The Russian principalities before the Tatar-Mongol yoke and the Moscow state after gaining legal independence are, as they say, two big differences. It will not be an exaggeration that the unified Russian state, of which modern Russia is the direct heir, was formed during the period of the yoke and under its influence. The overthrow of the Tatar-Mongol yoke was not only the cherished goal of Russian identity during the second half of the 13th-15th centuries. It also turned out to be a means of creating a state, national mentality and cultural identity.

Approaching the Battle of Kulikovo...

Most people’s idea of ​​the process of overthrowing the Tatar-Mongol yoke comes down to a very simplified scheme, according to which, before the Battle of Kulikovo, Rus' was enslaved by the Horde and did not even think about resistance, and after the Battle of Kulikovo, the yoke lasted another hundred years simply due to a misunderstanding. In reality, everything was more complicated.

The fact that the Russian principalities, although they generally recognized their vassal position in relation to the Golden Horde, did not stop trying to resist, is evidenced by a simple historical fact. Since the establishment of the yoke and throughout its entire length, about 60 major punitive campaigns, invasions and large-scale raids of Horde troops on Rus' are known from Russian chronicles. Obviously, in the case of completely conquered lands, such efforts are not required - this means that Rus' resisted, resisted actively, for centuries.

The Horde troops suffered their first significant military defeat on the territory controlled by Rus' about a hundred years before the Battle of Kulikovo. True, this battle took place during the internecine war for the grand-ducal throne of the Vladimir principality, which flared up between the sons of Alexander Nevsky . In 1285, Andrei Alexandrovich attracted the Horde prince Eltorai to his side and with his army went against his brother Dmitry Alexandrovich, who reigned in Vladimir. As a result, Dmitry Alexandrovich won a convincing victory over the Tatar-Mongol punitive corps.

Further, individual victories in military clashes with the Horde occurred, although not too often, but with stable consistency. Distinguished by his peacefulness and penchant for political solutions to all issues, the Moscow prince Daniil Alexandrovich, the youngest son of Nevsky, defeated the Mongol detachment near Pereyaslavl-Ryazan in 1301. In 1317, Mikhail Tverskoy defeated the army of Kavgady, which was attracted to his side by Yuri of Moscow.

The closer to the Battle of Kulikovo, the more confident the Russian principalities became, and unrest and unrest were observed in the Golden Horde, which could not but affect the balance of military forces.

In 1365, the Ryazan forces defeated the Horde detachment near the Shishevsky forest; in 1367, the Suzdal army won a victory at Pyana. Finally, in 1378, Dmitry of Moscow, the future Donskoy, won his dress rehearsal in the confrontation with the Horde: on the Vozha River he defeated an army under the command of Murza Begich, a close associate of Mamai.

Overthrow of the Tatar-Mongol yoke: the great Battle of Kulikovo

It is unnecessary to talk once again about the significance of the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, as well as to retell the details of its immediate course. From childhood, everyone knows the dramatic details of how Mamai’s army pressed on the center of the Russian army and how, at the most decisive moment, the Ambush Regiment hit the Horde and their allies in the rear, turning the fate of the battle. It is also well known that for Russian self-awareness it became an event of great importance when, for the first time after the establishment of the yoke, the Russian army was able to give a large-scale battle to the invader and win. But it is worth remembering that the victory in the Battle of Kulikovo, with all its enormous moral significance, did not lead to the overthrow of the yoke.

Dmitry Donskoy managed to take advantage of the difficult political situation in the Golden Horde and embody his leadership abilities and the fighting spirit of his own army. However, just two years later, Moscow was taken by the forces of the legitimate khan of the Horde, Tokhtamysh (Temnik Mamai was a temporary usurper) and almost completely destroyed.

The young Principality of Moscow was not yet ready to fight on equal terms with the weakened but still powerful Horde. Tokhtamysh imposed an increased tribute on the principality (the previous tribute was retained in the same amount, but the population actually decreased by half; in addition, an emergency tax was introduced). Dmitry Donskoy undertook to send his eldest son Vasily to the Horde as a hostage. But the Horde had already lost political power over Moscow - Prince Dmitry Ivanovich managed to transfer power by inheritance independently, without any label from the khan. In addition, a few years later Tokhtamysh was defeated by another eastern conqueror, Timur, and for some period Rus' stopped paying tribute.

In the 15th century, tribute was generally paid with serious fluctuations, taking advantage of increasingly constant periods of internal instability in the Horde. In the 1430s - 1450s, the Horde rulers undertook several ruinous campaigns against Rus' - but in essence these were just predatory raids, and not attempts to restore political supremacy.

In fact, the yoke did not end in 1480...

In school exam papers on the history of Russia, the correct answer to the question “When and with what event did the period of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' end?” will be considered “In 1480, Standing on the Ugra River.” In fact, this is the correct answer - but from a formal point of view, it does not correspond to historical reality.

In fact, in 1476, the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III refused to pay tribute to the Khan of the Great Horde, Akhmat. Until 1480, Akhmat dealt with his other enemy, the Crimean Khanate, after which he decided to punish the rebellious Russian ruler. The two armies met at the Ugra River in September 1380. The Horde's attempt to cross the river was stopped by Russian troops. After this, the Standing itself began, lasting until the beginning of November. As a result, Ivan III was able to force Akhmat to retreat without unnecessary loss of life. Firstly, there were strong reinforcements on the way to the Russians. Secondly, Akhmat’s cavalry began to experience a shortage of fodder, and illnesses began in the army itself. Thirdly, the Russians sent a sabotage detachment to the rear of Akhmat, which was supposed to plunder the defenseless capital of the Horde.

As a result, the khan ordered a retreat - and this ended the Tatar-Mongol yoke of almost 250 years. However, from a formal diplomatic position, Ivan III and the Moscow state remained in vassal dependence on the Great Horde for another 38 years. In 1481, Khan Akhmat was killed, and another wave of struggle for power arose in the Horde. In the difficult conditions of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Ivan III was not sure that the Horde would not be able to mobilize its forces again and organize a new large-scale campaign against Rus'. Therefore, being in fact a sovereign ruler and no longer paying tribute to the Horde, for diplomatic reasons in 1502, he officially recognized himself as a vassal of the Great Horde. But soon the Horde was finally defeated by its eastern enemies, so that in 1518 all vassal relations, even at the formal level, between the Moscow State and the Horde were terminated.

Alexander Babitsky

How historiographies are written.

Unfortunately, there is no analytical review on the history of historiographies yet. It's a pity! Then we would understand how the historiography for the state’s toast differs from the historiography for its repose. If we want to glorify the beginning of the state, we will write that it was founded by hardworking and independent people who enjoy the well-deserved respect of their neighbors.
If we want to sing a requiem for him, then we will say that it was founded by wild people living in dense forests and impassable swamps, and the state was created by representatives of a different ethnic group, who came here precisely because of the inability of the local residents to establish a distinctive and independent state. Then, if we sing a eulogy, we will say that the name of this ancient formation was understood by everyone, and has not changed to this day. On the contrary, if we bury our state, we will say that it was named unknown what, and then changed its name. Finally, in favor of the state in the first phase of its development will be a statement of its strength. And vice versa, if we want to show that the state was so-so, we must show not only that it was weak, but also that it was able to be conquered by an unknown in ancient times, and very peace-loving and small people. It is this last statement that I would like to dwell on.

– This is the name of a chapter from Kungurov’s book (KUN). He writes: “The official version of ancient Russian history, composed by Germans discharged from abroad to St. Petersburg, is built according to the following scheme: a single Russian state, created by the alien Varangians, crystallizes around Kiev and the middle Dnieper region and bears the name of Kievan Rus, then from somewhere with Evil wild nomads come from the East, destroy the Russian state and establish an occupation regime called “yoke”. After two and a half centuries, the Moscow princes throw off the yoke, gather Russian lands under their rule and create a powerful Moscow kingdom, which is the legal successor of Kievan Rus and frees the Russians from the “yoke”; for several centuries in Eastern Europe there has been an ethnically Russian Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but politically it is dependent on the Poles, and therefore cannot be considered a Russian state, therefore, the wars between Lithuania and Muscovy should be considered not as civil strife between Russian princes, but as a struggle between Moscow and Poland for the reunification of Russian lands.

Despite the fact that this version of history is still recognized as official, only “professional” scientists can consider it reliable. A person who is accustomed to thinking with his head will very much doubt this, if only because the story of the Mongol invasion has been completely sucked out of thin air. Until the 19th century, Russians had no idea that they had allegedly once been conquered by Transbaikal savages. Indeed, the version that a highly developed state was completely destroyed by some wild steppe inhabitants, unable to create an army in accordance with the technical and cultural achievements of that time, looks delusional. Moreover, such a people as the Mongols were not known to science. True, historians were not at a loss and declared that the Mongols are the small nomadic Khalkha people living in Central Asia” (KUN: 162).

Indeed, all the great conquerors are known by comparison. When Spain had a powerful fleet, a great armada, Spain captured a number of lands in North and South America, and today there are two dozen Latin American states. Britain, as the mistress of the seas, also has or had a lot of colonies. But today we do not know a single colony of Mongolia or a state dependent on it. Moreover, except for the Buryats or Kalmyks, who are the same Mongols, not a single ethnic group in Russia speaks Mongolian.

“The Khalkhas themselves learned that they were the heirs of the great Genghis Khan only in the 19th century, but they did not object - everyone wants to have great, albeit mythical, ancestors. And in order to explain the disappearance of the Mongols after their successful conquest of half the world, a completely artificial term “Mongol-Tatars” is introduced into use, which means other nomadic peoples allegedly conquered by the Mongols, who joined the conquerors and formed a certain community among them. In China, foreign conquerors turn into Manchus, in India - into Mughals, and in both cases they form ruling dynasties. In the future, however, we do not observe any Tatar nomads, but this is because, as the same historians explain, the Mongol-Tatars settled on the lands they conquered, and partially went back to the steppe and disappeared there completely without a trace” (KUN: 162- 163).

Wikipedia about the yoke.

Here is how Wikipedia interprets the Tatar-Mongol yoke: “The Mongol-Tatar yoke is a system of political and tributary dependence of the Russian principalities on the Mongol-Tatar khans (before the early 60s of the 13th century, the Mongol khans, after the khans of the Golden Horde) in the 13th-15th century centuries. The establishment of the yoke became possible as a result of the Mongol invasion of Rus' in 1237-1241 and occurred for two decades after it, including in unravaged lands. In North-Eastern Rus' it lasted until 1480. In other Russian lands it was liquidated in the 14th century as they were absorbed by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland.

The term “yoke,” meaning the power of the Golden Horde over Russia, does not appear in Russian chronicles. It appeared at the turn of the 15th-16th centuries in Polish historical literature. The first to use it were chronicler Jan Dlugosh (“iugum barbarum”, “iugum servitutis”) in 1479 and professor at the University of Krakow Matvey Miechowski in 1517. Literature: 1. Golden Horde // Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron: In 86 volumes (82 volumes. and 4 additional). - St. Petersburg: 1890-1907.2. Malov N. M., Malyshev A. B., Rakushin A. I. “Religion in the Golden Horde.” The word formation “Mongol-Tatar yoke” was first used in 1817 by H. Kruse, whose book was translated into Russian and published in St. Petersburg in the mid-19th century.”

So, this term was first introduced by the Poles in the 15th-16th centuries, who saw a “yoke” in the Tatar-Mongol relations with other peoples. The reason for this is explained by the second work of 3 authors: “Apparently, the Tatar yoke first began to be used in Polish historical literature of the late 15th - early 16th centuries. At this time, on the borders of Western Europe, the young Moscow state, freed from the vassal dependence of the Golden Horde khans, was pursuing an active foreign policy. In neighboring Poland, there is an increased interest in the history, foreign policy, armed forces, national relations, internal structure, traditions and customs of Muscovy. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the first word combination Tatar yoke was used in the Polish Chronicle (1515-1519) by Matvey Miechowski, professor at the University of Krakow, court physician and astrologer of King Sigismund I. The author of various medical and historical works spoke enthusiastically about Ivan III, who threw off the Tatar yoke , considering this his most important merit, and apparently a global event of the era.”

Mention of the yoke by historians.

Poland's attitude towards Russia has always been ambiguous, and its attitude towards its own fate as extremely tragic. So they could completely exaggerate the dependence of some peoples on the Tatar-Mongols. And then 3 authors continue: “Later, the term Tatar yoke is also mentioned in notes on the Moscow War of 1578-1582, compiled by the secretary of state of another king, Stefan Batory, Reinhold Heidenstein. Even Jacques Margeret, a French mercenary and adventurer, an officer in Russian service and a person far from science, knew what was meant by the Tatar yoke. This term was widely used by other Western European historians of the 17th-18th centuries. In particular, the Englishman John Milton and the Frenchman De Thou were familiar with him. Thus, for the first time the term Tatar yoke was probably introduced into circulation by Polish and Western European historians, and not by Russian or Russian ones.”

For now, I will interrupt the quotation to draw attention to the fact that, first of all, foreigners write about the “yoke”, who really liked the scenario of weak Rus', which was captured by the “evil Tatars”. While Russian historians still knew nothing about this

"IN. N. Tatishchev did not use this phrase, perhaps because when writing Russian History he mainly relied on early Russian chronicle terms and expressions, where it is absent. I. N. Boltin already used the term Tatar rule, and M., M., Shcherbatov believed that liberation from the Tatar yoke was a huge achievement of Ivan III. N.M., Karamzin found in the Tatar yoke both negative aspects - the tightening of laws and morals, the slowdown in the development of education and science, and positive aspects - the formation of autocracy, a factor in the unification of Rus'. Another phrase, Tatar-Mongol yoke, also most likely comes from the vocabulary of Western rather than domestic researchers. In 1817, Christopher Kruse published an Atlas on European history, where he first introduced the term Mongol-Tatar yoke into scientific circulation. Although this work was translated into Russian only in 1845, it was already in the 20s of the 19th century. domestic historians began to use this new scientific definition. Since that time, the terms: Mongol-Tatars, Mongol-Tatar yoke, Mongol yoke, Tatar yoke and Horde yoke, have traditionally been widely used in Russian historical science. In our encyclopedic publications, the Mongol-Tatar yoke in Rus' of the 13th-15th centuries is understood as: a system of rule by the Mongol-Tatar feudal lords, using various political, military and economic means, with the goal of regular exploitation of the conquered country. Thus, in European historical literature, the term yoke refers to domination, oppression, slavery, captivity, or the power of foreign conquerors over conquered peoples and states. It is known that the Old Russian principalities were subordinated to the Golden Horde economically and politically, and also paid tribute. The Golden Horde khans actively interfere in the politics of the Russian principalities, which they tried to strictly control. Sometimes, the relationship between the Golden Horde and the Russian principalities is characterized as a symbiosis, or a military alliance directed against the countries of Western Europe and some Asian states, first Muslim, and after the collapse of the Mongol Empire - Mongolian.

However, it should be noted that even if theoretically the so-called symbiosis, or military alliance, could exist for some time, it was never equal, voluntary and stable. In addition, even in the eras of the developed and late Middle Ages, short-term interstate unions were usually formalized by contractual relations. Such equal-allied relationships between the fragmented Russian principalities and the Golden Horde could not exist, since the khans of the Ulus of Jochi issued labels for the rule of the Vladimir, Tver, and Moscow princes. Russian princes were obliged, at the request of the khans, to send troops to participate in the military campaigns of the Golden Horde. In addition, using the Russian princes and their army, the Mongols carried out punitive campaigns against other rebellious Russian principalities. The khans summoned the princes to the Horde in order to issue one with a label to reign, and to execute or pardon those who were undesirable. During this period, the Russian lands were actually under the rule or yoke of the Ulus of Jochi. Although, sometimes the foreign policy interests of the Golden Horde khans and the Russian princes, due to various circumstances, could somewhat coincide. The Golden Horde is a chimera state in which the elite are conquerors, and the lower strata are conquered peoples. The Mongolian Golden Horde elite established power over the Cumans, Alans, Circassians, Khazars, Bulgars, Finno-Ugric peoples, and also placed the Russian principalities in strict vassalage. Therefore, it can be assumed that the scientific term yoke is quite acceptable to denote in historical literature the nature of the power of the Golden Horde established not only over the Russian lands.”

Yoke as Christianization of Rus'.

Thus, Russian historians actually repeated the statements of the German Christopher Kruse, while they did not read such a term from any chronicle. It was not only Kungurov who drew attention to the oddities in the interpretation of the Tatar-Mongol yoke. This is what we read in the article (TAT): “Such a nationality as the Mongol-Tatars does not exist, and never existed at all. The only thing the Mongols and Tatars have in common is that they roamed the Central Asian steppe, which, as we know, is large enough to accommodate any nomadic people, and at the same time give them the opportunity not to intersect on the same territory at all. The Mongol tribes lived at the southern tip of the Asian steppe and often raided China and its provinces, as the history of China often confirms to us. While other nomadic Turkic tribes, called from time immemorial in Rus' Bulgars (Volga Bulgaria), settled in the lower reaches of the Volga River. In those days in Europe they were called Tatars, or TatAryans (the most powerful of the nomadic tribes, unbending and invincible). And the Tatars, the closest neighbors of the Mongols, lived in the northeastern part of modern Mongolia, mainly in the area of ​​Lake Buir Nor and up to the borders of China. There were 70 thousand families, making up 6 tribes: Tutukulyut Tatars, Alchi Tatars, Chagan Tatars, Queen Tatars, Terat Tatars, Barkuy Tatars. The second parts of the names are apparently the self-names of these tribes. There is not a single word among them that sounds close to the Turkic language - they are more consonant with Mongolian names. Two related peoples - the Tatars and the Mongols - fought a war of mutual extermination for a long time with varying success, until Genghis Khan seized power throughout Mongolia. The fate of the Tatars was predetermined. Since the Tatars were the murderers of Genghis Khan’s father, exterminated many tribes and clans close to him, and constantly supported the tribes opposing him, “then Genghis Khan (Tey-mu-Chin) ordered a general massacre of the Tatars and not leave even one alive to that extent, which is determined by law (Yasak); so that women and small children should also be killed, and the wombs of pregnant women should be cut open in order to completely destroy them. …” That is why such a nationality could not threaten the freedom of Rus'. Moreover, many historians and cartographers of that time, especially Eastern European ones, “sinned” to call all indestructible (from the point of view of Europeans) and invincible peoples TatAriev or simply in Latin TatArie. This can be easily seen in ancient maps, for example, the Map of Russia 1594 in the Atlas of Gerhard Mercator, or the Maps of Russia and TarTaria by Ortelius. Below you can view these maps. So what can we see from the newfound material? What we see is that this event simply could not have happened, at least in the form in which it is conveyed to us. And before moving on to the narration of the truth, I propose to consider a few more inconsistencies in the “historical” description of these events.

Even in the modern school curriculum, this historical moment is briefly described as follows: “At the beginning of the 13th century, Genghis Khan gathered a large army of nomadic peoples, and, subordinating them to strict discipline, decided to conquer the whole world. Having defeated China, he sent his army to Rus'. In the winter of 1237, the army of “Mongol-Tatars” invaded the territory of Rus', and subsequently defeating the Russian army on the Kalka River, went further, through Poland and the Czech Republic. As a result, having reached the shores of the Adriatic Sea, the army suddenly stops and, without completing its task, turns back. From this period the so-called “Mongol-Tatar Yoke” over Russia began.
But wait, they were going to conquer the whole world... so why didn't they go further? Historians answered that they were afraid of an attack from behind, defeated and plundered, but still strong Rus'. But this is just funny. Will the plundered state run to defend other people's cities and villages? Rather, they will rebuild their borders and wait for the return of the enemy troops in order to fight back fully armed. But the weirdness doesn't end there. For some unimaginable reason, during the reign of the House of Romanov, dozens of chronicles describing the events of the “time of the Horde” disappear. For example, “The Tale of the Destruction of the Russian Land,” historians believe that this is a document from which everything that would indicate the Ige was carefully removed. They left only fragments telling about some kind of “trouble” that befell Rus'. But there is not a word about the “invasion of the Mongols.” There are many more strange things. In the story “about the evil Tatars,” the khan from the Golden Horde orders the execution of a Russian Christian prince... for refusing to bow to the “pagan god of the Slavs!” And some chronicles contain amazing phrases, for example: “Well, with God!” - said the khan and, crossing himself, galloped towards the enemy. So, what really happened? At that time, the “new faith” was already flourishing in Europe, namely Faith in Christ. Catholicism was widespread everywhere, and governed everything, from the way of life and the system, to the state system and legislation. At that time, crusades against infidels were still relevant, but along with military methods, “tactical tricks” were often used, akin to bribing authorities and inducing them to their faith. And after receiving power through the purchased person, the conversion of all his “subordinates” to the faith. It was precisely such a secret crusade that was carried out against Rus' at that time. Through bribery and other promises, church ministers were able to seize power over Kiev and nearby regions. Just relatively recently, by the standards of history, the baptism of Rus' took place, but history is silent about the civil war that arose on this basis immediately after the forced baptism.”

So, this author interprets the “Tatar-Mongol yoke” as a civil war imposed by the West, during the real, Western baptism of Rus', which took place in the 13th-14th centuries. This understanding of the baptism of Rus' is very painful for the Russian Orthodox Church for two reasons. The date of the baptism of Rus' is usually considered to be 988, and not 1237. Due to the shift in date, the antiquity of Russian Christianity is reduced by 249 years, which reduces the “millennium of Orthodoxy” by almost a third. On the other hand, the source of Russian Christianity turns out to be not the activities of Russian princes, including Vladimir, but the Western crusades, accompanied by mass protests of the Russian population. This raises the question of the legitimacy of the introduction of Orthodoxy in Rus'. Finally, responsibility for the “yoke” in this case is transferred from the unknown “Tatar-Mongols” to the very real West, to Rome and Constantinople. And official historiography turns out to be not science on this issue, but modern pseudo-scientific mythology. But let’s return to the texts of Alexei Kungurov’s book, especially since he examines in great detail all the inconsistencies with the official version.

Lack of writing and artifacts.

“The Mongols did not have their own alphabet and did not leave a single written source” (KUN: 163). Indeed, this is extremely surprising. Generally speaking, even if a people does not have its own written language, then for state acts it uses the writing of other peoples. Therefore, the complete absence of state acts in such a large state as the Mongol Khanate during its heyday causes not only bewilderment, but doubt that such a state ever existed. “If we demand to present at least some material evidence of the long existence of the Mongol Empire, then archaeologists, scratching their heads and grunting, will show a pair of half-rotten sabers and several women’s earrings. But don’t try to figure out why the remains of sabers are “Mongol-Tatar” and not Cossack, for example. Nobody can explain this to you for sure. At best, you will hear a story that the saber was dug up at the site where, according to an ancient and very reliable chronicle, there was a battle with the Mongols. Where is that chronicle? God knows, it has not survived to this day, but the historian N. saw it with his own eyes, who translated it from Old Russian. Where is this historian N.? Yes, it’s been two hundred years since he died - modern “scientists” will answer you, but they will certainly add that N’s works are considered classic and cannot be doubted, since all subsequent generations of historians wrote their works based on his works. I’m not laughing - this is approximately how things stand in the official historical science of Russian antiquity. Even worse - armchair scientists, creatively developing the legacy of the classics of Russian historiography, wrote in their plump volumes such nonsense about the Mongols, whose arrows, it turns out, pierced the armor of European knights, and battering guns, flamethrowers and even rocket artillery made it possible to take by storm for several days powerful fortresses, that this raises serious doubts about their mental capacity. It seems that they do not see any difference between a bow and a crossbow loaded with a lever” (KUN: 163-164).

But where could the Mongols encounter the armor of European knights and what do Russian sources say about this? “And the Vorogs came from overseas, and they brought faith in alien gods. With fire and sword they began to implant in us an alien faith, shower the Russian princes with gold and silver, bribe their will, and lead them astray from the true path. They promised them an idle life, full of wealth and happiness, and remission of any sins for their dashing deeds. And then Ros broke up into different states. The Russian clans retreated to the north to the great Asgard, and named their state after the names of their patron gods, Tarkh Dazhdbog the Great and Tara, his Sister the Light-Wise. (They called her the Great TarTaria). Leaving the foreigners with the princes purchased in the Principality of Kiev and its environs. Volga Bulgaria also did not bow to its enemies, and did not accept their alien faith as its own. But the Principality of Kiev did not live in peace with TarTaria. They began to conquer the Russian lands with fire and sword and impose their alien faith. And then the military army rose up for a fierce battle. In order to preserve their faith and reclaim their lands. Both old and young then joined the Ratniki in order to restore order to the Russian Lands.”

And so the war began, in which the Russian army, the land of the Great Arya (Army) defeated the enemy and drove him out of the primordially Slavic lands. It drove away the alien army, with their fierce faith, from its stately lands. By the way, the word Horde, translated according to the initial letters of the ancient Slavic alphabet, means Order. That is, the Golden Horde is not a separate state, it is a system. "Political" system of the Golden Order. Under which the Princes reigned locally, planted with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Defense, or in one word they called him KHAN (our defender).
This means that there were not more than two hundred years of oppression, but there was a time of peace and prosperity of the Great Aria or TarTaria. By the way, modern history also has confirmation of this, but for some reason no one pays attention to it. But we will definitely pay attention, and very closely...: Doesn’t it seem strange to you that the battle with the Swedes is taking place right in the middle of the “Mongol-Tatars” invasion of Rus'? Rus', blazing in fires and plundered by the “Mongols,” is attacked by the Swedish army, which safely drowns in the waters of the Neva, and at the same time the Swedish crusaders do not encounter the Mongols even once. And the Russians, who defeated the strong Swedish army, lose to the Mongols? In my opinion, this is just nonsense. Two huge armies are fighting on the same territory at the same time and never intersect. But if you turn to the ancient Slavic chronicles, then everything becomes clear.

From 1237, the Army of the Great TarTaria began to recapture their ancestral lands, and when the war was coming to an end, representatives of the church, losing power, asked for help, and the Swedish crusaders were sent into battle. Since they failed to take the country by bribery, it means they will take it by force. Just in 1240, the army of the Horde (that is, the army of Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich, one of the princes of the ancient Slavic family) clashed in battle with the army of the Crusaders, who came to the rescue of their minions. Having won the Battle of the Neva, Alexander received the title of Prince of the Neva and remained to rule Novgorod, and the Horde Army went further to drive the adversary out of the Russian lands completely. So she persecuted “the church and the alien faith” until she reached the Adriatic Sea, thereby restoring her original ancient borders. And having reached them, the army turned around and again went north. Establishing a 300-year period of peace” (TAT).

Fantasies of historians about the power of the Mongols.

Commenting on the lines quoted above (KUN: 163), Alexey Kungurov adds: “Here is what Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergei Nefyodov writes: “The main weapon of the Tatars was the Mongolian bow, “saadak,” - it was thanks to this New Weapon that the Mongols conquered most of the promised world. It was a complex killing machine, glued together from three layers of wood and bone and wrapped with sinew to protect it from moisture; gluing was carried out under pressure, and drying continued for several years - the secret of making these bows was kept secret. This bow was not inferior in power to a musket; an arrow from it pierced any armor 300 meters away, and it was all about the ability to hit the target, because bows did not have sights and shooting from them required many years of training. Possessing this all-destructive weapon, the Tatars did not like to fight hand-to-hand; they preferred to fire at the enemy with bows, dodging his attacks; This shelling sometimes lasted several days, and the Mongols took out their sabers only when the enemies were wounded and fell from exhaustion. The last, “ninth” attack was carried out by “swordsmen” - warriors armed with curved swords and, together with their horses, covered in armor made of thick buffalo leather. During major battles, this attack was preceded by shelling from “fire catapults” borrowed from the Chinese - these catapults fired bombs filled with gunpowder, which, when exploding, “burned through the armor with sparks” (NEF). – Alexey Kungurov comments on this passage as follows: “The funny thing here is not that Nefyodov is a historian (this brethren has the deepest idea of ​​natural science), but that he is also a candidate of physical and mathematical sciences. This is how much you have to degrade your mind to flog such nonsense! Yes, if a bow shot at 300 meters and at the same time pierced any armor, then firearms simply did not have a chance to appear. The American M-16 rifle has an effective firing range of 400 meters with a muzzle velocity of 1000 meters per second. Then the bullet quickly loses its damaging ability. In reality, aimed shooting from an M-16 with a mechanical sight is ineffective beyond 100 meters. Only a very experienced shooter can shoot accurately at 300 meters even from a powerful rifle without an optical sight. And the scientist Nefyodov weaves nonsense about the fact that Mongolian arrows not only flew accurately at a third of a kilometer (the maximum distance at which champion archers shoot in competitions is 90 meters), but also pierced any armor. Rave! For example, it will not be possible to pierce good chain mail even at point-blank range with the most powerful bow. To defeat a warrior in chain mail, a special arrow with a needle tip was used, which did not pierce the armor, but, under a successful combination of circumstances, passed through the rings.

In physics at school, I had grades no higher than three, but I know very well from practice that an arrow fired from a bow is imparted with the force that the arm muscles develop when it is pulled. That is, with approximately the same success, you can take an arrow with your hand and try to pierce at least an enamel basin with it. If you don't have an arrow, use any pointed object like half a pair of tailor's scissors, an awl or a knife. How is it going? Do you trust historians after this? If they write in their dissertations that short and thin Mongols pulled bows with a force of 75 kg, then I would award the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences only to those who can repeat this feat in defense. At least there will be fewer parasites with scientific titles. By the way, modern Mongols have no idea about any saadaks - a superweapon of the Middle Ages. Having conquered half the world with them, for some reason they completely forgot how to do it.

It’s even easier with battering machines and catapults: you just have to look at the drawings of these monsters, and it becomes clear that these multi-ton colossuses cannot be moved even a meter, since they will get stuck in the ground even during construction. But even if in those days there were asphalt roads from Transbaikalia to Kyiv and Polotsk, how would the Mongols drag them thousands of kilometers, how would they transport them across large rivers like the Volga or Dnieper? Stone fortresses ceased to be considered impregnable only with the invention of siege artillery, and in previous times well-fortified cities were only taken by starvation” (KUN: 164-165). – I think this criticism is excellent. I will also add that, according to the works of Ya.A. Koestler, there were no reserves of saltpeter in China, so they had nothing to stuff gunpowder bombs with. In addition, gunpowder does not create a temperature of 1556 degrees, at which iron melts in order to “burn through armor with sparks.” And if he could create such a temperature, then the “sparks” would primarily burn through cannons and rifles at the moment of firing. It is also very funny to read that the Tatars shot and shot (the number of arrows in their quiver, apparently, was not limited), and the enemy was exhausted, and the skinny Mongol warriors fired the tenth and hundredth arrow with the same fresh strength as the first, without getting tired at all. Surprisingly, even rifle shooters get tired when shooting while standing, and this condition was unknown to the Mongol archers.

At one time I heard the expression from lawyers: “He lies like an eyewitness.” Now, probably, using Nefyodov’s example, we should suggest the addition: “He lies like a professional historian.”

Mongols-metallurgists.

It would seem that we can put an end to this, but Kungurov wants to consider several more aspects. “I don’t know much about metallurgy, but I can still very roughly estimate how many tons of iron are needed to arm at least a 10,000-strong Mongol army” (KUN: 166). Where did the figure of 10 thousand come from? – This is the minimum size of the army with which you can go on a campaign of conquest. Guy Julius Caesar with such a detachment was unable to capture Britain, but when he doubled the number, the conquest of Foggy Albion was crowned with success. “In fact, such a small army could not have conquered China, India, Rus' and other countries. Therefore, historians, without trifling, write about Batu’s 30,000-strong cavalry horde sent to conquer Rus', but this figure seems completely fantastic. Even if we assume that the Mongol warriors had leather armor, wooden shields, and stone arrowheads, then iron is still required for horseshoes, spears, knives, swords, and sabers.

Now it’s worth thinking about: how did the wild nomads know the high iron-making technologies at that time? After all, the ore still needs to be mined, and for this to be able to find it, that is, to understand a little about geology. Are there many ancient ore mines in the Mongolian steppes? Do archaeologists find many remains of forges there? They, of course, are still magicians - they will find anything, wherever they need it. But in this case, nature itself made the task extremely difficult for archaeologists. Iron ore is not mined in Mongolia even today (although small deposits have recently been discovered)” (KUN: 166). But even if ore was found and smelting furnaces existed, the metallurgists would have to be paid for their work, and they themselves would have to live sedentary lives. Where are the former settlements of metallurgists? Where are the waste rock dumps (heap waste heaps)? Where are the remnants of finished product warehouses? None of this was found.

“Of course, weapons can be bought, but you need money, which the ancient Mongols did not have, at least they are completely unknown to world archeology. And they couldn’t have it, since their farm was not commercial. Weapons could be exchanged, but where, from whom and for what? In short, if you think about such little things, then Genghis Khan’s campaign from the Manchurian steppes to China, India, Persia, the Caucasus and Europe looks like complete fantasy” (KUN: 166).

This is not the first time I have come across this kind of “punctures” in mythological historiography. As a matter of fact, any historiographical myth is written in order to cover up the real fact like a smoke screen. This kind of camouflage works well in cases where secondary facts are masked. But it is impossible to disguise advanced technologies, the highest at that time. It’s the same as putting on someone else’s suit and mask for a criminal taller than two meters—he is identified not by his clothes or face, but by his exorbitant height. If in the indicated period, that is, in the 13th century, Western European knights had the best iron armor, then it will in no way be possible to attribute their urban culture to the steppe nomads. Just like the highest culture of Etruscan writing, where the Italic, Russian, stylized Greek alphabets and runitsa were used, it cannot be attributed to any small people such as the Albanians or Chechens, who, perhaps, did not yet exist in those days.

Forage for the Mongol cavalry.

“For example, how did the Mongols cross the Volga or the Dnieper? You can't swim through a two-kilometer stream, you can't wade it. There is only one way out - wait until winter to cross the ice. It was in winter, by the way, that in Rus' they usually fought in the old days. But in order to make such a long journey during the winter, it is necessary to prepare a huge amount of forage, since although the Mongolian horse is capable of finding withered grass under the snow, for this it needs to graze where there is grass. In this case, the snow cover should be small. In the Mongolian steppes, winters have little snow, and the grass stand is quite high. In Rus', the opposite is true - the grass is tall only in floodplain meadows, and in all other places it is very sparse. The snowdrifts are such that the horse, let alone finding grass under it, will not be able to move through the deep snow. Otherwise, it is not clear why the French lost all their cavalry during the retreat from Moscow. They ate it, of course, but they ate already fallen horses, because if the horses were well-fed and healthy, then the uninvited guests would use them to quickly escape” (KUN: 166-167). – Let us note that it is for this reason that summer campaigns have become preferable for Western Europeans.

“Oats are usually used as fodder, of which a horse needs 5-6 kg per day. It turns out that the nomads, in advance of preparing for a campaign to distant lands, sowed the steppe with oats? Or did they carry the hay with them on carts? Let's perform some simple arithmetic operations and calculate what preparations the nomads had to make in order to go on a long journey. Let's assume that they gathered an army of at least 10 thousand mounted soldiers. Each warrior needs several horses - one specially trained combatant for battle, one for marching, one for a convoy - to carry food, a yurt and other supplies. This is a minimum, but we must also take into account that some of the horses will fall along the way, and there will be combat losses, so a reserve is needed.

And if 10 thousand horsemen march in marching formation even across the steppe, then when the horses graze, where will the warriors live - rest in the snowdrifts, or what? On a long hike you cannot do without food, fodder and a convoy with warm yurts. You need more fuel to cook food, but where can you find firewood in the treeless steppe? The nomads drowned their yurts, sorry, with poop, because there was nothing else. It stank, of course. But they got used to it. You can, of course, fantasize about the strategic procurement of hundreds of tons of dried crap by the Mongols, which they took with them on the road when setting out to conquer the world, but I will leave this opportunity to the most stubborn historians.

Some clever people tried to prove to me that the Mongols did not have a convoy at all, which is why they were able to show phenomenal maneuverability. But how did they take the loot home in this case - in their pockets, or what? And where were their battering guns and other engineering devices, and the same maps and food supplies, not to mention their environmentally friendly fuel? Not a single army in the world could ever do without a convoy if it was going to make a transition lasting more than two days. The loss of a convoy usually meant the failure of a campaign, even if there was no battle with the enemy.

In short, according to the most conservative estimates, our mini-horde should have at its disposal at least 40 thousand horses. From the experience of mass armies of the 17th-19th centuries. it is known that the daily feed requirement of such a herd will be at least 200 tons of oats. This is just in one day! And the longer the journey, the more horses should be involved in the convoy. A medium-sized horse can pull a cart weighing 300 kg. This is on the road, but off-road in packs it’s half as much. That is, in order to provide for our 40,000-strong herd, we need 700 horses per day. A three-month campaign will require a convoy of almost 70 thousand horses. And this crowd also needs oats, and in order to feed 70 thousand horses carrying fodder for 40 thousand horses, more than 100 thousand horses with carts will be needed for the same three months, and these horses, in turn, want to eat - it turns out to be a vicious circle.” (KUN:167-168). – This calculation shows that intercontinental, for example, from Asia to Europe, trips on horseback with a full supply of provisions are fundamentally impossible. True, here are calculations for a 3-month winter campaign. But if the campaign is carried out in the summer, and you move in the steppe zone, feeding the horses with pasture, then you can advance much further.

“Even in the summer, the cavalry never did without forage, so the Mongol campaign against Rus' would still require logistical support. Until the twentieth century, the maneuverability of troops was determined not by the speed of horses' hooves and the strength of soldiers' legs, but by dependence on convoys and the capacity of the road network. A marching speed of 20 km per day was very good even for the average World War II division, and German tanks, when paved highways allowed them to carry out blitzkrieg, wound up on tracks at 50 km per day. But in this case, the rear inevitably lagged behind. In ancient times, in off-road conditions such indicators would have been simply fantastic. The textbook (SVI) reports that the Mongol army marched about 100 kilometers a day! Yes, it is hardly possible to find people who are the worst versed in history. Even in May 1945, Soviet tanks, making a forced march from Berlin to Prague along good European roads, could not break the “Mongol-Tatar” record” (KUN: 168-169). – I believe that the very division of Europe into Western and Eastern was made not so much for geographical, but for strategic reasons. Namely: within each of them, military campaigns, although they require supplies of fodder and horses, are within reasonable limits. And the transition to another part of Europe already requires the exertion of all state forces, so that a military campaign affects not only the army, but develops into a patriotic war, requiring the participation of the entire population.

Food problem.

“What did the riders themselves eat on the way? If you are chasing a flock of lambs, then you will have to move at their speed. During the winter there is no way to reach the nearest center of civilization. But nomads are unpretentious people; they made do with dried meat and cottage cheese, which they soaked in hot water. Whatever one may say, a kilogram of food a day is necessary. Three months of travel - 100 kg of weight. In the future, you can slaughter the baggage horses. At the same time, there will be savings on fodder. But not a single convoy can move at a speed of 100 km per day, especially off-road.” – It is clear that this problem mainly concerns uninhabited areas. In densely populated Europe, the winner can take food from the vanquished

Demographic problems.

“If we touch on demographic issues and try to understand how the nomads were able to field 10 thousand warriors, given the very low population density in the steppe zone, then we will run into another unsolvable mystery. Well, in the steppes there is no population density higher than 0.2 people per square kilometer! If we take the mobilization capabilities of the Mongols as 10% of the total population (every second healthy man from 18 to 45 years old), then to mobilize a horde of 10,000 people, it will be necessary to comb a territory of about half a million square kilometers. Or let's touch on purely organizational issues: for example, how the Mongols collected taxes on the army and recruited, how did military training take place, how was the military elite educated? It turns out that for purely technical reasons, the Mongol campaign against Rus', as described by “professional” historians, was impossible in principle.

There are examples of this from relatively recent times. In the spring of 1771, the Kalmyks, who were nomadic in the Caspian steppes, annoyed that the tsarist administration had significantly curtailed their autonomy, unanimously left their place and moved to their historical homeland in Dzungaria (the territory of the modern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China). Only 25 thousand Kalmyks who lived on the right bank of the Volga remained in place - they could not join the others due to the opening of the river. Of the 170 thousand nomads, only about 70 thousand reached the goal after 8 months. The rest, as you might guess, died on the way. The winter transition would be even more disastrous. The local population greeted the settlers without enthusiasm. Who will now find traces of Kalmyks in Xinjiang? And on the right bank of the Volga today live 165 thousand Kalmyks who switched to a sedentary lifestyle during the period of collectivization in 1929-1940, but who have not lost their original culture and religion (Buddhism)” (KUN: 1690170). – This last example is amazing! Almost 2/3 of the population, who walked slowly and with good convoys in the summer, died along the way. Even if the losses of the regular army were less than, say, 1/3, then instead of 10 thousand troops, less than 7 thousand people would reach the target. It may be objected that they drove the conquered peoples ahead of them. So I only counted those who died from the difficulties of the transition, but there were also combat losses. Defeated enemies can be driven back when the victors are at least twice as numerous as the vanquished. So if half the army dies in battle (in fact, about 6 times more attackers die than defenders), then the remaining 3.5 thousand can drive in front of no more than 1.5 thousand prisoners, who will try in the first battle run over to the side of the enemies, strengthening their ranks. And an army of less than 4 thousand people is unlikely to be able to advance further into a foreign country - it’s time for him to return home.

Why is the myth of the Tatar-Mongol invasion needed?

“But the myth of the terrible Mongol invasion is cultivated for some reason. And for what, it’s not difficult to guess - virtual Mongols are needed solely to explain the disappearance of the equally phantom Kievan Rus along with its original population. They say that as a result of Batu’s invasion, the Dnieper region was completely depopulated. Why the hell, one might ask, did the nomads want to destroy the population? Well, they would have imposed tribute like everyone else - at least there would have been some benefit. But no, historians unanimously convince us that the Mongols completely devastated the Kiev region, burned the cities, exterminated the population or drove them into captivity, and those who were lucky enough to survive, having greased their heels with lard, fled without looking back into the wild forests to the northeast, where Over time they created a powerful Moscow kingdom. One way or another, the time before the 16th century seems to fall out of the history of Southern Rus': if historians mention anything about this period, it is the raids of the Crimeans. But who did they raid, if the Russian lands were depopulated?

It cannot be that for 250 years no events took place at all in the historical center of Rus'! However, no epochal events were noted. This caused heated debate among historians when disputes were still allowed. Some put forward hypotheses about the general flight of the population to the northeast, others believed that the entire population died out, and new ones came from the Carpathians in the following centuries. Still others expressed the idea that the population did not flee anywhere, and did not come from anywhere, but simply sat quietly in isolation from the outside world and did not show any political, military, economic, demographic or cultural activity. Klyuchevsky propagated the idea that the population, scared to death by the evil Tatars, left their inhabited places and went partly to Galicia, and partly to the Suzdal lands, from where they spread far to the north and east. Kyiv, as a city, according to the professor, temporarily ceased to exist, having shrunk to 200 houses. Solovyov argued that Kyiv was completely destroyed and for many years it was a pile of ruins where no one lived. In the Galician lands, then called Little Russia, refugees from the Dnieper region, they say, became slightly Polish, and when they returned several centuries later to their autochthonous territory as Little Russians, they brought there a peculiar dialect and customs acquired in exile” (KUN: 170-171).

So, from the point of view of Alexei Kungurov, the myth about the Tatar-Mongols supports another myth - about Kievan Rus. While I am not considering this second myth, I admit that the existence of a vast Kievan Rus is also a myth. However, let's listen to this author to the end. Perhaps he will show that the myth of the Tatar-Mongols is beneficial to historians for other reasons.

Surprisingly fast surrender of Russian cities.

“At first glance, this version looks quite logical: evil barbarians came and destroyed a flourishing civilization, killed everyone and dispersed them to hell. Why? But because they are barbarians. For what? And Batu was in a bad mood, maybe his wife cuckolded him, maybe he had a stomach ulcer, so he was angry. The scientific community is quite satisfied with such answers, and since I have nothing to do with this very community, I immediately want to argue with the luminaries of historical “science”.

Why, one wonders, did the Mongols completely clear out the Kiev region? It should be taken into account that the Kiev land is not some insignificant outskirts, but supposedly the core of the Russian state, according to the same Klyuchevsky. Meanwhile, Kyiv was surrendered to the enemy in 1240 a few days after the siege. Are there similar cases in history? More often we will see opposite examples, when we gave everything to the enemy, but fought for the core to the last. Therefore, the fall of Kyiv seems completely incredible. Before the invention of siege artillery, a well-fortified city could only be taken by starvation. And it often happened that the besiegers ran out of steam faster than the besieged. History knows cases of very long defense of the city. For example, during the Polish intervention during the Time of Troubles, the siege of Smolensk by the Poles lasted from September 21, 1609 to June 3, 1611. The defenders capitulated only when Polish artillery made an impressive opening in the wall, and the besieged were extremely exhausted by hunger and disease.

The Polish king Sigismund, amazed by the courage of the defenders, let them go home. But why did the Kievans so quickly surrender to the wild Mongols, who spared no one? The nomads did not have powerful siege artillery, and the battering guns with which they allegedly destroyed fortifications were stupid inventions of historians. It was physically impossible to drag such a device to the wall, because the walls themselves always stood on a large earthen rampart, which was the basis of the city fortifications, and a ditch was built in front of them. It is now generally accepted that the defense of Kyiv lasted 93 days. The famous fiction writer Bushkov is sarcastic about this: “Historians are a little disingenuous. Ninety-three days is not the period between the beginning and end of the assault, but the first appearance of the “Tatar” army and the capture of Kyiv. First, “Batyev Voivode” Mengat appeared at the Kyiv walls and tried to persuade the Kyiv prince to surrender the city without a fight, but the Kievans killed his ambassadors, and he retreated. And three months later “Batu” came. And in a few days he took the city. It is the interval between these events that other researchers call the “long siege” (BUSH).

Moreover, the story of the rapid fall of Kyiv is by no means unique. If you believe historians, then all other Russian cities (Ryazan, Vladimir, Galich, Moscow, Pereslavl-Zalessky, etc.) usually held out for no more than five days. It’s surprising that Torzhok defended itself for almost two weeks. Little Kozelsk allegedly set a record by holding out for seven weeks under siege, but falling on the third day of the assault. Who will explain to me what kind of superweapon the Mongols used to take fortresses on the move? And why was this weapon forgotten? In the Middle Ages, throwing machines - vices - were sometimes used to destroy city walls. But in Rus' there was a big problem - there was nothing to throw - boulders of the appropriate size would have to be dragged with you.

True, cities in Rus' in most cases had wooden fortifications, and theoretically they could be burned. But in practice, in winter this was difficult to achieve, because the walls were watered from above, resulting in the formation of an ice shell on them. In fact, even if a 10,000-strong nomadic army had come to Rus', no catastrophe would have happened. This horde would simply melt away in a couple of months, taking a dozen cities by storm. The losses of the attackers in this case will be 3-5 times higher than those of the defenders of the citadel.

According to the official version of history, the northeastern lands of Rus' suffered much more severely from the adversary, but for some reason no one thought of running away from there. And vice versa, they fled to where the climate was colder and the Mongols were more outrageous. Where is the logic? And why was the “fleeing” population, until the 16th century, paralyzed by fear and did not try to return to the fertile lands of the Dnieper region? There was no trace of the Mongols long ago, and the frightened Russians, they say, were afraid to show their noses there. The Crimeans were not at all peaceful, but for some reason the Russians were not afraid of them - the Cossacks on their seagulls descended along the Don and Dnieper, unexpectedly attacked Crimean cities and carried out brutal pogroms there. Usually, if some places are favorable for life, then the struggle for them is especially fierce, and these lands are never empty. The vanquished are replaced by conquerors, who are ousted or assimilated by stronger neighbors - the issue here is not disagreements on some political or religious issues, but rather the possession of territory” (KUN: 171-173). “Indeed, this is a completely inexplicable situation from the point of view of the clash between steppe dwellers and townspeople.” It is very good for a denigrating version of the historiography of Rus', but is completely illogical. While Alexey Kungurov is noticing new aspects of the absolutely incredible development of events from the standpoint of the Tatar-Mongol invasion.

The unknown motives of the Mongols.

“Historians do not explain the motives of the mythical Mongols at all. Why did they participate in such grandiose campaigns? If in order to impose tribute on the conquered Russians, then why the hell did the Mongols raze 49 of 74 large Russian cities to the ground, and slaughter the population almost to the roots, as historians say? If they destroyed the aborigines because they liked the local grass and the milder climate than in the Trans-Caspian and Trans-Baikal steppes, then why did they go to the steppe? There is no logic in the actions of the conquerors. More precisely, it is not in the nonsense written by historians.

The root cause of the militancy of peoples in ancient times was the so-called crisis of nature and man. With the overpopulation of the territory, society seemed to push young and energetic people outside. If they conquer those lands of their neighbors and settle there - good. If they die in the fire, that’s also not bad, because there will be no “extra” population. In many ways, this is precisely what can explain the belligerence of the ancient Scandinavians: their stingy northern lands could not feed the increased population and they were left to live by robbery or be hired into the service of foreign rulers to engage in the same robbery. The Russians, one might say, were lucky - for centuries the excess population rolled back to the south and east, all the way to the Pacific Ocean. Subsequently, the crisis of nature and man began to be overcome through qualitative changes in agricultural technologies and industrial development.

But what could have caused the belligerence of the Mongols? If the population density of the steppes exceeds acceptable limits (that is, there is a shortage of pastures), some of the shepherds will simply migrate to other, less developed steppes. If the local nomads are not happy with the guests, then a small massacre will arise in which the strongest will win. That is, in order to get to Kyiv, the Mongols would have to conquer vast areas from Manchuria to the northern Black Sea region. But even in this case, the nomads did not pose a threat to strong civilized countries, because not a single nomadic people ever created their own statehood or had an army. The maximum that the steppe inhabitants are capable of is to raid a border village for the purpose of robbery.

The only analogue to the mythical warlike Mongols is the Chechen cattle breeders of the 19th century. This people is unique in that robbery has become the basis of its existence. The Chechens did not even have rudimentary statehood, lived in clans (teips), did not practice agriculture, unlike their neighbors, did not possess the secrets of metal processing, and in general mastered the most primitive crafts. They posed a threat to the Russian border and communications with Georgia, which became part of Russia in 1804, only because they supplied them with weapons and supplies, and bribed local princes. But the Chechen robbers, despite their numerical superiority, could not oppose the Russians with anything other than the tactics of raids and forest ambushes. When the patience of the latter ran out, the regular army under the command of Ermolov quite quickly carried out a total “cleansing” of the North Caucasus, driving the abreks into the mountains and gorges.

I am ready to believe in many things, but I categorically refuse to take seriously the nonsense of the evil nomads who destroyed Ancient Rus'. All the more fantastic is the theory about the three-century “yoke” of wild steppe inhabitants over the Russian principalities. Only the STATE can exercise dominion over conquered lands. Historians generally understand this, and therefore they invented a certain fabulous Mongol Empire - the world’s largest state in the entire history of mankind, founded by Genghis Khan in 1206 and including the territory from the Danube to the Sea of ​​Japan and from Novgorod to Cambodia. All the empires known to us were created over centuries and generations, and only the greatest world empire was allegedly created by an illiterate savage literally with the wave of his hand” (KUN: 173-175). – So, Alexey Kungurov comes to the conclusion that if there was a conquest of Rus', it was carried out not by wild steppe inhabitants, but by some powerful state. But where was its capital?

Capital of the steppes.

“If there is an empire, then there must be a capital. The fantastic city of Karakorum was appointed as the capital, the remains of which were explained by the ruins of the Buddhist monastery Erdene-Dzu of the late 16th century in the center of modern Mongolia. Based on what? And that’s what historians wanted. Schliemann dug up the ruins of a small ancient city and declared that this was Troy” (KUN: 175). I showed in two articles that Schliemann excavated one of the temples of Yar and took its treasures as a trace of ancient Troy, although Troy, as one of the Serbian researchers showed, was located on the shores of Lake Skoder (the modern city of Shkoder in Albania).

“And Nikolai Yadrintsev, who discovered an ancient settlement in the Orkhon valley, declared it Karakorum. Karakorum literally means “black stones.” Since there was a mountain range not far from the place of discovery, it was given the official name Karakorum. And since the mountains are called Karakorum, then the city was given the same name. This is such a convincing rationale! True, the local population had never heard of any Karakorum, but called the ridge Muztag - Ice Mountains, but this did not bother the scientists at all” (KUN: 175-176). – And rightly so, because in this case the “scientists” were not looking for the truth, but confirmation of their myth, and geographical renaming greatly contributes to this.

Traces of a grandiose empire.

“The largest world empire left the least traces of itself. Or rather, none at all. It, they say, broke up in the 13th century into separate uluses, the largest of which became the Yuan Empire, that is, China (its capital Khanbalyk, now Aekin, was allegedly at one time the capital of the entire Mongol Empire), the state of the Ilkhans (Iran, Transcaucasia, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan), Chagatai ulus (Central Asia) and the Golden Horde (territory from the Irtysh to the White, Baltic and Black Seas). Historians cleverly came up with this. Now any fragments of ceramics or copper jewelry found in the expanses from Hungary to the coast of the Sea of ​​Japan can be declared traces of the great Mongolian civilization. And they find and announce. And they won’t blink an eye” (KUN:176).

As an epigraphist, I am primarily interested in written monuments. Did they exist in the Tatar-Mongol era? Here is what Nefyodov writes about this: “Having installed Alexander Nevsky as Grand Duke of their own free will, the Tatars sent Baskaks and Chisniki to Rus' - “and the accursed Tatars began to ride through the streets, copying Christian houses.” This was a census carried out at that time throughout the vast Mongol Empire; The clerks compiled defter registers to collect taxes established by Yelu Chu-tsai: land tax, “kalan”, per capita tax, “kupchur”, and tax on merchants, “tamga”” (NEF). True, in epigraphy the word “tamga” has a different meaning, “tribal signs of ownership,” but that’s not the point: if there were three types of taxes, drawn up in the form of lists, then something certainly had to be preserved. - Alas, there is none of this. It is not even clear in what font all this was written. But if there are no such special marks, then it turns out that all these lists were written in Russian script, that is, in Cyrillic. – When I tried to find articles on the Internet on the topic “Artifacts of the Tatar-Mongol Yoke,” I came across a judgment that I reproduce below.

Why are the chronicles silent?

“During the time of the mythical “Tatar-Mongol yoke,” according to official history, decline came to Rus'. This, in their opinion, is confirmed by the almost complete lack of evidence about that period. Once, while talking with a history buff of my native land, I heard him mention the decline that reigned in this area during the time of the “Tatar-Mongol yoke.” As evidence, he recalled that a monastery once stood in these places. First, it should be said about the area: a river valley with hills in the immediate vicinity, there are springs - an ideal place for a settlement. And so it was. However, the chronicles of this monastery mention the nearest settlement only a few tens of kilometers away. Although you can read between the lines that people lived closer, only “wild ones”. Arguing on this topic, we came to the conclusion that, due to ideological motives, the monks mentioned only Christian settlements, or during the next rewriting of history, all information about non-Christian settlements was erased.

No, no, yes, sometimes historians excavate settlements that flourished during the “Tatar-Mongol yoke.” What forced them to admit that, in general, the Tatar-Mongols were quite tolerant of the conquered peoples... “However, the lack of reliable sources about general prosperity in Kievan Rus does not give reason to doubt the official history.

In fact, apart from the sources of the Orthodox Church, we have no reliable data about the occupation by the Tatar-Mongols. In addition, quite interesting is the fact of the rapid occupation of not only the steppe regions of Rus' (from the point of view of official history, the Tatar-Mongols are steppe dwellers), but also forested and even swampy territories. Of course, the history of military operations knows examples of the rapid conquest of the swampy forests of Belarus. However, the Nazis bypassed the swamps. But what about the Soviet army, which carried out a brilliant offensive operation in the swampy part of Belarus? This is true, however, the population in Belarus was needed to create a springboard for subsequent offensives. They simply chose to attack in the least expected (and therefore protected) area. But most importantly, the Soviet army relied on local partisans who thoroughly knew the terrain even better than the Nazis. But the mythical Tatar-Mongols, who did the unthinkable, immediately conquered the swamps - refused further attacks” (SPO). – Here the unknown researcher notes two curious facts: the monastery chronicle already considers as a populated area only the one where the parishioners lived, as well as the brilliant orientation of the steppe inhabitants among the swamps, which should not be characteristic of them. And the same author also notes the coincidence of the territory occupied by the Tatar-Mongols with the territory of Kievan Rus. Thus, he shows that in reality we are dealing with a territory that has undergone Christianization, regardless of whether it was in the steppe, in forests or in swamps. – But let’s return to Kungurov’s texts.

Religion of the Mongols.

“What was the official religion of the Mongols? - Choose any one you like. Allegedly, Buddhist shrines were discovered in the Karakorum “palace” of the Great Khan Ogedei (the heir of Genghis Khan). In the capital of the Golden Horde, Sarai-Batu, mostly Orthodox crosses and breastplates are found. Islam established itself in the Central Asian possessions of the Mongol conquerors, and Zoroastrianism continued to flourish in the South Caspian Sea. The Jewish Khazars also felt free in the Mongol Empire. A variety of shamanistic beliefs have been preserved in Siberia. Russian historians traditionally tell stories that the Mongols were idolaters. They say that they gave the Russian princes a “axe in the head” if they, coming for a label for the right to reign in their lands, did not worship their filthy pagan idols. In short, the Mongols did not have any state religion. All empires had one, but the Mongolian one did not. Anyone could pray to whomever they wanted” (KUN:176). – Let us note that there was no religious tolerance either before or after the Mongol invasion. Ancient Prussia with the Baltic people of the Prussians (relatives in language to the Lithuanians and Latvians) who inhabited it was wiped off the face of the earth by the German knightly orders only because they were pagans. And in Rus', not only the Vedists (Old Believers), but also the early Christians (Old Believers) began to be persecuted after Nikon’s reform as enemies. Therefore, such a combination of words as “evil Tatars” and “tolerance” is impossible, it is illogical. The division of the greatest empire into separate regions, each with its own religion, probably indicates the independent existence of these regions, united into a giant empire only in the mythology of historians. As for the finds of Orthodox crosses and breastplates in the European part of the empire, this suggests that the “Tatar-Mongols” implanted Christianity and eradicated paganism (Vedism), that is, forced Christianization took place.

Cash.

“By the way, if Karakorum was the Mongol capital, then there must have been a mint there. It is believed that the currency of the Mongol Empire was gold dinars and silver dirhams. For four years, archaeologists dug into the soil at Orkhon (1999-2003), but not like the mint, they didn’t even find a single dirham or dinar, but they dug up a lot of Chinese coins. It was this expedition that discovered traces of a Buddhist shrine under the Ogedei Palace (which turned out to be much smaller than expected). In Germany, a substantial tome “Genghis Khan and His Legacy” was published about the results of the excavations. This is despite the fact that archaeologists did not find any traces of the Mongol ruler. However, this does not matter, everything they found was declared the legacy of Genghis Khan. True, the publishers wisely kept silent about the Buddhist idol and Chinese coins, but filled most of the book with abstract discussions that are of no scientific interest” (KUN: 177). – A legitimate question arises: if the Mongols carried out three types of censuses, and collected tribute from them, then where was it stored? And in what currency? Was everything really translated into Chinese money? What could you buy with them in Europe?

Continuing the topic, Kungurov writes: “In general, IN ALL of Mongolia, only a few dirhams with Arabic inscriptions were found, which completely excludes the idea that this was the center of some kind of empire. “Scientific” historians cannot explain this, and therefore simply do not touch upon this issue. Even if you grab a historian by the lapel of his jacket and ask about it, looking intently into his eyes, he will act like a fool who doesn’t understand what he’s talking about” (KUN: 177). – I’ll interrupt the quotation here, because this is exactly how archaeologists behaved when I made my report at the Tver local history museum, showing that there was an INSCRIPTION on the stone cup donated to the museum by local historians. None of the archaeologists approached the stone and felt the letters cut out there. For to come up and touch the inscription meant for them to sign a long-standing lie about the lack of their own writing among the Slavs in the pre-Cyril era. This was the only thing they could do to protect the honor of the uniform (“I don’t see anything, I don’t hear anything, I won’t tell anyone anything,” as the popular song goes).

“There is no archaeological evidence of the existence of an imperial center in Mongolia, and therefore, as arguments in favor of a completely crazy version, official science can only offer a casuistic interpretation of the works of Rashid ad-Din. True, they quote the latter very selectively. For example, after four years of excavations on the Orkhon, historians prefer not to remember that the latter writes about the circulation of dinars and dirhams in Karakorum. And Guillaume de Rubruk reports that the Mongols knew a lot about Roman money, with which their budget bins were overflowing. Now they also have to keep quiet about this. You should also forget that Plano Carpini mentioned how the ruler of Baghdad paid tribute to the Mongols in Roman gold solidi - bezants. In short, all the ancient witnesses were wrong. Only modern historians know the truth” (KUN:178). – As we see, all the ancient witnesses indicated that the “Mongols” used European money that circulated in Western and Eastern Europe. And they didn’t say anything about the “Mongols” having Chinese money. Again, we are talking about the fact that the “Mongols” were Europeans, at least in economic terms. It would not occur to any cattle breeder to compile lists of landowners that the cattle breeders did not have. And even more so - to create a tax on traders, who in many eastern countries were wandering. In short, all these population censuses, very expensive actions, with the aim of collecting a STABLE TAX (10%) betray not greedy steppe dwellers, but scrupulous European bankers, who, of course, collected pre-calculated taxes in European currency. They had no use for Chinese money.

“Did the Mongols have a financial system, which, as you know, no state can do without? Did not have! Numismatists are not aware of any specific Mongolian money. But any unidentified coins can be declared as such if desired. What was the name of the imperial currency? It wasn't called anything. Where was the imperial mint and treasury located? And nowhere. It seems that historians wrote something about the evil Baskaks - tribute collectors in the Russian uluses of the Golden Horde. But today the ferocity of the Baskaks seems very exaggerated. It seems that they collected tithes (a tenth of the income) in favor of the khan, and recruited every tenth youth into their army. The latter should be considered a great exaggeration. After all, service in those days lasted not a couple of years, but probably a quarter of a century. The population of Rus' in the 13th century is usually estimated at at least 5 million souls. If every year 10 thousand recruits come to the army, then in 10 years it will swell to completely unimaginable sizes” (KUN: 178-179). – If you call up 10 thousand people annually, then in 10 years you will get 100 thousand, and in 25 years – 250 thousand. Was the state of that time able to feed such an army? - “And if you consider that the Mongols recruited not only Russians, but also representatives of all other conquered peoples into service, you will get a million-strong horde that no empire could feed or arm in the Middle Ages” (KUN: 179). - That's it.

“But where the tax went, how the accounting was carried out, who controlled the treasury, scientists cannot really explain anything. Nothing is known about the system of counting, weights and measures used in the empire. It remains a mystery for what purposes the huge Golden Horde budget was spent - the conquerors did not build any palaces, cities, monasteries, or fleets. Although no, other storytellers claim that the Mongols had a fleet. They, they say, even conquered the island of Java, and almost captured Japan. But this is such obvious nonsense that there is no point in discussing it. At least until at least some traces of the existence of steppe herder-seafarers on the earth are found” (KUN: 179). – As Alexei Kungurov considers various aspects of the activities of the Mongols, the impression arises that the Khalkha people, appointed by historians to the role of world conqueror, were minimally suitable for fulfilling this mission. How did the West make such a mistake? - The answer is simple. All of Siberia and Central Asia on European maps of that time was called Tartaria (as I showed in one of my articles, it was there that the Underworld, Tartarus, was moved). Accordingly, the mythical “Tatars” settled there. Their eastern wing extended to the Khalkha people, about whom at that time few historians knew anything, and therefore anything could be attributed to them. Of course, Western historians did not foresee that in a couple of centuries communications would develop so much that through the Internet it would be possible to receive any of the latest information from archaeologists, which, after analytical processing, would be able to refute any Western myths.

The ruling layer of the Mongols.

“What was the ruling class like in the Mongol Empire? Any state has its own military, political, economic, cultural and scientific elite. The ruling layer in the Middle Ages is called the aristocracy; today's ruling class is usually called the vague term “elite”. One way or another, there must be a government leadership, otherwise there is no state. And the Mongol occupiers had tensions with the elite. They conquered Rus' and left the Rurik dynasty to rule it. They themselves, they say, went to the steppe. There are no similar examples in history. That is, there was no state-forming aristocracy in the Mongol Empire” (KUN: 179). – The last one is extremely surprising. Let's take, for example, the previous huge empire - the Arab Caliphate. There were not only religions, Islam, but also secular literature. For example, tales of a thousand and one nights. There was a monetary system, and Arab money was long considered the most popular currency. Where are the legends about the Mongol khans, where are the Mongolian tales about the conquests of distant Western countries?

Mongolian infrastructure.

“Even today, any state cannot exist if it does not have transport and information connectivity. In the Middle Ages, the lack of convenient means of communication absolutely excluded the possibility of the functioning of the state. Therefore, the core of the state developed along river, sea, and, much less often, land communications. And the greatest Mongol Empire in the history of mankind did not have any means of communication between its parts and the center, which, by the way, did not exist either. More precisely, it seemed to exist, but only in the form of a camp where Genghis Khan left his family during campaigns” (KUN: 179-180). In this case, the question arises, how did state negotiations take place in the first place? Where did the ambassadors of sovereign states live? Is it really at military headquarters? And how was it possible to keep up with the constant transfers of these rates during combat operations? Where was the state chancellery, archives, translators, scribes, heralds, treasury, room for looted valuables? Did you also move with the Khan’s headquarters? – It’s hard to believe. – And now Kungurov comes to the conclusion.

Did the Mongol Empire exist?

“Here it is natural to ask the question: did this legendary Mongol Empire even exist? Was! - historians will shout in unison and, as evidence, will show a stone turtle of the Yuan dynasty in the vicinity of the modern Mongolian village of Karakorum or a shapeless coin of unknown origin. If this seems unconvincing to you, then historians will authoritatively add a couple more clay shards dug up in the Black Sea steppes. This will certainly convince the most inveterate skeptic” (KUN: 180). – Alexey Kungurov’s question has been asking for a long time, and the answer to it is quite natural. No Mongol Empire ever existed! – However, the author of the study is concerned not only about the Mongols, but also about the Tatars, as well as about the attitude of the Mongols to Rus', and therefore he continues his story.

“But we are interested in the great Mongol Empire because... Rus' was allegedly conquered by Batu, the grandson of Genghis Khan and the ruler of the Jochi ulus, better known as the Golden Horde. From the possessions of the Golden Horde to Rus' is still closer than from Mongolia. During the winter, you can get from the Caspian steppes to Kyiv, Moscow and even Vologda. But the same difficulties arise. Firstly, horses need fodder. In the Volga steppes, horses can no longer dig up withered grass from under the snow with their hoofs. The winters there are snowy, and therefore local nomads stocked up hay in their winter huts in order to survive during the most difficult times. In order for an army to move in winter, oats are needed. No oats - no opportunity to go to Rus'. Where did nomads get their oats?

The next problem is roads. From time immemorial, frozen rivers have been used as roads in winter. But a horse must be shod in order to be able to walk on ice. On the steppe it can run unshod all year round, but an unshod horse, and even with a rider, cannot walk on ice, stone deposits or a frozen road. In order to shoe the hundred thousand war horses and baggage mares required for the invasion, more than 400 tons of iron alone is needed! And after 2-3 months you need to shoe the horses again. How many forests do you need to cut down in order to prepare 50 thousand sleighs for a convoy?

But in general, as we found out, even in the event of a successful march to Rus', an army of 10,000 would find itself in an extremely difficult situation. Supply at the expense of the local population is almost impossible; increasing reserves is absolutely unrealistic. We have to conduct grueling assaults on cities, fortresses and monasteries, and suffer irreparable losses, delving deeper into enemy territory. What is the point of this deepening if the occupiers left behind a devastated desert? What is the general purpose of war? Every day the invaders will become weaker, and by spring they must go to the steppes, otherwise the opened rivers will lock the nomads in the forests, where they will die of hunger” (KUN: 180-181). – As we see, the problems of the Mongol Empire are manifested on a smaller scale in the example of the Golden Horde. And then Kungurov considers the later Mongol state - the Golden Horde.

Capitals of the Golden Horde.

“There are two known capitals of the Golden Horde - Sarai-Batu and Sarai-Berke. Even their ruins have not survived to this day. Historians also found the culprit here - Tamerlane, who came from Central Asia and destroyed these most prosperous and populated cities of the East. Today, archaeologists are excavating on the site of the supposedly great capitals of the great Eurasian empire only the remains of adobe huts and the most primitive household utensils. Everything valuable, they say, was plundered by the evil Tamerlane. What is characteristic is that archaeologists do not find the slightest trace of the presence of Mongolian nomads in these places.

However, this does not bother them at all. Since traces of Greeks, Russians, Italians and others were found there, it means the matter is clear: the Mongols brought craftsmen from conquered countries to their capital. Does anyone doubt that the Mongols conquered Italy? Read carefully the works of “scientific” historians - it says that Batu reached the coast of the Adriatic Sea and almost to Vienna. Somewhere there he caught the Italians. And what does it mean that Sarai-Berke is the center of the Sarsk and Podonsk Orthodox diocese? This, according to historians, testifies to the phenomenal religious tolerance of the Mongol conquerors. True, in this case it is not clear why the Golden Horde khans allegedly tortured several Russian princes who did not want to renounce their faith. The Grand Duke of Kiev and Chernigov, Mikhail Vsevolodovich, was even canonized for refusing to worship the sacred fire, and was killed for disobedience” (KUN: 181). Again we see a complete inconsistency in the official version.

What was the Golden Horde?

“The Golden Horde is the same state invented by historians as the Mongol Empire. Accordingly, the Mongol-Tatar “yoke” is also a fiction. The question is who invented it. It is useless to look for mentions of the “yoke” or the mythical Mongols in Russian chronicles. “Evil Tatars” are mentioned in it quite often. The question is, who did the chroniclers mean by this name? Either this is an ethnic group, or a way of life or class (akin to the Cossacks), or this is a collective name for all Turks. Maybe the word “Tatar” means a mounted warrior? There are a great many Tatars known: Kasimov, Crimean, Lithuanian, Bordakovsky (Ryazan), Belgorod, Don, Yenisei, Tula... just listing all kinds of Tatars will take half a page. The chronicles mention service Tatars, baptized Tatars, godless Tatars, sovereign Tatars and Basurman Tatars. That is, this term has an extremely broad interpretation.

The Tatars, as an ethnic group, appeared relatively recently, about three hundred years ago. Therefore, an attempt to apply the term “Tatar-Mongols” to modern Kazan or Crimean Tatars is fraudulent. There were no Kazan Tatars in the 13th century; there were Bulgars, who had their own principality, which historians decided to call Volga Bulgaria. At that time there were no Crimean or Siberian Tatars, but there were Kipchaks, they are Polovtsians, they are Nogais. But if the Mongols conquered, partially exterminating, the Kipchaks and periodically fought with the Bulgars, then where did the Mongol-Tatar symbiosis come from?

No newcomers from the Mongolian steppes were known not only in Rus', but also in Europe. The term “Tatar yoke,” meaning the power of the Golden Horde over Russia, appeared at the turn of the 14th-15th centuries in Poland in propaganda literature. It is believed that it belongs to the pen of the historian and geographer Matthew Miechowski (1457-1523), a professor at the University of Krakow” (KUN: 181-182). – Above, we read news about this both on Wikipedia and in the works of three authors (SVI). His “Treatise on the Two Sarmatias” was considered in the West the first detailed geographical and ethnographic description of Eastern Europe to the meridian of the Caspian Sea. In the preamble to this work, Miechowski wrote: “The southern regions and coastal peoples up to India were discovered by the king of Portugal. Let the northern regions with the peoples living near the Northern Ocean to the east, discovered by the troops of the Polish king, now become known to the world" (KUN: 182-183). - Very interesting! It turns out that Rus' had to be discovered by someone, although this state existed for several millennia!

“How dashing! This enlightened man equates Russians with African blacks and American Indians, and attributes fantastic merits to the Polish troops. The Poles never reached the coast of the Arctic Ocean, long ago developed by the Russians. Only a century after the death of Mekhovsky during the Time of Troubles, individual Polish detachments scoured the Vologda and Arkhangelsk regions, but these were not the troops of the Polish king, but ordinary gangs of robbers robbing merchants on the northern trade route. Therefore, one should not take seriously his insinuations about the fact that the backward Russians were conquered by completely wild Tatars” (KUN: 183) - It turns out that Mekhovsky’s writing was a fantasy that the West did not have the opportunity to verify.

“By the way, Tatars are the European collective name for all eastern peoples. Moreover, in the old days it was pronounced as “tartars” from the word “tartar” - the underworld. It is quite possible that the word “Tatars” came into the Russian language from Europe. At least, when European travelers called the inhabitants of the lower Volga Tatars in the 16th century, they did not really understand the meaning of this word, and even more so did not know that for Europeans it meant “savages who escaped from hell.” The association of the word “Tatars” by the Criminal Code with a specific ethnic group began only in the 17th century. The term “Tatars”, as a designation for the Volga-Ural and Siberian settled Turkic-speaking peoples, was finally established only in the twentieth century. The word formation “Mongol-Tatar yoke” was first used in 1817 by the German historian Hermann Kruse, whose book was translated into Russian and published in St. Petersburg in the mid-19th century. In 1860, the head of the Russian spiritual mission in China, Archimandrite Palladius, acquired the manuscript of “The Secret History of the Mongols,” making it public. No one was embarrassed that “The Tale” was written in Chinese. This is even very convenient, because any discrepancies can be explained by erroneous transcription from Mongolian to Chinese. Mo, Yuan is a Chinese transcription of the Chinggisid dynasty. And Shutsu is Kublai Khan. With such a “creative” approach, as you might guess, any Chinese legend can be declared either the history of the Mongols or a chronicle of the Crusades” (KUN: 183-184). – It is not for nothing that Kungurov mentions a clergyman from the Russian Orthodox Church, Archimandrite Palladius, hinting that he was interested in creating a legend about the Tatars based on Chinese chronicles. And it’s not for nothing that he builds a bridge to the Crusades.

The legend of the Tatars and the role of Kyiv in Rus'.

“The beginning of the legend about Kievan Rus was laid by the “Synopsis” published in 1674 - the first educational book on Russian history known to us. This book was reprinted several times (1676, 1680, 1718 and 1810) and was very popular until the middle of the 19th century. Its author is considered to be Innocent Gisel (1600-1683). Born in Prussia, in his youth he came to Kyiv, converted to Orthodoxy and became a monk. Metropolitan Peter Mohyla sent the young monk abroad, from where he returned an educated man. He applied his learning in a tense ideological and political struggle with the Jesuits. He is known as a literary theologian, historiographer and theologian” (KUN: 184). – When we talk about the fact that in the 18th century Miller, Bayer and Schlözer became the “fathers” of Russian historiography, we forget that a century earlier, under the first Romanovs and after Nikon’s reform, a new Romanov historiography under the name “Synopsis”, that is, the summary was also written by a German, so there was already a precedent. It is clear that after the eradication of the Rurikovich dynasty and the persecution of Old Believers and Old Believers, Muscovy needed a new historiography that would whitewash the Romanovs and denigrate the Rurikovichs. And it appeared, although it did not come from Muscovy, but from Little Russia, which since 1654 became part of Muscovy, although it was spiritually adjacent to Lithuania and Poland.

“Gisel should be considered not only a church figure, but also a political figure, for the Orthodox church elite in the Polish-Lithuanian state was an integral part of the political elite. As a protégé of Metropolitan Peter Mogila, he maintained active ties with Moscow on political and financial issues. In 1664 he visited the Russian capital as part of the Little Russian embassy of Cossack elders and clergy. Apparently, his works were appreciated, since in 1656 he received the rank of archimandrite and rector of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, retaining it until his death in 1683.

Of course, Innocent Gisel was an ardent supporter of the annexation of Little Russia to Great Russia, otherwise it is difficult to explain why Tsars Alexei Mikhailovich, Fyodor Alekseevich and ruler Sofya Alekseevna were very favorable to him and repeatedly presented him with valuable gifts. So, it is “Synopsis” that begins to actively popularize the legend of Kievan Rus, the Tatar invasion and the fight against Poland. The main stereotypes of ancient Russian history (the founding of Kyiv by three brothers, the calling of the Varangians, the legend of the baptism of Rus' by Vladimir, etc.) are arranged in an orderly row in the Synopsis and are precisely dated. Perhaps Gisel’s story “On Slavic Freedom or Liberty” may seem somewhat strange to today’s reader. - “The Slavs, in their bravery and courage, strive hard day by day, also fighting against the ancient Greek and Roman Caesars, and always receiving a glorious victory, in all freedom alive; It was also possible for the great King Alexander the Great and his father Philip to bring the power under the rule of this Light. To the same, glorious for the sake of military deeds and labors, Tsar Alexander granted the Slavs a letter on gold parchment, written in Alexandria, approving liberties and land to them, before the Nativity of Christ in the year 310; and Augustus Caesar (in his own Kingdom, the King of glory, Christ the Lord was born) did not dare to wage war with the free and strong Slavs" (KUN: 184-185). – I note that if the legend about the founding of Kiev was very important for Little Russia, which according to it became the political center of all ancient Rus', in light of which the legend about the baptism of Kiev by Vladimir grew to the statement about the baptism of All Rus', and both legends thus carried a powerful the political meaning of promoting Little Russia to first place in the history and religion of Rus', then the quoted passage does not carry such pro-Ukrainian propaganda. Here, apparently, we have an insertion of traditional views on the participation of Russian soldiers in the campaigns of Alexander the Great, for which they received a number of privileges. Here are also examples of interaction between Rus' and the politicians of late antiquity; later, the historiographies of all countries will remove any mention of the existence of Rus' in the specified period. It is also interesting to see that the interests of Little Russia in the 17th century and now are diametrically opposed: then Gisel argued that Little Russia is the Center of Rus', and all the events in it are epoch-making for Great Rus'; now, on the contrary, the “independence” of the Outskirts from Rus', the connection of the Outskirts with Poland are being proven, and the work of the first President of the Outskirts, Kravchuk, was called “The Outskirts is such a power.” Supposedly independent throughout its history. And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Outskirts asks Russians to write “In the Outskirts”, and not “ON the Outskirts”, distorting the Russian language. That is, at the moment the Qiu power is more satisfied with the role of the Polish periphery. This example clearly shows how political interests can change the country’s position by 180 degrees, and not only abandon claims to leadership, but even change the name to a completely dissonant one. Modern Gisel would try to connect the three brothers who founded Kyiv with Germany and the German Ukrainians, who had nothing to do with Little Russia, and the introduction of Christianity in Kyiv with the general Christianization of Europe, which supposedly had nothing to do with Rus'.

“When an archimandrite, favored at court, undertakes to compose history, it is very difficult to consider this work as a model of unbiased scientific research. Rather, it will be a propaganda treatise. And a lie is the most effective method of propaganda if the lie can be introduced into the mass consciousness.

It is “Synopsis”, which was published in 1674, that has the honor of becoming the first Russian MASS print publication. Until the beginning of the 19th century, the book was used as a textbook on Russian history; in total, it went through 25 editions, the last of which was published in 1861 (the 26th edition was already in our century). From the point of view of propaganda, it does not matter how much Giesel’s work corresponded to reality, what is important is how firmly it was rooted in the consciousness of the educated layer. And it took root firmly. Considering that “Synopsis” was actually written by order of the ruling house of the Romanovs and was officially imposed, it could not have been otherwise. Tatishchev, Karamzin, Shcherbatov, Solovyov, Kostomarov, Klyuchevsky and other historians, brought up on the Giselian concept, simply could not (and hardly wanted) to critically comprehend the legend of Kievan Rus” (KUN: 185). – As we see, a kind of “Short Course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)” of the victorious pro-Western Romanov dynasty was the “Synopsis” of the German Gisel, who represented the interests of Little Russia, which had recently become part of Rus', which immediately began to claim the role of leader in the political and religious life of Rus'. So to speak, from rags to riches! It was this peripheral newly acquired part of Rus' that completely suited the Romanovs as a historical leader, as well as the story that this weak state was defeated by equally peripheral steppe inhabitants from the Underworld - Russian Tartaria. The meaning of these legends is obvious - Rus' was allegedly defective from the very beginning!

Other Romanov historians about Kievan Rus and the Tatars.

“The court historians of the 18th century, Gottlieb Siegfried Bayer, August Ludwig Schlözer and Gerard Friedrich Miller, also did not contradict the Synopsis. Tell me, please, how could Bayer be a researcher of Russian antiquities and the author of the concept of Russian history (he gave rise to the Norman theory), when during the 13 years of his stay in Russia he did not even learn the Russian language? The last two were co-authors of the obscenely politicized Norman theory, which proved that Rus' acquired the features of a normal state only under the leadership of true Europeans, the Ruriks. Both of them edited and published Tatishchev’s works, after which it is difficult to say what remained of the original in his works. At least, it is known for sure that the original of Tatishchev’s “Russian History” disappeared without a trace, and Miller, according to the official version, used some “drafts” that are now also unknown to us.

Despite constant conflicts with colleagues, it was Miller who formed the academic framework of official Russian historiography. His most important opponent and ruthless critic was Mikhail Lomonosov. However, Miller managed to take revenge on the great Russian scientist. And how! “Ancient Russian History”, prepared by Lomonosov for publication, was never published through the efforts of his opponents. Moreover, the work was confiscated after the author’s death and disappeared without a trace. And a few years later, only the first volume of his monumental work was printed, prepared for publication, it is believed, by Muller personally. Reading Lomonosov today, it is completely impossible to understand what he argued so fiercely with the German courtiers - his “Ancient Russian History” was in the spirit of the officially approved version of history. There are absolutely no contradictions with Müller on the most controversial issue of Russian antiquity in Lomonosov’s book. Consequently, we are dealing with a forgery” (KUN: 186). - Brilliant conclusion! Although something else remains unclear: the Soviet government was no longer interested in exalting one of the republics of the USSR, namely the Ukrainian, and belittling the Turkic republics, which precisely fell under the understanding of Tartary or Tatars. It would seem that it was time to get rid of the forgery and show the true history of Rus'. Why, in Soviet times, did Soviet historiography adhere to the version pleasing to the Romanovs and the Russian Orthodox Church? – The answer lies on the surface. Because the worse the history of Tsarist Russia was, the better the history of Soviet Russia was. It was then, during the time of the Rurikovichs, that it was possible to call on foreigners to rule a great power, and the country was so weak that it could have been conquered by some Tatar-Mongols. In Soviet times, it seemed that no one was called up from anywhere, and Lenin and Stalin were natives of Russia (although in Soviet times no one would have dared to write that Rothschild helped Trotsky with money and people, Lenin was helped by the German general staff, and Yakov Sverdlov was responsible for communications with European bankers). On the other hand, one of the employees of the Institute of Archeology in the 90s told me that the flower of pre-revolutionary archaeological thought did not remain in Soviet Russia, Soviet-style archaeologists were very much inferior in their professionalism to pre-revolutionary archaeologists, and they tried to destroy pre-revolutionary archaeological archives. “I asked her in connection with archaeologist Veselovsky’s excavations of the Kamennaya Mogila caves in Ukraine, because for some reason all the reports about his expedition were lost. It turned out that they were not lost, but deliberately destroyed. For the Stone Grave is a Paleolithic monument in which there are Russian runic inscriptions. And according to it, a completely different history of Russian culture emerges. But archaeologists are part of the team of historians of the Soviet era. And they created no less politicized historiography than historians in the service of the Romanovs.

“It remains only to state that the edition of Russian history that is still in use today was compiled exclusively by foreign authors, mainly Germans. The works of Russian historians who tried to resist them were destroyed, and falsifications were published under their name. One should not expect that the gravediggers of the national historiographical school spared dangerous primary sources. Lomonosov was horrified when he learned that Schlözer had gained access to all the ancient Russian chronicles that had survived at that time. Where are those chronicles now?

By the way, Schlözer called Lomonosov “a rude ignorant who knew nothing except his chronicles.” It is difficult to say what there is more hatred for in these words - towards the stubborn Russian scientist who considers the Russian people to be the same age as the Romans, or towards the chronicles that confirmed this. But it turns out that the German historian who received the Russian chronicles at his disposal was not guided by them at all. He respected political order above science. Mikhail Vasilyevich, when it came to the hateful little thing, also did not mince words. About Schlözer we have heard the following statement of his: “... what kind of vile dirty tricks would such cattle, allowed to them, do in Russian antiquities” or “He is a lot like some idol priest who, having smoked himself with henbane and dope and spinning fast on one leg, spun his head, gives dubious, dark, incomprehensible and completely wild answers.”

How long will we dance to the tune of the “stoned idol priests”?” (KUN:186-187).

Discussion.

Although on the topic of the mythological nature of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, I read the works of L.N. Gumilyov, and A.T. Fomenko, and Valyansky and Kalyuzhny, but no one wrote so clearly, in detail and conclusively before Alexei Kungurov. And I can congratulate “our regiment” of researchers of non-politicized Russian history for having one more bayonet in it. I note that he is not only well-read, but also capable of a remarkable analysis of all the absurdities of professional historians. It is professional historiography that comes up with bows that shoot 300 meters with the lethal force of a modern rifle bullet; it is precisely this that calmly appoints backward herders who had no statehood as the creators of the largest state in the history of mankind; it is they who suck out huge armies of conquerors that are impossible to feed. , nor move several thousand kilometers. The illiterate Mongols, it turns out, compiled land and capitation lists, that is, they conducted a population census throughout this huge country, and also recorded trade income even from itinerant traders. And the results of this enormous work in the form of reports, lists and analytical reviews disappeared somewhere without a trace. It turned out that there is not a single archaeological confirmation of the existence of both the capital of the Mongols and the capitals of the uluses, as well as the existence of Mongol coins. And even today, Mongolian tugriks are a non-convertible monetary unit.

Of course, the chapter touches on many more problems than the reality of the existence of the Mongol-Tatars. For example, the possibility of masking the real forced Christianization of Rus' by the West due to the Tatar-Mongol invasion. However, this problem requires much more serious argumentation, which is absent in this chapter of Alexei Kungurov’s book. Therefore, I am in no hurry to draw any conclusions in this regard.

Conclusion.

Nowadays, there is only one justification for supporting the myth of the Tatar-Mongol invasion: it not only expressed, but also expresses today the Western point of view on the history of Russia. The West is not interested in the point of view of Russian researchers. It will always be possible to find such “professionals” who, for the sake of self-interest, career or fame in the West, will support a generally accepted myth fabricated by the West.

Golden Horde- one of the saddest pages in Russian history. Some time after the victory in Battle of Kalka, the Mongols began to prepare a new invasion of Russian lands, having studied the tactics and characteristics of the future enemy.

Golden Horde.

The Golden Horde (Ulus Juni) was formed in 1224 as a result of the division Mongol Empire Genghis Khan between his sons to the western and eastern parts. The Golden Horde became the western part of the empire from 1224 to 1266. Under the new khan, Mengu-Timur became virtually (although not formally) independent from the Mongol Empire.

Like many states of that era, in the 15th century it experienced feudal fragmentation and as a result (and there were a lot of enemies offended by the Mongols) by the 16th century it finally ceased to exist.

In the 14th century, Islam became the state religion of the Mongol Empire. It is noteworthy that in the territories under their control the Horde khans (including in Rus') did not particularly impose their religion. The concept of “Golden” became established among the Horde only in the 16th century because of the golden tents of its khans.

Tatar-Mongol yoke.

Tatar-Mongol yoke, as well as Mongol-Tatar yoke, - not entirely true from a historical point of view. Genghis Khan considered the Tatars his main enemies, and destroyed most of them (almost all) tribes, while the rest submitted to the Mongol Empire. The number of Tatars in the Mongol troops was scanty, but due to the fact that the empire occupied all the former lands of the Tatars, Genghis Khan’s troops began to be called Tatar-Mongolian or Mongol-Tatar conquerors. In reality, it was about Mongol yoke.

So, the Mongol, or Horde, yoke is a system of political dependence of Ancient Rus' on the Mongol Empire, and a little later on the Golden Horde as a separate state. The complete elimination of the Mongol yoke occurred only at the beginning of the 15th century, although the actual one was somewhat earlier.

The Mongol invasion began after the death of Genghis Khan Batu Khan(or Khan Batu) in 1237. The main Mongol troops converged on the territories near present-day Voronezh, which had previously been controlled by the Volga Bulgars until they were almost destroyed by the Mongols.

In 1237, the Golden Horde captured Ryazan and destroyed the entire Ryazan principality, including small villages and towns.

In January-March 1238, the same fate befell the Vladimir-Suzdal principality and Pereyaslavl-Zalessky. The last to be taken were Tver and Torzhok. There was a threat of taking the Novgorod principality, but after the capture of Torzhok on March 5, 1238, less than 100 km from Novgorod, the Mongols turned around and returned to the steppes.

Until the end of 38, the Mongols only made periodic raids, and in 1239 they moved to Southern Rus' and took Chernigov on October 18, 1239. Putivl (the scene of “Yaroslavna’s Lament”), Glukhov, Rylsk and other cities in the territory of present-day Sumy, Kharkov and Belgorod regions were destroyed.

This year Ögedey(the next ruler of the Mongol Empire after Genghis Khan) sent additional troops to Batu from Transcaucasia and in the fall of 1240 Batu Khan besieged Kyiv, having previously plundered all the surrounding lands. The Kyiv, Volyn and Galician principalities at that time were ruled by Danila Galitsky, son of Roman Mstislavovich, who at that moment was in Hungary, unsuccessfully trying to conclude an alliance with the Hungarian king. Perhaps later, the Hungarians regretted their refusal to Prince Danil, when Batu's Horde captured all of Poland and Hungary. Kyiv was taken by early December 1240 after several weeks of siege. The Mongols began to control most of Rus', including even those areas (on an economic and political level) that they did not capture.

Kyiv, Vladimir, Suzdal, Tver, Chernigov, Ryazan, Pereyaslavl and many other cities were completely or partially destroyed.

An economic and cultural decline set in in Rus' - this explains the almost complete absence of chronicles of contemporaries, and as a result - a lack of information for today's historians.

For some time, the Mongols were distracted from Rus' due to raids and invasions of Polish, Lithuanian, Hungarian and other European lands.

1243 - After the defeat of Northern Rus' by the Mongol-Tatars and the death of the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich (1188-1238x), Yaroslav Vsevolodovich (1190-1246+) remained the eldest in the family, who became the Grand Duke.
Returning from the western campaign, Batu summons Grand Duke Yaroslav II Vsevolodovich of Vladimir-Suzdal to the Horde and presents him at the Khan's headquarters in Sarai with a label (sign of permission) for the great reign in Rus': “You will be older than all the princes in the Russian language.”
This is how the unilateral act of vassal submission of Rus' to the Golden Horde was carried out and legally formalized.
Rus', according to the label, lost the right to fight and had to regularly pay tribute to the khans twice annually (in spring and autumn). Baskaks (governors) were sent to the Russian principalities - their capitals - to oversee the strict collection of tribute and compliance with its amounts.
1243-1252 - This decade was a time when Horde troops and officials did not bother Rus', receiving timely tribute and expressions of external submission. During this period, the Russian princes assessed the current situation and developed their own line of behavior in relation to the Horde.
Two lines of Russian policy:
1. The line of systematic partisan resistance and continuous “spot” uprisings: (“to run away, not to serve the king”) - led. book Andrey I Yaroslavich, Yaroslav III Yaroslavich and others.
2. Line of complete, unquestioning submission to the Horde (Alexander Nevsky and most other princes). Many appanage princes (Uglitsky, Yaroslavl, and especially Rostov) established relations with the Mongol khans, who left them to “rule and rule.” The princes preferred to recognize the supreme power of the Horde khan and donate part of the feudal rent collected from the dependent population to the conquerors, rather than risk losing their reigns (See “On the arrivals of Russian princes to the Horde”). The Orthodox Church pursued the same policy.
1252 Invasion of the "Nevryuev Army" The first after 1239 in North-Eastern Rus' - Reasons for the invasion: To punish Grand Duke Andrei I Yaroslavich for disobedience and to speed up the full payment of tribute.
Horde forces: Nevryu’s army had a significant number - at least 10 thousand people. and a maximum of 20-25 thousand. This indirectly follows from the title of Nevryuya (prince) and the presence in his army of two wings led by temniks - Yelabuga (Olabuga) and Kotiy, as well as from the fact that Nevryuya’s army was able to disperse throughout the Vladimir-Suzdal principality and "comb" it!
Russian forces: Consisted of regiments of the prince. Andrei (i.e. regular troops) and the squad (volunteer and security detachments) of the Tver governor Zhiroslav, sent by the Tver prince Yaroslav Yaroslavich to help his brother. These forces were an order of magnitude smaller than the Horde in number, i.e. 1.5-2 thousand people.
Progress of the invasion: Having crossed the Klyazma River near Vladimir, Nevryu’s punitive army hastily headed to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, where the prince took refuge. Andrei, and, having overtaken the prince’s army, defeated him completely. The Horde plundered and destroyed the city, and then occupied the entire Vladimir land and, returning to the Horde, “combed” it.
Results of the invasion: The Horde army rounded up and captured tens of thousands of captive peasants (for sale in eastern markets) and hundreds of thousands of heads of livestock and took them to the Horde. Book Andrei and the remnants of his squad fled to the Novgorod Republic, which refused to give him asylum, fearing Horde reprisals. Fearing that one of his “friends” would hand him over to the Horde, Andrei fled to Sweden. Thus, the first attempt to resist the Horde failed. The Russian princes abandoned the line of resistance and leaned toward the line of obedience.
Alexander Nevsky received the label for the great reign.
1255 The first complete census of the population of North-Eastern Rus', carried out by the Horde - was accompanied by spontaneous unrest of the local population, scattered, unorganized, but united by the common demand of the masses: “not to give numbers to the Tatars,” i.e. do not provide them with any data that could form the basis for a fixed payment of tribute.
Other authors indicate other dates for the census (1257-1259)
1257 Attempt to conduct a census in Novgorod - In 1255, a census was not carried out in Novgorod. In 1257, this measure was accompanied by an uprising of the Novgorodians, the expulsion of the Horde “counters” from the city, which led to the complete failure of the attempt to collect tribute.
1259 Embassy of the Murzas Berke and Kasachik to Novgorod - The punitive-control army of the Horde ambassadors - the Murzas Berke and Kasachik - was sent to Novgorod to collect tribute and prevent anti-Horde protests by the population. Novgorod, as always in case of military danger, yielded to force and traditionally paid off, and also gave an obligation to pay tribute annually, without reminders or pressure, “voluntarily” determining its size, without drawing up census documents, in exchange for a guarantee of absence from the city Horde collectors.
1262 Meeting of representatives of Russian cities to discuss measures to resist the Horde - A decision was made to simultaneously expel tribute collectors - representatives of the Horde administration in the cities of Rostov the Great, Vladimir, Suzdal, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, Yaroslavl, where anti-Horde popular protests take place. These riots were suppressed by Horde military detachments at the disposal of the Baskaks. But nevertheless, the khan’s government took into account 20 years of experience in repeating such spontaneous rebellious outbreaks and abandoned the Baskas, from now on transferring the collection of tribute into the hands of the Russian, princely administration.

Since 1263, the Russian princes themselves began to bring tribute to the Horde.
Thus, the formal moment, as in the case of Novgorod, turned out to be decisive. The Russians did not so much resist the fact of paying tribute and its size as they were offended by the foreign composition of the collectors. They were ready to pay more, but to “their” princes and their administration. The Khan's authorities quickly realized the benefits of such a decision for the Horde:
firstly, the absence of your own troubles,
secondly, a guarantee of an end to the uprisings and complete obedience of the Russians.
thirdly, the presence of specific responsible persons (princes), who could always easily, conveniently and even “legally” be brought to justice, punished for failure to pay tribute, and not have to deal with intractable spontaneous popular uprisings of thousands of people.
This is a very early manifestation of a specifically Russian social and individual psychology, for which the visible is important, not the essential, and which is always ready to make actually important, serious, essential concessions in exchange for visible, superficial, external, “toy” and supposedly prestigious ones, will be repeated many times throughout Russian history up to the present time.
The Russian people are easy to persuade, to appease with petty handouts, trifles, but they cannot be irritated. Then he becomes stubborn, intractable and reckless, and sometimes even angry.
But you can literally take it with your bare hands, wrap it around your finger, if you immediately give in to some trifle. The Mongols, like the first Horde khans - Batu and Berke, understood this well.

I cannot agree with V. Pokhlebkin’s unfair and humiliating generalization. You should not consider your ancestors as stupid, gullible savages and judge them from the “height” of 700 past years. There were numerous anti-Horde protests - they were suppressed, presumably, cruelly, not only by the Horde troops, but also by their own princes. But the transfer of the collection of tribute (from which it was simply impossible to free oneself in those conditions) to the Russian princes was not a “petty concession”, but an important, fundamental point. Unlike a number of other countries conquered by the Horde, North-Eastern Rus' retained its political and social system. There was never a permanent Mongol administration on Russian soil; under the painful yoke, Rus' managed to maintain the conditions for its independent development, although not without the influence of the Horde. An example of the opposite kind is the Volga Bulgaria, which, under the Horde, was ultimately unable to preserve not only its own ruling dynasty and name, but also the ethnic continuity of the population.

Later, the khan’s power itself became smaller, lost state wisdom and gradually, through its mistakes, “raised” from Rus' its enemy as insidious and prudent as itself. But in the 60s of the 13th century. this finale was still far away - two whole centuries. In the meantime, the Horde manipulated the Russian princes and, through them, all of Russia, as it wanted. (He who laughs last laughs best - isn't it?)

1272 Second Horde census in Rus' - Under the leadership and supervision of the Russian princes, the Russian local administration, it took place peacefully, calmly, without a hitch. After all, it was carried out by “Russian people”, and the population was calm.
It’s a pity that the census results were not preserved, or maybe I just don’t know?

And the fact that it was carried out according to the Khan’s orders, that the Russian princes delivered its data to the Horde and this data directly served the Horde’s economic and political interests - all this was “behind the scenes” for the people, all this “did not concern” them and did not interest them . The appearance that the census was taking place “without Tatars” was more important than the essence, i.e. the strengthening of the tax oppression that came on its basis, the impoverishment of the population, and its suffering. All this “was not visible,” and therefore, according to Russian ideas, this means that... it did not happen.
Moreover, in just three decades since the enslavement, Russian society had essentially become accustomed to the fact of the Horde yoke, and the fact that it was isolated from direct contact with representatives of the Horde and entrusted these contacts exclusively to the princes completely satisfied it, both ordinary people and nobles.
The proverb “out of sight, out of mind” explains this situation very accurately and correctly. As is clear from the chronicles of that time, the lives of saints and patristic and other religious literature, which was a reflection of the prevailing ideas, Russians of all classes and conditions had no desire to get to know their enslavers better, to get acquainted with “what they breathe,” what they think, how they think as they understand themselves and Rus'. They were seen as “God’s punishment” sent down to the Russian land for sins. If they had not sinned, if they had not angered God, there would not have been such disasters - this is the starting point of all explanations on the part of the authorities and the church of the then “international situation”. It is not difficult to see that this position is not only very, very passive, but that, in addition, it actually removes the blame for the enslavement of Rus' from both the Mongol-Tatars and the Russian princes who allowed such a yoke, and shifts it entirely onto the people who found themselves enslaved and suffered more than anyone else from this.
Based on the thesis of sinfulness, the churchmen called on the Russian people not to resist the invaders, but, on the contrary, to their own repentance and submission to the “Tatars”; they not only did not condemn the Horde power, but also... set it as an example to their flock. This was direct payment on the part of the Orthodox Church for the enormous privileges granted to it by the khans - exemption from taxes and levies, ceremonial receptions of metropolitans in the Horde, the establishment in 1261 of a special Sarai diocese and permission to erect an Orthodox church directly opposite the khan's Headquarters *.

*) After the collapse of the Horde, at the end of the 15th century. the entire staff of the Sarai diocese was retained and transferred to Moscow, to the Krutitsky monastery, and the Sarai bishops received the title of metropolitans of Sarai and Podonsk, and then of Krutitsky and Kolomna, i.e. formally they were equal in rank with the metropolitans of Moscow and All Rus', although they were no longer engaged in any real church-political activities. This historical and decorative post was liquidated only at the end of the 18th century. (1788) [Note. V. Pokhlebkina]

It should be noted that on the threshold of the 21st century. we are going through a similar situation. Modern “princes,” like the princes of Vladimir-Suzdal Rus', are trying to exploit the ignorance and slave psychology of the people and even cultivate it, not without the help of the same church.

At the end of the 70s of the 13th century. The period of temporary calm from Horde unrest in Rus' is ending, explained by ten years of emphasized submission of the Russian princes and the church. The internal needs of the Horde economy, which made constant profits from the trade in slaves (captured during the war) in the eastern (Iranian, Turkish and Arab) markets, require a new influx of funds, and therefore in 1277-1278. The Horde twice makes local raids into the Russian border borders solely to take away the Polyanniks.
It is significant that it is not the central khan’s administration and its military forces that take part in this, but regional, ulus authorities in the peripheral areas of the Horde’s territory, solving their local, local economic problems with these raids, and therefore strictly limiting both place and time (very short, calculated in weeks) of these military actions.

1277 - A raid on the lands of the Galicia-Volyn principality is carried out by detachments from the western Dniester-Dnieper regions of the Horde, which were under the rule of the Temnik Nogai.
1278 - A similar local raid follows from the Volga region to Ryazan, and it is limited only to this principality.

During the next decade - in the 80s and early 90s of the 13th century. - new processes are taking place in Russian-Horde relations.
The Russian princes, having become accustomed to the new situation over the previous 25-30 years and essentially deprived of any control from domestic authorities, begin to settle their petty feudal scores with each other with the help of the Horde military force.
Just like in the 12th century. The Chernigov and Kyiv princes fought with each other, calling the Polovtsians to Rus', and the princes of North-Eastern Rus' fought in the 80s of the 13th century. with each other for power, relying on Horde troops, which they invite to plunder the principalities of their political opponents, i.e., in fact, they coldly call on foreign troops to devastate the areas inhabited by their Russian compatriots.

1281 - The son of Alexander Nevsky, Andrei II Alexandrovich, Prince Gorodetsky, invites the Horde army against his brother led. Dmitry I Alexandrovich and his allies. This army is organized by Khan Tuda-Mengu, who simultaneously gives Andrew II the label for the great reign, even before the outcome of the military clash.
Dmitry I, fleeing from the Khan's troops, fled first to Tver, then to Novgorod, and from there to his possession on Novgorod land - Koporye. But the Novgorodians, declaring themselves loyal to the Horde, do not allow Dmitry to enter his estate and, taking advantage of its location inside the Novgorod lands, force the prince to tear down all its fortifications and ultimately force Dmitry I to flee from Rus' to Sweden, threatening to hand him over to the Tatars.
The Horde army (Kavgadai and Alchegey), under the pretext of persecuting Dmitry I, relying on the permission of Andrew II, passes through and devastates several Russian principalities - Vladimir, Tver, Suzdal, Rostov, Murom, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky and their capitals. The Horde reached Torzhok, practically occupying all of North-Eastern Rus' to the borders of the Novgorod Republic.
The length of the entire territory from Murom to Torzhok (from east to west) was 450 km, and from south to north - 250-280 km, i.e. almost 120 thousand square kilometers that were devastated by military operations. This turns the Russian population of the devastated principalities against Andrew II, and his formal “reign” after the flight of Dmitry I does not bring peace.
Dmitry I returns to Pereyaslavl and prepares for revenge, Andrei II goes to the Horde with a request for help, and his allies - Svyatoslav Yaroslavich Tverskoy, Daniil Alexandrovich Moskovsky and the Novgorodians - go to Dmitry I and make peace with him.
1282 - Andrew II comes from the Horde with Tatar regiments led by Turai-Temir and Ali, reaches Pereyaslavl and again expels Dmitry, who flees this time to the Black Sea, into the possession of Temnik Nogai (who at that time was the de facto ruler of the Golden Horde) , and, playing on the contradictions between Nogai and the Sarai khans, brings the troops given by Nogai to Rus' and forces Andrei II to return the great reign to him.
The price of this “restoration of justice” is very high: Nogai officials are left to collect tribute in Kursk, Lipetsk, Rylsk; Rostov and Murom are again being ruined. The conflict between the two princes (and the allies who joined them) continues throughout the 80s and early 90s.
1285 - Andrew II again travels to the Horde and brings from there a new punitive detachment of the Horde, led by one of the khan’s sons. However, Dmitry I manages to successfully and quickly defeat this detachment.

Thus, the first victory of Russian troops over the regular Horde troops was won in 1285, and not in 1378, on the Vozha River, as is usually believed.
It is not surprising that Andrew II stopped turning to the Horde for help in subsequent years.
The Horde themselves sent small predatory expeditions to Rus' in the late 80s:

1287 - Raid on Vladimir.
1288 - Raid on Ryazan and Murom and Mordovian lands. These two raids (short-term) were of a specific, local nature and were aimed at plundering property and capturing polyanyans. They were provoked by a denunciation or complaint from the Russian princes.
1292 - “Dedeneva’s army” to the Vladimir land Andrei Gorodetsky, together with princes Dmitry Borisovich Rostovsky, Konstantin Borisovich Uglitsky, Mikhail Glebovich Belozersky, Fyodor Yaroslavsky and Bishop Tarasius, went to the Horde to complain about Dmitry I Alexandrovich.
Khan Tokhta, having listened to the complainants, dispatched a significant army under the leadership of his brother Tudan (in Russian chronicles - Deden) to conduct a punitive expedition.
"Dedeneva's army" marched throughout Vladimir Rus', ravaging the capital of Vladimir and 14 other cities: Murom, Suzdal, Gorokhovets, Starodub, Bogolyubov, Yuryev-Polsky, Gorodets, Uglechepol (Uglich), Yaroslavl, Nerekhta, Ksnyatin, Pereyaslavl-Zalessky , Rostov, Dmitrov.
In addition to them, only 7 cities that lay outside the route of movement of Tudan’s detachments remained untouched by the invasion: Kostroma, Tver, Zubtsov, Moscow, Galich Mersky, Unzha, Nizhny Novgorod.
On the approach to Moscow (or near Moscow), Tudan’s army divided into two detachments, one of which headed to Kolomna, i.e. to the south, and the other to the west: to Zvenigorod, Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk.
In Volokolamsk, the Horde army received gifts from the Novgorodians, who hastened to bring and present gifts to the khan’s brother far from their lands. Tudan did not go to Tver, but returned to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, which was made a base where all the looted booty was brought and prisoners were concentrated.
This campaign was a significant pogrom of Rus'. It is possible that Tudan and his army also passed through Klin, Serpukhov, and Zvenigorod, which were not named in the chronicles. Thus, its area of ​​​​operation covered about two dozen cities.
1293 - In winter, a new Horde detachment appeared near Tver under the leadership of Toktemir, who came with punitive purposes at the request of one of the princes to restore order in feudal strife. He had limited goals, and the chronicles do not describe his route and time of stay on Russian territory.
In any case, the entire year of 1293 passed under the sign of another Horde pogrom, the cause of which was exclusively the feudal rivalry of the princes. They were the main reason for the Horde repressions that fell on the Russian people.

1294-1315 Two decades pass without any Horde invasions.
The princes regularly pay tribute, the people, frightened and impoverished from previous robberies, are slowly healing from economic and human losses. Only the accession to the throne of the extremely powerful and active Uzbek Khan opens a new period of pressure on Rus'
The main idea of ​​Uzbek is to achieve complete disunity of the Russian princes and turn them into continuously warring factions. Hence his plan - the transfer of the great reign to the weakest and most unwarlike prince - Moscow (under Khan Uzbek, the Moscow prince was Yuri Danilovich, who challenged the great reign from Mikhail Yaroslavich Tver) and the weakening of the former rulers of the "strong principalities" - Rostov, Vladimir, Tver.
To ensure the collection of tribute, Uzbek Khan practices sending, together with the prince, who received instructions in the Horde, special envoys-ambassadors, accompanied by military detachments numbering several thousand people (sometimes there were up to 5 temniks!). Each prince collects tribute on the territory of a rival principality.
From 1315 to 1327, i.e. over 12 years, Uzbek sent 9 military “embassies”. Their functions were not diplomatic, but military-punitive (police) and partly military-political (pressure on princes).

1315 - “Ambassadors” of Uzbek accompany Grand Duke Mikhail of Tverskoy (see Table of Ambassadors), and their detachments plunder Rostov and Torzhok, near which they defeat detachments of Novgorodians.
1317 - Horde punitive detachments accompany Yuri of Moscow and plunder Kostroma, and then try to rob Tver, but suffer a severe defeat.
1319 - Kostroma and Rostov are robbed again.
1320 - Rostov becomes a victim of robbery for the third time, but Vladimir is mostly destroyed.
1321 - Tribute is extorted from Kashin and the Kashin principality.
1322 - Yaroslavl and the cities of the Nizhny Novgorod principality are subjected to a punitive action to collect tribute.
1327 “Shchelkanov’s Army” - Novgorodians, frightened by the Horde’s activity, “voluntarily” pay a tribute of 2,000 rubles in silver to the Horde.
The famous attack of Chelkan’s (Cholpan’s) detachment on Tver takes place, known in the chronicles as the “Shchelkanov invasion”, or “Shchelkanov’s army”. It causes an unprecedentedly decisive uprising of the townspeople and the destruction of the “ambassador” and his detachment. “Schelkan” himself is burned in the hut.
1328 - A special punitive expedition follows against Tver under the leadership of three ambassadors - Turalyk, Syuga and Fedorok - and with 5 temniks, i.e. an entire army, which the chronicle defines as a “great army.” Along with the 50,000-strong Horde army, Moscow princely detachments also took part in the destruction of Tver.

From 1328 to 1367, “great silence” sets in for 40 years.
It is a direct result of three circumstances:
1. Complete defeat of the Tver principality as a rival of Moscow and thereby eliminating the causes of military-political rivalry in Rus'.
2. Timely collection of tribute by Ivan Kalita, who in the eyes of the khans becomes an exemplary executor of the Horde’s fiscal orders and, in addition, expresses exceptional political obedience to it, and, finally
3. The result of the understanding by the Horde rulers that the Russian population had matured in its determination to fight the enslavers and therefore it was necessary to apply other forms of pressure and consolidation of the dependence of Rus', other than punitive ones.
As for the use of some princes against others, this measure no longer seems universal in the face of possible popular uprisings uncontrolled by the “tame princes.” A turning point is coming in Russian-Horde relations.
Punitive campaigns (invasions) into the central regions of North-Eastern Rus' with the inevitable ruin of its population have since ceased.
At the same time, short-term raids with predatory (but not ruinous) purposes on peripheral areas of Russian territory, raids on local, limited areas continue to take place and are preserved as the most favorite and safest for the Horde, one-sided short-term military-economic action.

A new phenomenon in the period from 1360 to 1375 were retaliatory raids, or more precisely, campaigns of Russian armed detachments in peripheral lands dependent on the Horde, bordering with Russia - mainly in the Bulgars.

1347 - A raid is made on the city of Aleksin, a border town on the Moscow-Horde border along the Oka
1360 - The first raid is made by Novgorod ushkuiniki on the city of Zhukotin.
1365 - The Horde prince Tagai raids the Ryazan principality.
1367 - The troops of Prince Temir-Bulat invade the Nizhny Novgorod principality with a raid, especially intensively in the border strip along the Piana River.
1370 - A new Horde raid follows on the Ryazan principality in the area of ​​the Moscow-Ryazan border. But the Horde troops stationed there were not allowed to cross the Oka River by Prince Dmitry IV Ivanovich. And the Horde, in turn, noticing the resistance, did not strive to overcome it and limited themselves to reconnaissance.
The raid-invasion is carried out by Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich of Nizhny Novgorod on the lands of the “parallel” khan of Bulgaria - Bulat-Temir;
1374 Anti-Horde uprising in Novgorod - The reason was the arrival of Horde ambassadors, accompanied by a large armed retinue of 1000 people. This is common at the beginning of the 14th century. the escort was, however, regarded in the last quarter of the same century as a dangerous threat and provoked an armed attack by the Novgorodians on the “embassy”, during which both the “ambassadors” and their guards were completely destroyed.
A new raid by the Ushkuiniks, who rob not only the city of Bulgar, but are not afraid to penetrate to Astrakhan.
1375 - Horde raid on the city of Kashin, brief and local.
1376 2nd campaign against the Bulgars - The combined Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod army prepared and carried out the 2nd campaign against the Bulgars, and took an indemnity of 5,000 silver rubles from the city. This attack, unheard of in 130 years of Russian-Horde relations, by Russians on a territory dependent on the Horde, naturally provokes a retaliatory military action.
1377 Massacre on the Pyana River - On the border Russian-Horde territory, on the Pyana River, where the Nizhny Novgorod princes were preparing a new raid on the Mordovian lands that lay beyond the river, dependent on the Horde, they were attacked by a detachment of Prince Arapsha (Arab Shah, Khan of the Blue Horde ) and suffered a crushing defeat.
On August 2, 1377, the united militia of the princes of Suzdal, Pereyaslavl, Yaroslavl, Yuryevsky, Murom and Nizhny Novgorod was completely killed, and the “commander-in-chief” Prince Ivan Dmitrievich of Nizhny Novgorod drowned in the river, trying to escape, along with his personal squad and his “headquarters” . This defeat of the Russian army was explained to a large extent by their loss of vigilance due to many days of drunkenness.
Having destroyed the Russian army, the troops of Tsarevich Arapsha raided the capitals of the unlucky warrior princes - Nizhny Novgorod, Murom and Ryazan - and subjected them to complete plunder and burning to the ground.
1378 Battle of the Vozha River - In the 13th century. after such a defeat, the Russians usually lost any desire to resist the Horde troops for 10-20 years, but at the end of the 14th century. The situation has completely changed:
already in 1378, the ally of the princes defeated in the battle on the Pyana River, Moscow Grand Duke Dmitry IV Ivanovich, having learned that the Horde troops who had burned Nizhny Novgorod intended to go to Moscow under the command of Murza Begich, decided to meet them on the border of his principality on the Oka and not allow to the capital.
On August 11, 1378, a battle took place on the bank of the right tributary of the Oka, the Vozha River, in the Ryazan principality. Dmitry divided his army into three parts and, at the head of the main regiment, attacked the Horde army from the front, while Prince Daniil Pronsky and Okolnichy Timofey Vasilyevich attacked the Tatars from the flanks, in the girth. The Horde were completely defeated and fled across the Vozha River, losing many killed and carts, which Russian troops captured the next day, rushing to pursue the Tatars.
The Battle of the Vozha River had enormous moral and military significance as a dress rehearsal for the Battle of Kulikovo, which followed two years later.
1380 Battle of Kulikovo - The Battle of Kulikovo was the first serious, specially prepared battle in advance, and not random and improvised, like all previous military clashes between Russian and Horde troops.
1382 Tokhtamysh's invasion of Moscow - The defeat of Mamai's army on the Kulikovo field and his flight to Kafa and death in 1381 allowed the energetic Khan Tokhtamysh to end the power of the Temniks in the Horde and reunite it into a single state, eliminating the "parallel khans" in the regions.
Tokhtamysh identified as his main military-political task the restoration of the military and foreign policy prestige of the Horde and the preparation of a revanchist campaign against Moscow.

Results of Tokhtamysh’s campaign:
Returning to Moscow in early September 1382, Dmitry Donskoy saw the ashes and ordered the immediate restoration of devastated Moscow, at least with temporary wooden buildings, before the onset of frost.
Thus, the military, political and economic achievements of the Battle of Kulikovo were completely eliminated by the Horde two years later:
1. The tribute was not only restored, but actually doubled, because the population decreased, but the size of the tribute remained the same. In addition, the people had to pay the Grand Duke a special emergency tax to replenish the princely treasury taken away by the Horde.
2. Politically, vassalage increased sharply, even formally. In 1384, Dmitry Donskoy was forced for the first time to send his son, the heir to the throne, the future Grand Duke Vasily II Dmitrievich, who was 12 years old, to the Horde as a hostage (According to the generally accepted account, this is Vasily I. V.V. Pokhlebkin, apparently, believes 1 -m Vasily Yaroslavich Kostromsky). Relations with neighbors worsened - the Tver, Suzdal, Ryazan principalities, which were specially supported by the Horde to create a political and military counterbalance to Moscow.

The situation was really difficult; in 1383, Dmitry Donskoy had to “compete” in the Horde for the great reign, to which Mikhail Alexandrovich Tverskoy again made his claims. The reign was left to Dmitry, but his son Vasily was taken hostage into the Horde. The “fierce” ambassador Adash appeared in Vladimir (1383, see “Golden Horde Ambassadors in Rus'”). In 1384, it was necessary to collect a heavy tribute (half a ruble per village) from the entire Russian land, and from Novgorod - Black Forest. The Novgorodians began looting along the Volga and Kama and refused to pay tribute. In 1385, they had to show unprecedented leniency towards the Ryazan prince, who decided to attack Kolomna (annexed to Moscow back in 1300) and defeated the troops of the Moscow prince.

Thus, Rus' was actually thrown back to the situation in 1313, under the Uzbek Khan, i.e. practically, the achievements of the Battle of Kulikovo were completely erased. Both in military-political and economic terms, the Moscow principality was thrown back 75-100 years. The prospects for relations with the Horde, therefore, were extremely gloomy for Moscow and Rus' as a whole. One could have assumed that the Horde yoke would be secured forever (well, nothing lasts forever!), if a new historical accident had not occurred:
The period of the wars of the Horde with the empire of Tamerlane and the complete defeat of the Horde during these two wars, the disruption of all economic, administrative, political life in the Horde, the death of the Horde army, the ruin of both of its capitals - Sarai I and Sarai II, the beginning of a new unrest, the struggle for power of several khans in the period from 1391-1396. - all this led to an unprecedented weakening of the Horde in all areas and made it necessary for the Horde khans to focus on the turn of the 14th century. and XV century exclusively on internal problems, temporarily neglect external ones and, in particular, weaken control over Russia.
It was this unexpected situation that helped the Moscow principality gain significant respite and restore its strength - economic, military and political.

Here, perhaps, we should pause and make a few notes. I do not believe in historical accidents of this magnitude, and there is no need to explain the further relations of Muscovite Rus' with the Horde as an unexpected happy accident. Without going into details, we note that by the early 90s of the 14th century. Moscow somehow solved the economic and political problems that arose. The Moscow-Lithuanian Treaty concluded in 1384 removed the Principality of Tver from the influence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Mikhail Alexandrovich Tverskoy, having lost support both in the Horde and in Lithuania, recognized the primacy of Moscow. In 1385, the son of Dmitry Donskoy, Vasily Dmitrievich, was released from the Horde. In 1386, a reconciliation between Dmitry Donskoy and Oleg Ivanovich Ryazansky took place, which in 1387 was sealed by the marriage of their children (Fyodor Olegovich and Sofia Dmitrievna). In the same 1386, Dmitry managed to restore his influence there with a large military demonstration under the Novgorod walls, take the black forest in the volosts and 8,000 rubles in Novgorod. In 1388, Dmitry also faced the discontent of his cousin and comrade-in-arms Vladimir Andreevich, who had to be brought “to his will” by force and forced to recognize the political seniority of his eldest son Vasily. Dmitry managed to make peace with Vladimir two months before his death (1389). In his spiritual will, Dmitry blessed (for the first time) his eldest son Vasily “with his fatherland with his great reign.” And finally, in the summer of 1390, in a solemn atmosphere, the marriage of Vasily and Sophia, the daughter of the Lithuanian prince Vitovt, took place. In Eastern Europe, Vasily I Dmitrievich and Cyprian, who became metropolitan on October 1, 1389, are trying to prevent the strengthening of the Lithuanian-Polish dynastic union and replace the Polish-Catholic colonization of Lithuanian and Russian lands with the consolidation of Russian forces around Moscow. An alliance with Vytautas, who was against the Catholicization of the Russian lands that were part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, was important for Moscow, but could not be durable, since Vytautas, naturally, had his own goals and his own vision of what center the Russians should gather around lands.
A new stage in the history of the Golden Horde coincided with the death of Dmitry. It was then that Tokhtamysh came out of the reconciliation with Tamerlane and began to lay claim to the territories under his control. A confrontation began. Under these conditions, Tokhtamysh, immediately after the death of Dmitry Donskoy, issued a label for the reign of Vladimir to his son, Vasily I, and strengthened it, transferring to him the Nizhny Novgorod principality and a number of cities. In 1395, Tamerlane's troops defeated Tokhtamysh on the Terek River.

At the same time, Tamerlane, having destroyed the power of the Horde, did not carry out his campaign against Rus'. Having reached Yelets without fighting or looting, he unexpectedly turned back and returned to Central Asia. Thus, Tamerlane’s actions at the end of the 14th century. became a historical factor that helped Rus' survive in the fight against the Horde.

1405 - In 1405, based on the situation in the Horde, the Grand Duke of Moscow officially announced for the first time that he refused to pay tribute to the Horde. During 1405-1407 The Horde did not react in any way to this demarche, but then Edigei’s campaign against Moscow followed.
Only 13 years after Tokhtamysh’s campaign (Apparently, there is a typo in the book - 13 years have passed since Tamerlane’s campaign) could the Horde authorities again remember the vassalage of Moscow and gather forces for a new campaign in order to restore the flow of tribute, which had ceased since 1395.
1408 Edigei's campaign against Moscow - December 1, 1408, a huge army of Edigei's temnik approached Moscow along the winter sled road and besieged the Kremlin.
On the Russian side, the situation during Tokhtamysh’s campaign in 1382 was repeated in detail.
1. Grand Duke Vasily II Dmitrievich, hearing about the danger, like his father, fled to Kostroma (supposedly to gather an army).
2. In Moscow, Vladimir Andreevich Brave, Prince Serpukhovsky, a participant in the Battle of Kulikovo, remained as the head of the garrison.
3. The Moscow suburb was burned out again, i.e. all wooden Moscow around the Kremlin, for a mile in all directions.
4. Edigei, approaching Moscow, set up his camp in Kolomenskoye, and sent a notice to the Kremlin that he would stand all winter and starve out the Kremlin without losing a single fighter.
5. The memory of Tokhtamysh’s invasion was still so fresh among Muscovites that it was decided to fulfill any demands of Edigei, so that only he would leave without hostilities.
6. Edigei demanded to collect 3,000 rubles in two weeks. silver, which was done. In addition, Edigei's troops, scattered throughout the principality and its cities, began to gather Polonyanniks for capture (several tens of thousands of people). Some cities were severely devastated, for example Mozhaisk was completely burned.
7. On December 20, 1408, having received everything that was required, Edigei’s army left Moscow without being attacked or pursued by Russian forces.
8. The damage caused by Edigei’s campaign was less than the damage caused by Tokhtamysh’s invasion, but it also fell heavily on the shoulders of the population
The restoration of Moscow's tributary dependence on the Horde lasted from then on for almost another 60 years (until 1474)
1412 - Payment of tribute to the Horde became regular. To ensure this regularity, the Horde forces from time to time made frighteningly reminiscent raids on Rus'.
1415 - Ruin of the Yelets (border, buffer) land by the Horde.
1427 - Raid of Horde troops on Ryazan.
1428 - Raid of the Horde army on the Kostroma lands - Galich Mersky, destruction and robbery of Kostroma, Ples and Lukh.
1437 - Battle of Belevskaya Campaign of Ulu-Muhammad to the Trans-Oka lands. The Battle of Belev on December 5, 1437 (the defeat of the Moscow army) due to the reluctance of the Yuryevich brothers - Shemyaka and Krasny - to allow the army of Ulu-Muhammad to settle in Belev and make peace. Due to the betrayal of the Lithuanian governor of Mtsensk, Grigory Protasyev, who went over to the side of the Tatars, Ulu-Mukhammed won the Battle of Belev, after which he went east to Kazan, where he founded the Kazan Khanate.

Actually, from this moment begins the long struggle of the Russian state with the Kazan Khanate, which Rus' had to wage in parallel with the heir of the Golden Horde - the Great Horde and which only Ivan IV the Terrible managed to complete. The first campaign of the Kazan Tatars against Moscow took place already in 1439. Moscow was burned, but the Kremlin was not taken. The second campaign of the Kazan people (1444-1445) led to the catastrophic defeat of the Russian troops, the capture of the Moscow prince Vasily II the Dark, a humiliating peace and the eventual blinding of Vasily II. Further, the raids of the Kazan Tatars on Rus' and the retaliatory Russian actions (1461, 1467-1469, 1478) are not indicated in the table, but they should be kept in mind (See "Kazan Khanate");
1451 - Campaign of Mahmut, son of Kichi-Muhammad, to Moscow. He burned the settlements, but the Kremlin did not take them.
1462 - Ivan III stopped issuing Russian coins with the name of the Khan of the Horde. Statement by Ivan III on the renunciation of the khan's label for the great reign.
1468 - Khan Akhmat's campaign against Ryazan
1471 - Campaign of the Horde to the Moscow borders in the Trans-Oka region
1472 - The Horde army approached the city of Aleksin, but did not cross the Oka. The Russian army marched to Kolomna. There was no clash between the two forces. Both sides feared that the outcome of the battle would not be in their favor. Caution in conflicts with the Horde is a characteristic feature of the policy of Ivan III. He didn't want to take any risks.
1474 - Khan Akhmat again approaches the Zaoksk region, on the border with the Moscow Grand Duchy. Peace, or, more precisely, a truce, is concluded on the terms of the Moscow prince paying an indemnity of 140 thousand altyns in two terms: in the spring - 80 thousand, in the fall - 60 thousand. Ivan III again avoids a military conflict.
1480 Great Standing on the Ugra River - Akhmat demands that Ivan III pay tribute for 7 years, during which Moscow stopped paying it. Goes on a campaign against Moscow. Ivan III advances with his army to meet the Khan.

We formally end the history of Russian-Horde relations with the year 1481 as the date of death of the last khan of the Horde - Akhmat, who was killed a year after the Great Standing on the Ugra, since the Horde really ceased to exist as a state organism and administration and even as a certain territory to which jurisdiction and real the power of this once unified administration.
Formally and in fact, new Tatar states were formed on the former territory of the Golden Horde, much smaller in size, but manageable and relatively consolidated. Of course, the virtual disappearance of a huge empire could not happen overnight and it could not “evaporate” completely without a trace.
People, peoples, the population of the Horde continued to live their former lives and, feeling that catastrophic changes had occurred, nevertheless did not realize them as a complete collapse, as the absolute disappearance from the face of the earth of their former state.
In fact, the process of the collapse of the Horde, especially at the lower social level, continued for another three to four decades during the first quarter of the 16th century.
But the international consequences of the collapse and disappearance of the Horde, on the contrary, affected themselves quite quickly and quite clearly, distinctly. The liquidation of the gigantic empire, which controlled and influenced events from Siberia to the Balakans and from Egypt to the Middle Urals for two and a half centuries, led to a complete change in the international situation not only in this area, but also radically changed the general international position of the Russian state and its military-political plans and actions in relations with the East as a whole.
Moscow was able to quickly, within one decade, radically restructure the strategy and tactics of its eastern foreign policy.
The statement seems too categorical to me: it should be taken into account that the process of fragmentation of the Golden Horde was not a one-time act, but occurred throughout the entire 15th century. The policy of the Russian state changed accordingly. An example is the relationship between Moscow and the Kazan Khanate, which separated from the Horde in 1438 and tried to pursue the same policy. After two successful campaigns against Moscow (1439, 1444-1445), Kazan began to experience increasingly persistent and powerful pressure from the Russian state, which was formally still in vassal dependence on the Great Horde (in the period under review these were the campaigns of 1461, 1467-1469, 1478). ).
Firstly, an active, offensive line was chosen in relation to both rudiments and completely viable heirs of the Horde. The Russian tsars decided not to let them come to their senses, to finish off the already half-defeated enemy, and not to rest on the laurels of the victors.
Secondly, pitting one Tatar group against another was used as a new tactical technique that gave the most useful military-political effect. Significant Tatar formations began to be included in the Russian armed forces to carry out joint attacks on other Tatar military formations, and primarily on the remnants of the Horde.
So, in 1485, 1487 and 1491. Ivan III sent military detachments to strike the troops of the Great Horde, who were attacking Moscow's ally at that time - the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey.
Particularly significant in military-political terms was the so-called. spring campaign of 1491 to the “Wild Field” along converging directions.

1491 Campaign to the “Wild Field” - 1. The Horde khans Seid-Akhmet and Shig-Akhmet besieged Crimea in May 1491. Ivan III dispatched a huge army of 60 thousand people to help his ally Mengli-Girey. under the leadership of the following military leaders:
a) Prince Peter Nikitich Obolensky;
b) Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Repni-Obolensky;
c) Kasimov prince Satilgan Merdzhulatovich.
2. These independent detachments headed for the Crimea in such a way that they had to approach the rear of the Horde troops from three sides in converging directions in order to squeeze them into pincers, while they would be attacked from the front by the troops of Mengli-Girey.
3. In addition, on June 3 and 8, 1491, the allies were mobilized to attack from the flanks. These were again both Russian and Tatar troops:
a) Kazan Khan Muhammad-Emin and his governors Abash-Ulan and Burash-Seyid;
b) Ivan III's brothers appanage princes Andrei Vasilyevich Bolshoi and Boris Vasilyevich with their troops.

Another new tactical technique introduced in the 90s of the 15th century. Ivan III in his military policy regarding Tatar attacks is a systematic organization of pursuit of Tatar raids invading Russia, which has never been done before.

1492 - The pursuit of the troops of two governors - Fyodor Koltovsky and Goryain Sidorov - and their battle with the Tatars in the area between the Bystraya Sosna and Trudy rivers;
1499 - Pursuit after the Tatars’ raid on Kozelsk, which recaptured from the enemy all the “full” and cattle he had taken away;
1500 (summer) - The army of Khan Shig-Ahmed (Great Horde) of 20 thousand people. stood at the mouth of the Tikhaya Sosna River, but did not dare to go further towards the Moscow border;
1500 (autumn) - A new campaign of an even more numerous army of Shig-Akhmed, but further than the Zaokskaya side, i.e. territory of the north of the Oryol region, it did not dare to go;
1501 - On August 30, the 20,000-strong army of the Great Horde began the devastation of the Kursk land, approaching Rylsk, and by November it reached the Bryansk and Novgorod-Seversk lands. The Tatars captured the city of Novgorod-Seversky, but this army of the Great Horde did not go further to the Moscow lands.

In 1501, a coalition of Lithuania, Livonia and the Great Horde was formed, directed against the union of Moscow, Kazan and Crimea. This campaign was part of the war between Muscovite Rus' and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the Verkhovsky principalities (1500-1503). It is incorrect to talk about the Tatars seizing the Novgorod-Seversky lands, which were part of their ally - the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and were captured by Moscow in 1500. According to the truce of 1503, almost all of these lands went to Moscow.
1502 Liquidation of the Great Horde - The army of the Great Horde remained to winter at the mouth of the Seim River and near Belgorod. Ivan III then agreed with Mengli-Girey that he would send his troops to expel Shig-Akhmed’s troops from this territory. Mengli-Girey fulfilled this request, inflicting a strong blow on the Great Horde in February 1502.
In May 1502, Mengli-Girey defeated the troops of Shig-Akhmed for the second time at the mouth of the Sula River, where they migrated to spring pastures. This battle effectively ended the remnants of the Great Horde.

This is how Ivan III dealt with it at the beginning of the 16th century. with the Tatar states through the hands of the Tatars themselves.
Thus, from the beginning of the 16th century. the last remnants of the Golden Horde disappeared from the historical arena. And the point was not only that this completely removed from the Moscow state any threat of invasion from the East, seriously strengthened its security - the main, significant result was a sharp change in the formal and actual international legal position of the Russian state, which manifested itself in a change in its international -legal relations with the Tatar states - the “successors” of the Golden Horde.
This was precisely the main historical meaning, the main historical significance of the liberation of Russia from Horde dependence.
For the Moscow state, vassal relations ceased, it became a sovereign state, a subject of international relations. This completely changed his position both among the Russian lands and in Europe as a whole.
Until then, for 250 years, the Grand Duke received only unilateral labels from the Horde khans, i.e. permission to own his own fiefdom (principality), or, in other words, the khan’s consent to continue to trust his tenant and vassal, to the fact that he will temporarily not be touched from this post if he fulfills a number of conditions: pay tribute, conduct loyalty to the khan politics, send “gifts,” and participate, if necessary, in the military activities of the Horde.
With the collapse of the Horde and the emergence of new khanates on its ruins - Kazan, Astrakhan, Crimean, Siberian - a completely new situation arose: the institution of vassal submission to Rus' disappeared and ceased. This was expressed in the fact that all relations with the new Tatar states began to occur on a bilateral basis. The conclusion of bilateral treaties on political issues began at the end of wars and at the conclusion of peace. And this was precisely the main and important change.
Outwardly, especially in the first decades, there were no noticeable changes in the relations between Russia and the khanates:
The Moscow princes continued to occasionally pay tribute to the Tatar khans, continued to send them gifts, and the khans of the new Tatar states, in turn, continued to maintain the old forms of relations with the Moscow Grand Duchy, i.e. Sometimes, like the Horde, they organized campaigns against Moscow right up to the walls of the Kremlin, resorted to devastating raids for the meadows, stole cattle and plundered the property of the Grand Duke’s subjects, demanded that he pay indemnity, etc. and so on.
But after the end of hostilities, the parties began to draw legal conclusions - i.e. record their victories and defeats in bilateral documents, conclude peace or truce treaties, sign written obligations. And it was precisely this that significantly changed their true relations, leading to the fact that the entire relationship of forces on both sides actually changed significantly.
That is why it became possible for the Moscow state to purposefully work to change this balance of forces in its favor and ultimately achieve the weakening and liquidation of the new khanates that arose on the ruins of the Golden Horde, not within two and a half centuries, but much faster - in less than 75 years old, in the second half of the 16th century.

"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.
V.V. Pokhlebkina "Tatars and Rus'. 360 years of relations in 1238-1598." (M. "International Relations" 2000).
Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary. 4th edition, M. 1987.

50 famous riddles of the Middle Ages Zgurskaya Maria Pavlovna

So was there a Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus'?

A passing Tatar. Hell will truly consume these.

(Pass.)

From Ivan Maslov’s parody theatrical play “Elder Paphnutius”, 1867.

The traditional version of the Tatar-Mongol invasion of Rus', the “Tatar-Mongol yoke,” and liberation from it is known to the reader from school. As presented by most historians, the events looked something like this. At the beginning of the 13th century, in the steppes of the Far East, the energetic and brave tribal leader Genghis Khan gathered a huge army of nomads, welded together by iron discipline, and rushed to conquer the world - “to the last sea.” Having conquered their closest neighbors, and then China, the mighty Tatar-Mongol horde rolled west. Having traveled about 5 thousand kilometers, the Mongols defeated Khorezm, then Georgia, and in 1223 they reached the southern outskirts of Rus', where they defeated the army of Russian princes in the battle on the Kalka River. In the winter of 1237, the Tatar-Mongols invaded Rus' with all their countless troops, burned and destroyed many Russian cities, and in 1241 they tried to conquer Western Europe, invading Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, reached the shores of the Adriatic Sea, but turned back because that they were afraid to leave Rus' in their rear, devastated, but still dangerous for them. The Tatar-Mongol yoke began.

The great poet A.S. Pushkin left heartfelt lines: “Russia was destined for a high destiny... its vast plains absorbed the power of the Mongols and stopped their invasion at the very edge of Europe; The barbarians did not dare to leave enslaved Russia in their rear and returned to the steppes of their East. The resulting enlightenment was saved by a torn and dying Russia...”

The huge Mongol power, stretching from China to the Volga, hung like an ominous shadow over Russia. The Mongol khans gave the Russian princes labels to reign, attacked Rus' many times to plunder and plunder, and repeatedly killed Russian princes in their Golden Horde.

Having strengthened over time, Rus' began to resist. In 1380, the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Donskoy defeated the Horde Khan Mamai, and a century later in the so-called “stand on the Ugra” the troops of the Grand Duke Ivan III and the Horde Khan Akhmat met. The opponents camped for a long time on opposite sides of the Ugra River, after which Khan Akhmat, finally realizing that the Russians had become strong and he had little chance of winning the battle, gave the order to retreat and led his horde to the Volga. These events are considered the “end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke.”

But in recent decades this classic version has been called into question. Geographer, ethnographer and historian Lev Gumilev convincingly showed that relations between Russia and the Mongols were much more complex than the usual confrontation between cruel conquerors and their unfortunate victims. Deep knowledge in the field of history and ethnography allowed the scientist to conclude that there was a certain “complementarity” between the Mongols and Russians, that is, compatibility, the ability for symbiosis and mutual support at the cultural and ethnic level. The writer and publicist Alexander Bushkov went even further, “twisting” Gumilyov’s theory to its logical conclusion and expressing a completely original version: what is commonly called the Tatar-Mongol invasion was in fact a struggle of the descendants of Prince Vsevolod the Big Nest (son of Yaroslav and grandson of Alexander Nevsky ) with their rival princes for sole power over Russia. Khans Mamai and Akhmat were not alien raiders, but noble nobles who, according to the dynastic ties of the Russian-Tatar families, had legally valid rights to the great reign. Thus, the Battle of Kulikovo and the “stand on the Ugra” are not episodes of the struggle against foreign aggressors, but pages of the civil war in Rus'. Moreover, this author promulgated a completely “revolutionary” idea: under the names “Genghis Khan” and “Batu” the Russian princes Yaroslav and Alexander Nevsky appear in history, and Dmitry Donskoy is Khan Mamai himself (!).

Of course, the publicist’s conclusions are full of irony and border on postmodern “banter,” but it should be noted that many facts of the history of the Tatar-Mongol invasion and “yoke” really look too mysterious and need closer attention and unbiased research. Let's try to look at some of these mysteries.

Let's start with a general note. Western Europe in the 13th century presented a disappointing picture. The Christian world was experiencing a certain depression. The activity of Europeans shifted to the borders of their range. German feudal lords began to seize the border Slavic lands and turn their population into powerless serfs. The Western Slavs who lived along the Elbe resisted German pressure with all their might, but the forces were unequal.

Who were the Mongols who approached the borders of the Christian world from the east? How did the powerful Mongol state appear? Let's take an excursion into its history.

At the beginning of the 13th century, in 1202–1203, the Mongols defeated first the Merkits and then the Keraits. The fact is that the Keraits were divided into supporters of Genghis Khan and his opponents. The opponents of Genghis Khan were led by the son of Van Khan, the legal heir to the throne - Nilha. He had reasons to hate Genghis Khan: even at the time when Van Khan was an ally of Genghis, he (the leader of the Keraits), seeing the undeniable talents of the latter, wanted to transfer the Kerait throne to him, bypassing his own son. Thus, the clash between some of the Keraits and the Mongols occurred during Wang Khan’s lifetime. And although the Keraits had a numerical superiority, the Mongols defeated them, as they showed exceptional mobility and took the enemy by surprise.

In the clash with the Keraits, the character of Genghis Khan was fully revealed. When Wang Khan and his son Nilha fled from the battlefield, one of their noyons (military leaders) with a small detachment detained the Mongols, saving their leaders from captivity. This noyon was seized, brought before the eyes of Genghis, and he asked: “Why, noyon, seeing the position of your troops, did not you leave? You had both time and opportunity.” He replied: “I served my khan and gave him the opportunity to escape, and my head is for you, O conqueror.” Genghis Khan said: “Everyone must imitate this man.

Look how brave, faithful, valiant he is. I can’t kill you, noyon, I’m offering you a place in my army.” Noyon became a thousand-man and, of course, served Genghis Khan faithfully, because the Kerait horde disintegrated. Van Khan himself died while trying to escape to the Naiman. Their guards at the border, seeing Kerait, killed him, and presented the old man’s severed head to their khan.

In 1204, there was a clash between the Mongols of Genghis Khan and the powerful Naiman Khanate. And again the Mongols won. The vanquished were included in the horde of Genghis. In the eastern steppe there were no longer any tribes capable of actively resisting the new order, and in 1206, at the great kurultai, Chinggis was again elected khan, but of all Mongolia. This is how the pan-Mongolian state was born. The only tribe hostile to him remained the ancient enemies of the Borjigins - the Merkits, but by 1208 they were forced out into the valley of the Irgiz River.

The growing power of Genghis Khan allowed his horde to assimilate different tribes and peoples quite easily. Because, in accordance with Mongolian stereotypes of behavior, the khan could and should have demanded humility, obedience to orders, and fulfillment of duties, but forcing a person to renounce his faith or customs was considered immoral - the individual had the right to his own choice. This state of affairs was attractive to many. In 1209, the Uighur state sent envoys to Genghis Khan with a request to accept them into his ulus. The request was naturally granted, and Genghis Khan gave the Uyghurs enormous trading privileges. A caravan route passed through Uyghuria, and the Uyghurs, once part of the Mongol state, became rich by selling water, fruit, meat and “pleasures” to hungry caravan riders at high prices. The voluntary union of Uighuria with Mongolia turned out to be useful for the Mongols. With the annexation of Uyghuria, the Mongols went beyond the boundaries of their ethnic area and came into contact with other peoples of the ecumene.

In 1216, on the Irgiz River, the Mongols were attacked by the Khorezmians. Khorezm by that time was the most powerful of the states that arose after the weakening of the power of the Seljuk Turks. The rulers of Khorezm turned from governors of the ruler of Urgench into independent sovereigns and adopted the title of “Khorezmshahs”. They turned out to be energetic, enterprising and militant. This allowed them to conquer most of Central Asia and southern Afghanistan. The Khorezmshahs created a huge state in which the main military force were Turks from the adjacent steppes.

But the state turned out to be fragile, despite the wealth, brave warriors and experienced diplomats. The regime of the military dictatorship relied on tribes alien to the local population, who had a different language, different morals and customs. The cruelty of the mercenaries caused discontent among the residents of Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv and other Central Asian cities. The uprising in Samarkand led to the destruction of the Turkic garrison. Naturally, this was followed by a punitive operation of the Khorezmians, who brutally dealt with the population of Samarkand. Other large and wealthy cities in Central Asia were also affected.

In this situation, Khorezmshah Muhammad decided to confirm his title of “ghazi” - “victor of the infidels” - and become famous for another victory over them. The opportunity presented itself to him in the same year 1216, when the Mongols, fighting with the Merkits, reached Irgiz. Having learned about the arrival of the Mongols, Muhammad sent an army against them on the grounds that the steppe inhabitants needed to be converted to Islam.

The Khorezmian army attacked the Mongols, but in a rearguard battle they themselves went on the offensive and severely battered the Khorezmians. Only the attack of the left wing, commanded by the son of the Khorezmshah, the talented commander Jalal ad-Din, straightened the situation. After this, the Khorezmians retreated, and the Mongols returned home: they did not intend to fight with Khorezm; on the contrary, Genghis Khan wanted to establish ties with the Khorezmshah. After all, the Great Caravan Route went through Central Asia and all the owners of the lands along which it ran grew rich due to the duties paid by merchants. Merchants willingly paid duties because they passed on their costs to consumers without losing anything. Wanting to preserve all the advantages associated with the existence of caravan routes, the Mongols strove for peace and quiet on their borders. The difference of faith, in their opinion, did not give a reason for war and could not justify bloodshed. Probably, the Khorezmshah himself understood the episodic nature of the clash on Irshza. In 1218, Muhammad sent a trade caravan to Mongolia. Peace was restored, especially since the Mongols had no time for Khorezm: shortly before this, the Naiman prince Kuchluk began a new war with the Mongols.

Once again, Mongol-Khorezm relations were disrupted by the Khorezm Shah himself and his officials. In 1219, a rich caravan from the lands of Genghis Khan approached the Khorezm city of Otrar. The merchants went to the city to replenish food supplies and wash themselves in the bathhouse. There the merchants met two acquaintances, one of whom reported to the ruler of the city that these merchants were spies. He immediately realized that there was an excellent reason to rob travelers. The merchants were killed and their property was confiscated. The ruler of Otrar sent half of the loot to Khorezm, and Muhammad accepted the loot, which means he shared responsibility for what he had done.

Genghis Khan sent envoys to find out what caused the incident. Muhammad became angry when he saw the infidels, and ordered some of the ambassadors to be killed, and some, stripped naked, to be driven out to certain death in the steppe. Two or three Mongols finally made it home and told about what had happened. Genghis Khan's anger knew no bounds. From the Mongolian point of view, two of the most terrible crimes occurred: the deception of those who trusted and the murder of guests. According to custom, Genghis Khan could not leave unavenged either the merchants who were killed in Otrar or the ambassadors whom the Khorezmshah insulted and killed. Khan had to fight, otherwise his fellow tribesmen would simply refuse to trust him.

In Central Asia, the Khorezmshah had at his disposal a regular army of four hundred thousand. And the Mongols, as the famous Russian orientalist V.V. Bartold believed, had no more than 200 thousand. Genghis Khan demanded military assistance from all allies. Warriors came from the Turks and Kara-Kitai, the Uighurs sent a detachment of 5 thousand people, only the Tangut ambassador boldly replied: “If you don’t have enough troops, don’t fight.” Genghis Khan considered the answer an insult and said: “Only the dead could I bear such an insult.”

Genghis Khan sent assembled Mongolian, Uighur, Turkic and Kara-Chinese troops to Khorezm. Khorezmshah, having quarreled with his mother Turkan Khatun, did not trust the military leaders related to her. He was afraid to gather them into a fist in order to repel the onslaught of the Mongols, and scattered the army into garrisons. The best commanders of the Shah were his own unloved son Jalal ad-Din and the commandant of the Khojent fortress Timur-Melik. The Mongols took the fortresses one after another, but in Khojent, even after taking the fortress, they were unable to capture the garrison. Timur-Melik put his soldiers on rafts and escaped pursuit along the wide Syr Darya. The scattered garrisons could not hold back the advance of Genghis Khan's troops. Soon all the major cities of the sultanate - Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv, Herat - were captured by the Mongols.

Regarding the capture of Central Asian cities by the Mongols, there is an established version: “Wild nomads destroyed the cultural oases of agricultural peoples.” Is it so? This version, as L.N. Gumilev showed, is based on the legends of court Muslim historians. For example, the fall of Herat was reported by Islamic historians as a disaster in which the entire population of the city was exterminated, except for a few men who managed to escape in the mosque. They hid there, afraid to go out into the streets littered with corpses. Only wild animals roamed the city and tormented the dead. After sitting for some time and coming to their senses, these “heroes” went to distant lands to rob caravans in order to regain their lost wealth.

But is this possible? If the entire population of a large city was exterminated and lay on the streets, then inside the city, in particular in the mosque, the air would be full of corpse miasma, and those hiding there would simply die. No predators, except jackals, live near the city, and they very rarely penetrate into the city. It was simply impossible for exhausted people to move to rob caravans several hundred kilometers from Herat, because they would have to walk, carrying heavy loads - water and provisions. Such a “robber”, having met a caravan, would no longer be able to rob it...

Even more surprising is the information reported by historians about Merv. The Mongols took it in 1219 and also allegedly exterminated all the inhabitants there. But already in 1229 Merv rebelled, and the Mongols had to take the city again. And finally, two years later, Merv sent a detachment of 10 thousand people to fight the Mongols.

We see that the fruits of fantasy and religious hatred gave rise to legends of Mongol atrocities. If you take into account the degree of reliability of sources and ask simple but inevitable questions, it is easy to separate historical truth from literary fiction.

The Mongols occupied Persia almost without fighting, pushing the Khorezmshah's son Jalal ad-Din into northern India. Muhammad II Ghazi himself, broken by the struggle and constant defeats, died in a leper colony on an island in the Caspian Sea (1221). The Mongols made peace with the Shiite population of Iran, which was constantly offended by the Sunnis in power, in particular the Baghdad Caliph and Jalal ad-Din himself. As a result, the Shia population of Persia suffered significantly less than the Sunnis of Central Asia. Be that as it may, in 1221 the state of the Khorezmshahs was ended. Under one ruler - Muhammad II Ghazi - this state achieved both its greatest power and its destruction. As a result, Khorezm, Northern Iran, and Khorasan were annexed to the Mongol Empire.

In 1226, the hour struck for the Tangut state, which, at the decisive moment of the war with Khorezm, refused to help Genghis Khan. The Mongols rightly viewed this move as a betrayal that, according to Yasa, required vengeance. The capital of Tangut was the city of Zhongxing. It was besieged by Genghis Khan in 1227, having defeated the Tangut troops in previous battles.

During the siege of Zhongxing, Genghis Khan died, but the Mongol noyons, by order of their leader, hid his death. The fortress was taken, and the population of the “evil” city, which suffered the collective guilt of betrayal, was executed. The Tangut state disappeared, leaving behind only written evidence of its former culture, but the city survived and lived until 1405, when it was destroyed by the Chinese of the Ming Dynasty.

From the capital of the Tanguts, the Mongols took the body of their great ruler to their native steppes. The funeral ritual was as follows: the remains of Genghis Khan were lowered into a dug grave, along with many valuable things, and all the slaves who performed funeral work were killed. According to custom, exactly one year later it was necessary to celebrate the wake. In order to later find the burial place, the Mongols did the following. At the grave they sacrificed a little camel that had just been taken from its mother. And a year later, the camel herself found in the vast steppe the place where her cub was killed. Having slaughtered this camel, the Mongols performed the required funeral ritual and then left the grave forever. Since then, no one knows where Genghis Khan is buried.

In the last years of his life, he was extremely concerned about the fate of his state. The khan had four sons from his beloved wife Borte and many children from other wives, who, although they were considered legitimate children, had no rights to their father’s throne. The sons from Borte differed in inclinations and character. The eldest son, Jochi, was born shortly after the Merkit captivity of Borte, and therefore not only evil tongues, but also his younger brother Chagatai called him a “Merkit degenerate.” Although Borte invariably defended Jochi, and Genghis Khan himself always recognized him as his son, the shadow of his mother’s Merkit captivity fell on Jochi with the burden of suspicion of illegitimacy. Once, in the presence of his father, Chagatai openly called Jochi illegitimate, and the matter almost ended in a fight between the brothers.

It is curious, but according to the testimony of contemporaries, Jochi’s behavior contained some stable stereotypes that greatly distinguished him from Chinggis. If for Genghis Khan there was no concept of “mercy” in relation to enemies (he left life only for small children adopted by his mother Hoelun, and valiant warriors who went into Mongol service), then Jochi was distinguished by his humanity and kindness. So, during the siege of Gurganj, the Khorezmians, completely exhausted by the war, asked to accept surrender, that is, in other words, to spare them. Jochi spoke out in favor of showing mercy, but Genghis Khan categorically rejected the request for mercy, and as a result, the garrison of Gurganj was partially slaughtered, and the city itself was flooded by the waters of the Amu Darya. The misunderstanding between the father and the eldest son, constantly fueled by the intrigues and slander of relatives, deepened over time and turned into the sovereign's mistrust of his heir. Genghis Khan suspected that Jochi wanted to gain popularity among the conquered peoples and secede from Mongolia. It is unlikely that this was the case, but the fact remains: at the beginning of 1227, Jochi, who was hunting in the steppe, was found dead - his spine was broken. The details of what happened were kept secret, but, without a doubt, Genghis Khan was a person interested in the death of Jochi and was quite capable of ending his son’s life.

In contrast to Jochi, Genghis Khan's second son, Chaga-tai, was a strict, efficient and even cruel man. Therefore, he received the position of "guardian of the Yasa" (something like an attorney general or chief judge). Chagatai strictly observed the law and treated its violators without any mercy.

The third son of the Great Khan, Ogedei, like Jochi, was distinguished by his kindness and tolerance towards people. The character of Ogedei is best illustrated by this incident: one day, on a joint trip, the brothers saw a Muslim washing himself by the water. According to Muslim custom, every believer is obliged to perform prayer and ritual ablution several times a day. Mongolian tradition, on the contrary, forbade a person to wash throughout the summer. The Mongols believed that washing in a river or lake causes a thunderstorm, and a thunderstorm in the steppe is very dangerous for travelers, and therefore “calling a thunderstorm” was considered an attempt on people’s lives. Nuker vigilantes of the ruthless zealot of the law Chagatai captured the Muslim. Anticipating a bloody outcome - the unfortunate man was in danger of having his head cut off - Ogedei sent his man to tell the Muslim to answer that he had dropped a gold piece into the water and was just looking for it there. The Muslim said so to Chagatay. He ordered to look for the coin, and during this time Ogedei’s warrior threw the gold into the water. The found coin was returned to the “rightful owner.” In parting, Ogedei, taking a handful of coins from his pocket, handed them to the rescued person and said: “The next time you drop gold into the water, don’t go after it, don’t break the law.”

The youngest of Genghis' sons, Tului, was born in 1193. Since Genghis Khan was in captivity at that time, this time Borte’s infidelity was quite obvious, but Genghis Khan recognized Tuluya as his legitimate son, although he did not outwardly resemble his father.

Of Genghis Khan's four sons, the youngest had the greatest talents and showed the greatest moral dignity. A good commander and an outstanding administrator, Tuluy was also a loving husband and distinguished by his nobility. He married the daughter of the deceased head of the Keraits, Van Khan, who was a devout Christian. Tuluy himself did not have the right to accept the Christian faith: like Genghisid, he had to profess the Bon religion (paganism). But the khan’s son allowed his wife not only to perform all Christian rituals in a luxurious “church” yurt, but also to have priests with her and receive monks. The death of Tuluy can be called heroic without any exaggeration. When Ogedei fell ill, Tuluy voluntarily took a powerful shamanic potion in an effort to “attract” the disease to himself, and died saving his brother.

All four sons had the right to succeed Genghis Khan. After Jochi was eliminated, there were three heirs left, and when Genghis died and a new khan had not yet been elected, Tului ruled the ulus. But at the kurultai of 1229, the gentle and tolerant Ogedei was chosen as the Great Khan, in accordance with the will of Genghis. Ogedei, as we have already mentioned, had a kind soul, but the kindness of a sovereign is often not to the benefit of the state and his subjects. The management of the ulus under him was carried out mainly thanks to the severity of Chagatai and the diplomatic and administrative skills of Tuluy. The Great Khan himself preferred wanderings with hunts and feasts in Western Mongolia to state concerns.

The grandchildren of Genghis Khan were allocated various areas of the ulus or high positions. Jochi's eldest son, Orda-Ichen, received the White Horde, located between the Irtysh and the Tarbagatai ridge (the area of ​​​​present-day Semipalatinsk). The second son, Batu, began to own the Golden (Great) Horde on the Volga. The third son, Sheibani, received the Blue Horde, which roamed from Tyumen to the Aral Sea. At the same time, the three brothers - the rulers of the uluses - were allocated only one or two thousand Mongol soldiers, while the total number of the Mongol army reached 130 thousand people.

The children of Chagatai also received a thousand soldiers, and the descendants of Tului, being at court, owned the entire grandfather’s and father’s ulus. So the Mongols established a system of inheritance called minorat, in which the youngest son received all the rights of his father as an inheritance, and older brothers received only a share in the common inheritance.

The Great Khan Ogedei also had a son, Guyuk, who claimed the inheritance. The expansion of the clan during the lifetime of Chingis’s children caused the division of the inheritance and enormous difficulties in managing the ulus, which stretched across the territory from the Black to the Yellow Sea. In these difficulties and family scores were hidden the seeds of future strife that destroyed the state created by Genghis Khan and his comrades.

How many Tatar-Mongols came to Rus'? Let's try to sort this issue out.

Russian pre-revolutionary historians mention a “half-million-strong Mongol army.” V. Yang, author of the famous trilogy “Genghis Khan”, “Batu” and “To the Last Sea”, names the number four hundred thousand. However, it is known that a warrior of a nomadic tribe goes on a campaign with three horses (minimum two). One carries luggage (packed rations, horseshoes, spare harness, arrows, armor), and the third needs to be changed from time to time so that one horse can rest if it suddenly has to go into battle.

Simple calculations show that for an army of half a million or four hundred thousand soldiers, at least one and a half million horses are needed. Such a herd is unlikely to be able to effectively move a long distance, since the leading horses will instantly destroy the grass over a vast area, and the rear ones will die from lack of food.

All the main invasions of the Tatar-Mongols into Rus' took place in winter, when the remaining grass was hidden under the snow, and you couldn’t take much fodder with you... The Mongolian horse really knows how to get food from under the snow, but ancient sources do not mention the horses of the Mongolian breed that existed “in service” with the horde. Horse breeding experts prove that the Tatar-Mongol horde rode Turkmens, and this is a completely different breed, looks different, and is not capable of feeding itself in the winter without human help...

In addition, the difference between a horse allowed to wander in winter without any work and a horse forced to make long journeys under a rider and also participate in battles is not taken into account. But in addition to the horsemen, they also had to carry heavy booty! The convoys followed the troops. The cattle that pull the carts also need to be fed... The picture of a huge mass of people moving in the rearguard of an army of half a million with convoys, wives and children seems quite fantastic.

The temptation for a historian to explain the Mongol campaigns of the 13th century by “migrations” is great. But modern researchers show that the Mongol campaigns were not directly related to the movements of huge masses of the population. Victories were won not by hordes of nomads, but by small, well-organized mobile detachments returning to their native steppes after campaigns. And the khans of the Jochi branch - Batu, Horde and Sheybani - received, according to the will of Genghis, only 4 thousand horsemen, i.e. about 12 thousand people settled in the territory from the Carpathians to Altai.

In the end, historians settled on thirty thousand warriors. But here, too, unanswered questions arise. And the first among them will be this: isn’t it enough? Despite the disunity of the Russian principalities, thirty thousand cavalry is too small a figure to cause “fire and ruin” throughout Rus'! After all, they (even supporters of the “classical” version admit this) did not move in a compact mass. Several detachments scattered in different directions, and this reduces the number of “innumerable Tatar hordes” to the limit beyond which elementary mistrust begins: could such a number of aggressors conquer Rus'?

It turns out to be a vicious circle: a huge Tatar-Mongol army, for purely physical reasons, would hardly be able to maintain combat capability in order to move quickly and deliver the notorious “indestructible blows.” A small army would hardly have been able to establish control over most of the territory of Rus'. To get out of this vicious circle, we have to admit: the Tatar-Mongol invasion was in fact only an episode of the bloody civil war that was going on in Rus'. The enemy forces were relatively small; they relied on their own forage reserves accumulated in the cities. And the Tatar-Mongols became an additional external factor, used in the internal struggle in the same way as the troops of the Pechenegs and Polovtsians had previously been used.

The chronicle information that has reached us about the military campaigns of 1237–1238 depicts the classically Russian style of these battles - the battles take place in winter, and the Mongols - the steppe inhabitants - act with amazing skill in the forests (for example, the encirclement and subsequent complete destruction on the City River of a Russian detachment under the command of the great Prince of Vladimir Yuri Vsevolodovich).

Having taken a general look at the history of the creation of the huge Mongol power, we must return to Rus'. Let us take a closer look at the situation with the Battle of the Kalka River, which is not fully understood by historians.

It was not the steppe people who represented the main danger to Kievan Rus at the turn of the 11th–12th centuries. Our ancestors were friends with the Polovtsian khans, married “red Polovtsian girls”, accepted baptized Polovtsians into their midst, and the descendants of the latter became Zaporozhye and Sloboda Cossacks, it is not for nothing that in their nicknames the traditional Slavic suffix of affiliation “ov” (Ivanov) was replaced by the Turkic one - “ enko" (Ivanenko).

At this time, a more formidable phenomenon emerged - a decline in morals, a rejection of traditional Russian ethics and morality. In 1097, a princely congress took place in Lyubech, marking the beginning of a new political form of existence of the country. There it was decided that “let everyone keep his fatherland.” Rus' began to turn into a confederation of independent states. The princes swore to inviolably observe what was proclaimed and kissed the cross in this. But after the death of Mstislav, the Kiev state began to quickly disintegrate. Polotsk was the first to settle down. Then the Novgorod “republic” stopped sending money to Kyiv.

A striking example of the loss of moral values ​​and patriotic feelings was the act of Prince Andrei Bogolyubsky. In 1169, having captured Kyiv, Andrei gave the city to his warriors for three days of plunder. Until that moment, in Rus' it was customary to do this only with foreign cities. During any civil strife, such a practice was never extended to Russian cities.

Igor Svyatoslavich, a descendant of Prince Oleg, the hero of “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign,” who became the Prince of Chernigov in 1198, set himself the goal of dealing with Kiev, a city where the rivals of his dynasty were constantly strengthening. He agreed with the Smolensk prince Rurik Rostislavich and called on the Polovtsians for help. Prince Roman Volynsky spoke in defense of Kyiv, the “mother of Russian cities,” relying on the Torcan troops allied to him.

The plan of the Chernigov prince was implemented after his death (1202). Rurik, Prince of Smolensk, and the Olgovichi with the Polovtsy in January 1203, in a battle that was fought mainly between the Polovtsy and the Torks of Roman Volynsky, gained the upper hand. Having captured Kyiv, Rurik Rostislavich subjected the city to a terrible defeat. The Tithe Church and the Kiev Pechersk Lavra were destroyed, and the city itself was burned. “They have created a great evil that has not existed since baptism in the Russian land,” the chronicler left a message.

After the fateful year of 1203, Kyiv never recovered.

According to L.N. Gumilyov, by this time the ancient Russians had lost their passionarity, that is, their cultural and energetic “charge”. In such conditions, a clash with a strong enemy could not but become tragic for the country.

Meanwhile, the Mongol regiments were approaching the Russian borders. At that time, the main enemy of the Mongols in the west was the Cumans. Their enmity began in 1216, when the Cumans accepted the blood enemies of Genghis - the Merkits. The Polovtsians actively pursued their anti-Mongol policy, constantly supporting the Finno-Ugric tribes hostile to the Mongols. At the same time, the Cumans of the steppe were as mobile as the Mongols themselves. Seeing the futility of cavalry clashes with the Cumans, the Mongols sent an expeditionary force behind enemy lines.

Talented commanders Subetei and Jebe led a corps of three tumens across the Caucasus. The Georgian king George Lasha tried to attack them, but was destroyed along with his army. The Mongols managed to capture the guides who showed the way through the Daryal Gorge. So they went to the upper reaches of the Kuban, to the rear of the Polovtsians. They, having discovered the enemy in their rear, retreated to the Russian border and asked for help from the Russian princes.

It should be noted that the relations between Rus' and the Polovtsians do not fit into the scheme of irreconcilable confrontation “sedentary - nomadic”. In 1223, the Russian princes became allies of the Polovtsians. The three strongest princes of Rus' - Mstislav the Udaloy from Galich, Mstislav of Kiev and Mstislav of Chernigov - gathered troops and tried to protect them.

The clash on Kalka in 1223 is described in some detail in the chronicles; In addition, there is another source - “The Tale of the Battle of Kalka, and of the Russian Princes, and of the Seventy Heroes.” However, the abundance of information does not always bring clarity...

Historical science has long not denied the fact that the events on Kalka were not the aggression of evil aliens, but an attack by the Russians. The Mongols themselves did not seek war with Russia. The ambassadors who arrived to the Russian princes quite friendly asked the Russians not to interfere in their relations with the Polovtsians. But, true to their allied obligations, the Russian princes rejected peace proposals. In doing so, they made a fatal mistake that had bitter consequences. All the ambassadors were killed (according to some sources, they were not just killed, but “tortured”). At all times, the murder of an ambassador or envoy was considered a serious crime; According to Mongolian law, deceiving someone who trusted was an unforgivable crime.

Following this, the Russian army sets out on a long march. Having left the borders of Rus', it first attacks the Tatar camp, takes booty, steals cattle, after which it moves outside its territory for another eight days. A decisive battle takes place on the Kalka River: the eighty-thousandth Russian-Polovtsian army attacked the twenty-thousandth (!) detachment of the Mongols. This battle was lost by the Allies due to their inability to coordinate their actions. The Polovtsy left the battlefield in panic. Mstislav Udaloy and his “younger” prince Daniil fled across the Dnieper; They were the first to reach the shore and managed to jump into the boats. At the same time, the prince chopped up the rest of the boats, fearing that the Tatars would be able to cross after him, “and, filled with fear, I reached Galich on foot.” Thus, he doomed his comrades, whose horses were worse than princely ones, to death. The enemies killed everyone they overtook.

The other princes are left alone with the enemy, fight off his attacks for three days, after which, believing the assurances of the Tatars, they surrender. Here lies another mystery. It turns out that the princes surrendered after a certain Russian named Ploskinya, who was in the enemy’s battle formations, solemnly kissed the pectoral cross that the Russians would be spared and their blood would not be shed. The Mongols, according to their custom, kept their word: having tied up the captives, they laid them on the ground, covered them with planks and sat down to feast on the bodies. Not a drop of blood was actually shed! And the latter, according to Mongolian views, was considered extremely important. (By the way, only the “Tale of the Battle of Kalka” reports that the captured princes were put under planks. Other sources write that the princes were simply killed without mockery, and still others that they were “captured.” So the story with a feast on the bodies is just one version.)

Different peoples perceive the rule of law and the concept of honesty differently. The Russians believed that the Mongols, by killing the captives, broke their oath. But from the point of view of the Mongols, they kept their oath, and the execution was the highest justice, because the princes committed the terrible sin of killing someone who trusted them. Therefore, the point is not in deceit (history provides a lot of evidence of how the Russian princes themselves violated the “kiss of the cross”), but in the personality of Ploskini himself - a Russian, a Christian, who somehow mysteriously found himself among the warriors of the “unknown people”.

Why did the Russian princes surrender after listening to Ploskini’s entreaties? “The Tale of the Battle of Kalka” writes: “There were also wanderers along with the Tatars, and their commander was Ploskinya.” Brodniks are Russian free warriors who lived in those places, the predecessors of the Cossacks. However, establishing Ploschini's social status only confuses the matter. It turns out that the wanderers in a short time managed to come to an agreement with the “unknown peoples” and became so close to them that they jointly struck at their brothers in blood and faith? One thing can be stated with certainty: part of the army with which the Russian princes fought on Kalka was Slavic, Christian.

The Russian princes do not look their best in this whole story. But let's return to our riddles. For some reason, the “Tale of the Battle of Kalka” that we mentioned is not able to definitely name the enemy of the Russians! Here is the quote: “...Because of our sins, unknown peoples came, the godless Moabites [symbolic name from the Bible], about whom no one knows exactly who they are and where they came from, and what their language is, and what tribe they are, and what faith. And they call them Tatars, while others say Taurmen, and others say Pechenegs.”

Amazing lines! They were written much later than the events described, when it was supposed to be known exactly who the Russian princes fought on Kalka. After all, part of the army (albeit small) nevertheless returned from Kalka. Moreover, the victors, pursuing the defeated Russian regiments, chased them to Novgorod-Svyatopolch (on the Dnieper), where they attacked the civilian population, so that among the townspeople there should have been witnesses who saw the enemy with their own eyes. And yet he remains “unknown”! This statement further confuses the matter. After all, by the time described, the Polovtsians were well known in Rus' - they lived nearby for many years, then fought, then became related... The Taurmen - a nomadic Turkic tribe that lived in the Northern Black Sea region - were again well known to the Russians. It is curious that in the “Tale of Igor’s Campaign” certain “Tatars” are mentioned among the nomadic Turks who served the Chernigov prince.

One gets the impression that the chronicler is hiding something. For some reason unknown to us, he does not want to directly name the Russian enemy in that battle. Maybe the battle on Kalka is not a clash with unknown peoples at all, but one of the episodes of the internecine war waged among themselves by Russian Christians, Polovtsian Christians and the Tatars who got involved in the matter?

After the Battle of Kalka, some of the Mongols turned their horses to the east, trying to report on the completion of the assigned task - the victory over the Cumans. But on the banks of the Volga, the army was ambushed by the Volga Bulgars. The Muslims, who hated the Mongols as pagans, unexpectedly attacked them during the crossing. Here the victors at Kalka were defeated and lost many people. Those who managed to cross the Volga left the steppes to the east and united with the main forces of Genghis Khan. Thus ended the first meeting of the Mongols and Russians.

L.N. Gumilyov collected a huge amount of material, clearly demonstrating that the relationship between Russia and the Horde CAN be described by the word “symbiosis”. After Gumilev, they write especially a lot and often about how Russian princes and “Mongol khans” became brothers-in-law, relatives, sons-in-law and fathers-in-law, how they went on joint military campaigns, how (let’s call a spade a spade) they were friends. Relations of this kind are unique in their own way - the Tatars did not behave this way in any country they conquered. This symbiosis, brotherhood in arms leads to such an interweaving of names and events that sometimes it is even difficult to understand where the Russians end and the Tatars begin...

Therefore, the question of whether there was a Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' (in the classical sense of the term) remains open. This topic awaits its researchers.

This text is an introductory fragment. author

7.4. Fourth period: the Tatar-Mongol yoke from the battle of the City (1238) to the “standing on the Ugra” (1481) - the official end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' BATY KHAN from 1238 YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH, 1238–1248, ruled for 10 years, capital - Vladimir Came from Novgorod, village. 70. According to,

From the book Rus' and the Horde. Great Empire of the Middle Ages author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

2. The Tatar-Mongol invasion as the unification of Rus' under the rule of the Novgorod = Yaroslavl dynasty of George = Genghis Khan and then his brother Yaroslav = Batu = Ivan Kalita Above, we have already begun to talk about the “Tatar-Mongol invasion” as the unification of the Russian

From the book Rus' and the Horde. Great Empire of the Middle Ages author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

3. “Tatar-Mongol yoke” in Rus' - the era of military control in the Russian Empire and its heyday 3.1. What is the difference between our version and the Miller-Romanov version? The Miller-Romanov story paints the era of the 13th–15th centuries in the dark colors of a fierce foreign yoke in Rus'. With one

From the book Reconstruction of True History author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

12. There was no foreign “Tatar-Mongol conquest” of Rus'. Medieval Mongolia and Rus' are simply one and the same. No foreigners conquered Rus'. Rus' was originally inhabited by peoples originally living on their land - Russians, Tatars, etc. The so-called

author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

7.4. Fourth period: the Tatar-Mongol yoke from the battle of the City in 1238 to the “standing on the Ugra” in 1481, considered today the “official end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke” BATY KHAN from 1238. YAROSLAV VSEVOLODOVICH 1238–1248, ruled for 10 years, capital - Vladimir. Came from Novgorod

From the book Book 1. New chronology of Rus' [Russian Chronicles. "Mongol-Tatar" conquest. Battle of Kulikovo. Ivan groznyj. Razin. Pugachev. The defeat of Tobolsk and author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

2. The Tatar-Mongol invasion as the unification of Rus' under the rule of the Novgorod = Yaroslavl dynasty of George = Genghis Khan and then his brother Yaroslav = Batu = Ivan Kalita Above, we have already begun to talk about the “Tatar-Mongol invasion” as a process of unification of the Russian

From the book Book 1. New chronology of Rus' [Russian Chronicles. "Mongol-Tatar" conquest. Battle of Kulikovo. Ivan groznyj. Razin. Pugachev. The defeat of Tobolsk and author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

3. The Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' is a period of military control in the United Russian Empire 3.1. What is the difference between our version and the Miller-Romanov version? The Miller-Romanov story paints the era of the 13th–15th centuries in the dark colors of a fierce foreign yoke in Rus'. WITH

author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

4th period: Tatar-Mongol yoke from the battle of the City in 1237 to the “standing on the Ugra” in 1481, considered today the “official end of the Tatar-Mongol yoke” Batu Khan from 1238 Yaroslav Vsevolodovich 1238–1248 (10), capital - Vladimir, came from Novgorod (p. 70). By: 1238–1247 (8). By

From the book New Chronology and the Concept of the Ancient History of Rus', England and Rome author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

The Tatar-Mongol invasion as the unification of Rus' under the rule of the Novgorod = Yaroslavl dynasty of George = Genghis Khan and then his brother Yaroslav = Batu = Ivan Kalita Above, we have already begun to talk about the “Tatar-Mongol invasion” as a process of unification of the Russian

From the book New Chronology and the Concept of the Ancient History of Rus', England and Rome author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

The Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus' = the period of military rule in the united Russian empire. What is the difference between our version and the traditional one? Traditional history paints the era of the 13th–15th centuries in the dark colors of foreign yoke in Rus'. On the one hand, we are called to believe that

From the book Gumilyov, son of Gumilyov author Belyakov Sergey Stanislavovich

THE TATAR-MONGOL YOKE But perhaps the victims were justified, and the “alliance with the Horde” saved the Russian land from the worst misfortune, from the insidious papal prelates, from the merciless dog-knights, from enslavement not only physical, but also spiritual? Maybe Gumilev is right, and Tatar help

From the book Reconstruction of True History author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

12. There was no foreign “Tatar-Mongol conquest” of Rus'. Medieval Mongolia and Rus' are simply one and the same. No foreigners conquered Rus'. Rus' was originally inhabited by peoples who had originally lived on their land - Russians, Tatars, etc. The so-called

author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

From the book Rus'. China. England. Dating of the Nativity of Christ and the First Ecumenical Council author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich

From the book The Great Alexander Nevsky. “The Russian Land will stand!” author Pronina Natalya M.

Chapter IV. The internal crisis of Rus' and the Tatar-Mongol invasion But the fact was that by the middle of the 13th century the Kiev state, like most early feudal empires, suffered a painful process of complete fragmentation and collapse. Actually, the first attempts to violate

From the book Turks or Mongols? Age of Genghis Khan author Olovintsov Anatoly Grigorievich

Chapter X “Tatar-Mongol yoke” - how it was There was no so-called Tatar yoke. The Tatars never occupied Russian lands and did not keep their garrisons there... It is difficult to find parallels in history for such generosity of the victors. B. Ishboldin, honorary professor