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Heroes of the partisan movement of 1812. The partisan movement is “the cudgel of the people’s war. State educational institution

27.02.2024

Protracted military conflict. Detachments in which people were united by the idea of the liberation struggle fought on a par with the regular army, and in the case of a well-organized leadership, their actions were highly effective and largely decided the outcome of the battles.

Partisans of 1812

When Napoleon attacked Russia, the idea of strategic guerrilla warfare arose. Then, for the first time in world history, Russian troops used a universal method of conducting military operations on enemy territory. This method was based on the organization and coordination of the rebels' actions by the regular army itself. For this purpose, trained professionals - “army partisans” - were thrown behind the front line. At this time, the detachments of Figner and Ilovaisky, as well as the detachment of Denis Davydov, who was lieutenant colonel Akhtyrsky, became famous for their military exploits

This detachment was separated from the main forces longer than others (for six weeks). The tactics of Davydov’s partisan detachment consisted in the fact that they avoided open attacks, attacked by surprise, changed directions of attacks, and probed for the enemy’s weak points. The local population helped: the peasants were guides, spies, and participated in the extermination of the French.

In the Patriotic War, the partisan movement was of particular importance. The basis for the formation of detachments and units was the local population, who were familiar with the area. In addition, it was hostile to the occupiers.

The main goal of the movement

The main task of guerrilla warfare was to isolate enemy troops from its communications. The main blow of the people's avengers was aimed at the supply lines of the enemy army. Their detachments disrupted communications, prevented the approach of reinforcements and the supply of ammunition. When the French began to retreat, their actions were aimed at destroying ferries and bridges over numerous rivers. Thanks to the active actions of army partisans, Napoleon lost almost half of his artillery during his retreat.

The experience of waging partisan warfare in 1812 was used in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). During this period, this movement was large-scale and well organized.

Period of the Great Patriotic War

The need to organize a partisan movement arose due to the fact that most of the territory of the Soviet state was captured by German troops, who sought to make slaves and liquidate the population of the occupied areas. The main idea of partisan warfare in the Great Patriotic War is the disorganization of the activities of the Nazi troops, causing them human and material losses. For this purpose, fighter and sabotage groups were created, and the network of underground organizations was expanded to guide all actions in the occupied territory.

The partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War was two-sided. On the one hand, the detachments were created spontaneously, from people who remained in enemy-occupied territories, and sought to protect themselves from mass fascist terror. On the other hand, this process took place in an organized manner, under leadership from above. Sabotage groups were thrown behind enemy lines or pre-organized in the territory that they were supposed to leave in the near future. To provide such detachments with ammunition and food, they first made caches with supplies, and also worked out issues of their further replenishment. In addition, issues of secrecy were worked out, the locations of detachments based in the forest were determined after the front retreated further to the east, and the provision of money and valuables was organized.

Movement leadership

In order to lead the guerrilla war and sabotage struggle, workers from among the local residents who were well acquainted with these areas were sent to the territory captured by the enemy. Very often, among the organizers and leaders, including the underground, were the leaders of Soviet and party bodies who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy.

Guerrilla warfare played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.

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The Patriotic War of 1812 was one of the turning points in Russian history, a serious shock for Russian society, which was faced with a number of new problems and phenomena that still require comprehension by modern historians.

One of these phenomena was the People's War, which gave rise to an incredible number of rumors, and then persistent legends.

The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 has been sufficiently studied, but many controversial episodes remain in it, since there are conflicting opinions in assessing this event. The differences begin from the very beginning - with the causes of the war, go through all the battles and personalities and end only with the departure of the French from Russia. The issue of the popular partisan movement is not fully understood until today, which is why this topic will always be relevant.

In historiography, this topic is presented quite fully, however, the opinions of domestic historians about the partisan war itself and its participants, about their role in the Patriotic War of 1812 are extremely ambiguous.

Dzhivelegov A.K. wrote the following: “The peasants participated in the war only after Smolensk, but especially after the surrender of Moscow. If there had been more discipline in the Great Army, normal relations with the peasants would have begun very soon. But the foragers turned into marauders, from whom the peasants “naturally defended themselves, and for defense, precisely for defense and nothing more, peasant detachments were formed... all of them, we repeat, had in mind exclusively self-defense. The People's War of 1812 was nothing more than an optical illusion created by the ideology of the nobility...” (6, p. 219).

Opinion of historian Tarle E.V. was a little more lenient, but in general it was similar to the opinion of the author presented above: “All this led to the fact that the mythical “peasant partisans” began to be attributed to what in reality was carried out by the retreating Russian army. There were classic partisans, but mostly only in the Smolensk province. On the other hand, the peasants were terribly annoyed by endless foreign foragers and marauders. And, naturally, they were actively resisted. And “many peasants fled into the forests when the French army approached, often simply out of fear. And not from some great patriotism” (9, p. 12).

Historian Popov A.I. does not deny the existence of peasant partisan detachments, but believes that it is incorrect to call them “partisans”, that they were more like a militia (8, p. 9). Davydov clearly distinguished between “partisans and villagers.” In the leaflets, partisan detachments are clearly distinguished from “peasants from villages adjacent to the theater of war,” who “arrange militias among themselves”; they record the difference between armed villagers and partisans, between “our detached detachments and zemstvo militias” (8, p. 10). So the accusations by Soviet authors of noble and bourgeois historians that they did not consider the peasants to be partisans are completely groundless, because they were not considered such by their contemporaries.

Modern historian N.A. Troitsky in his article “The Patriotic War of 1812 From Moscow to the Neman” wrote: “Meanwhile, a partisan war, destructive for the French, flared up around Moscow. Peaceful townspeople and villagers of both sexes and all ages, armed with anything - from axes to simple clubs, multiplied the ranks of partisans and militias... The total number of people's militia exceeded 400 thousand people. In the combat zone, almost all peasants capable of carrying weapons became partisans. It was the nationwide rise of the masses who came out in defense of the Fatherland that became the main reason for Russia’s victory in the War of 1812” (11)

In pre-revolutionary historiography there were facts discrediting the actions of the partisans. Some historians called the partisans looters, showing their indecent actions not only towards the French, but also towards ordinary residents. In many works of domestic and foreign historians, the role of the resistance movement of the broad masses, which responded to a foreign invasion with a nationwide war, is clearly downplayed.

Our study presents an analysis of the works of such historians as: Alekseev V.P., Babkin V.I., Beskrovny L.G., Bichkov L.N., Knyazkov S.A., Popov A.I., Tarle E.V. ., Dzhivilegov A.K., Troitsky N.A.

The object of our research is the partisan war of 1812, and the subject of the study is a historical assessment of the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

In doing so, we used the following research methods: narrative, hermeneutic, content analysis, historical-comparative, historical-genetic.

Based on all of the above, the purpose of our work is to give a historical assessment of such a phenomenon as the partisan war of 1812.

1. Theoretical analysis of sources and works related to the topic of our research;

2. To identify whether such a phenomenon as the “People's War” took place according to the narrative tradition;

3. Consider the concept of “partisan movement of 1812” and its reasons;

4. Consider the peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812;

5. Conduct their comparative analysis in order to determine the role of peasant and army partisan detachments in achieving victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Thus, the structure of our work looks like this:

Introduction

Chapter 1: People's War according to the narrative tradition

Chapter 2: General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

Conclusion

Bibliography

Chapter 1. People's War according to the narrative tradition

Modern historians often question the existence of the People's War, believing that such actions of peasants were carried out solely for the purpose of self-defense and that detachments of peasants in no case can be distinguished as separate types of partisans.

In the course of our work, a large number of sources were analyzed, ranging from essays to collections of documents, which allowed us to understand whether such a phenomenon as the “People's War” took place.

Reporting documentation always provides the most reliable evidence, since it lacks subjectivity and clearly traces information that proves certain hypotheses. In it you can find many different facts, such as: the size of the army, the names of the units, actions at various stages of the war, the number of casualties and, in our case, facts about the location, number, methods and motives of peasant partisan detachments. In our case, this documentation includes manifestos, reports, government messages.

1) It all started with the “Manifesto of Alexander I on the collection of the zemstvo militia of July 6, 1812.” In it, the tsar directly calls on the peasants to fight the French troops, believing that a regular army alone will not be enough to win the war (4, p. 14).

2) Typical raids on small detachments of the French can be clearly seen in the report of the Zhizdra district leader of the nobility to the Kaluga civil governor (10, p. 117)

3) From the report of E.I. Vlastova Ya.X. Wittgenstein from the town of Bely “On the actions of peasants against the enemy” from the government report “On the activities of peasant detachments against Napoleon’s army in the Moscow province”, from the “Brief Journal of Military Actions” about the struggle of the peasants of Belsky district. Smolensk province. with Napoleon's army, we see that the actions of peasant partisan detachments actually took place during the Patriotic War of 1812, mainly in the Smolensk province (10, pp. 118, 119, 123).

Memoirs, as well as memories, are not the most reliable source of information, since by definition, memoirs are notes from contemporaries telling about events in which their author directly took part. Memoirs are not identical to chronicles of events, since in memoirs the author tries to comprehend the historical context of his own life; accordingly, memoirs differ from chronicles of events in their subjectivity - in that the events described are refracted through the prism of the author’s consciousness with his own sympathies and vision of what is happening. Therefore, memoirs, unfortunately, provide practically no evidence in our case.

1) The attitude of the peasants in the Smolensk province and their willingness to fight is clearly traced in the memoirs of A.P. Buteneva (10, p. 28)

2) From the memoirs of I.V. Snegirev, we can conclude that the peasants are ready to defend Moscow (10, p. 75)

However, we see that memoirs and memoirs are not a reliable source of information, since they contain too many subjective assessments, and in the end we will not take them into account.

Notes And letters are also subject to subjectivity, but their difference from memoirs is such that they were written directly during these historical events, and not for the purpose of subsequent familiarization with them to the masses, as is the case with journalism, but as personal correspondence or notes, accordingly their reliability although it is questioned, they can be considered as evidence. In our case, notes and letters provide us with evidence not so much of the existence of the People’s War as such, but they prove the courage and strong spirit of the Russian people, showing that peasant partisan detachments were created in greater numbers based on patriotism, and not on the need for self-defense.

1) The first attempts at peasant resistance can be traced in a letter from Rostopchin to Balashov dated August 1, 1812 (10, p. 28)

2) From the notes of A.D. Bestuzhev-Ryumin dated August 31, 1812, from a letter to P.M. Longinova S.R. Vorontsov, from the diary of Ya.N. Pushchin about the battle of peasants with an enemy detachment near Borodino and about the mood of the officers after leaving Moscow, we see that the actions of peasant partisan detachments during the Patriotic War of 1812 were caused not only by the need for self-defense, but also by deep patriotic feelings and the desire to protect their homeland. enemy (10, pp. 74, 76, 114).

Journalism at the beginning of the 19th century it was subject to censorship in the Russian Empire. Thus, in the “First Censorship Decree” of Alexander I dated July 9, 1804, the following is stated: “... censorship is obliged to consider all books and works intended for distribution in society,” i.e. in fact, it was impossible to publish anything without permission from the regulatory authority, and accordingly, all descriptions of the exploits of the Russian people could turn out to be banal propaganda or a kind of “call to action” (12, p. 32). However, this does not mean that journalism does not provide us with any evidence of the existence of the People's War. Despite the apparent severity of censorship, it is worth noting that it did not cope with the assigned tasks in the best way. Professor of the University of Illinois Marianna Tax Choldin writes: “... a significant number of “harmful” works entered the country despite all the efforts of the government to prevent this” (12, p. 37). Accordingly, journalism does not claim to be 100% accurate, but it also provides us with some evidence about the existence of the People’s War and a description of the exploits of the Russian people.

Having analyzed the “Domestic Notes” about the activities of one of the organizers of peasant partisan detachments Emelyanov, correspondence to the newspaper “Severnaya Pochta” about the actions of peasants against the enemy and an article by N.P. Polikarpov “The Unknown and Elusive Russian Partisan Detachment”, we see that excerpts from these newspapers and magazines support evidence of the existence of peasant partisan detachments as such and confirms their patriotic motives (10, p. 31, 118; 1, p. 125) .

Based on this reasoning, we can come to the conclusion that the most useful in proving the existence of the People's War was reporting documentation due to the lack of subjectivity. Reporting documentation provides evidence of the existence of the People's War(description of the actions of peasant partisan detachments, their methods, numbers and motives), and notes And letters confirm that the formation of such detachments and the People's War itself was caused by Not only in order to self-defense, but also based on deep patriotism And courage Russian people. Journalism also reinforces both these judgments. Based on the above analysis of numerous documentation, we can conclude that contemporaries of the Patriotic War of 1812 realized that the People’s War took place and clearly distinguished peasant partisan detachments from army partisan detachments, and also realized that this phenomenon was not caused by self-defense. Thus, from all of the above, we can say that there was a People's War.

Chapter 2. General characteristics and comparative analysis of partisan detachments

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812 is an armed conflict between Napoleon's multinational army and Russian partisans on Russian territory in 1812 (1, p. 227).

Guerrilla warfare was one of the three main forms of war of the Russian people against Napoleon's invasion, along with passive resistance (for example, the destruction of food and fodder, setting fire to their own houses, going into the forests) and mass participation in militias.

The reasons for the emergence of the Partisan War were associated, first of all, with the unsuccessful start of the war and the retreat of the Russian army deep into its territory showed that the enemy could hardly be defeated by the forces of regular troops alone. This required the efforts of the entire people. In the overwhelming majority of areas occupied by the enemy, he perceived the “Great Army” not as his liberator from serfdom, but as an enslaver. Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their powerless situation. If at the beginning promising phrases were uttered about the liberation of serfs from serfdom and there was even talk about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with the help of which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which is what he feared most. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when joining Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France, and it was difficult for him to preach revolution to Russia” (3, p. 12).

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs and in defense of the feudal landowners. The temporary Lithuanian “government”, subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first resolutions obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landowners, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, attracting for this purpose , if circumstances require it, military force (3, p. 15).

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than they had been in before. The peasants also associated the fight against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

In reality, things were somewhat different. Even before the start of the war, Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Chuykevich compiled a note on the conduct of active partisan warfare, and in 1811 the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, “The Small War,” was published in Russian. This was the beginning of the creation of partisan detachments in the War of 1812. However, in the Russian army they looked at the partisans with a significant degree of skepticism, seeing in the partisan movement “a disastrous system of fragmentation of the army” (2, p. 27).

The partisan forces consisted of detachments of the Russian army operating in the rear of Napoleon's troops; Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity; volunteers from the local population.

§2.1 Peasant partisan detachments

The first partisan detachments were created even before the Battle of Borodino. On July 23, after joining with Bagration near Smolensk, Barclay de Tolly formed a flying partisan detachment from the Kazan Dragoon, three Don Cossack and Stavropol Kalmyk regiments under the general command of F. Wintzingerode. Wintzingerode was supposed to act against the French left flank and provide communication with Wittgenstein's corps. The Wintzingerode flying squad also proved to be an important source of information. On the night of July 26-27, Barclay received news from Wintzingerode from Velizh about Napoleon’s plans to advance from Porechye to Smolensk in order to cut off the retreat routes of the Russian army. After the Battle of Borodino, the Wintzingerode detachment was reinforced with three Cossack regiments and two battalions of rangers and continued to operate against the enemy’s flanks, breaking into smaller detachments (5, p. 31).

With the invasion of Napoleonic hordes, local residents initially simply left the villages and went to forests and areas remote from military operations. Later, retreating through the Smolensk lands, the commander of the Russian 1st Western Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly called on his compatriots to take up arms against the invaders. His proclamation, which was apparently drawn up on the basis of the work of the Prussian Colonel Valentini, indicated how to act against the enemy and how to conduct guerrilla warfare.

It arose spontaneously and represented the actions of small scattered detachments of local residents and soldiers lagging behind their units against the predatory actions of the rear units of the Napoleonic army. Trying to protect their property and food supplies, the population was forced to resort to self-defense. According to the memoirs of D.V. Davydov, “in every village the gates were locked; with them stood old and young with pitchforks, stakes, axes, and some of them with firearms” (8, p. 74).

French foragers sent to villages for food faced more than just passive resistance. In the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasants made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers.

Later, the Smolensk province was also plundered. Some researchers believe that it was from this moment that the war became domestic for the Russian people. It was here that popular resistance acquired the widest scope. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky districts, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky districts. At first, before the appeal of M.B. Barclay de Tolly, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, fearing that they would later be brought to justice. However, this process subsequently intensified (3, p. 13).

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, peasant detachments attacked French parties making their way towards them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychev detachments, police officer Boguslavsky and retired major Emelyanov, armed their villagers with guns taken from the French and established proper order and discipline. Sychevsky partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people (7, p. 209).

Residents of the Roslavl district created several horse and foot peasant detachments, arming the villagers with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many peasant detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the river. Ugra, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisan detachment D.V. Davydova.

Another detachment, created from peasants, was also active in the Gzhatsk district, headed by Ermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private in the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. Chetvertakov’s detachment began not only to protect villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. As a result, throughout the entire space of 35 versts from the Gzhatsk pier, the lands were not devastated, despite the fact that all the surrounding villages lay in ruins. For this feat, the residents of those places “with sensitive gratitude” called Chetvertakov “the savior of that side” (5, p. 39).

Private Eremenko did the same. With the help of the landowner. In Michulovo, by the name of Krechetov, he also organized a peasant detachment, with which on October 30 he exterminated 47 people from the enemy.

The actions of peasant detachments became especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces.

In Zvenigorod district, peasant detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost mayor Ivan Andreev and the centenarian Pavel Ivanov. In Volokolamsk district, such detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost mayor Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Philip Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant detachments united up to 2 thousand people. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants from the Bronnitsy district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratyev, Vladimir Afanasyev (5, p. 46).

The largest peasant detachment in the Moscow region was a detachment of Bogorodsk partisans. In one of the first publications in 1813 about the formation of this detachment, it was written that “the head of the economic volosts of Vokhnovskaya Yegor Stulov, the centurion Ivan Chushkin and the peasant Gerasim Kurin, the Amerevskaya head Emelyan Vasilyev gathered the peasants under their jurisdiction, and also invited neighboring ones” (1, p. 228).

The detachment consisted of about 6 thousand people in its ranks, the leader of this detachment was the peasant Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably defended the entire Bogorodskaya district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into armed struggle with enemy troops.

It should be noted that even women took part in forays against the enemy. Subsequently, these episodes became overgrown with legends and in some cases did not even remotely resemble real events. A typical example is with Vasilisa Kozhina, to whom popular rumor and propaganda of that time attributed neither more nor less than the leadership of a peasant detachment, which in reality was not the case.

During the war, many active participants in peasant groups were awarded. Emperor Alexander I ordered to reward the people subordinate to Count F.V. Rostopchin: 23 people “in command” received insignia of the Military Order (St. George’s Crosses), and the other 27 people received a special silver medal “For Love of the Fatherland” on the Vladimir Ribbon.

Thus, as a result of the actions of military and peasant detachments, as well as militia warriors, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases to supply the main forces. He failed to gain a foothold either in Bogorodsk, or in Dmitrov, or in Voskresensk. His attempt to obtain additional communications that would have connected the main forces with the corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier was thwarted. The enemy also failed to capture Bryansk and reach Kyiv.

§2.2 Army partisan units

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played a major role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Wintzengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoons, 11 Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina.

The detachment of Denis Davydov was a real threat for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration’s army to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov to “ask for a separate detachment.” Lieutenant M.F. strengthened him in this intention. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to find out the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A., who was captured. Tuchkova. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest and poor rear protection in the French army (8, p. 83).

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments, were. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for flying peasant detachments to fight without a coordinated plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov made a request to General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For a “test,” Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 1,280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.

In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.

A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S. operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Dorokhova. Captain A.S. Figner and his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.

In the area of Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A.N. Seslavina. Colonel N.D. was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. Kudashiv. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I.E. Efremova. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Wintzengerode, who, by detaching small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon’s troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region (6, p. 210).

The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, then I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the divided forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him , and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving up important units in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk” (2, p. 74). Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in size: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons and suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to obtain food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Headquarters of the Russian Army . The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action and were informed of the areas of operation of neighboring detachments in the event of joint operations.

The partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first there were many difficulties. Even residents of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to dress in peasant caftans and grow beards.

The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift. To swoop down out of the blue and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.

The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, and took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.

Davydov’s detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev-Zamishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zamishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost burst into the village together with them. The convoy and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans (1, p. 247).

Sometimes, knowing the location of the enemy in advance, the partisans launched a surprise raid. Thus, General Wintzengerode, having established that in the village of Sokolov - 15 there was an outpost of two cavalry squadrons and three infantry companies, allocated 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly burst into the village, destroyed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers -officers, 83 soldiers (1, p. 249).

Colonel Kudashiv's detachment, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolskoye, suddenly attacked the enemy, destroyed more than 100 people and captured 200.

Most often, partisan detachments ambushed and attacked enemy transport on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of General Dorokhov's detachment, operating along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 captured two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 6, Colonel Efremov’s detachment, having met an enemy column heading towards Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people (5, p. 56).

Captain Figner's detachment, which was always close to the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up an artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, killed up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers (7 , p. 215).

Later, the partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, took the city of Vereya on September 28, 1812, destroying part of the French garrison.

§2.3 Comparative analysis of peasant and army partisan detachments of 1812

Peasant partisan detachments arose spontaneously in connection with the oppression of peasants by French troops. Army partisan detachments arose with the consent of the highest command leadership due to the insufficient effectiveness of the conventional regular army, on the one hand, and with the chosen tactics aimed at disuniting and exhausting the enemy, on the other hand.

Basically, both types of partisan detachments operated in the region of Smolensk and adjacent cities: Gzhaisk, Mozhaisk, etc., as well as in the following counties: Krasnensky, Porechsky, Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavlsky, Gzhatsky, Vyazemsky.

The composition and degree of organization of the partisan detachments was radically different: the first group consisted of peasants who began their activities due to the fact that the invading French troops with their first actions aggravated the already poor situation of the peasants. In this regard, this group included men and women, young and old, and at first acted spontaneously and not always coherently. The second group consisted of the military (hussars, Cossacks, officers, soldiers), created to help the regular army. This group, being professional soldiers, acted more unitedly and harmoniously, often winning not by numbers, but by training and ingenuity.

Peasant partisan detachments were armed mainly with pitchforks, spears, axes, and less often with firearms. Army partisan detachments were better equipped and of better quality.

In this regard, peasant partisan detachments carried out raids on convoys, set up ambushes, and forays into the rear. Army partisan detachments controlled roads, destroyed food warehouses and small French detachments, carried out raids and raids on larger enemy detachments, and carried out sabotage.

In quantitative terms, peasant partisan detachments were superior to army ones.

The results of the activities were also not very similar but, perhaps, equally important. With the help of peasant partisan detachments, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to expand the zone under his control and create additional bases to supply the main forces, while with the help of army partisan detachments, Napoleon's army was weakened and subsequently destroyed.

Thus, peasant partisan detachments stopped the strengthening of Napoleon’s army, and army partisan detachments helped the regular army destroy it, which was no longer able to increase its power.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 received the name Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of “war not according to the rules,” Kutuzov said that these were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years have not known war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland...” (1, p. 310).

In our work, based on evidence from multiple analyzed sources and works, we proved that peasant partisan detachments existed on a par with army partisan detachments, and this phenomenon was caused by a wave of patriotism, and not out of people’s fear of the French “oppressors.”

Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war were based on the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that emerged in the national liberation war.

The guerrilla war that unfolded near Moscow made a significant contribution to the victory over Napoleon's army and expelling the enemy from Russia.

Bibliography

1. Alekseev V.P. People's War. // Patriotic War and Russian Society: in 7 volumes. - M.: Publishing House of I. D. Sytin, 1911. T.4. - P.227-337 [electronic document] ( www.museum.ru) Retrieved 01/23/2016

2. Babkin V.I. People’s militia in the Patriotic War of 1812 - M.: Nauka, 1962. - 211 p.

3. Beskrovny L.G. Partisans in the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. No. 1, 1972 - pp. 12-16.

4. Beskrovny L.G. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents [electronic document] ( http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/narodnoe-opolchenie1812/index.html) Retrieved 06/23/2016

5. Bichkov L.N. Peasant partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812. - M.: Political publishing house. literature, 1954 - 103 p.

6. Dzhivilegov A.K. Alexander I and Napoleon: East. essays. M., 1915. P. 219.

7. Knyazkov S.A. Partisans and partisan warfare in 1812. // Patriotic War and Russian Society: in 7 volumes. - M.: Publishing House of I. D. Sytin, 1911. T.4. - P. 208-226 [electronic document] ( www.museum.ru) Retrieved 01/23/2016

8. Popov A.I. Partisans 1812 // Historical research. Vol. 3. Samara, 2000. - pp. 73-93

9. Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia - M.: Guise, 1941 [electronic document] ( http://militera.lib.ru/h/tarle1/index.html) Retrieved 09/13/2016

10. Tarle E.V. Patriotic War of 1812: Collection of documents and materials [electronic document] ( http://militera.lib.ru/docs/da/otechestvennaya-voina/index.html) Retrieved 09/11/2016

11. Troitsky N.A. Patriotic War of 1812 From Moscow to Neman [electronic document] ( http://scepsis.net/library/id_1428.html) Retrieved 02/10/2017

12. Choldin M.T. History of censorship in Tsarist Russia - M.: Rudomino, 2002 - 309 p.

French losses from partisan actions will apparently never be counted. Talks about the “club of the people’s war” Alexey Shishov, employee of the Research Institute of Military History of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.

There was an error

A.Sh.:- Shortly before Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Chuykevich, who headed military counterintelligence, submitted a memo to the highest name about the armament of part of the population of the western provinces. She was supported by War Minister Barclay de Tolly. In practice, it hardly came to this, but when the invasion began, Smolensk and Kaluga landowners began to distribute weapons to their serfs. There were detachments of 300-400 and even a thousand people, commanded by retired military and police officers. More often, however, it happened differently: when the enemy approached, the landowners gave up, but the peasants had nowhere to run. Under the leadership of village elders, they united into self-defense units. They did not engage in battle with serious French forces, but they were an insurmountable obstacle in the way of their foragers - the procurers of horse feed. A horse without oats is like a tank without diesel fuel.

“AiF”: - Napoleon came to Russia with the idea of abolishing serfdom. Why weren't the peasants happy with him?

A.Sh.:- Indeed, under Napoleon, serfdom was abolished in Poland, Prussia and a number of other German lands. And in Russia the words “Freedom, equality, brotherhood” were inscribed on his banners. However, when it actually came to the liberation of the peasants of the Smolensk and Vitebsk provinces, it all ended in robbery and arson of the lordly estates. Apparently (no documents have survived to this effect), these facts amazed Napoleon so much that he no longer played democracy in Russia.

"AiF":- What about regular partisan detachments?

A.Sh.:- At the origins of their formation was General Tormasov, commander of the 3rd Army, which covered Ukraine. The most famous were the detachments of Wintzingerode, Figner, Seslavin, Ilovaisky... Army partisans, consisting mainly of Cossacks and hussars, disrupted the communications of the Great Army, interfered with the supply of ammunition and the approach of reinforcements. When the French retreated, they, ahead of their vanguard, burned bridges and sank ferries across the rivers. As a result of the actions of army partisans, Napoleon lost almost half of his artillery during his retreat! Alexander Benckendorf, the future chief of the gendarme corps, also distinguished himself as a partisan in 1812.

Pitchforks to the side!

"AiF":- Napoleon complained that the Russians were fighting “wrongly.”

A.Sh.:- To live with wolves... In 1812, Denis Davydov, a poet and lieutenant colonel of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, commanded a detachment that spent longer than other partisans separated from the main forces - 6 weeks. Here are the instructions he drew up for the Russian peasants: “Receive them (the French - Ed.) friendly, offer them with bows... everything you have that is edible, and especially drinkable, put them to bed drunk and, when you notice that they are definitely fell asleep, throw yourself all at their weapons... and do what God commanded to do with the enemies of Christ’s Church and your homeland. Having destroyed them, bury the bodies in a barn, in a forest or in some impassable place..."

However, the peasants hardly needed such instructions. Unlike the army partisans, they did not take prisoners in principle. There were some really wild incidents. A detachment of Teptyar Cossacks came to the Kaluga village - there is such a nationality in the Middle Urals. They hardly spoke Russian. The men mistook them for Frenchmen and drowned them in a pond at night. It is no coincidence that Davydov, for a raid behind enemy lines, changed his hussar uniform to a peasant dress (the men did not distinguish a Russian uniform from a French one) and grew a beard. Such is the “club of the people’s war”...

The partisan movement of 1812 (partisan war) was an armed conflict between Napoleon's army and detachments of Russian partisans that broke out during the times with the French.

The partisan troops consisted mainly of Cossacks and regular army units located in the rear. Gradually they were joined by released prisoners of war, as well as volunteers from the civilian population (peasants). Partisan detachments were one of the main military forces of Russia in this war and offered significant resistance.

Creation of partisan units

Napoleon's army moved very quickly into the country, pursuing Russian troops, who were forced to retreat. As a result of this, Napoleon's soldiers soon spread out over a large territory of Russia and created communication networks with the border through which weapons, food and prisoners of war were delivered. To defeat Napoleon, it was necessary to interrupt these networks. The leadership of the Russian army decided to create numerous partisan detachments throughout the country, which were supposed to engage in subversive work and prevent the French army from receiving everything it needed.

The first detachment was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.

Cossack partisan detachments

Davydov presented to the leadership a plan for a partisan attack on the French, which was quickly approved. To implement the plan, the army leadership gave Davydov 50 Cossacks and 50 officers.

In September 1812, Davydov’s detachment attacked a French detachment that was secretly transporting additional human forces and food to the camp of the main army. Thanks to the effect of surprise, the French were captured, some were killed, and the entire cargo was destroyed. This attack was followed by several more of the same kind, which turned out to be extremely successful.

Davydov's detachment began to gradually be replenished with released prisoners of war and volunteers from the peasants. At the very beginning of the guerrilla war, peasants were wary of soldiers carrying out subversive activities, but soon they began to actively help and even participated in attacks on the French.

However, the height of the partisan war began after Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow. He gave the order to begin active partisan activity in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments had already been formed throughout the country and numbered from 200 to 1,500 people. The main force consisted of Cossacks and soldiers, but peasants also actively participated in the resistance.

Several factors contributed to the success of guerrilla warfare. Firstly, the detachments always attacked suddenly and acted secretly - the French could not predict where and when the next attack would occur and could not prepare. Secondly, after the capture of Moscow, discord began in the ranks of the French.

In the middle of the war, the guerrilla attack was in its most acute stage. The French were exhausted by military operations, and the number of partisans had increased so much that they could already form their own army, not inferior to the troops of the emperor.

Peasant partisan units

Peasants also play an important role in the resistance. Although they did not actively join the detachments, they actively helped the partisans. The French, deprived of food supplies from their own, constantly tried to get food from the peasants in the rear, but they did not surrender and did not conduct any trade with the enemy. Moreover, peasants burned their own warehouses and houses so that the grain would not go to their enemies.

As the guerrilla war grew, the peasants began to participate more actively in it and often attacked the enemy themselves, armed with whatever they could. The first peasant partisan detachments appeared.

Results of the partisan war of 1812

The role of the partisan war of 1812 in the victory over the French is difficult to overestimate - it was the partisans who were able to undermine the enemy’s forces, weaken him and allow the regular army to drive Napoleon out of Russia.

After the victory, the heroes of the partisan war were duly rewarded.

Russian partisans in 1812

Victor Bezotosny

The term “partisans” in the minds of every Russian person is associated with two periods of history – the people’s war that unfolded in Russian territories in 1812 and the mass partisan movement during the Second World War. Both of these periods were called the Patriotic Wars. A long time ago, a persistent stereotype arose that partisans first appeared in Russia during the Patriotic War of 1812, and their founder was the dashing hussar and poet Denis Vasilyevich Davydov. His poetic works were practically forgotten, but everyone from school remembers that he created the first partisan detachment in 1812.

Historical reality was somewhat different. The term itself existed long before 1812. In the Russian army back in the 18th century, partisans were called military personnel who were sent as part of independent small separate detachments, or parties (from the Latin word partis, from the French parti) to operate on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. Naturally, this phenomenon cannot be considered a purely Russian invention. Even before 1812, both the Russian and French armies experienced the irritating actions of the partisans. For example, the French in Spain against the Guerillas, the Russians in 1808–1809. during the Russian-Swedish war against detachments of Finnish peasants. Moreover, many, both Russian and French officers, who adhered to the rules of the medieval knightly code of conduct in war, considered partisan methods (surprise attacks from behind on a weak enemy) not entirely worthy. Nevertheless, one of the leaders of Russian intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich, in an analytical note submitted to the command before the start of the war, proposed launching active partisan operations on the flanks and behind enemy lines and using Cossack units for this.

The success of the Russian partisans in the campaign of 1812 was facilitated by the huge territory of the theater of military operations, their length, sprawl and weak cover of the communication line of the Great Army.

And of course, huge forests. But still, I think the main thing is the support of the population. Guerrilla actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Observation Army, General A.P. Tormasov, who in July sent a detachment of Colonel K.B. Knorring to Brest-Litovsk and Bialystok. A little later, M.B. Barclay de Tolly formed the “flying corps” of Adjutant General F.F. Wintzingerode. By order of Russian military leaders, raiding partisan detachments began to actively operate on the flanks of the Great Army in July-August 1812. Only on August 25 (September 6), on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, with the permission of Kutuzov, a party (50 Akhtyrsky hussars and 80 Cossacks) of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, the Davydov to whom Soviet historians attributed the role of the initiator and founder of this movement, was sent on a “search” .

The main purpose of the partisans was considered to be actions against the enemy’s operational (communication) line. The party commander enjoyed great independence, receiving only the most general instructions from the command. The partisans' actions were almost exclusively offensive in nature. The key to their success was secrecy and speed of movement, surprise of attack and lightning withdrawal. This, in turn, determined the composition of the partisan parties: they included predominantly light regular (hussars, lancers) and irregular (Don, Bug and other Cossacks, Kalmyks, Bashkirs) cavalry, sometimes reinforced by several pieces of horse artillery. The party size did not exceed several hundred people, this ensured mobility. Infantry was rarely supplied: at the very beginning of the offensive, the detachments of A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner received one Jaeger company each. The party of D.V. Davydov operated behind enemy lines for the longest time – 6 weeks.

Even on the eve of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian command was thinking about how to attract the huge masses of peasants to resist the enemy, making the war truly popular. It was obvious that religious and patriotic propaganda was needed, an appeal to the peasant masses was needed, a call to them. Lieutenant Colonel P. A. Chuykevich believed, for example, that the people “must be armed and adjusted, as in Spain, with the help of the clergy.” And Barclay de Tolly, as the commander at the theater of military operations, without waiting for anyone’s help, turned on August 1 (13) to the residents of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces with calls for “universal armament.”

First of all, armed detachments began to be created on the initiative of the nobility in the Smolensk province. But since the Smolensk region was very soon completely occupied, the resistance here was local and episodic, as in other places where landowners fought off looters with the support of army detachments. In other provinces bordering the theater of military operations, “cordons” were created, consisting of armed peasants, whose main task was to fight looters and small detachments of enemy foragers.

During the stay of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp, the people's war reached its greatest extent. At this time, enemy marauders and foragers are rampant, their outrages and robberies become widespread, and partisan parties, individual militia units and army detachments begin to support the cordon chain. The cordon system was created in Kaluga, Tver, Vladimir, Tula and part of Moscow provinces. It was at this time that the extermination of marauders by armed peasants acquired a massive scale, and among the leaders of peasant detachments, G. M. Urin and E. S. Stulov, E. V. Chetvertakov and F. Potapov, and the elder Vasilisa Kozhina became famous throughout Russia. According to D.V. Davydov, the extermination of marauders and foragers “was more the work of the villagers than of the parties rushing to inform the enemy for a much more important purpose, which was only to protect property.”

Contemporaries distinguished a people's war from a guerrilla war. Partisan parties, consisting of regular troops and Cossacks, acted offensively in the territory occupied by the enemy, attacking his convoys, transports, artillery parks, and small detachments. Cordons and people's squads, consisting of peasants and townspeople led by retired military and civil officials, were located in a zone not occupied by the enemy, defending their villages from plunder by marauders and foragers.

The partisans became especially active in the fall of 1812, during the stay of Napoleon's army in Moscow. Their constant raids caused irreparable harm to the enemy and kept him in constant tension. In addition, they delivered operational information to the command. Particularly valuable was the information promptly reported by Captain Seslavin about the French exit from Moscow and about the direction of movement of Napoleonic units to Kaluga. These data allowed Kutuzov to urgently transfer the Russian army to Maloyaroslavets and block the path of Napoleon’s army.

With the beginning of the retreat of the Great Army, the partisan parties were strengthened and on October 8 (20) they were given the task of preventing the enemy from retreating. During the pursuit, partisans often acted together with the vanguard of the Russian army - for example, in the battles of Vyazma, Dorogobuzh, Smolensk, Krasny, Berezina, Vilna; and were active right up to the borders of the Russian Empire, where some of them were disbanded. Contemporaries appreciated the activities of the army partisans and gave them full credit. As a result of the 1812 campaign, all detachment commanders were generously awarded ranks and orders, and the practice of guerrilla warfare continued in 1813–1814.

It is indisputable that the partisans became one of those important factors (hunger, cold, heroic actions of the Russian army and the Russian people) that ultimately led Napoleon's Grand Army to disaster in Russia. It is almost impossible to calculate the number of enemy soldiers killed and captured by the partisans. In 1812, there was an unspoken practice - not to take prisoners (with the exception of important persons and “tongues”), since the commanders were not interested in separating a convoy from their few parties. The peasants, who were under the influence of official propaganda (all the French are “unchrists”, and Napoleon is “a fiend of hell and the son of Satan”), destroyed all the prisoners, sometimes in savage ways (they buried them alive or burned them, drowned them, etc.). But, it must be said that among the commanders of army partisan detachments, only Figner, according to some contemporaries, used cruel methods towards prisoners.

In Soviet times, the concept of “partisan war” was reinterpreted in accordance with Marxist ideology, and under the influence of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, it began to be interpreted as “the armed struggle of the people, mainly peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of Napoleonic troops and on their communications." Soviet authors began to view partisan warfare “as a people’s struggle, generated by the creativity of the masses,” and saw in it “one of the manifestations of the decisive role of the people in the war.” The peasantry was declared to be the initiator of the “people's” guerrilla war, which supposedly began immediately after the invasion of the Great Army into the territory of the Russian Empire, and it was argued that it was under their influence that the Russian command later began to create army partisan detachments.

The statements of a number of Soviet historians that the “partisan” people’s war began in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, that the government banned the arming of the people, that peasant detachments attacked enemy reserves, garrisons and communications and partially joined the army partisan detachments do not correspond to the truth. . The significance and scale of the people's war were enormously exaggerated: it was argued that the partisans and peasants “kept the enemy army under siege” in Moscow, that “the club of the people’s war nailed the enemy” right up to the Russian border. At the same time, the activities of the army partisan detachments turned out to be obscured, and it was they who made a tangible contribution to the defeat of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812. Today, historians are re-opening archives and reading documents, now without the ideology and instructions of the leaders that dominate them. And reality reveals itself in an unvarnished and unclouded form.

author Belskaya G.P.

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