Number of tanks in the Russian army. Organization of tank forces of the Third Reich. Legendary separate tank brigades

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the armored forces of the Red Army (it should be noted that the name of this type of troops changed several times: before the war they were called “armored”, and from the end of 1942 - “armored and mechanized troops”) consisted of mechanized corps, several tank divisions and tank regiments that were part of cavalry divisions. The military tank units and units and units of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK) that existed until mid-1940 were sent to staff them during the formation of mechanized corps.

By the beginning of the war, there were 29 mechanized corps in various stages of formation, consisting of two tank, one motorized divisions, a motorcycle regiment, a separate communications battalion, a separate engineering battalion and other corps units.

In general, taking into account corps units and subunits, the mechanized corps was supposed to have over 36 thousand people, 1031 tanks (including 546 KV and T-34), 358 guns and mortars, 268 armored vehicles.

However, it should be noted that the simultaneous deployment of such a large number of corps did not correspond to the capabilities available at that time to provide them with personnel, military equipment, weapons and vehicles. By mid-1941, the vast majority of these formations were understaffed. The shortage of military equipment and weapons, as well as the highly maneuverable nature of combat operations in the initial period of the war, confronted the Soviet command with the need for changes in the organizational structure of tank units. At the end of July 1941, the abolition of mechanized corps began and continued until September. Tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of army commanders, and motorized divisions were reorganized into rifle divisions.

At the same time, 10 tank divisions were created from the mechanized corps located in the internal military districts. They were supposed to have two tank, motorized and artillery-anti-tank regiments, a reconnaissance battalion, an anti-aircraft division and other units.

At the end of August 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense approved the staff of a regimental tank brigade with 93 tanks. The brigade's tank regiment consisted of three tank battalions. It was planned to equip one battalion with heavy and medium tanks, the other two with light tanks. Already in September, changes took place in the tank battalions of the regiment in the direction of reducing the number of tanks, after which the brigade had 67 vehicles. The experience of using regimental brigades revealed a number of shortcomings in their organization. Thus, the presence of an intermediate authority (regiment) complicated management; the brigade commander and headquarters were sometimes deprived of the ability to quickly respond to changing situations. Taking all this into account, the formation of battalion-level brigades began in September.

Simultaneously with the creation of new tank brigades, separate tank battalions were formed. The main reason for their appearance, as combat practice has shown, was the need to strengthen the rifle divisions defending important directions or lines, since the fragmentation of brigades for this purpose led to the dispersion of their efforts, complicated the management of units and complicated logistics.

The first staff of a separate wartime tank battalion was accepted in the same September 1941. According to this state, the battalion was supposed to have three tank companies (one company of medium and two companies of light tanks). The staff provided for 130 people and 29 tanks. Soon the need for more powerful tank battalions, which would also include heavy tanks, became apparent. Such battalions were created in November 1941. They were to consist of a company of heavy tanks with two platoons, a company of medium tanks and two companies of light tanks. In total, such a battalion was supposed to have 202 people and 36 tanks (heavy - 5, medium - 11, light - 20).

In 1941 and the winter of 1942, separate tank battalions were maintained in other, and different, states. This was explained mainly by the conditions for the formation of units, which were staffed with the material available in reserve. Often individual battalions outnumbered tank brigades in the number of combat vehicles.

At the beginning of January 1942, the formation of tank brigades for cavalry and infantry began. It was assumed that they would be light in composition, with a minimum number of support and service units. Each such brigade was to have a staff of 372 people and 46 tanks. (A tank brigade for infantry was supposed to have 10 heavy, 16 medium and 20 light tanks; a tank brigade for cavalry was supposed to have 20 medium and 26 light vehicles.) However, it was not possible to form the required number of such brigades. In February 1942, it was decided to create tank brigades consisting of 282 people, 27 tanks and include them in the staff of rifle divisions. But very few such brigades were able to be formed.

The experience gained in conducting combat operations in the winter of 1941/42 confirmed the correctness of the theory of deep offensive operations developed in our country at the end of the 1920s. War practice showed that the absence of large tank formations in the fronts and armies did not allow us to fully solve such an important offensive task as developing tactical success into operational success.

Therefore, in March 1942, the formation of the first four tank corps began, which included the corps administration, first two, and soon three tank and motorized rifle brigades. According to this staff, the corps should have had 5,603 people and 100 tanks (of which 20 heavy KVs, 40 medium T-34s and 40 light T-60s or T-70s). The created formations did not at all provide for artillery units, engineer-sapper, reconnaissance units, as well as their own corps rear. The corps administration actually consisted of a small group of officers intended to coordinate the combat operations of the brigades.

The first experience of the combat use of such corps in the spring of 1942 in Voronezh and other directions showed that the new formations did not have the necessary operational and tactical independence when conducting combat operations, which negatively affected their results.

In July 1942, a separate guards mortar division, numbering 250 people and 8 BM-13 rocket launchers, reconnaissance and motorcycle battalions, were included in the corps staff. Somewhat later, the corps received two mobile repair bases, as well as a fuel and lubricants delivery company to provide a second refueling of fuel and oil.

In parallel with the deployment of tank corps, tank armies (TA) began to be created in May 1942.

The first two tank armies (3rd and 5th) were formed in May - June 1942. At the end of July of the same year, directly on the Stalingrad front, using the field directorates of the 38th and 28th armies, the 1st and 4th tank armies were created, respectively, which were disbanded about a month later.

Initially, the combat composition of the TA was determined by the directives for their formation and was not the same. The experience of using tank armies in the summer of 1942 in defensive and offensive operations in the Voronezh direction (5 TA), in the Kozelsk area (3 TA) and especially in the counter-offensive near Stalingrad (5 TA) allowed us to draw a number of important conclusions about their combat capabilities and organizational structure. The presence in them of rifle divisions, tank and cavalry corps, which had different combat capabilities and mobility, negatively affected the organization, implementation of interaction, management and logistics. In general, the TAs turned out to be bulky, unmaneuverable and difficult to control.

In September 1942, the formation of mechanized corps (MK) began, taking into account the experience of creating tank corps. Therefore, already at the very beginning, units and subunits of special troops were included in the new formations. However, the organization of the corps was still uneven. So, for example, the 1st and 2nd mechanized corps each had three mechanized and one tank brigade, an anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a guards mortar division, an armored vehicle, repair and restoration battalions, as well as an engineering mine company, control and delivery companies for fuel and lubricants. The 3rd and 5th mechanized corps had two tank brigades instead of one, and the 4th and 6th corps, instead of tank brigades, were each equipped with two separate tank regiments.

Thus, out of the six mechanized corps, fully formed by the beginning of 1943, there were three types of organization, which affected the size of the new formations. In particular, for tanks it looked like this. The 1st and 2nd MKs were supposed to have 175 tanks, the 3rd and 5th - 224, and the 4th and 6th - 204 tanks. However, the main one was the staff on which the first two corps were maintained. This state became the basis for the formation of all new corps, and corps that had a different organization were subsequently transferred to it.

In the first half of 1942, tank brigades, both individual and part of corps, were formed and staffed in various states. The presence of battalions and companies in brigades that had heavy, medium and light tanks negatively affected their use. In July 1942, a single staff was approved for all tank brigades, to which previously created brigades were gradually transferred.

Mechanized brigades began to be created in September 1942, that is, from the moment the mechanized corps were formed. In addition, there were several separate mechanized brigades.

In 1942, the required number of motorized rifle brigades were formed, which were included in the tank corps, and several similar brigades were made separate. All brigades were created according to a single staff and were supposed to have three motorized rifle battalions. artillery and anti-aircraft artillery divisions, as well as support and service units.

Along with the formation of separate tank brigades intended to support the infantry, in September 1942 the formation of separate tank regiments began, which were also supposed to strengthen rifle formations. The organization of such a regiment was similar to the organization of a tank regiment of a mechanized brigade.

Almost simultaneously, in October 1942, separate heavy tank breakthrough regiments of the RGK began to be created. The regiment consisted of four companies (each with 5 tanks) and a technical support company. In total, it was supposed to have 214 people and 21 KV heavy tanks. To staff these regiments, heavy tanks were sent, withdrawn from mixed separate tank battalions and heavy tank brigades that were being disbanded at that time, created in small numbers in the summer of 1942.

As a result of the implementation in 1942 of a truly grandiose program for the construction of tank forces, by January 1943 the Red Army had two tank armies, 24 tank armies (two of them were in the process of formation), 8 mechanized corps (two of them were completing formation), as well as a significant the number of different brigades, regiments and battalions intended for joint operations with infantry.

Subsequently, the improvement of the organizational structure of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army continued.

Thus, to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of a motorized rifle battalion of a tank brigade, in January 1943, a company of anti-tank rifles was added to its staff, and in March - an anti-aircraft machine gun company. More significant changes occurred at the end of 1943, when a new tank brigade staff was accepted. In connection with the adoption of the T-34–85 tank, whose crew consisted of five people (which, however, was not always observed), the anti-tank rifle company of the motorized rifle battalion in April 1944 was turned to complement the crews of the new tanks. Tank brigades were gradually transferred to this state, primarily brigades that were part of tank and mechanized corps. Subsequently, until the end of the war, the organization of the tank brigade remained virtually unchanged.

In January 1943, in order to strengthen the striking force of the mechanized brigade, another company of medium tanks was added to the staff of the tank regiment. The total number of tanks in the regiment remained the same - 39. However, there were 32 medium tanks, instead of the previously available 23, and light tanks decreased by 9 vehicles. In February of the same year, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the brigade, and an anti-aircraft machine-gun company was introduced in its place. At the same time, an engineering mine company was included in the staff, and all vehicles intended for transporting personnel of motorized rifle battalions were consolidated into a brigade auto company.

Further changes in the organization of the mechanized brigade occurred mainly in connection with the improvement of the organization of its tank regiment. So, in February 1944, the tank regiment was transferred to a new state, according to which it had three tank companies, equipped only with medium tanks. As a result, the regiment received 35 T-34 tanks, and light tanks were excluded from the staff. After this, no changes occurred in the brigade until the end of the war.

In order to strengthen the firepower of the tank corps, in January 1943, the RGK mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars) and the RGK self-propelled artillery regiment (25 self-propelled guns) were added to its staff. Somewhat later, a reserve of tanks (40 vehicles) with crews and 100 drivers was added to some corps. At the same time, the capabilities of the fuel and lubricants delivery company were increased.

In February, instead of engineering mine companies, a sapper battalion was included in the corps, and in March - an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. In April, a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment (20 45-mm guns) and a fighter-anti-tank division (12 85-mm anti-aircraft guns) were added to the corps staff. However, already in August 1943 they were replaced by two self-propelled artillery regiments (SU-76 and SU-152). In October, in individual tank corps, and in November in all others, instead of an armored car battalion, a separate motorcycle battalion was introduced, which included two motorcycle companies, a tank company, a company of armored personnel carriers and an anti-tank artillery battery.

In August 1944, in order to increase the fire capabilities of the corps, a light artillery regiment was included in its composition, which had 24 76-mm cannons.

From the above it follows that the organization of the tank corps was improved mainly in the direction of increasing fire and striking power, increasing the mobility and independence of the corps during combat operations.

The organization of the mechanized corps was also improved taking into account the experience of its combat use and in connection with the arrival of new military equipment into the troops. In January 1943, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the mechanized brigade, and the army air defense regiment was excluded from the corps. At the same time, a mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars), a mixed self-propelled artillery regiment (8 SU-122, 17 SU-76), as well as a tank reserve (40 tanks and 147 crew members) and 100 drivers were added to the corps. In February, instead of an engineering mine company, a sapper battalion was included in the corps, and in March the control company was reorganized into a communications battalion. At the same time, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment (16 37-mm guns, 16 DShK) joined the corps staff. In April, a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment and an aviation communications unit - 3 aircraft - were introduced into the state. In May, the corps received an anti-tank artillery division and a chemical defense company. In August 1943, instead of the anti-tank fighter regiment, the SU-76 self-propelled artillery regiment (21 units) was introduced into the corps staff, and instead of the anti-tank fighter division, the SU-85 regiment (16 units and one T-34 tank).

At the same time, armored vehicles were excluded from the mechanized corps that were part of such armies, and separate motorcycle battalions were introduced instead.

In 1944, the tank regiment of the mechanized brigade was transferred to a new staff. As a result, the regiment had 35 medium tanks, and light tanks were completely eliminated.

As for the tank armies, a special meeting of the State Defense Committee was held at the end of January 1943, dedicated to the development of regulations on their formation. Previously, the opinions of some prominent military leaders were heard on this issue. Everyone agreed that it was necessary, first of all, to remove non-motorized rifle divisions from tank armies and to organizationally separate their tank core. Thus, tank armies were supposed to consist, as a rule, of two tank and one mechanized corps, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a guards mortar, howitzer artillery, anti-tank fighter and motorcycle regiments. The support units included a communications regiment, an aviation communications regiment (Po-2 aircraft), an engineering battalion, an automobile regiment and two repair and restoration battalions. The rear units and institutions included field service units and units, army departments, food, supply, medical and chemical institutions, artillery supply bodies, fuel and lubricants supplies, as well as units for the collection, reception and evacuation of captured property. However, it should be noted that the composition of the tank armies was determined by the orders for their formation and was not the same. So, for example, out of 64 offensive operations carried out by tank armies of the above composition, in 32 cases they operated in a two-corps composition. Only one tank army (3rd Guards) had three corps throughout the war.

At the beginning of 1944, it was decided to introduce self-propelled artillery and light artillery brigades into the tank armies. By the end of September 1944, all six tank armies already had these brigades. However, to successfully carry out operations, tank armies were reinforced with artillery and anti-tank brigades and regiments.

At the end of the war, the three-corps tank army, as a rule, had over 50 thousand people, 850–920 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 800 guns and mortars, and more than 5 thousand vehicles. However, in the vast majority of offensive operations, tank armies did not have a full complement of people, weapons and military equipment.

In February 1944, the heavy breakthrough tank regiments mentioned above were transferred to new states, and they began to be called heavy tank regiments. The new regiments consisted of 375 people, four IS-2 tank companies (21 tanks), a company of machine gunners, engineer and utility platoons, and a regimental medical center. When these regiments were formed, they were given the honorary name “Guards”.

Individual tank regiments were also reorganized. The essence of this reorganization, carried out at the beginning of 1944, was to exclude light tanks from them and strengthen the support and service units. In total, the regiment was supposed to have 386 people and 35 tanks.

In December 1944, the formation of separate Guards heavy tank brigades began. Organizationally, the brigade consisted of three heavy tank regiments, a motorized battalion of machine gunners, and support and service units. In total, the brigade consisted of 1,666 people, 65 IS-2 heavy tanks, three SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, 19 armored personnel carriers and 3 armored vehicles.

In addition to the units and formations considered, the tank forces had tank regiments and special-purpose brigades. In mid-1943, an engineering tank regiment was formed. It included two T-34 tank companies and support units. The regiment had 22 medium tanks, 18 trawls and means of transporting them.

The organization of tank units and formations is briefly discussed here. However, this does not mean that the regiments, brigades and corps were all the same in strength. In reality, especially in the tank and mechanized corps, there were significant discrepancies with their main staff.

In general, it should be noted that during the war, the organizational structure of the tank forces was in full accordance with the methods of conducting combat operations and significantly contributed to the achievement of high combat effectiveness of this type of troops.

Abbreviations adopted in the diagrams:

BMP - battalion medical station,

GAP - howitzer artillery regiment,

ZPU - anti-aircraft machine gun installation,

MZA - small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery,

SME - motorized rifle battalion,

SME - motorized rifle regiment,

OZAD - a separate anti-aircraft artillery division,

PTA - anti-tank artillery,

PTD - anti-tank division,

PTO - anti-tank defense,

PTR - anti-tank rifle,

RTO - maintenance company,

TB - tank battalion,

TP - tank regiment.

This topic has surfaced on social networks at the instigation of liberal “strategists” and is being actively discussed with the posting of “kind and affectionate” comments addressed to those who really care about maintaining the combat capability of the Russian army at the required level, even if there is a catastrophic lack of funds for this.

As an answer to this question, let me retell the article by Mikhail Barabanov, who is an employee of such an organization as the “Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies,” which is dated March 12, 2017.

We dance “from the stove”

or

“what we had yesterday and what we have today”

In 2005, the Russian Armed Forces had 23,000 tanks of various models in service. In 2016, 2,700 units remained. Citing these two figures, “experts” loudly declare that the huge Russian army, powerful and modern, is a fiction and a “Kremlin myth.” At the same time, they refer to the fact that even the Turkish or Syrian armies currently have more tanks.

T-72M1M with KAZ "Arena"

Where did the missing tanks go? And, most importantly, what are we going to fight with if the Russian army has only 2,700 tanks in service:

• T-90A;
• T-72B.

And the remaining 10,200 tanks are T-55, T-62, T-72 and T-64, which are in storage.

Where did the numbers 2700 + 10200 come from?

The modern Russian army is focused, first of all, on participation in limited armed conflicts. First of all, on the territory of the former USSR. For this, the remaining 10,200 tanks are enough to complete the assigned tasks.

There is currently no real threat of an unexpected large-scale land invasion of the territory of our state. Any potential adversaries who are hypothetically capable of such an invasion (the USA and NATO, China) will require a fairly long period of mobilization, subsequent deployment and concentration of significant groups of ground forces on the borders of Russia. Our country will get similar time for this.

In such a situation, “measuring by quantity” is pointless. The existing systems of modern communications, control and reconnaissance, the presence of high-precision weapons (ground and airborne) are, today, the main guarantee of achieving victory in the war, incl. and land.

In such a situation, only the most modern tanks are needed, equipped with thermal imagers and the latest protective equipment. Otherwise. A potential enemy will simply shoot “blind” tanks in a night battle. This is exactly what the Americans did with the tanks of the Iraqi army in 1991 during the Gulf War.

It is quite natural that Russia is not able to have a significant number of modern tanks due to the current economic situation.

T-90A "Vladimir"

Conclusion. It is better to have 2000 - 3000 tanks, but the most modern ones, or those that have undergone radical modernization.

Human resource

1. Western Military District:
   1. 4th separate guards tank division Kantemirovskaya (military unit 19612);
   2. 1 Ural-Lvov Tank Brigade (military unit 63453);
   3. 6 Czestochowa Tank Brigade (military unit 54096);
   4. 1st Guards Tank Regiment of the 2nd Guards MSD (military unit 58190).
2. Southern Military District:
   1. Tank regiment of the 150th MSD.
3. Eastern Military District:
   1. 5th Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Brigade (military unit 46108). Deployed on the basis of the 2nd Guards Tank Division.
4. Central Military District:
   1. 90th Guards Vitebsk-Novgorod, twice Red Banner Tank Division - Chebarkul, Chelyabinsk region. Deployed on 12/01/16 on the basis of the 7th Separate Guards Tank Brigade.

Individual parts:

• 240th training tank regiment (military unit 30632-6);
• 212 district training center of tank forces of the Siberian Military District (military unit 21250);
• 44th Training Guards Tank Regiment (military unit 30618-8);
• 522nd Guards Training Tank Riga Regiment (military unit 30616-7).

Elementary calculations indicate that the number of tanks and the tankers who control them is the same. That is, the number of tanks currently in service is precisely the number that we are able to control at a time.

Our neighbours

According to RIA Novosti, NATO has 10,000 tanks in Europe. Most likely, this number includes both vehicles in service and those in reserve.

According to information posted in open sources (including Wikipedia), as of 2016, the countries that were potential opponents had:

1. First strike countries:
   1. Poland:
      1. Leopard2A5 - 105;
      2. Leopard2A4 - 142;

• T-72M - 505;

1. RT-91 “Twardy - 233.

1. Romania:
   1. T-55 - 250;
   2. TR-580 - 42;

• TR-85 - 91;

1. TR-85M1 "Bizonul" - 54.

1. Czech Republic:
   1. T-72 and its modifications - 154.
2. Slovakia:
   1. T-72M - 245.
3. Hungary:
   1. T-72 - 155.
4. Germany:
   1. 1100 tanks of various modifications. It is planned that after the 2017 reform there will be 600 left.

Leopard2A6M

1. Second strike countries:
   1. Britannia:
      1. Challenger - 70;
      2. "Chieftain" of various modifications - over 900;

• Light tanks "Scorpion" - up to 300.

1. France (total 776):
   1. "Leclerc" - 300 in service + 80 in reserve;
   2. Tanks of other models - 396 reserve

Leclerc

1. Denmark - 69
2. Italy (1730):
   1. C1-"Ariete" - 200;
   2. "Leopard1A5" - 120;

• M60A1 - 300 reserve;

1. M47 - 510

1. Bulgaria (524):
   1. T-72 - 362;
   2. T-55 - 165
2. Spain (510):
   1. Leopard2A4 - 108;
   2. Other models - 402
3. Portugal (224):
   1. Leopard 2A6 - 37;
   2. M60 - 101;

• Other models - 86

1. Third strike countries:
   1. Türkiye (4504):
      1. M60 - 932;
      2. Leopard1 - 397;

• Leopard 2A4 - 325;

1. M48A5 - 2850

1. USA (9125) of which M1 Abrams make up about 60%.

BHVT and CBRT

One of the most important questions, when fully considering a possible confrontation, becomes the following: “How quickly will Russia be able to reactivate the equipment stored at the BKhVT?” The outcome of the armed confrontation will largely depend on this.

What is the condition of the equipment in storage?

During long-term storage:

• oxidation of connectors occurs in electrical circuits;
• the insulation resistance of the existing electrical wiring decreases;
• all filled technical fluids (antifreeze, oils, hydraulic fluids, lubricants) become unsuitable for use;
• fuel tanks begin to rust from the inside;
• Rust appears on the mirror surfaces of hydraulic cylinders.

Despite the fact that high-quality conservation allows you to save equipment from all of the above, a certain percentage of equipment fails. It is precisely in order to reduce the number of such cases to zero that exercises are regularly held in Russia, in which equipment from the reserve is attracted to participate. Before exercises, it undergoes the necessary maintenance and testing.

During inspections carried out in 2016, the condition of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other armored vehicles was considered satisfactory.

The time required for an army to bring it into combat readiness is calculated by summing up the time:

• necessary for mobilization (staffing) of units and units;
• replenishment of ammunition and provisions;
• bringing materiel to the condition required to carry out any combat orders;
• the time given to a specific unit to complete its formation and recruitment.

The mentioned period is significantly influenced by the initial state of the unit in peacetime, as well as the distance from the place of its deployment to the places where reserves are received.

What about tanks?

Modern warfare is a remote war. And today, few people bet on tanks, since modern anti-tank weapons (starting with RPGs) are capable, with a high degree of probability, of destroying almost any tank.

But this is not the type of weapon that can stop the war.

Modern tanks are vulnerable from the air, they can be suppressed by artillery fire, destroyed by opposing them with special units whose task is to destroy the armored vehicles of a potential enemy (ATGM, etc.).

Based on this, the high command of the Russian Armed Forces and the leadership of our country acted quite pragmatically, reasoning: fighting head-on is futile today. Therefore, the Russian Armed Forces do not require an excessive number of tanks. What we have today is quite enough.

T-14

But a tank is still armor - fire and maneuver. And we are not going to completely abandon it, which is confirmed by the appearance of the T-14 and the entire line of armored vehicles on the Armata platform.

Deputy Minister of Defense of Russia Dmitry Bulgakov said:

More than 25 thousand units of new armored vehicles and vehicles, 4 thousand modern types of missile and artillery weapons were delivered to the Armed Forces from 2012 to 2017. Russia ranks first in the world in the number of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and multiple launch rocket systems.

How many tanks do the countries that are in the world top ten have (data taken from various sources over the last three years and therefore approximate)?

1. Russia - 20,000

2. USA - 9,100

3. China - 9,000

4. India - 5,900

5. DPRK - 5,500

6. Syria - 4,700

7. Egypt - 4,150

8. Pakistan - 4,000

9. Ukraine - 3,800

10. Türkiye - 3,760

So, Russia has twice as many tanks as the United States.

And at the peak of the Cold War (80s of the last century), the Soviet army had almost 70 thousand tanks! In the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in the GDR alone there were more than 7,700 of them. This was NATO’s biggest headache in Europe - in the event of war, such a steel armada could “wash the tracks in the English Channel” within 24 hours.

But not all Russian tanks are ready to rush into battle immediately after a combat alert is declared. We hardly have more than 3 thousand of them (T-90, T-72). The rest are in so-called conservation at storage bases (T-54, T-64).

If “tomorrow we’re going on a hike,” they’ll quickly install batteries, fill the tanks with fuel, “stuff” them with ammunition—and off we go! There is also a trained reserve of tankers for this purpose.

Yes, the lion's share of combat armor is a Soviet legacy. But even though these are tanks from the last century, they have been mostly modernized in recent years.

In a modern war (using conventional weapons or even nuclear weapons), tanks are still indispensable - both for breaking through the enemy’s deeply layered defenses and for covering mother infantry. And in terms of the level of protection against grenade launchers and shells, a modern tank differs from its predecessors, like an armored train from a cart.

And it is not surprising that Russia is in first place on the tank list - the number of weapons is determined by both the size of the country’s territory and the length of its state border (19,312 km!). Moreover, for a number of parameters important in combat, our T-90 and T-72 tanks have long been among the best in the world. And the golden heads of our defense industry are already testing the T-14 (Armata) supertank. When Ural craftsmen created the “Armata” and showed it to the world at the 2015 Victory Parade, the jaws of Western specialists dropped in surprise.

This almost 50-ton hulk with creative modern forms either quickly ran past me along the red, broken training ground, then deftly climbed a high clay hill, then immediately rushed into a deep ford and easily overcame it. The powerful T-14 engine (1,500 “horses” under the armor!) allowed any maneuvers.

The equipment of the commander's seat of the T-14 differs from the one on which I sat in my T-10M back in 1965, just as the captain's chair of a spaceship differs from the driver's seat-stool of an old tractor.

In the Armata, all ammunition for both the cannon and the machine gun is removed from the fighting compartment (it is also called an armored capsule - this is a revolutionary technical solution of the Ural tank builders). A thick layer of armor separates the crew from the ammunition. The creators thought that human life is more valuable than iron.

She is expected in the troops in a couple of years. So that we can be proud not only of the quantity, but also of the quality of our tanks.

Follow us

On Monday, February 1, the press service of the Western Military District (ZVO) announced the re-establishment of the 1st Guards Tank Army in the Western Military District. This is the first time such an event has occurred in the country in 25 years. In this case, we are talking about the birth of a structurally and qualitatively new army, which included the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, the 2nd Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division, the 6th Tank Brigade, the 27th Guards Sevastopol Motorized Rifle Brigade (only it was located in the previous composition of the association) and a number of other parts.

On January 29, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu presented the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Major General Alexander Chaiko, with a personal standard. Back in July 2015, RIA Novosti reported on the Western Military District, the formation and creation of the headquarters of the 1st Guards Tank Army.

Russian Ministry of Defense: the first tank army of the Western Military District has been formedAccording to the Russian military department, Major General Alexander Chaiko has been appointed commander of the First Tank Army of the Western Military District, the headquarters is located in Bakovka (Odintsovo, Moscow region).

Production and government testing of the newest Armata tank is planned to be completed and put into service in 2016. Simultaneously, the Russian defense industry will begin mass production of the latest basic platforms "Armata", "Boomerang", "Kurganets", "Typhoon", which have almost unlimited modernization potential for decades. And the unified Kurganets platform will become common for medium tracked combat vehicles (infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery units, command post and other vehicles).

However, even today the 1st Guards Tank Army is armed with modernized and quite effective T-72B3, T-80 tanks, BPM-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and more than 130 types of military equipment of other modifications.

For example, the not-so-modern T-72B tank weighs more than 40 tons and reaches speeds of up to 75 km per hour. It is impossible to hit it head-on (the newest tanks have a much more advanced defense system). The tank is capable of crossing water obstacles up to 1 kilometer wide and up to 5 meters deep along the bottom.

Experienced tankers sometimes say that the survivability of a tank in battle is 15 minutes, but even during this time the tankers will complete their task.

In parallel, the formation of new formations of the combined arms 20th Guards Army continues. The tank army will have more tanks, and the combined arms army will have more infantry fighting vehicles.

Purpose and history lessons

The main striking force of the Ground Forces is tankers, and if they are not in reserve, they always go for a breakthrough. Anyone who has seen the attack of at least one tank battalion knows: even tactical nuclear weapons cannot stop this avalanche of steel and fire. New aircraft and missiles appear, according to new standards, there is no longer a leading edge, and yet on the battlefield, victory is largely determined by tank crews. This was confirmed by the operation to force Georgia to peace in August 2008.

RIA Novosti's choice: the most anticipated events in the military sphere in 2016In 2016, the Air Force, Navy and Strategic Missile Forces will receive new types of weapons. In addition, the first launch from the new Vostochny Cosmodrome is planned.

Previously, in the confrontation with the North Atlantic Alliance, the Soviet strategy included the possibility of a tank breakthrough to the English Channel. In the 21st century, adjustments are inevitable, but the existence of the NATO bloc still contradicts Russia’s national interests.

In 2016, servicemen of the 1st Guards Tank Army will have to conduct more than 1,500 tactical exercises, live firing and other combat training events.

Perhaps in the near future the armed forces will be replenished with another tank army; the General Staff is working on this issue. At the same time, the development of rapid reaction troops continues, and the combat strength of the Airborne Forces is growing. In general, the capabilities of the armed forces to respond to a wide range of threats to the national interests of the Russian Federation in Eurasia are significantly expanding.

In the summer of 1996, not far from the city of Ulan-Ude, I was struck by the Transbaikal steppe, lined with tanks to the horizon. Thousands of modern machines with sophisticated electronic filling were taken out of the Urals under the disarmament treaty and abandoned in the open air.

The fate of the tank crews was not easy either. The USSR had more than 60 thousand tanks of various modifications. In 2009, 20 thousand remained, and the reduction continued (some sources cited a target figure of 2 thousand tanks).
By 2012, the country had two permanently ready tank brigades (in the Central and Eastern Military Districts) and about 20 separate tank battalions (30-40 tanks each) in permanently ready motorized rifle brigades. Of course, reforming the armed forces.

But Russia has not forgotten the 1st Guards Tank Army, which... And in January 2013, the 70th anniversary of the formation of the army was solemnly celebrated in Smolensk, which after the Great Patriotic War was part of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), and in 1992 - 1998 was stationed near Smolensk

Periodically, on the Internet or in print, the issue of the number of tanks in the ranks of the Ground Forces of the RF Armed Forces is discussed, and now the Airborne Forces also have tanks, and the Navy Marine Corps also has them (in the Coastal Troops of the Navy there were, in fact, these are ordinary motorized rifle brigades , but listed as part of the Navy due to the geography of their permanent deployment). No, everyone knows that, together with long-term storage, Russia’s tank reserves are such that they are enough for us, our friends and allies, and our potential adversaries. But regarding tanks in linear units, there are many different options for assessment, and very often they refer to various calculations from the early 2010s, when formations and personnel units were liquidated and divisions were transformed into brigades. But since then, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge both in the rivers and from the stands. The RF Armed Forces gradually completed the formation of brigades, then began to form divisions.

Let's try to estimate how many vehicles we should have in units, based on the approximate states and their total number. The exact organizational and staffing structures for each unit or formation in our country are secret; we have not been a de facto member of the CFE Treaty for a long time, so there is no accurate information on this matter. But typical OSHSs are more or less known, so we can roughly estimate what we will do.

To begin with, we will open the Military Balance 2018 directory, published by SIPRI Stockholm. Honestly, this reference book, even in its description of NATO armies, is prone to errors and oddities, but when it comes to Russia, there is a feeling that, although the Vikings have become history, like the berserkers, the art of consuming fly agarics has not been forgotten in Sweden. Although the Swedes’ endless searches for submarines of the Russian Navy, then underwater means of movement of saboteurs, or even some kind of bottom-based tracked vehicles (there was such a thing in the Swedish media at one time) also leads to these thoughts - it is clearly not possible to do without fly agarics either.

According to this reference book, the RF Armed Forces have 2,780 tanks in service, but the fact that the information written there is unreliable can be seen by which tanks and how many. For example, the T-90 and T-90A - 350 vehicles, but in fact in the troops there are, let’s say, much less of them, and the T-90, apart from a few vehicles in combat training groups of formations and training, are mainly located in the central reserve bases (SIPRI noted this, but the total figure of 550 vehicles does not correspond to the truth). T-72B3 and T-72B3 UBKh - a total of 880 vehicles, in their opinion, although this modernization has been coming out of UVZ in large quantities since 2011, in some years it reached up to 300 vehicles, and 200 were handed over per year, but all There’s no way they’ll even get to 1000 in the directory, although in fact there’s already been more than 1000 there for a long time. However, just a year or two ago, everything in their directory was even worse, there were T-55 and T-62 in reserve, for example. Which have long been removed from service (although, of course, they are still present at reserve bases, from where the same T-62 and T-62M end up in Syria).

Some time ago, the American Insitute for the Study of War (ISW), the “Institute for the Study of War,” released a report Russia's Military Posture - Ground Forces Order of Battle. From there we will take information about the number (for approximately the second half of last year) and deployment formations of the RF Armed Forces. We are not particularly interested in the deployment, but the formations themselves are. At the same time, you need to understand that this reference book is also inaccurate, for example, in a number of divisions the fourth combat (combined arms - tank and motorized rifle) regiments were already formed, and there they are not indicated, something is not there at all, but this, in general, is not so important. When calculating, we will take as a basis that in separate motorized rifle brigades, our tank battalion has 41 tanks - 4 companies of 3 platoons of 3 tanks each plus a company tank in each and plus a battalion commander's tank. And in tank battalions of tank regiments of divisions and separate tank brigades - 31 tanks, in tank battalions of motorized rifle regiments of divisions we will take 41 tank staff as a basis (although options are possible) Although there is information that switched to 42-tank and 32-tank states - one more tank in the battalion's control. In a tank brigade there are 3 tank battalions, 1 motorized rifle battalion, in a motorized rifle brigade it’s the other way around, in a tank regiment there are also 3 tank battalions and a motorized rifle battalion, and in a motorized rifle brigade it’s the other way around. A motorized rifle division has 3 motorized rifle regiments and a tank regiment (we are talking only about combined arms regiments, artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments and everything else is not of interest to us now), a tank division is the opposite. We are, of course, talking about ordinary states; there are also so-called difficult states. Accordingly, there are 41 (42?) tanks in a motorized rifle brigade or regiment, 94 (97?) in a tank regiment, as well as in a tank regiment, 217 (223?) tanks in a motorized rifle division, and 323 (333) tanks in a tank division. It is clear that the division command also has tanks, but we will not count them. Of course, this is in a fully formed division, but in reality somewhere there are 3 regiments, somewhere 3 regiments and a tank battalion, but in the process of formation there is already a regiment, and somewhere, maybe even 2 more regiments. But this, of course, is a temporary moment, and we do not take it into account.

So, according to the above-mentioned report, the RF Armed Forces and the Coastal Forces of the Navy now have 12 armies (1 of them tank) and 4 army corps. In the Western Military District (WMD), of this number there are 3 armies (1 GvTA, 20 Guards OA, 6 OA) and 1 corps (11 Guards AK in the Kaliningrad defensive region), part of the joint operational-strategic command "North" (Northern fleet) includes 14 AK on the Kola Peninsula, in the Southern Military District (SMD) - 3 armies (8 Guards OA, 58 OA, 49 OA) and 1 corps (22 AK in Crimea), in the Central Military District (CMD) - 2 armies (2 Guards OA, 41 OA), in the Eastern Military District (EMD) - 4 armies (29 OA, 35 OA, 36 OA, 5 OA) and 1 corps (68 AK in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands). The 1st Guards Tank Army includes the 4th Guards Tank and 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions, the 6th Separate Tank Brigade, the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (various formations and units of army and corps sets are not counted), a total of 675 ( 695) tanks, subject to the formation of the fourth regiments in the 4th Guards Tank Division and the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, but so far they are just being formed. In the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army - 144 Guards. Motorized Rifle Division and 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, in the end there are 434 (446) tanks, provided that the divisions are fully formed, but it is known that so far the fourth pair of regiments is only being formed there in both divisions. However, it is possible that 144 Guards. The mechanized infantry division will have not one tank regiment, but two - a tank regiment is being formed on the basis of a separate tank battalion, and meanwhile, the division already has the 228th tank regiment. That is, the division will be something like the 150th motorized rifle division.

IN northern and northwestern parts of the Western Military District With tanks it’s much worse, in 6 OA there are only 2 motorized rifle brigades (138 and 25 motorized rifle brigades), so there are only 82 (84) tanks per army, and the army, in general, is small. On the other hand, the only potential adversaries there are the Baltic superpowers with three NATO combined battalions inside and Finland. True, apparently, in the RF Armed Forces, when forming divisions, they are approaching the issue anew in such a way that obviously, in the end, each army will have at least one mechanized infantry division, so it is possible that in the coming years some kind of similar decision in this case. The Kaliningrad 11th Guards AK has only two motorized rifle brigades (omsbr), the 7th Guards and the 79th Guards, for a total of 82 (84) tanks. No tanks have yet appeared in the nearby 336th Guards Marine Brigade of the Baltic Fleet, but most likely in the next couple of years, first a company and then a battalion will appear - a similar process is already underway in the Pacific Fleet. So far, no one is forming any divisions there, but such a decision seems to arise in the future. However, soon only a fairy tale is told from the rostrum, and the work is usually done much more slowly. In total, the Western Military District has 1275 (1305) tanks in line formations, although in reality there are still slightly fewer of them. If we add the 14th AK from the USC "Sever" there, then for now there is definitely a tank battalion of 200 motorized infantry brigades, perhaps there is or will be one in the 80th Arctic motorized infantry brigade, there are no tanks in the 61st marine brigade yet, but they will definitely appear soon. For now we are counting 82 (84 tanks).

IN Central Military District, according to the same report, as part of the 2nd Guards. OA now has 3 motorized rifle brigades, numbered 21, 15 and 30. But they are all different. The 21st Motorized Rifle Brigade from Totsky seems to be the only one in the RF Armed Forces (perhaps not), formed according to the so-called. "heavy staff" with 2 tank and 2 motorized rifle battalions, it has 82 (84) tanks, but the 15th motorized rifle brigade is a peacekeeping force, there seems to be no tank battalion in it, which is up to 30 motorized rifle battalions, newly formed to replace those withdrawn after the start of the war Ukraine from this army of units and formations (which became the basis for the formation of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division) - there is no information on its composition, except that in it the reconnaissance battalion, following Syrian tracks, seems to have been placed on various light vehicles, starting with Tiger-M and ending with the Patriots. There is probably still a tank battalion there. In general, we will conditionally write down 123 (124) tanks for the army. According to the same document, the newly formed 90th Guards Tank Division is part of the 41st OA (previously there was information that it remained under district subordination, it is unknown who is right here), together with the 74th Guards. Omsbr, 35th Guards. Omsbr and the 55th mountain brigade from Kyzyl in Tuva. The Tuvan “highlanders” don’t have tanks, they don’t need them, but everyone else has them. It also includes 201 military bases in Tajikistan, which now has three motorized rifle regiments; it seems that there are tanks everywhere. The total is a fairly strong fist of 534 (543) tanks, if everything is correct, of course. In total, 657 (667) vehicles are obtained for the Central Military District.

IN VVO, despite 4 armies and a corps, divisions, namely they are the most “rich” in heavy armored vehicles, have not yet been formed, but only for now. Not all of the armies themselves can be considered deployed; in a number of them there are combined arms brigades, God forbid, 1-2, and with deployed brigades and regiments of the army complement. In general, this situation is clear - China is not our enemy at the moment, but a friend and ally, and we have more and more potential enemies in Europe, in NATO. In total, in all these 4 armies and 1 corps there are 10 motorized rifle brigades, 1 tank brigade and the 18th machine-gun and artillery division in the Kuril Islands (fortified, but there are tank units in it too), that is, approximately 600 tanks. In addition, in the Pacific Fleet, in the 155th Marine Brigade there are no tanks yet, but soon there will be; in the 40th Marine Brigade a company is now deployed, but it will be reorganized into a battalion, we will also count that.

IN Southern Military District Now the 58 OA includes 42 guards. Motorized Rifle Division, 19th and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 4th Guards Military Base in South Ossetia. 42 The Yevpatoriya division is now fully deployed, but according to researchers from the United States, it does not have a tank regiment or it is being deployed. The total is 340 (350) cars. The 49 OA has as many as 2 combined arms brigades, 205 and 34 mountain brigades, which do not have tanks. Much more interesting is the newly formed 8th Guards. The OA, formed with the obvious aim of possibly coercing various generous Cossacks from the territory neighboring the Donbass republics into peace, who love to talk about how they “contain Russian fascism,” not forgetting, of course, to shout Nazi slogans and “salute the Sun” with a characteristic gesture. It has 150 Idritsa-Berlin Motorized Rifle Division, which includes 2 tank and 2 motorized rifle regiments, formed according to, as they say, difficult conditions. That is, there are much more tanks and artillery in it, not only in conventional infantry fighting units, but even in the general division. If we assume (and this is most likely the case) that the staff of this division repeats the OShS of the so-called “Ogarkovsky” heavy infantry fighting divisions, which were successfully dispersed under Gorbachev, then in the end, upon completion of formation, there may be about 400 tanks there. In those divisions, the battalions had 4 companies (in the MSB there were 3 MSR and 1 troop, in the TB it was the other way around), and all tank companies had 13 tanks, and battalions even in tank regiments had 40 tanks. Moreover, at the battalion level there were 122mm 2S1 self-propelled guns and many other useful things, and in the regiments the artillery was 152mm 2S3, which in ordinary divisions was in the artillery regiment. The same army also includes the 20th Guards. omsbr from Volgograd (if the Americans are not mistaken). In the Crimean 22 AK, there is still only one combined arms brigade with tanks - number 126 from Perevalnoye, called the coastal defense brigade, but in essence it is a motorized rifle brigade, just naval, like everyone else in Crimea, subordinate. This is another 41 (42 tanks). In total, there are 860-876 tanks in the Southern Military District, if all units are fully formed, and estimates for 150 divisions more or less coincide with reality.

In total, across all districts there are 3475-3530 vehicles in service. In reality, there are fewer of them, for the above reasons - not all formations have been completed, on the other hand, we also don’t count training centers and military schools, where there are still hundreds of tanks, like many other things. And, of course, tanks at bases for storing and repairing military equipment (S&RVT), that is, bases for the formation of regiments and brigades of the first stage of mobilization, are not taken into account (everything else is formed on the basis of equipment from the central reserve bases). These military and military personnel are now being reorganized into the so-called TsOMRs (centers for supporting military deployment), in fact, this is the same base, but with training and other bases to support the activities of permanent reserve reservists, which was recently officially legalized, and this is a very good and long overdue decision. We also do not take into account the bases of the dual-based system, where sets of equipment are stored for formations transported lightly from the depths of the country, and the central reserve bases themselves - after all, we counted combat vehicles. So the total would be about 15 thousand cars, perhaps less than 12-13 thousand.

At the same time, it must be said that the formation of divisions will continue in the near future. Thus, according to media reports, in the Southern Military District the formation of three motorized infantry divisions will begin at once (perhaps fewer, nevertheless) on the basis of the 19th, 20th and 136th motorized rifle brigade. There were reports about the creation of a “coastal defense” division in the North, perhaps even two - on the Kola Peninsula and Chukotka. The formation of divisions also begins beyond the Urals, so in the 5th Red Banner OA in Primorye the 127th Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division is formed. Each motorized rifle division means an increase of about 176 or more tanks (this is if it is formed on the basis of one motorized rifle brigade, but if there are two, then the increase will be less significant). It is clear that with such a deployment of units, the Russian Ministry of Defense was ready to abandon the previously declared thesis of getting rid of a variety of tanks and vigorously return T-80BV tanks to service with repairs and minimal modernization, while simultaneously launching a program to modernize their fleet into T-80BVM. We need a lot of tanks, and we still need a lot of personnel, especially officers. But there are problems with the graduation of young officers - a truly normal graduation rate is only expected; before that, officers are graduated who entered the schools when enrollment was small. Of course, this is not the situation before the Great Patriotic War, when 30 mechanized corps were formed, and the shortage of staff before the war reached tens of thousands of positions. But we are not in the same situation as before the war. Although it is clear that the RF Armed Forces are gradually deploying, this is not of a mobilization nature. The situation in the world has simply changed - priorities, goals, objectives, and requirements for the structure and number, including the tank fleet, have changed.

In addition, we forgot about the Airborne Forces, but even there 6 tank companies have been formed (in each of 2 air assault divisions and 4 air assault brigades), companies in divisions are deployed into battalions, in brigades, it seems, for now they will remain companies or then they will also become battalions. This is more than a hundred tanks.

Is this a lot or a little - more than three thousand tanks in the ranks of linear units? This is a lot, considering that even the US army has only 10 tank brigades with 87 tanks each, 3 of the same brigades in the National Guard and several hundred (maximum) tanks in the Marine Corps. And there is nothing to say about the various European “great powers”: with the exception of the Poles, as well as the Greeks and Turks (whose almost completely outdated tank fleets are mainly directed at each other), the European powers are lucky to have two hundred vehicles in service. France has 200 vehicles, Germany has 225 (there is a plan to deploy up to 328), Britain has less than 200, and so on. But there are also fleets of 32-40 vehicles, the absolute majority of NATO members. This is without touching on the actual combat readiness of these units, formations and armies in these countries. As well as comparisons of the technical level of all vehicles in service with the Russian Armed Forces or NATO countries. But this is no longer the topic of this material.