get closer to him” (Rp. 1997. No. 2. P. 68). A. Sakharov asserted: “In the early 20s... Stalin believed that it was possible to divide spheres of influence with Hitler” (ZnL 99O.No. 12. P.91). Suppose, showing brilliant foresight, Stalin accurately determined the course of history 10 years in advance and predicted Hitler's rise to power. But the complete far-fetchedness of the “discoveries” of Sakharov and Shakhmagonov is revealed by this fact in 1933. Hitler seized power, and on Stalin’s initiative, cooperation between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht was immediately terminated. According to D. Najafarov, a document was found stating that “Stalin and Hitler met secretly in Lvov on the eve of the Second World War” (Kp.11.11.1991). This document was elementary disinformation; it was signed on October 17, 1939 by the head of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover.

In the textbooks by L. Pyatnitsky “History of Russia for applicants and high school students” (1995) and A. Levandovsky and Yu. Shchetinov “Russia in the 20th century” (1997) for grades 10–11 of general education institutions, it is argued that the Soviet government, having concluded the Soviet- German Treaty of August 23, 1939, made a major foreign policy mistake. Condemning this pact, many write that it led to a world war. This motive prevailed at the round table in 1989 at the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences. V. Dashichev spoke about the aggressiveness of the USSR, which allegedly initiated the war: “By signing a non-aggression pact with Hitler, Stalin thereby signed a verdict on the Soviet Union, because it allowed the implementation of the general strategic plan of the war, which had been developed by the German generals since the First World War. Stalin eliminated Russia's deterrent to Hitler and thus allowed him to defeat France and strengthen his rear for the main goal - the defeat of the Soviet Union. It was categorically impossible to conclude an agreement with Germany, because it opened the green light to the Second World War.” S. Sluch reasoned in the same spirit: “The main thing that Hitler received was freedom of hands in the West…. And this is precisely what led to the defeat of France and other Western powers within five weeks... And from this point of view, one can evaluate the Soviet-German treaty of August 23, 1939 not only as a miscalculation of Soviet foreign policy, but also as a criminal act on the part of the Stalinist leadership” (Kil8.08.1989). Without saying a word about the grave guilt of England and France, S. Zavorotny and A. Novikov echoed them: “Stalin provided Hitler with a unique opportunity, which the German generals had unsuccessfully dreamed of since the beginning of the century: to defeat France without fear of an attack from the east, and then, turning back, attack Russia” (Kp.23.01.1990).

This means that Stalin committed a “criminal act”, acted short-sightedly in relation to France, did not understand that she and Russia are traditional allies in the same boat. In 1935, a mutual assistance agreement was concluded between the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia. What happened next? The shameful Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, when France and England cynically handed Czechoslovakia over to Hitler, depriving it of a fifth of its territory and half of its heavy industry. It was essentially a conspiracy against the Soviet Union. The war was being prepared to redistribute the world, to seize territories. According to the English historian A Taylor, “the British recoiled in horror” from the proposal to conclude an agreement with the USSR: “a war in which they would fight on the side of Soviet Russia against Germany was unthinkable for them” (World War II: two views. 1995. P.397). Charles de Gaulle wrote: “... when in September 1939 the French government... decided to enter into the war in Poland, which had already begun by that time, I had no doubt that it was dominated by illusions that, despite the state of war, serious battles were a matter of won’t get there,” in 1939–1940. in France, “some circles saw the enemy more in Stalin than in Hitler, they were preoccupied with how to strike at Russia” (The Second World War in Memoirs. 1990. P196) French political scientist Raymond Aron justified the Munich Agreement and even the surrender of France in 1940 g. Why? Yes, because it helped “throw the Germans in the direction of their eastern claims.” And if France had not been defeated, then “the attack on the Soviet Union would have been completely postponed.”

In V. Pikul’s novel “Barbarossa,” responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations between the USSR and England and France in the summer of 1939 is placed on Stalin, who supposedly admired Hitler, “trembled for his own skin,” and pursued a capitulatory policy towards Germany. This concept, Pikul admitted, was formed under the influence of the “excellent historian” Dashichev. During the negotiations, it became clear to our government that the main goal of England and France was to pit the USSR against Germany. The Kremlin knew, V. Molotov told I. Stadnyuk, “that some Swede, on behalf of Goering, flew every day on his personal plane from Berlin to London and from there delivered Chamberlain’s assurances to Goering: Germany, they say, is free in its actions against the Soviet Union "(Project 22.06L 993). The British conducted secret negotiations with the Germans in London when the Anglo-French delegation was discussing options for a military agreement with the USSR in Moscow; they used this as a means of putting pressure on Germany. Great Britain hatched a plan to create an Anglo-German alliance. On June 29, 1939, its Foreign Minister Halifax, on behalf of his government, expressed his readiness to come to an agreement with the Germans on all issues that “caused alarm to the world.” Preliminary sounding was carried out by prominent members of the conservative party, who proposed that “Hitler divide the world into two spheres of influence: Anglo-American in the West and German in the East” (Ng. ZO.O6.2OOO).

Dashichev said that “the pact of 1939 was inevitable - under Stalin. With a reasonable statesman...everything would have been completely different, and it would have been possible to curb Hitler’s aggression.” But the facts show that our leadership did a lot, if not everything, to prevent war. In the summer of 1939, it negotiated with great interest with England and France to conclude a defensive pact, but their rulers had other plans. Knowing that no later than September the Wehrmacht would attack Poland (04/11/1939 Hitler signed the “Weiss Plan” - about preparing a war against it), they decided to sacrifice it in order to clear Germany’s road to the east. On August 11, 1939, the British and French missions arrived in Moscow for negotiations, without the authority to conclude a military agreement (the document was sent to the English Admiral Drax only at the end of the negotiations). According to the English diplomat G. Ferker, “long before the arrival of the British military mission, the British embassy in Moscow received instructions from the government, which indicated that the negotiations should under no circumstances end successfully.” The secret instructions to the British delegation stated that "the British Government does not wish to be drawn into any specific obligation which could tie our hands under any circumstances." On August 8, 1939, the US Embassy in England reported to Washington: “The military mission now being sent to Moscow has been instructed to make every effort to extend the negotiations until October 1.” US Secretary of the Interior Henry Ickes concluded: “Chamberlain... hopes that Hitler will ultimately decide to move to the East rather than to the West. That is why he is slow to reach an agreement with Russia” (Ag. 10/26/1988). The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General F. Halder, wrote in his office diary on August 14, 1939: “The British were given to understand that the Fuhrer, after resolving the inescapable Polish question for Germany, would once again turn to England with proposals. London understood. Paris also knows our determination. Therefore, the whole big performance is approaching its end... England is already testing the waters to see how the Fuhrer imagines the further development of the situation after the resolution of the Polish question.”

The Soviet ambassador in London, I. Maisky, told Molotov: the German leadership had come to the conclusion that “England and France are not capable of a serious war and that nothing will come of negotiations on a triple alliance.” Hitler expected them to leave Poland to its fate, regarded this as their weakness and decided to use their hidden plans for his own purposes. General G. Guderian in “Memoirs of a Soldier” (1999) argued: “Hitler and his Foreign Minister were inclined to believe that the Western powers would not dare to start a war against Germany and therefore it had a free hand to achieve its goals in Eastern Europe” (89 ). General K. Tippelskirch wrote in “History of the Second World War” (1956) about Hitler’s conviction that they would not dare to attack Germany if it attacked Poland: “When Hitler was given the ultimatum of the British government, he was literally petrified - he understood that that he was mistaken about the possible reaction of the British and acted too carelessly” (8). England and France, having declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, did not conduct active military operations against it, as Poland had hoped for. Having pledged to protect her, they betrayed their ally, watching with amazing calm as German formations crushed the Polish army. G. Rychkov believes that the main reason for this inaction is that France “was unable to mobilize the army and transfer the economy to a war footing” (PR. No. 23, 2001). This idea is not consistent with the facts. Field Marshal E. Manstein, in his book “Lost Victories” (1999), noted that “from the first day of the war, the French army was many times superior to the German forces operating on the Western Front” (36). Taylor believed, “If the French had attacked, the Germans would have had no way of resisting” (401). General Jodl admitted at the Nuremberg trials: “If we were not defeated back in 1939, it was only because approximately 110 French and British divisions, which stood during our war with Poland in the West against 23 German divisions, remained completely inactive.” This “strange war” was a continuation of the policy of “appeasement”, an attempt to preserve the opportunity to push Germany and the USSR into conflict in the future.

To vilify Stalin for the non-aggression pact with Germany is either an unwillingness to delve into the exceptional complexity and danger of the international situation of that time, or mindlessly assent to those who are accustomed to tarring our past with black paint. G. Dimitrov recorded in his diary the words spoken by Stalin on September 7, 1939: “We preferred an agreement with the so-called democratic countries and therefore negotiated, but England and France wanted to have us as farm laborers and not pay anything.” The authors of the textbook “Russia. Century XX" (Voronezh 1997) mislead readers by declaring that Stalin chose Hitler as an ally, "because for him German “national socialism” was more congenial, similar and understandable than “class alien bourgeois parliamentarism” (194 ). The German government several times proposed to Moscow to conclude an agreement, but received no response. If she had not accepted this offer again, Hitler could have announced at the right moment. “Russia does not want to conclude a non-aggression pact with us, which means it is preparing aggression against us, and we must speak to it in the language of guns.” If events had followed this path, then London and Paris would have rejoiced, dreaming that Germany and the Soviet Union would collide, bleed each other, and they would dictate their peace terms to them. France and England had non-aggression treaties with Germany, but for some reason the USSR could not do what these states did, which were also negotiating a military alliance with it.

The August Pact with Germany was completely justified: there was no other solution that more reliably met the security interests of the USSR: attempts to conclude an equal treaty of mutual assistance with England and France failed, our army was reorganizing and rearming, and was not ready to successfully repel fascist aggression. The Soviet people accepted this pact with understanding: a bad peace is better than a good quarrel, especially war. But the friendship treaty with Germany dated September 28. The year 1939 caused bewilderment among many of our people and was perceived as a forced, strange zigzag in politics. The danger hanging over our state was making itself felt too strongly. At that time, the situation in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River was acutely worrying, where, after air raids on July 3, 1939, the Japanese launched an offensive against the Mongolian and Soviet troops. US President Roosevelt on July 2, 1939 asked our plenipotentiary “to tell Stalin and Molotov that the other day a very authoritative a Japanese figure offered him a scheme for Japanese-American cooperation to exploit the riches of Eastern Siberia... fantastic, but typical of the plans of Japanese “activists” who have not abandoned thoughts of adventures in your direction.” 04/16/1939 R. Sorge reported that the German Ambassador to Japan “received information about the military anti-Comintern Pact: if Germany and Italy start a war with the USSR, Japan will join them at any moment.”

A. N. Yakovlev wrote that the agreement of August 23, 1939 with Germany became a revision of the “strategic course towards collective security” (this course was thwarted by England and France), considered it a deviation “first of all from the Leninist norms of Soviet foreign policy, from Lenin’s break with secret diplomacy” (Project 08/18/1989). D. Volkogonov, calling this pact “completely cynical,” also assessed it as a “deviation from Leninist norms of foreign policy”: “the Soviet country has sunk to the level of ... imperialist powers.” Yes, we had to “stoop” to their level in a critical situation: it became clear that we could not do without secret diplomacy. To live with wolves is to howl like a wolf. The press noted the low level of Volkogonov’s work. In the book “Triumph and Tragedy. Political Portrait of J.V. Stalin" (1991) he spoke warmly about the "brilliant spiritual power of Lenin." And in the same year, in AiF (No. 41), he wrote that his philosophical works are “rather primitive,” and he “seems to be an unsympathetic person.” Bushin found a number of absurdities in the work of this changeling. Let's add it. Volkogonov wrote that Stalin personally met with the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow Stamenev in order to try to conclude “a separate peace treaty with the Germans, similar to Brest-Litovsk” (in Pikul’s Barbarossa, Stalin, Molotov and Beria “visited” Stamenev). In fact, Sudoplatov, one of the leaders of our intelligence, met with him, his task “was to launch disinformation regarding a possible peace with Hitler, using Stamenev as a source” (Sudoplatov P. Special Operations. Lubyanka and the Kremlin. 1930–1950. 1990. With .614). This was an attempt to explore the possibility of stopping the fighting in order to gain time to mobilize reserves. Volkogonov argued that after Stalingrad, Stalin “was overcome by the persistent idea of ​​encirclement” (Kp. 06/22/1991). But what about the fact that in 1943 G. Zhukov, A. Vasilevsky, A. Antonov proposed to encircle an enemy group in the Orel region, but Stalin did not support them? The same thing happened when the idea arose to encircle the Germans at Krivoy Rog. Zhukov knew that Stalin “in general, due to a number of circumstances, is not yet very confident in the advisability of a more decisive use of operations to encircle the enemy” (Memoirs and Reflections. 1983. T.Z. P.77). Stalin was not inclined to surround the Germans on his territory because he did not want to create conditions for the destruction of our cities, believing that it was necessary to create such a situation so that the enemy would “leave quickly.” And to surround “later, on enemy territory” (Marshal Zhukov. As we remember him. 1988. C122).

The four-volume work “The Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945: Military Historical Sketches” (1988–1999) is the last word in our military historical science. It criticizes the secret annex to the pact of August 23, 1939 and the September treaty of friendship with Germany from moral and legal positions. Of course, it would be nice for the Soviet government to always maintain crystal honesty in foreign policy, but where would this lead the USSR? With the collapse of the Warsaw bloc, the United States verbally promised Gorbachev not to expand NATO eastward. And now Western politicians are making it known with cynical mockery that there is no point in remembering these unofficial assurances, and besides, those who promised it are no longer in power. Some people wanted Stalin to be as short-sighted and a convenient partner for the West as Gorbachev, who did a lot to lead the USSR to disaster. It is sometimes argued that at the conclusion of the August Pact, “Stalin showed the world examples of the greatest immorality, striking a blow to the authority of the USSR.” What should he have done? Not defending the interests of your country? Don't think about the benefits for her? Become a toy in the hands of England and France, who betrayed Czechoslovakia because they wanted to push Hitler to campaign in the East? V. Kozhinov wrote that “Stalin in August 1939 behaved exactly the same as Chamberlain in September 1938.” Here it is incorrect to say “exactly the same,” and therefore he clarified his thought: “Chamberlain’s behavior was both “cynical” and, certainly, “more shameful” (Ns. 1998. No. 10. P. 148). Yes, Western rulers behaved in that difficult, tense situation in an amazingly vile manner, much worse than the Soviet government.

How to assess the moral level of Truman, the future president of the United States, who on June 23, 1941 said: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as many as possible"? Berezhkov, Stalin’s translator, wrote about the “immorality” of our policy: “To some extent this is true, but we must keep in mind that we were dealing with states that also pursued very immoral policies. If we take Munich, relations with Czechoslovakia, non-intervention during the war in Spain, the attitude towards the Anschluss of Austria - is this really a moral policy? We also understood who we were dealing with!... At that dramatic moment when everyone was figuring out what to do so that there would be a minimum of losses, in order to somehow ensure their safety” (K.p.8.08.1989).

Let us touch upon the most unfavorable fact for us in moral and political terms - the war with Finland in the winter of 1939–1940. Our border with her was 32 kilometers from Leningrad. And Orlov correctly considers the Soviet-Finnish war “in a certain sense, “unnecessary,” generated by the political miscalculations of both countries” (Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945. T.I. C32). Finnish rulers then pursued a short-sighted foreign policy. The oath of the Finnish officer included the words: “Just as I believe in one God, I believe in Greater Finland and its great future.” A prominent public figure in Finland, Väine Voinomaa, wrote to his son about how the chairman of the Social Democratic faction in the Finnish parliament, Tanner, spoke on 19.06. 1941: “The very existence of Russia is unjustified, and it must be liquidated,” “Peter will be wiped off the face of the earth.” Finnish borders, according to President Ryti, will be established along the Svir to Lake Onega and from there to the White Sea, “the Stalin Canal remains on the Finnish side” (LR.4.05.2001). Such plans found support among a considerable part of the Finnish population. Noting that as a result of the victory over the Finns, the USSR “improved its strategic position in the northwest and north, created the prerequisites for ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Murmansk railway,” Orlov noted that “the territorial gains of 1939–1940. turned into major political losses” (34). But they were covered by the fact that German troops attacked us from positions 400 kilometers away from the old border. In November they approached Moscow. Where would they be if the border had not been pushed west? Berezhkov reasoned: “...what would have happened if the border with Finland had passed where it had passed before the spring of 1940? Another question: would Leningrad have survived? This means that there was something in this, which means that we cannot say that we only lost, discredited ourselves” (Kp.8.08.1989).

According to Dashichev, “in the pact of 1939, Stalinism found its clearest manifestation in foreign policy... Long before 1939, Stalin planned to pit England, France and Germany against each other - and he obviously believed that this clash would become a generator of revolutionary events in Western Europe, and the USSR could stand aside “the third rejoicing.” But this was a colossal miscalculation made by Stalin due to his ignorance” (Kp. 08/08/1989). Yu. Afanasyev declared the USSR a “warmonger”: from 1939 to 1941. he nurtured and sought to implement “aggressive plans” with the goal of “expanding socialism.” According to him, “to understand the true causes of the tragedy, first of all, you should pay attention to the text of Stalin’s speech at the Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939,” when he said “The experience of the last twenty years shows that in peacetime it is impossible to have a communist in Europe a movement strong to such an extent that the Bolshevik Party could seize power. The dictatorship of this party becomes possible only as a result of a big war. We will make our choice, and it is clear... The first advantage we will gain will be the destruction of Poland right up to the very approaches to Warsaw , including Ukrainian Galicia." V. Anfilov corrected the illegible historian: “The Politburo on August 19 actually took place, but other issues were considered at it. The words attributed to Stalin are an evil fake that has been circulating around the world for a long time. The given words do not even correspond to the style of Stalin’s language" (Ng 06/23/2000) In the 30s, Stalin did not implement the doctrine of world revolution, and therefore Trotsky noted that “Stalinism has become the worst brake on the world revolution”, that “international politics is completely subordinated to domestic politics for Stalin.” From the second half of the 30s. and especially in 1940–1941. he did not consider it necessary to conduct active subversive Comintern activities in bourgeois states.

Now what has long been hidden behind seven seals in the depths of foreign intelligence services is being thrown into the fire of political struggle. V. Suvorov (V. Rezun), who became an employee of the British secret services, revealed their secret plans of old years in the book “Icebreaker”. If Dashichev argued that from the August 1939 treaty “only one person benefited - Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany. For us it was a complete loss,” then Rezun presented Hitler’s main mistake as the fact that he concluded a non-aggression pact with the USSR, turned his back on it and allowed it to prepare for war. By delaying the German attack for almost two years, Stalin confused the plans of the ruling circles of England and France; they, together with Hitler, miscalculated: their united front was needed, but what happened was completely different. How to evaluate the position of V. Toporov: “The USSR and Germany secretly concluded an aggressive alliance and began a world war of conquest... The fact that England and France did not declare war on our country at the same time, in September 1939, only testifies to the indecisiveness of their then governments.” ? (Nov. 1990. No. 6. P. 165). You have to really hate our country to say that it started a world war. One might think that Toporov does not know the situation in 1939 at all, regretting that England and France did not simultaneously fight Germany and the Soviet Union. This is real schizophrenia. But upon reflection, you come to the conclusion: it’s not a matter of illness. The historical course of events should have led to a united struggle of Western countries against the USSR, to a joint continuation of the “Drang nach Osten” policy - this is what would suit those who are dissatisfied with our victory in the Patriotic War. In vain did the German professor G. Jacobsen assert that “the threat of an anti-Soviet front between the Western powers and Germany did not exist at all” (Lg. 08/30/1989). In fact, in 1939–1941. More than once attempts were made to end the armed conflict between the Western powers and to direct their united armies against the USSR.

As Berezhkov wrote, “in the twenties of August 1939, in Berlin...there was a plane that was supposed to deliver Goering to London in the event of the failure of Ribbentrop’s mission to Moscow.” Our leadership could not help but notice that the possibility of a common front between Western democracies and fascist Germany was then emerging. The non-aggression pact destroyed this planned combination, which was dangerous for the USSR, introduced a considerable irritable element into Japan’s relations with Germany, and improved our military-strategic positions. The Japanese historian and Sovietologist H. Teratani assessed him this way: “... in this case, Stalin showed himself to be a statesman of the highest qualifications... without the non-aggression pact, the fate of the world would have turned out differently and not at all in favor of the USSR. By concluding an agreement with Germany, the Soviet Union confused the cards of all its opponents. Technically, it was done simply with jewelry. The plans of the British, who were flirting with Germany and, to a lesser extent, with the USSR, and in fact trying to play them off against each other, were thwarted. But Japan suffered the greatest shock. An ally of Nazi Germany in the struggle for a “new order” in the world, Japan received a terrible blow on August 23, 1939. Never before or since in history has there been a case where the Japanese government resigned due to the conclusion of an agreement between two other states. Here the resignation followed immediately. I would venture to suggest, without in any way detracting from the military successes of the Soviet troops at Khalkhin Gol, that the pact largely predetermined the outcome of the campaign, Japan was so demoralized. The treaty undoubtedly changed the balance of forces in the world in favor of the USSR... Stalin in 1939 made objectively the best moves in terms of the interests of the USSR as a state” (Kp. 1.09.1989). In his memoirs “The Second World War,” Churchill wrote: “The fact that such an agreement was possible marks the depth of the failure of British and French policy and diplomacy over several years.” This agreement destroyed the plans of England and France to set Germany against the Soviet Union and prevented it from having to fight simultaneously on two fronts - in the Far East and in the West. We had the opportunity to stay out of the war for almost two years.

Some believe that there was an alternative to the treaty with Germany: if the USSR had not signed it, the world war would not have started. But Hitler’s leadership decided back on April 3, 1939 to attack Poland no later than September 1, “there really is no reason to believe that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was a decisive step towards unleashing the Second World War,” (M. Narinsky). War would have broken out regardless of the fate of this treaty. But Dashichev reasoned: “If the war had begun in September without the presence of the 1939 pact, it would not have developed so unfavorably for us, because Hitler would have been squeezed from two sides - from the west and the east. The factor of the Soviet Union would have acted on Hitler and would not have allowed him to achieve such a quick victory even over Poland.” How would this “factor” make itself felt? Where would Poland get additional forces from? Volkogonov reproached Stalin for the fact that the USSR did not prevent “Hitler from attacking Poland” (Kp.06.22.1991), but did not say how this could have been done. Rezun wrote that Stalin could have prevented a world war, for which he had to announce: the USSR would defend the territory of Poland as its own. But he “forgot” that before that she took part in the division of Czechoslovakia, adopted a short-sighted anti-Soviet policy and arrogantly refused our help in the event of German aggression. M. Semiryaga believed that the USSR should have rejected Germany’s proposal as unacceptable or delayed negotiations with it and persistently sought “the conclusion of a military agreement with England and France. Even if it had not been concluded immediately, its threat, like the sword of Damocles, would have hung over the aggressor and kept him from immediate adventures” (Lg. 5.10.1988). I wouldn't hold it. The Soviet government tried to delay negotiations with Germany, but it soon became clear that delaying the conclusion of an agreement with it would mean facing the Wehrmacht, and at that time there were battles with Japanese troops in the east.

L. Isakov wrote: “If it were not for the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Hitler, in the conditions of Japanese support in the East, would undoubtedly rush at us...” (Sl. 2002. No. 2. P. 103). But Narinsky did not believe in such a turn of events, because “there are no documents that would indicate that Germany was planning a war against the Soviet Union in the fall of 1939.” Not everything goes according to plan, and if “the Nazi Reich at that moment was simply not ready for such a war,” then the USSR was even more unprepared for it. Then Stalin “believed that only by 1943 we could meet the Germans on an equal footing.” And could he not take into account the fact that on April 15, 1939, Sorge reported about Ribbentrop’s speech to his employees, who stated that “Germany’s main goal is to conclude a lasting peace with England and start a war with the USSR”? In conversations with Keitel in June 1940, Hitler proposed to undertake an “eastern campaign” that same fall. The military convinced him that autumn was an unfavorable time for the German army to conduct military operations in Russia. At the end of July, he agreed to postpone the start of the “eastern campaign” to the spring of 1941.

The rapid defeat of the Polish army came as a surprise to our government; at first it did not intend to conduct military operations in Poland. A. Orlov in “The Great Patriotic War...” noted: “Immediately after England and France entered the war, Ribbentrop persistently suggested that the USSR send its troops to Poland.” But this could lead to serious consequences: “there were no guarantees that England and France would not declare war on the USSR if the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border” (Vol. 1, p. 30). 12.09 Hitler, in a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Brauchich, said: “... the Russians, obviously, do not want to act... The Russians believe that the Poles will agree to make peace” (Ng. 06/23/2000). R. Zhugzhda unreasonably believed that “the campaign of the Red Army was a surprise for Germany and caused its concern: it cut off the Reich from Romanian oil and did not allow it to gain a foothold in Galicia” (SR.24.08.1988). You can castigate the secret protocol on the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR as much as you like (the Supreme Soviet of the USSR condemned it), if you proceed from the position of some abstract ideal and neglect historical reality. Who will say: what should our leadership have done when the Polish government fled and German troops were approaching Brest and Lvov? Allow them to occupy Western Belarus, Western Ukraine, the Baltic states and later start a war against us with an attack on Minsk and Leningrad?

On September 14, 1999, “Memorial” considered our defense of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine “a tragedy for their inhabitants” and called on the Russian leadership to “publicly call it a crime” (Rm. 1999. No. 4287). But in 1939, as former British Prime Minister Lloyd George wrote to the Polish ambassador in London at the time, “The USSR occupied territories that are not Polish and which were taken by force by Poland after the First World War... It would be an act of madness to put the Russian advance on one board with the promotion of Germany" (Project 1.09.1988). Doctor of Historical Sciences Berezhkov wrote in the book “Next to Stalin”: “...as a witness to the events that took place in the fall of 1939, I cannot forget the atmosphere that reigned in those days in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. We were greeted with flowers, bread and salt, treated to fruits and milk. In small private cafes, Soviet officers were fed for free. Those were genuine feelings.

The Red Army was seen as protection from Hitler’s terror. Something similar happened in the Baltic states.” In 1999, the peoples of Belarus and Ukraine celebrated the 60th anniversary of their reunification as a holiday.

Russophobes see this differently. D. Khmelnitsky wrote that the real entry of the USSR into the war “occurred on September 17, 1941” (Rm. 2000. No. 4323). Yu. Afanasyev appreciated “the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939; parade of Soviet and German troops in Brest in the fall of the same year; occupation of the Baltic states, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Bessarabia in 1940; Stalin's congratulations to Hitler on each of his victories in Europe up to June 1941; toasts in honor of the Fuhrer in the Kremlin... as the actual participation of the USSR until mid-1941 in the war on the side of Germany against the Western allies.” Anfilov in his article “Against History” (Ng.27. 01.2000) indicated that the USSR was forced to conclude an agreement with Germany: Chamberlain and Daladier did not respond to his calls. There were no “joint military actions” between German and Soviet troops in Poland. The question of the “victory parade” in Brest, which was “hosted” by General Guderian and Brigade Commander Krivoshei, remains speculative. For the Red Army, the “parade” was a “diplomatic” step to avoid undesirable consequences. The same goal was pursued by Stalin's toasts and congratulations to Hitler.

Hitler intended to take over most of the Baltic states. On September 25, 1939, he signed secret directive No. 4, which provided for “to keep in combat readiness in East Prussia forces sufficient for the rapid seizure of Lithuania even in the event of armed resistance.” Inclusion in Nazi Europe did not bode well for the Baltic peoples. The head of the SS, Himmler, in 1942 put forward the task of “total Germanization” of the Baltic states within 20 years. In the fall of 1939, the USSR concluded mutual assistance agreements with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and, on their basis, sent its troops into these states on July 26, 1940; the London Times noted that their “unanimous decision to join Soviet Russia” “reflects... not pressure from Moscow, but a sincere recognition that such an exit is a better alternative than inclusion in the new Nazi Europe.” This strengthened the security of our northwestern borders and helped prepare to repel Hitler’s aggression.

K. Kolikov announced that the USSR attacked Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. He didn't attack them. Until 1918, Bessarabia never belonged to Romania, which, taking advantage of our weakness at that time, seized it, and in 1940 the USSR returned it to itself, restoring historical justice. In October 1939, Churchill told the Soviet Plenipotentiary Maisky: “From the point of view of the correctly understood interests of England, the fact that the entire East and South-East of Europe is outside the war zone has not a negative, but a positive meaning. Mainly, England has no reason to object to the actions of the USSR in the Baltic states. Of course, some sentimental figures may shed tears over the Russian protectorate over Estonia or Latvia, but this cannot be taken seriously” (Pr. 08/11/1989). He stated: “In favor of the Soviets, it must be said that it was vital for the Soviet Union to push the starting positions of the German armies as far to the West as possible, so that the Russians would have time and could gather forces from all corners of their colossal empire. If their policy was coldly calculating, it was also at that moment highly realistic.” D Trenin and V. Makarenko did not understand this when they wrote: “In 1939, Stalin made a gross strategic mistake by concluding a deal with Hitler on the division of Poland. The liquidation of independent Poland deprived the Soviet Union of a natural buffer between itself and Germany. The Germans would never have been able to carry out such a sudden attack if there had not been the notorious “line of demarcation of the mutual state interests of the USSR and Germany,” as the Soviet-German border began to be officially called in the fall of 1939” (Tzh.28.07.1992). But it is clear that after the defeat of Poland, a common border with Germany and us became a reality.

From the Declaration on the Formation of the USSR (1922): “The USSR is the first decisive step in the creation of the World Soviet Socialist Republic.”

Some Soviet Socialist Republic can be created as a result of a local revolution, and a World Soviet Socialist Republic can only be created as a result of a worldwide revolution.

Already from the Declaration of Communo-Fascists of the USSR it follows that the goal of communism is world revolution.

What, according to the communists themselves, will result in such a revolution? Back in 1916, Lenin gave a clear answer: as a result of the second imperialist war!

Stalin followed a path ahead of Hitler, and this path was quite successful and correct from the point of view of the Soviet communist fascists. The world game in this bloody multi-move chess game according to the calculations of STALIN - MOLOTOV, Hitler starts, and Stalin takes the initiative into his own hands and wins. But the multi-pass failed. The Abwehr miscalculated Stalin and Hitler played ahead by attacking the USSR, ahead of Stalin by literally weeks.

This mouse fuss of two paranoid dictators, paradoxically, saved Europe and the world from the red-brown plague.

I have no question who started World War II. There is no doubt that Stalin fueled it for a long time and consistently, and Hitler, supported by the USSR, joined the flaring fire, giving it a second wind.

So many years have passed since the end of this massacre, and politicians have not yet developed a common opinion on this issue.

The Soviet government, for example, changed its opinion on this issue many times, Viktor Suvorov writes in Bristol in his memoirs.

On September 18, 1939, the Soviet government announced in an official note that Poland was the culprit of the war.

On November 30, 1939, Stalin named more “culprits” in the Pravda newspaper: “England and France attacked Germany, taking responsibility for the current war.”

On May 5, 1941, in a secret speech to graduates of military academies, Stalin named another culprit - Germany.

After the end of the war, the circle of “culprits” expanded. Stalin said that World War II was started by all the capitalist countries of the world.
Before World War II, all sovereign states of the world, except the USSR, according to the Stalinist division, were considered capitalist.
If you believe Stalin, then the bloodiest war in human history was started by the governments of all countries, including Sweden and Switzerland, but excluding the Soviet Union.

The Stalinist point of view that everyone is to blame except the USSR was stabilized in communist mythology for a long time.

During the times of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, accusations against the whole world were repeated many times. During Gorbachev's time, many things changed in the Soviet Union, but not the Stalinist point of view about the perpetrators of wars.

Thus, in Gorbachev’s times, the chief historian of the Soviet Army, Lieutenant General P. A. Zhilin, repeats: “The culprits of the war were not only the imperialists of Germany, but of the whole world” (“Red Star”, September 24, 1985).

I have the courage to say that the Soviet communists accuse all countries of the world of starting the Second World War only in order to hide their shameful role as arsonists.

Let's remember that after the First World War, Germany lost the right to have a powerful army and offensive weapons, including tanks, heavy artillery, and combat aircraft.
On their own territory, German commanders were deprived of the opportunity to prepare for wars of aggression.

German commanders did not violate prohibitions until a certain time and did not prepare for aggressive wars at their training grounds; they did it... on the territory of the Soviet Union.
Stalin provided the German commanders with everything they had no right to have: tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft.

Stalin allocated classrooms, training grounds, and shooting ranges to German commanders. Stalin gave German commanders access to the most powerful Soviet tank factories in the world: look, remember, adopt.

If Stalin wanted peace, he had to do everything he could to prevent the revival of the striking power of German militarism: after all, then Germany would remain a militarily weak country.

In addition to a militarily weak Germany, there would be Britain in Europe, which does not have a powerful ground army; France, which spent almost its entire military budget on purely defensive programs, erecting something like the Great Wall of China along its borders, and other countries that were weaker militarily and economically.

In such a situation, Europe would not be such a fire hazard at all...

But Stalin, for some purpose, spares no money, effort and time to revive German striking power.

For what? Against who? Of course, not against yourself! Then against whom? There is only one answer: against the rest of Europe.

But reviving a powerful army in Germany and an equally powerful military industry is only half the battle.

Even the most aggressive army does not start wars on its own. Above all, we need a fanatical, insane leader, ready to start a war.

And Stalin did a lot to ensure that just such a leader would be at the head of Germany.

How Stalin created Hitler, how he helped him seize power and strengthen himself is a separate big topic. I am preparing a book on this topic.

But we will talk about this later, and now we will just remember that Stalin stubbornly and persistently pushed the Nazis who came to power towards war. The pinnacle of these efforts is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

With this pact, Stalin guaranteed Hitler freedom of action in Europe and essentially opened the floodgates of World War II.

When we use an unkind word to remember the dog that bit half of Europe, let’s not forget Stalin, who raised the dog and then let it off the chain.

Even before he came to power, Soviet leaders gave Hitler a secret title: Icebreaker of the Revolution.

The name is precise and succinct. Stalin understood that Europe was vulnerable only in case of war and that the Icebreaker of the Revolution could make Europe vulnerable. Adolf Hitler, without realizing it, was clearing the way for world communism. With lightning wars, Hitler crushed Western democracies, while dispersing and scattering his forces from Norway to Libya.

The Icebreaker of the Revolution committed the greatest atrocities against the world and humanity and through its actions gave Stalin the moral right at any moment to declare himself the Liberator of Europe, replacing the brown concentration camps with red ones.

Stalin understood that the war is won not by the one who enters it first, but by the one who enters last, and kindly conceded to Hitler the shameful right to be the instigator of the war, while he himself patiently waited for the moment “when the capitalists squabble among themselves” (Stalin, speech 3 December 1927).

I consider Hitler a criminal and a scoundrel. I consider him a cannibal on a European scale.

But if Hitler was a cannibal, it does not at all follow that Stalin was a vegetarian. Much has been done to expose the crimes of Nazism and to find the executioners who committed grave atrocities under its flag. This work must be continued and strengthened.

But by exposing the fascists, we are obliged to expose the Soviet communists, who encouraged the Nazis to commit crimes and intended to take advantage of the results of their crimes.

Joint parade of communist-fascists of the USSR and fascists of Germany in Brest

In the Soviet Union, the archives have long been thoroughly cleaned, and what remains is almost inaccessible to researchers. I was lucky enough to work quite a bit in the archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but I quite consciously almost never use archival materials. I have a lot of materials from German military archives, but I hardly use them either. My main source is open Soviet publications.

Even this is quite enough to put the Soviet communists against the wall of shame and put them in the dock next to the German fascists, or even ahead.

My main witnesses: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, all Soviet marshals during the war and many leading generals. The communists themselves admit that with the hands of Hitler they unleashed a war in Europe and were preparing a surprise attack on Hitler himself in order to seize the Europe he had destroyed.

The value of my sources lies in the fact that the criminals themselves talk about their crimes, sums up the writer and historian Viktor Suvorov.

Now let's move on to the myths about the evil ones who fought on their land and for their independence from both the red and brown plague.

Communism and Nazism collaborated, but for some reason they blame Bandera, who served time in a German concentration camp for declaring the independence of Ukraine, writes 365news.

15 facts about “Bandera”, or What the Kremlin is silent about

1. Stepan Bandera is from a believing family, he was not a military man and did not participate in any battle.

Unlike Stalin, who killed millions of people (including Russians), Stepan Bandera did not do this.

2. Stepan Bandera served three years in the German concentration camp Sachsenhausen for proclaiming the act of independence of Ukraine on June 30, 1941, and for refusing to swear allegiance to the German occupation government, Stepan Bandera’s two brothers were tortured in the German concentration camp Auschwitz.

All for what they fought for - for an independent, conciliar and self-sufficient Ukraine.

3. OUN and UPA are different things. Despite the fact that the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) was the backbone of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), the OUN and the UPA are different structures.

First, the OUN is a political organization, second, the UPA is the largest unofficial liberation army in Europe.

4. Fact: the OUN was divided into two camps - OUN M and OUN B. OUN M - “Melnikovites” who did not reject cooperation with Germany. OUN B - Banderaites (the same ones) who were against any cooperation with Germany.

It was the OUN B (Banderaites), setting the goal of an independent Ukraine, that formed the backbone of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army).

5. The UPA began its activities only after the German occupation (in 1942), that is, against Germany and its occupation.

6. Despite communist myths, the UPA soldiers had their own uniform, their own ranks, their own distinctions, their own awards, among them chevrons with the coat of arms and flag of Ukraine.

7. Despite communist myths, the UPA swore only allegiance to Ukraine.
The corresponding text of the oath was approved by the UGBP and introduced by order of the Main Military Staff, part 7, dated July 19.

8. Unlike the communists, who actively collaborated with Germany and divided Europe with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the UPA and OUN B did not cooperate with either the German or communist occupation governments.

In turn, the Communists and Germans, in addition to concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, taught each other, carried out joint repressions, parades, exchanged weapons, etc.

The Communists and Germany jointly attacked Poland, starting World War II on September 1, 1939!

That is, communism and Nazism collaborated closely, but for some reason they blame Bandera, who served time in a German concentration camp for declaring the independence of Ukraine.

And for refusing to cooperate with Germany, two Bandera brothers were tortured in the Auschwitz concentration camp.

Then the question arises: who is whose accomplice really?

It is a well-known fact that communist pilots studied in Germany, and Germany adopted the “experience of building Gulags” from the communists.

They helped each other with food at the expense of the famines in Ukraine.

The UPA and Bandera did not have any agreements with the German occupation government, for which Bandera was in a concentration camp, and most of his family were repressed under various pretexts by both the Communists and the Germans.

9. The UPA did not conduct a single battle with the standing army of the USSR, and all the “backs” that they could “shoot” could only be the backs of the NKVD punitive forces, who exterminated millions of people and then burned villages!

One of the important facts is that the UPA did not occupy foreign lands, but acted only on its own land and defended its land and its people both from the German occupation forces and from the NKVD punitive forces.

One of the most famous is the testimony of one of the participants in a specially formed special group of the NKVD RO, Major Sokolov.

“I consulted with the commanders of the special group that it wouldn’t be better for us to change our work - not to enter villages under the guise of gangs, looking for bandits, but to steal from the villages people who are registered with the RO NKVD as having connections with bandits, and interrogate them under the guise of the UPA ..."

Another piece of evidence: “Moving through areas controlled by nationalists for about 300 km (!), in order to avoid clashes and study the rebels, the Kovpakovites themselves disguised themselves as nationalists, removing their insignia.”

11. It is a known fact that the partisans of the Red Army, who were in the forests of Western Ukraine, admitted in their diaries that the UPA was fighting against the German army for the independence of Ukraine.

Among these, the most famous is the testimony of Semyon Rudnev:

“Our people fought joint battles with the UPA against the fascists for about two weeks.

They tell us: “We, Ukrainian nationalists, are against the Germans and Moscow - for an independent, conciliar Ukrainian state.”

Then negotiations began, as a result of which the nationalists promised not to oppose us and gave our battalion four bags of flour, a bag of cereal, a bag of sugar and a box of matches.”

12. People of different nationalities fought in the UPA.

Among them the most famous are: Russian Vladimir Cheremoshintsev, Jew Hasman Mandik.

UPA soldiers are also known, including Belarusians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Armenians, Georgians, Greeks, etc.

13. An established fact: the majority of doctors in the UPA were Jews.

They “Served in the UPA at the call of their hearts, fighting for the independence of Ukraine, healing soldiers in the wards...” - such testimonies are left by doctors.

14. The UPA set the goal of an independent, conciliar and independent Ukrainian state.

15. Fact: The UPA has not been officially dissolved.