Types of manifestation of corruption. Systemic characteristics of business corruption Types of corruption and examples

Without resorting to exaggeration, it can be argued that corruption 1 is the main and dynamically growing sector of the Russian economy. As will be shown below, the 2005 bottom estimate of annual income from business corruption was more than twice the total income from the export of crude oil, oil products and gas. In addition, corruption permeates political, administrative, economic, social relations, pursuing any business from its registration to its capture by officials or ruin, and leading to devastating consequences in all areas of social life.

Currently, the literature on the economic aspects of corruption and its relationship with political regimes and social status in a particular country includes several thousand articles, a number of monographs and collections, including reference books (Abed, Gupta, 2002; Kotkin, Sajo, 2004; Rose-Ackerman , 2006). These works consider both micro- and macroeconomic models of corruption interactions, as well as numerous statistical and econometric models 2 . There are studies devoted to various aspects of corruption in the USSR and Russia 3 .

A number of works have studied the changes that took place after the collapse of the USSR, in particular new opportunities for corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1998; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Some authors have considered certain characteristics of corruption in Russia and the countries of the former USSR, in particular, the abuse of power or, in other words, the use of administrative resources (Allina-Pisano, 2010; Ledeneva, Shekshnia, 2011). Corruption networks play an important role (Jiang, 2006; Cheloukhine and King, 2007; Stefes, 2007).

There are not many empirical studies on corruption in Russia, they are mainly devoted to individual sectors of the economy, for example, higher education, bank lending, and a number of others (Galitsky and Levin, 2007; Osipyan, 2011; Osipian 2010, 2012; Yakovlev, 2001). There are several works in which the authors consider differences in the corrupt behavior of small enterprises in Russia (Safavian et al., 2001) or compare corruption in different regions of the country (Dininio, Orttung, 2005).

Such works, if we exclude numerous articles and publicistic reports, can be (conditionally) divided into several types. First, on the history of corruption in Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as on the history of corruption in the post-Soviet period (Osipian, 2010). Secondly, these are works devoted to the economic and political specifics of corruption in the USSR. A number of articles analyze the relationship between the permanent shortage of goods and services in the consumer and industrial sectors, the privileges that accompanied it in the shadow economy, “blat” (“you give me - I give you”) and corruption. The study of post-Soviet corruption began in the mid-1990s, initiated by the peculiarities of the transition period and, of course, the discussion of corruption scandals in the media.

It should be noted that in the last 15 years, statistical studies have been carried out aimed at assessing the volume of corrupt transactions, the propensity to corrupt relationships, the importance of corruption as an obstacle to business development, etc. (see, for example: Satarov, 2007; Bakaleinik et al., 2002) . Some of them will be discussed in detail below.

In this article, we will try to analyze the dynamics of Russian corruption over the past 25 years, show its structure, explain the causes and demonstrate the negative consequences, and assess the prospects for counteraction. At the same time, we deliberately abandoned the description of scientific research on this phenomenon and the compilation of mathematical models of corruption, trying to focus on corruption itself and based both on our own research and on the developments of Russian and foreign colleagues.

Basic concepts

Below, we will distinguish between everyday corruption, which covers the sphere of routine interactions between citizens and government (health care, education, legal proceedings, various types of registration, military conscription, personal security, etc.), and business corruption, which extends to the sphere of interaction between business and government-regulator . In countries with a high level of corruption (as in Russia), the former is especially significant, while in Western countries corruption is more common in business activities.

The spheres of corrupt interaction between citizens or businesses, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, will be characterized by the term "corruption market". This is due to the fact that corrupt transactions have many of the characteristics of a normal market exchange, especially in the field of everyday corruption. Different spheres of corruption have properties that can be interpreted in traditional economic terms of supply 4 , demand, price of goods, market size, etc. You can also use such terms as the maximum propensity for corrupt consumption for bribe takers and the corrupt multiplier. Special corruption markets can be distinguished both by supply (levels and types of authorities) and by demand (different areas of public services that clients need). Branches of the economy and spheres of business activity can also serve as the basis.

In addition, we single out different types of strategies for the behavior of bribers. The most common, especially in business corruption, is the adaptation strategy: citizens and entrepreneurs actively use the defects of state regulation with the help of corruption in order to gain unilateral advantages. It is about adapting to the environment of state regulation. The evasion strategy is the next most common. She is passive. In this case, they try to minimize contacts with the state. We often encounter a type of behavior of bribe givers, which can be called hopelessness when a bribe is given, because there are no alternative methods for solving the problem, and the price of refusing a bribe is too high, while corruption is perceived as a given, as a natural part of the social order.

The next two strategies concern exclusively the interaction between government and business, they are universal, that is, one way or another, they are always present. The first strategy is characteristic of business representatives and is called "state capture" (state capture). This term denotes corporate and individual strategies of business behavior aimed at establishing shadow control over the adoption of power decisions, meaning both different branches and different levels of government (central, regional, etc.) (Hellman et al., 2003).

Another strategy can be called "business capture" (business capture). We propose to understand this as a set of strategies and practices by which the authorities, represented by their representatives or even organizations, seek to ensure shadow control over business in order to collectively and (or) individually extract administrative rent (Satarov, Parkhomenko, 2001). In this case, the rent is provided not by the bribes received, but directly by the business and the income from it.

The last classification of corruption that we will consider is of a historical and cultural nature (Levin, Satarov, 2012). Western corruption 5 is characterized by the certainty of property rights and the separation of power from business. Household corruption is low, and in business corruption the seizure of power prevails in comparison with the seizure of business due to the stability and certainty of property rights. Corruption acts as a shadow market for services. Corruption networks are small and rare. Eastern corruption is closely intertwined with extensive networks of patron-client relationships. Property rights have a status character, and business is not separated from power. The level of domestic corruption is also high.

Latin American corruption is rooted in networks of economic and administrative-political exchange. In addition, corruption often acts as an instrument of political control and suppression; big business dominates power. Property rights are poorly defined. In the business sphere, corruption in the form of direct requisitions competes with corruption as a type of service; domestic corruption is also widespread. African corruption can be seen as a kind of branching patriarchal relationship within the extended family. The level of corrupt competition between clans is high. Property rights are unstable, property is not separated from power, with power control over property and a significant level of everyday corruption.

Another historical and cultural variety of corruption we have called socialist, arising in a planned economy. It is characterized by the absence of private property, total power control and the development of domestic corruption. In this case, corruption, firstly, becomes a means of compensating for numerous defects in central planning and management. Secondly, it is caused by a chronic shortage and low quality of goods and services, thirdly, by the contradiction between socialist ideas and the real social structure, which is dominated by vertical relations of power domination-subordination or feudal patron-client relations: bribes destroy these vertical relations and equalize administrative agents and their clients.

The following circumstance attracts attention: everyday corruption is typical for all cultural and historical types of corruption, except for Western. The following cultural and historical classification of corruption will be used by us to analyze Russian corruption in retrospect.

Change of political regimes and corruption in Russia

Russia differs from other countries of Western civilization in that its natural development was destroyed for 70 years by the communist regime: the successful development of capitalism, the transition to a constitutional monarchy were interrupted, parliamentarism and an independent judiciary were destroyed, freedom of the press was destroyed, etc. At the same time, under the socialist The imperial traditions of the previous tsarist period were preserved under ideological cover, borrowing from it, among other things, inefficient bureaucracy and corruption.

The tsarist and communist regimes had two important features in common. The first is that anti-corruption persecution did not extend to senior dignitaries. The second - at the stages of its decline, the tsarist empire of the times of Nicholas II and the communist empire, starting with Brezhnev and until the moment of its collapse, used corruption as a resource for buying the loyalty of the bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, corruption before the revolution of 1917 and after it was qualitatively different. At the beginning of the XX century. Corruption in Russia clearly followed the path of rapprochement with the Western type in the business sphere, while remaining predominantly Eastern in the sphere of domestic corruption. By the end of the XIX century. the Russian economy had already become quite open, which affected the business atmosphere. At the beginning of the XX century. in terms of the cultural-historical classification introduced above, corruption in Russia was (conditionally) half Western and half Eastern. If we talk about everyday corruption, then it was practically absent in education and health care, but remained significant in other areas due to the rootedness of patriarchal social relations. Business corruption in Russia at that time already differed little from the West.

During the decades of Soviet power, a colossal blow was dealt to the morality of people and the ethics of public relations. This was aggravated by the preservation of the paternalistic culture of relations between the government and the population and contributed to the persistence and spread of domestic corruption, including in the field of education. As for business corruption, its nature has fundamentally changed with the abolition of ownership of the means of production and with the transition to central planning and distribution. Business corruption was mainly associated with the solution of the following tasks: adjustment of centralized economic plans; obtaining special advantages and preferences in the system of centralized distribution of resources; conducting shadow economic activities 6 .

In general, the corruption of the Soviet period was half Eastern (in the sphere of domestic corruption), and half - socialist (in the sphere of business corruption).

Structural changes in corruption from perestroika to the present day

The period of Gorbachev's rule (1985 - 1991) was characterized by two trends: the disintegration of the bureaucracy and the emergence of capitalist relations on a social and legal basis that was not prepared for this. Property rights began to acquire a status character 7 . As a result, socialist corruption in the business sphere was partly supplanted by Eastern corruption. Soviet economic ties between production managers and party leadership were gradually transformed into networks of economic and administrative-political exchange of the Latin American kind. At the same time, with the development of the cooperative movement and the subsequent expansion of private entrepreneurship, an out-of-status business appeared. This trend led to Soviet corruption in business being supplanted by Western corruption. In the sphere of domestic corruption, there was also a partial displacement of eastern corruption by western corruption as the status of the state changed. Thus, Gorbachev's corruption was a mixture of Eastern, Western, Latin American and Soviet corruption.

The transformation of Soviet corruption, accompanied by its growth, was completed during the Yeltsin era. Transitional periods are characterized by a weakening of legal regulation against the background of the destruction of the old and the delayed formation of a new system of norms. From the point of view of corruption, such a period is characterized by its growth and, most importantly, a qualitative change. Many new types of corruption emerged. Among them were those characteristic of Western economies, and inherent in the main or exceptional way in Russia due to its specific historical drift in the 20th century.

The main problem, specific to Russia, which gave rise to the growth of corruption in the transition period, is quite obvious: 70 years of Soviet power that distorted institutions, the consciousness of people and their social practices. This consideration is concretized by a number of circumstances that directly influenced the growth of corruption.

First, the most enterprising and talented workers were destroyed (for example, in agriculture). The regime suppressed independent thinking; prejudices against private property and competition were formed, paternalistic moods were encouraged, legal consciousness was distorted. Secondly, there was a closeness and lack of control of the authorities, the absence of a border between power and property, as well as property rights as such. Thirdly, the problem arose of the operational and psychological unpreparedness of the bureaucracy to solve new tasks, for example, to ensure the protection of private property, which affected the corruption of law enforcement agencies. A tradition was formed of subordinating officials not to the law, but to instructions and the boss. Such semi-feudal relations led to the formation of corruption networks. Fourthly, the legacy of the Soviet regime was: the weakness of civil society, in particular - in the sphere of control over power; insufficient rootedness of democratic political traditions; lack of an independent judiciary.

The main factors of a general nature that operated during most of the Yeltsin period were: excessive regulation of the economy; legislative gaps and inconstancy of the rules of the game; large-scale privatization of state property; high inflation stimulating short-term business strategies; inefficient tax administration; inefficient execution of the budget; weakness of the banking system. The financial and economic weakness of the state reduces its ability to fulfill social obligations, which leads to an increase in everyday corruption. Another important factor in the growth of corruption is the weakness of legal institutions. The ability to enforce the rule of law is a key factor influencing the level of corruption not only in transitional economies, but also in countries with established effective democracies (Gorbuz et al., 2010).

Another common factor in the growth of corruption during the period of economic transformation was the strategy of the Washington Consensus, which is criticized for the list of specific institutional measures aimed at economic liberalization and financial recovery. Meanwhile, the point is not in specific measures, but in ways to create new institutions or transform old ones: copying formal institutions does not ensure their viability, but, on the contrary, gives rise to new forms of corruption. New formal norms come into conflict with ingrained informal norms and practices, which leads to the inefficiency of transplanted institutions, and the latter, in turn, causes corruption.

During the second presidency of Yeltsin, large domestic owners appeared, which gave rise to such a type of corruption as “state capture”. Big business began to create its own resources of informational influence, some businessmen went to the legislative and executive authorities. By the end of the 1990s, another process came to an end: a decade-long fight against racketeering. "Victory" led to the fact that instead of bandits, representatives of law enforcement agencies began to engage in racketeering.

The Eastern type of corruption persisted mainly in the sphere of domestic corruption. The proportion of Soviet corruption decreased, while Western corruption grew, which was due to the formal copying of Western institutions. The growth in the share of Latin American corruption was associated with the influence of big business. As for African corruption, it flourished in some regions where individual clans, including family ones, seized power (for example, Bashkortostan).

With the beginning of the new millennium, the cultural and historical profile of corruption in Russia has changed significantly, and its scale has begun to grow rapidly. The increase in corruption during Putin's presidency was due to the departure from the democratic achievements of the Yeltsin era (separation of powers, freedom of the media, etc.), which allowed external control over the bureaucracy.

At the same time there were qualitative changes in corruption. Domestic corruption was relatively stable: it grew at a rate comparable to the growth rate of the population's income (see below), and retained elements of the Soviet one. The main changes took place in the sphere of business corruption. First of all, the capture of the state was rather quickly over, and the focus shifted to the capture of business. The bribe has ceased to fulfill the function of payment in the market of shadow administrative services. Corruption crime networks were rapidly formed. Corruption became clan-like at all levels. Property again began to acquire a status character, as it was during the Gorbachev period. The ability to sustain a business depended on belonging to a clan or clientele. Direct requisitions from businesses began to spread widely.

The above-described changes of the last 25 years, characterized in terms of the cultural-historical typology of corruption, can be represented graphically (Fig. 1) 8 . The diagram shows a steady decline in the share of socialist corruption, which is offset by the growing importance of African and Latin American types of corruption 9 .

Dynamics of everyday corruption

In this and the next sections, we will consider the structure and dynamics of Russian corruption, both domestic and business, according to special sociological surveys conducted by the INDEM Foundation or with its methodological participation in 2001, 2005 and 2010. Citizens and entrepreneurs participated in the first two polls, citizens in the last one. All samples were representative of Russia as a whole 10 . The analysis of data on respondents' corrupt practices is based on a unified methodology developed by the INDEM Foundation in 2000. It included a special set of questions on respondents' corrupt practices and statistical methods for analyzing answers to these questions 11 .

Let us explain the main indicators used. Corrupt coverage - the proportion of respondents who said that at least once they got into a corruption situation. The risk of corruption is the share of respondents who got into a corruption situation during their last interaction with a state representative. Willingness to give bribes - the proportion of respondents who gave a bribe in the most recent corruption situation. The intensity of corruption is the average number of bribes per year per one bribe giver. The average size of a bribe is the value obtained by averaging the sizes of bribes without taking into account a given number of the largest and smallest bribes; cutting off the latter ensures the robustness (stability) of the indicator values. The average normalized amount of a bribe-1 is the average amount of a bribe, related to the subsistence level. The average normalized amount of a bribe-2 is the average amount of a bribe, referred to the average annual monthly per capita income. The average annual corruption fee - the average annual cost of bribes by one bribe giver, is defined as the product of the intensity of corruption by the average size of the bribe. The normalized average annual corruption fee-1 and 2 are obtained as the ratio of the average annual corruption fee to the subsistence minimum and the average annual monthly per capita income, respectively. The volume of the everyday corruption market is an estimate of the amount of bribes paid by bribers in a year. The normalized volume of the market of "domestic" corruption-1 and 2 are obtained as the ratio of the volume of the market of "domestic" corruption to the annual expenditures on final consumption of households and to the value of GDP, respectively.

Table 1 shows the values ​​of these indicators for 2001, 2005 and 2010. The table shows that there is a steady tendency for citizens to flee from bribes, which is expressed in a decrease in the willingness to pay bribes and a decrease in the intensity of corruption. The decrease in the risk of corruption in the period from 2005 to 2010 is explained by the reaction of bribe-takers to the fight against corruption that has begun. At the same time, taking bribes somewhat less often, corrupt officials compensate for this by increasing the amount of bribes.

Table 1

Comparison of the values ​​of the characteristics of the everyday corruption market in Russia in 2001, 2005 and 2010 (V %)

Characteristic
Corrupt coverage
Corruption risk
Willingness to pay bribes
Intensity of corruption
Average bribe, rub.
Average normalized bribe-1*
The average normalized amount of a bribe is 2*
Average annual corruption fee, rub.
Normalized average annual corruption fee-1*
Normalized average annual corruption fee-2*
The volume of the market of "domestic" corruption, million rubles.
The normalized volume of the market of "domestic" corruption-1*
The normalized volume of the market of "domestic" corruption-2**

* For 2010, the forecast is used.

** For 2010, the result of 2009 was used. Source: MED, 2011.

If we evaluate the dynamics of the everyday corruption market in monetary units, then for a correct comparison it is necessary to take into account the dynamics of income, which, of course, includes the inflation component. Therefore, in Table 1, along with absolute monetary indicators, relative ones are used. Their change shows that absolute monetary incomes grew faster than corruption expenses expressed in absolute units. This leads to a decrease in the values ​​of relative indicators. Similarly, the normalized volume of the market for everyday corruption is also falling. The values ​​of the latter may seem small. However, it should be taken into account that the total annual corruption expenses of citizens are correlated with all expenses: for housing, food, clothing, leisure, health, etc. In addition, the expenses of the entire population, including the disabled, are taken into account, and not just the expenses of bribe givers.

The data in Table 1 make it possible to estimate the number of corrupt transactions made during one year in the market of "domestic" corruption. Such an estimate is obtained by dividing the volume of the corruption market by the average size of a bribe. It is clear that this estimate can give a bias, since for a more accurate analysis it is necessary to take into account the distribution of the number of bribes over intervals of their size, but for an approximate estimate used in calculating the dynamics, it is quite adequate. The results of simple calculations are as follows: in 2001 and 2005. the number of corrupt transactions in the market of everyday corruption fluctuated within the range of 46-47 million, in 2010 the value of this indicator decreased to 31 million transactions. It is easy to see that until 2005 the indicator under consideration demonstrated stability, which was ensured by a balance between the growth of the corruption onslaught by state representatives, on the one hand, and the flight of citizens from bribes, on the other. By 2010, there was a decrease in the number of corrupt transactions by a third from the initial level. This is most likely due to the symbolic influence of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign in Russia and is more typical of everyday corruption.

Statistical analysis shows that the distribution of corrupt practices in the social space is weakly dependent on social positions. The key factor is the intensity of interaction between members of social groups and the state.

A completely different picture is characteristic of special markets for everyday corruption. Let's start the study by comparing the structure of these markets, which is reflected in the share of corrupt transactions in each of them. The corresponding data are given in Table 2. Only the data for 2005 and 2010 are compared, since in 2001 the study originally set a slightly different list of special markets for everyday corruption.

table 2

Comparison of the structure of the everyday corruption market in 2005 and 2010 by share of bribes (corrupt transactions)
Situation
1. Receiving free medical care in a polyclinic (tests, doctor's appointments, etc.), in a hospital (serious treatment, surgery, normal care, etc.)
2. Preschool institutions (admission, service, etc.)
3. School: to enter the right school and successfully graduate from it, education, “contributions”, “thanks”, etc.
4 University: enroll, transfer from one university to another, exams and tests, diploma, etc.
5. Pensions: registration, recalculation, etc.
6. Social embroidered: clearance, recalculation, etc.
7. Solving problems in connection with conscription for military service
8. Job: Get what you want or secure a promotion
9. Land plot: purchase (for giving or running your own household) and / or register the right to it
10. Housing: obtain and / or formalize the legal right to it, privatization, etc.
I. Get services for the repair, operation of housing from municipal services for the operation (DEZ, etc.)
12. When applying to the court
13. When applying for help and protection to the police
14. Obtain a residence registration, passport or foreign passport, weapons permit, etc.
15. Settle the situation with the traffic police (obtaining rights, technical inspection, violation of traffic rules, etc.)
16. Register real estate transactions (houses, apartments, garages, etc.

For ease of comparison, this and the following tables list the characteristic's value along with its rank; rank 1 is assigned to the highest value. In the tables, individual rows with data indicating significant and indicative dynamics are highlighted in dark gray 12 . In Table 2, two markets are highlighted in color, which are characterized by a significant increase in the share of the general market of domestic corruption: this concerns preschool institutions and traffic police. The first place of health care is due to the fact that health is the most demanded public good. Household corruption is also showing strong negative dynamics in preschool institutions. The explanation is that a huge deficit has formed in this area of ​​public services, which causes corruption of the socialist type. We will discuss the dynamics of corruption among the traffic police below.

The following tables also provide data for 2001, but only for those special markets for everyday corruption that were then included in the list. Markets that do not participate in comparisons are represented by empty shaded cells.

When analyzing the data in Table 3, one should keep in mind the general trend recorded in Table 1: a decrease in the risk of corruption in general in the market of everyday corruption. Therefore, Table 3 identifies three markets: with a significant drop in the risk of corruption - getting help from the police, with the absence of such a drop - the traffic police, which retains its leading position, and with a significant increase in the risk of corruption - the situation of getting the right job or promotion (this market with one of the last places moved to fifth) 13 . It can be noted that with the leading position of everyday corruption in the structure of special markets, healthcare is significantly inferior to most other markets in terms of the risk of corruption. The recorded drop in the risk of corruption in the police is partly associated with the structural changes that have taken place over the past five years: migration and registration at the place of residence (together with passports) have been removed from the police.

Recall that the willingness to give bribes in everyday corruption as a whole also decreased. Given this circumstance, Table 4 highlights three special cases. The first is an unexpected doubling of the willingness to pay bribes in the field of pension services. A possible explanation is the retirement of a generation that has mastered corrupt practices in recent years. The second is an equally significant drop in the sphere of services for the security of citizens.

Table 3

Perhaps this is due to a change in the attitude of citizens towards the police. In the same series, the third case: an equally large-scale decline in the willingness to pay bribes in the field of military conscription. This can be explained by institutional changes (a significant reduction in the period of conscription service). The high willingness to pay bribes in healthcare and in solving problems with the traffic police has a different nature. In the first case, the high price of refusing a bribe for those who do not have enough money for paid medicine affects. In the second case, the specifics of bribe givers are decisive: car owners, as a rule, are people with an income that allows them to pay bribes.

When comparing various special markets for everyday corruption, the volume of these markets serves as one of the integral indicators characterizing their dynamics. Table 5 provides relevant information. We are seeing a sharp increase in corruption turnovers in two special markets. The first is the "services" provided by the traffic police (more than three times). In the period from 2001 to 2005, this market declined due to a number of reasons, the first of which is institutional, associated with the emergence of global legal proceedings. In recent years, the traffic police leadership has made many regulatory “efforts” to restore the market for corruption on the roads, which is also evident from the results of this study.

Table 4

Note. For 2005 and 2010 the rank (r) of the value of R is given; rank 1 is assigned to the market with the highest willingness to bribe.

From 2005 to 2010, the annual income from corruption in the market of security services, which the police are supposed to provide, increased by almost 13 (!) times. Here, the reasons for the growth of corruption lie in the inefficiency of the provision of public services, the global decomposition of the system and the complete loss of controllability. It is no coincidence that the police have now become the main object of public criticism and constant concern of the state, which is engaged in reforming this sphere 14 .

Table 5

Comparison of special markets for everyday corruption in 2001, 2005 and 2010 in terms of annual market volume (R, million rubles)

Note. For 2005 and 2010 the rank (r) of the average bribe is given; Rank 1 is assigned to the market with the highest average bribe.

Table 5 highlights several corruption markets with increased annual revenues. Revenues in the medical services market more than doubled, which brought it to the first place. Pre-school institutions made a "jump" from 10th to 5th place, having increased their corruption proceeds by almost 4 times. In this case, the growth of corruption is due to the growing shortage of this type of service.

At the same time, we are seeing no less impressive examples of the reduction of corruption markets. Perhaps the most striking example is conscription. Here, from 2001 to 2005, there was a rapid growth of the corruption market, but in recent years there has been a more than sevenfold reduction in its volume, which was the result of targeted efforts by the military leadership. In two more service markets, corruption was reduced in a similar way (by 3-4 times) - both of them are associated with the registration of real estate.

The volume of the corrupt market is a convenient indicator when analyzing the dynamics of special markets, but it does not allow comparison between them, since differences in market sizes are largely due to differences in the intensity of use of various services by citizens. Therefore, for an integral comparison of everyday corruption markets, a specially designed indicator is needed, based on characteristics that do not depend on the intensity of interaction of citizens with a particular area of ​​public services. In our case, these are the risk of corruption, the willingness to pay bribes, and the average size of a bribe. The value of each characteristic is converted in a linear manner so that the minimum value is 0 and the maximum value is 1. After that, the converted values ​​are averaged. The new integral value "Level of everyday corruption" is also in the range from 0 to 1. The results of the described calculations are shown in Figure 2.

We see two markets leading the way: higher education and traffic police. Next, with some margin, are conscription for military service and preschool institutions.

Dynamics of business corruption in Russia

As mentioned above, only two large surveys on business corruption are available - 2001 and 2005. Therefore, the main data on the dynamics of business corruption in Russia will concern this time interval. For the subsequent period, some qualitative assessments will be given. The peculiarities of sociological communication with entrepreneurs did not allow asking them questions similar to those asked by ordinary citizens. Therefore, the list of characteristics to describe business corruption will be shorter. We restrict ourselves to the following characteristics: corruption coverage 15 , intensity of corruption, average size of a bribe and market size. The listed characteristics of the business corruption market as a whole are presented in Table 6.

The data presented in the table are striking: the absolute size of the bribe has increased by more than 13 times; the volume of the business corruption market has grown 9 times, while the intensity has slightly decreased, and the scope of corruption has not changed. Comparing the volume of the corruption market with the turnover leads to the conclusion that entrepreneurs deduct one third of their income for bribes, which seems completely improbable. The bewilderment is supported by the fact that the given assessments of the characteristics of business corruption practice are estimates from below - the real volume of corruption is above 16 . Therefore, the data presented require comments and justification.

Table 6

Comparison of the characteristics of the business corruption market in Russia in 2001 and 2005

Let's start with the size of the bribes. Constant thorough statistical analysis of sociological data (Satarov, 2012) showed the following. The sample distribution of the size of bribes in the field of business corruption is very reliably approximated by “gluing” two log-normal distributions. The first part of the gluing corresponds to "typical" bribes, the second - to "large" bribes. In 2001, "large" bribes accounted for 5% of all observations. In 2005, this share increased fivefold, with both "typical" and "large" bribes growing at the same time, the latter especially sharply.

In order to assess the real scale of this dynamics, one must take into account the accompanying growth of the economy and the turnover of firms. This is where the problem of normative indicators arises, and therefore we decided to evaluate the dynamics of the “purchasing power” of bribes by comparing the average size of a bribe with the average Russian cost of one square meter of housing on the primary market 17 . The results of the calculations showed the following: in 2001, a medium-sized bribe could buy 30 square meters of housing; in 2005 it became possible to buy 209 square meters of housing - seven (!) times more. Although prices in this market have grown rapidly in these years.

However, with such a large market for business corruption, the above explanations are not enough. Let's do a little comparison. In 2005, the total income from the export of crude oil, oil products and gas amounted, according to official data, to $149 billion. from business corruption more than double the revenue from hydrocarbon exports. This gave us grounds at the beginning of the article to call corruption the main branch of the Russian economy.

Considering this circumstance, let us analyze the figures characterizing the size of the business corruption market. First of all, the following should be noted. Although since 1996 in Russia the calculation of GDP and turnover has been (formally) based on the System of National Accounts (SNA), its requirements are not fully met. In particular, the scale of the shadow economy is sharply underestimated, and corruption, as required by the SNA standards, is not taken into account at all. Independent estimates of the shadow economy in Russia are much higher than official data. Our calculations, the results of which coincide with the results of other experts (Yasin, Shestoperov, 2010), show that by 2005 the shadow turnover amounted to approximately 40% of the real estimate of the total (“white” and shadow together) turnover (excluding corruption) 18 . With this assessment, the ratio of the volume of the business corruption market to turnover reaches 17%.

The growth of corruption and the growth of the shadow economy are closely interrelated. One of the reasons is that bribes partially serve as a kind of shadow tax. On the other hand, high corruption proceeds exacerbate the problem of their use, expanding the sphere of shadow consumption.

The second aspect that we must discuss when analyzing the size of the business corruption market in Russia concerns the nature of this indicator: it characterizes the total annual income of bribe givers, but does not coincide with the total annual losses from bribes for entrepreneurs. This is due to the fact that part of the corrupt proceeds is returned to the market for corrupt consumption. We can say that we have the right to introduce a parameter that can be called “marginal propensity for corrupt consumption”, which is estimated by the share of corrupt income that returns to the domestic market for consumption during the year. It is easy to calculate that with a reasonable increase in the marginal propensity for corrupt consumption, the total annual losses from paying bribes for the entire business can decrease by two to three times. Our quite conservative estimates, taking into account the considerations listed above, show that the net annual costs of the entire business for paying bribes in 2005 amounted to 7-10% of the total turnover. The last figure seems to be more than realistic 19 .

So, the recorded growth of business corruption was caused by three processes. First, the share of monthly turnover allocated by firms to pay bribes has approximately doubled (meaning the total turnover - legal and shadow). The second process: the share of large bribes in the total array of bribes increased from 5 to 25%. Third: the total turnover of firms has increased. According to our data, the median distribution of firms by monthly turnover increased by more than 3 times. We also argue that the main contribution to this change is made by the growth of shadow turnover, which outpaces the growth of legal turnover.

We believe that the Khodorkovsky case had a certain impact on the growth of corruption, but the case itself and its effect had common fundamental causes that lay both in the political and economic spheres. We will start with the economic aspect, and for discussion we will use the concept of opportunity cost. We will assume that the entrepreneur makes a choice between two lines of behavior: a legal strategy (honesty) and a corruption strategy. Each strategy leads to its own costs, which include direct costs, risk assessments of various negative consequences, moral assessments, etc. When making a decision, the entrepreneur weighs the estimated costs of the two strategies and chooses the one that is associated with lower costs. Therefore, if the costs of a legal strategy are higher than those of a corrupt one, this should lead to an overall increase in corruption.

Beginning with the 2001 survey, the entrepreneurs' questionnaire included a question that measured entrepreneurs' assessments of the costs of honest and corrupt behaviour. With a high level of statistical significance, it was found that the high costs of complying with legal norms are considered by entrepreneurs as a more significant obstacle than the costs of bribes, with the costs of “correct” behavior increasing from 2001 to 2005 due to the actions of the bureaucracy (Satarov, 2012 ).

Structure of political and business corruption

The whole variety of types of business corruption can be classified according to two fundamentally different grounds: who gets paid and who pays. The first basis generates a classification of types of corruption by special markets: by branches of government (legislative, executive, judicial) and types of regulation (non-financial control, supervisory; fiscal, tax; licensing; customs; law enforcement). The second basis generates a classification of types of corruption according to different groups

bribers. We will start by comparing the types of bribe takers using the structure of special corruption markets, i.e. the share of bribes in each market (a comparison of average bribes did not reveal significant differences). We see from Figure 3 that the largest share of bribes falls on the executive branch.

The result obtained is a direct consequence of the extreme regulation of economic activity. This structure was also fixed according to the data of 2001. There is no relationship between the scale of business (small, medium, large) and the attraction to one or another branch of government in corrupt interactions.

The judiciary in the diagram above appears to be the least corrupt. As recent studies by the INDEM Foundation show (Gorbuz et al., 2010), the judiciary in Russia is divided into three uneven segments. One segment includes cases in which, with rare exceptions, the interests of some third party are not visible. This includes almost all cases of civil proceedings, most of the arbitration cases and a fairly significant part of the cases of administrative proceedings. This segment includes the majority of the total array of cases considered in courts, and they are resolved, as a rule, without violations of procedures and rules of law. The second segment forms the criminal justice. It is not very corrupt, but is characterized by a huge accusatory bias: no more than 0.5% of acquittals.

The third segment is the most important: these are cases in which there is influence of a third party. This may be political influence, as in the well-known case of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. The same category of cases includes all cases of violation of electoral rights. Another category of cases in this segment is characterized by the presence of third-party commercial interest. This segment of Russian justice is relatively small, but its influence is extremely large in terms of negative consequences for the country.

An important part of political corruption 20 in Russia is corruption in the field of political competition. In the mid-2000s, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, the political structure was changed. Directly related to corruption is the adoption of new laws on elections to the State Duma and on presidential elections.

In the article by Person et al. (Persson et al., 2003), different electoral systems were characterized by two parameters: the first is the level of barriers to entry into the political market, and the second is the degree of independence of the elected from voters. It was shown that the higher the level of barriers and the higher the degree of independence of the elected from voters, the higher the level of corruption in the country. The changes made to the electoral legislation significantly raised the barriers for political parties, on the one hand, and on the other hand, limited the participation of citizens. Political corruption does not stop there. Its constant manifestations include the trade in administrative posts at all levels of government and the adoption of laws for motives far from the interests of voters.

Let's return to the routine functions of the executive branch. The structure of special markets for corruption by areas of economic regulation is quite stable. Additional analysis shows that small businesses are more likely (compared to businesses of a different scale) to pay bribes to law enforcement officials. Large business mainly pays to tax authorities, and medium - to licensing. The aspect of the corrupt influence of the police deserves special consideration. In the 1990s, extensive control over private owners was opened up, especially with regard to laws governing the work of the police. This quickly led to massive corruption, especially in small businesses. Later, attempts were repeatedly made to amend the laws and reduce the corruption pressure of the police on business, but we see that it not only persisted, but even grew.

It was noted above that corruption is one of the forms of adaptation (in this case, business) to defects in the institutional environment. The analysis undertaken in our studies made it possible to identify the types of such strategies and assess their impact on business success (Satarov, 2012). The greatest success today is achieved by enterprises that follow two paths. The first way is corruption. While bribes are burdensome for them, they are compelled to accept them because of perceived inefficiencies in government regulation and significant administrative obstacles. Another way to realize business success is to seize business by power. Enterprises following this path are quite large, moreover, they enter into strong partnerships. As a result, there is little need for them to resort to the usual corruption in the form of bribery.

The next most effective strategy is to systematically "feed" government officials on a relatively small scale, turning them into "business partners". We emphasize that a rather small number of enterprises adhere to this strategy. It seems to be unsustainable compared to the other one used by numerous and successful enterprises: to give average bribes to “your people” and actively resort to pulling. Other strategies are less successful, for example - rarely give bribes, and in small amounts. The result (and possibly the reason) of choosing such a strategy is a very low business efficiency.

Thus, at present, in terms of business success, in essence, only two strategies are effective: “surrendering” your business to government representatives and “taking” government representatives for regular maintenance. All other strategies are either unsustainable or do not lead to business success.

An alternative classification of business strategies based on the use of various types of informal practices is proposed in the article by Ledeneva and Shekshni (2011). The results of the study conducted by the authors showed that, compared with 2000, the level of direct extortion has significantly decreased. At the same time, there is a tendency to increase pressure from officials, as well as the emergence of more and more politicians from among the former criminal authorities. Another significant change is the transition from cash bribes to more complex, long-term schemes.

We do not have reliable sociological data on the dynamics of business corruption after 2005, but we can judge the general trend from indirect evidence. According to the reports of law enforcement agencies, in particular, one can judge (approximately, of course) about an increase in the amount of bribes. The anti-corruption campaign launched by President Medvedev has a negative impact: one of the big businessmen said of the authorities: “They are now taking like the last time,” hinting at a sharp increase in bribes. Thus, in 2000-2009. corruption in Russia was growing, primarily business corruption, and by 2004 it had significantly surpassed the level of the late 1990s. In addition to sociological data (in particular, studies of the INDEM Foundation), this is recorded by the data of criminal prosecutions, which indicate a rapid increase in the amount of bribes. In 2008, presidential candidate D. Medvedev, during his election campaign, was forced to talk about the inadmissibility of trade in government posts. In the 1990s, this topic was not raised even by the opposition (although there is indirect evidence of individual rare cases).

Consequences of corruption in Russia

Russia is a country with large-scale endemic corruption. In such a state, corruption turns from an episodic deviation from moral and legal rules into a supporting structure of power, a norm of relations between citizens and the state. In such a critically ill state, almost every negative consequence turns into a challenge. The list of main consequences-problems-challenges is given below.

Corruption becomes a source of corruption. We are talking about an avalanche-like process in which corruption breeds corruption. We proceed from the general position that corruption is the result of inefficiency, like defects in management or problems in public relations. Large-scale corruption gives rise to new defects and problems, and they, in turn, give rise to new varieties of corruption and lead to the expansion of its existing types. As a result, corruption becomes the main source of problems for the country and society, which is what is happening now in Russia (Cheloukhine and King, 2007).

Corruption is a giant institutional trap. Most - in power and in society - the costs associated with overcoming corruption are perceived as significantly exceeding the current costs of corruption itself.

Getting used to corruption. According to various sociological data, at least half of Russian citizens have found themselves in a corruption situation at least once in their lives. Corruption has become an informal practice that is widespread. In such a situation, informal practice turns into an informal norm, condemned in words, but acceptable in fact, which makes it very difficult to counteract it.

Corruption is a threat to national security. This idea has been repeatedly expressed by both experts and government officials. Large-scale corruption covers all power and law enforcement agencies, and corruption in them is equivalent to their inefficiency. Consequently, the risks of any other threats are growing uncontrollably.

Corruption is a threat to public safety. Again, it is important to recall the equivalence of corruption and inefficiency, in particular the inefficiency of enforcement of standards in different areas (construction, fire safety, childcare, etc.).

Corruption causes the degradation of "human capital". It was noted above that healthcare and education are among the most developed markets for everyday corruption. Therefore, as a result of corruption, life expectancy and the level of health of people are reduced, and intellectual capital is degrading. No less destructive is the impact of corruption on basic social relations, on morality, which again leads to an increase in corruption and indifference to the possible negative consequences of this growth.

Corruption destroys the sphere of law. We are talking about the basic legal relations in society, without which its normal existence is unthinkable. Corruption is expressed, in particular, in the selective application of laws (a typical example is the Yukos case), as a result of which an alternative shadow quasi-legal system is formed that coexists with official law, distorting and destroying it. Another, even more serious, consequence is connected with this consequence - a catastrophically growing gap between laws and their implementation.

Corruption forms an abnormal economy in Russia. In such an economy, fundamental economic laws cease to operate. A particular example: corruption is becoming the main source of cost-push inflation. The reason is obvious: when bribes become a standard cost of business, compensation for these costs is built into the price of the product. At the same time, it is impossible to reduce inflation by standard methods, which was confirmed by the experience of Russia in the 2000s.

All eight listed consequences-challenges interact in various combinations with each other and reinforce each other, spinning the spiral of corruption and exacerbating its negative consequences.

It has been repeatedly mentioned above that corruption is always the result of inefficiency, first of all, of management inefficiency. In the case of Russia and its huge endemic corruption, this is manifested in the fact that the bureaucracy has largely left the subordination of the supreme power in everything related to the implementation of the standard functions of the state provided for by laws, and the critical inefficiency of power makes the socio-political situation explosive. This is the reason for sporadic attempts by the supreme authorities to limit corruption, including the most ambitious one, launched by Medvedev. But there are good reasons to doubt the success of these efforts. Since 2009, two national anti-corruption plans have been adopted, as well as a strategy. All this was done without the participation of professionals, any preliminary analysis of the situation, the adoption of indicators indicating the effectiveness of combating corruption.

We must state that the fight against corruption in Russia will become possible only if the monopoly omnipotent position of the bureaucracy is eliminated. This means the need to restore political competition in Russia, the separation of powers and the freedom of the non-state sector - entrepreneurship, the media, and public organizations. Then it will be possible to use various recipes, taking into account, among other things, the accumulated negative experience.

1 Within the framework of this article, we consider corruption, in which only representatives of the state who receive a salary from it are involved. At the same time, we call corrupt behavior the use by representatives of the state for personal purposes of the resources that the state provides them for the exercise of their official powers.

2 Let us point out, in particular, the review works: Aidt, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2007.

3 Myslovsky, 2007; Timofeev, 2000; Klyamkin, Timofeev, 2000; Radaev, 2000.

4 This is a kind of proposal that can be called "imposed". A similar proposal is characterized by a planned economy.

5 This typology uses the names of continents. This is not surprising, because the specifics of corruption, determined by the history and culture of various parts of the world, do exist. Similar terminology has been used in other studies (see, for example, Paldam, 2002). However, we ask readers to consider the proposed titles as provisional.

6 The scale of the latter was enormous and still underestimated in its function of filling the gaps of an inefficient planning system. See: Timofeev, 2000.

7 A typical example is the emergence of Gazprom. This also applied to the emergence of private banks.

8 The diagram was built on the basis of simple expert assessments of three Russian experts who worked in the ratings matching mode. Therefore, specific percentages are not given to emphasize the qualitative, rather than quantitative, nature of the picture.

9 Corruption is assessed as a whole in the country, although, of course, there are significant regional differences.

10 The 2001 surveys were conducted by the INDEM Foundation as part of a large project funded by the World Bank. 2017 citizens and 709 entrepreneurs were interviewed. The 2005 survey was conducted with private donations from Russian entrepreneurs. 3010 citizens and 1030 entrepreneurs were interviewed. The 2010 poll was funded by the federal budget of the Russian Federation as part of the program for monitoring domestic corruption in Russia, carried out on behalf of President D. Medvedev. In 70 regions of Russia, 17,500 citizens were surveyed in order to compare the regions with each other. From this sample, a subsample was formed, representing Russia, with a volume of 3,200 respondents.

11 The developed methodology was repeatedly evaluated by American and Russian experts and was recognized as correct and conservative. A description of the technique can be found, for example, in: Satarov, 2004; 2006.

12 An analysis of the statistical significance of differences is analyzed in detail in: Satarov, 2012. No comparison will be made in terms of corruption coverage (it does not make sense for special markets) and normalized characteristics, since the normalization coefficients used are the same for all special markets of everyday corruption.

13 This type of corruption is not always part of state corruption. But it is extremely important for citizens, which was the reason for its inclusion in the sociological survey.

14 We draw the readers' attention to the fact that the decline in demand for corruption related to everyday corruption in general. At the same time, there may be an increase in everyday corruption in certain special markets.

15 In this case, the coverage of corruption is interpreted somewhat differently - as the share of entrepreneurs who at least once paid a bribe for their business.

16 This fact is confirmed by the fact that the method of sociological surveys is accompanied by several limitations. First, the sample does not include criminal business (drugs, human trafficking, smuggling, etc.) and super-large businesses. Secondly, the higher the bribes, the more likely it is to avoid answering the question during the interview. Thirdly, the method of statistical estimation itself is focused on conservative estimates.

17 It makes no sense to use standard indicators like the cost of a basket, since the consumer basket of an ordinary Russian differs from that of an average Russian entrepreneur. On the other hand, real estate is a popular area for investing corruption proceeds, not only for consumption, but also for accumulation.

18 Shadow turnover here refers to the part of economic activity that is exempt from taxation.

19 Unfortunately, we are unable to compare our results with data from other studies. In those rare cases where questions on the amount of bribes are included in the questionnaires, the intensity of corruption is not assessed, which is necessary to calculate the size of the corruption market.

20 By political corruption, we mean the illegal use of power to strengthen one's own power.

Bibliography

Galitsky E., Levin M. (2007). Corruption relationships between business and government (empirical analysis) // Questions of Economics. No. 1. S. 19 - 32.

Gorbuz A. K., Krasnov M. A., Mishina E. A., Satarov G. A. (2010). Transformation of the Russian judiciary. Experience in complex analysis. SPb.: Norma.

Klyamkin I. M., Timofeev L. M. (2000). Shadow Russia. Economic and sociological research. M.: Ros. state humanit. un-t.

Levin M. I., Satarov G. A. (2012). Russian Corruption: Past, Present, Future: Report / XIII April International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development HSE. April 3 - 5, Moscow.

Ledeneva A., Shekshnya S. (2011). Business in Russia: informal practices and anti-corruption strategies // Russie.Nei.Visions. No. 58. March.

Myslovsky E. N. (2007). Corruption in Russia: a crime or a way of life. Moscow: Ekon-Inform.

MED (2011). State of Everyday Corruption in the Russian Federation / Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/connect/116f09004739f0c7a2a4eeb4415291fl/doklad_kor.pdf?MOD=AJPERES<&C ACHEID=116f09004739f0c7a2a4eeb4415291fl.

Osipyan A. L. (2011). Raiding: corrupt takeovers and hostile takeovers. Kramatorsk: Circulation-51.

Satarov G. A. (ed.) (2004). Anti-corruption policy / INDEM Foundation. M.: SPAS.

Satarov G. A. (2006). Measurement of everyday corruption in mass sociological surveys // Bulletin of Public Opinion. No. 3. S. 25 - 33.

Satarov G. (2007). How to measure and control corruption // Questions of Economics. No. 1. S. 4 - 10.

Satarov G. A. (2012). Russian corruption: level, structure, dynamics. Experience of sociological analysis. [In the press].

Satarov G., Parkhomenko S. (2001). Country Diversity and Corruption Diversity (Analysis of Comparative Studies): Policy Paper. Moscow: INDEM Fund. www.anti-corr.ru/indem/2001razn_corr.doc.

Timofeev L. M. (2000). Institutional corruption: essays on theory. M: RGGU. .

Yasin E. T., Shestoperov O. M. (2010). Estimation of shadow turnover in small business. www.nisse.ru/business/article/article_l 113.html?effort=l.

Abed G. T, Gupta S. (eds.). (2002). Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Acemoglu D., Verdier T (2000). The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption // American Economic Review. Vol. 90, No. 1. P. 194-211.

Aidt T S. (2003). Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey // Economic Journal. Vol. 113, No. 491. P. 632-652.

Allina-Pisano J. (2010). Social Contracts and Authoritarian Projects in Post-Soviet Space: The Use of Administrative Resource // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 43, No 4. P. 373-382.

Bakaleinik E., Mirkin B., Levin M. (2002). Intelligent K-Means Clustering in Analysis of Newspaper Articles on Bribing // Artificial Intelligence. 2002. No 2. P. 365 - 373.

Cheloukhine S., King J. (2007). Corruption Networks as a Sphere of Investment Activities in Modern Russia // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol. 40, No. 1. P. 107-122.

Dininio P., Orttung R. W. (2005). Explaining Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions // World Politics. Vol. 57, No 4. P. 500-529.

Hellman J. S., Geraint J., Kaufmann D. (2003). Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition // Journal of Comparative Economics. Vol. 31, No 4. P. 751-773.

Kotkin S., Sajo A. (eds.). 2004. Political Corruption in Transition: A Skeptic's Handbook. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Lambsdorff J. G. 2007. The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform. Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press.

Osipian A. (2010). Corrupt Organizational Hierarchies in the Former Soviet Bloc // Transition Studies Review. Vol. 17, No 4. P. 822-836.

Osipian A. (2012). Education Corruption, Reform, and Growth: Case of Post-Soviet Russia // Journal of Eurasian Studies. Vol. 3, No 1. P. 20-29.

Paldam M. (2002). The Cross-country Pattern of Corruption: Economics, Culture and the Seesaw Dynamics // European Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 18, No. 2. P. 215-240.

Persson T., Tabellini G., Trebbi F. (2003). Electoral Rules and Corruption // Journal of the European Economic Association. Vol. 1, No 4. P. 958 - 989.

Radaev V. 2000. Corruption and Violence in Russian Business in the Late 1990s // Bribery and Blat in Russia / S. Lovell, A. Ledeneva, A. Rogachevskii (eds.). L.: Macmillan.

Rose-Ackerman S. (ed.). (2006). International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Safavian M. S., Graham D. H., Gonzalez-Vega C. (2001). Corruption and Microenterprises in Russia // World Development. Vol. 29, No 7. P. 1215-1224.

Shleifer A., ​​Vis/my R. W. (1993). Corruption // Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 108, No 3. P. 599-618.

Shleifer A., ​​Vishny R. W. (1998). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Stefes C. H. (2007). Measuring, Conceptualizing, and Fighting Systemic Corruption: Evidence from Post-Soviet Countries // Perspectives on Global Issues. Vol. 2, No. 1. P. 1-16.

Yakovlev A. (2001). "Black Cash" Tax Evasion in Russia: Its Forms, Incentives and Consequences at Firm Level // Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 53, No 1. P. 33-55.

Corruption as a social phenomenon

The term "corruption" is based on the Latin verb "rumpere", meaning "to break something". In general, this translation gives a general idea of ​​the essence of corruption - damage to power by bribing it. The Latin-Russian dictionary, in addition to the above meanings, also gives such meanings as “seduction, decline, perversion, bad condition, vicissitudes (of opinions or views), as well as upset, damage, degrade, destroy, destroy, seduce, seduce, corrupt, distort, falsify, dishonor, dishonor. In Roman law, this term denoted the activities of several persons aimed at disrupting the normal course of the judicial process or the management of society, and corruption included a number of acts related to the falsification and damage of state documents, bribery of judges or moral corruption of someone else's slave. The concept of corruption refers to categories of complex, multifaceted, to the disclosure of the essential content of which researchers approach from different positions. We can talk about corruption as a criminal act and consider this phenomenon in legal aspect(that is, through the concepts of legality and illegality). In the context sociological discourse corruption is studied as a complex, multidimensional social phenomenon which covers all spheres of social relations between civil society and the state and takes root in society, becoming a social norm. In sociology, corruption is interpreted as a kind of deviant (deviant) behavior, as a violation of role functions members of society under the direct influence of private interests, as inconsistent with status public servant a self-serving act (“abandoning the expected standards of behavior on the part of authorities for the sake of illegal personal gain”). At the same time, it seems that corruption is a social phenomenon that consists in the decomposition of power, when state (municipal) employees and other persons authorized to perform state functions use their official position, status and authority of their position for personal gain or group interests. She is regarded as disease of developing societies, the result of poverty. There are also everyday understanding corruption, which is formed on the basis of the experience of the population. The phenomenon of corruption here often comes down to a bribe, nepotism, while it is mythologized and presented as an inevitable, integral part of culture, certain rules of the game, which, due to the lack of choice, must be unconditionally accepted by everyone. Bribery, “administrative delight” (as F. Dostoevsky aptly put it), nepotism become a social norm, finding its expression in everything, even in folklore (“if you don’t put it on, you won’t go”). Russians consider bribes more like “economic costs” and treat them as “normal”. The most complete and deep understanding of corruption is possible when studying it as social phenomenon, social practice, stereotypes of consciousness and their emotional perception. Corruption in social terms is one of the manifestations of corruption. The process of social construction of corruption includes: the presence of many facts of venality (bribery) of various civil servants and officials; awareness of these facts as a social problem; criminalization of certain forms of corrupt activities; the reaction of politicians, law enforcement agencies, lawyers , the media, the population for corruption, etc. In modern society, including Russian, corruption is social institution, element of the management system, closely interconnected with other social institutions - political, economic, cultural. The institutionalization of corruption is evidenced by: 1 the implementation of a number of social functions- simplification of administrative ties, acceleration and simplification of managerial decision-making, consolidation and restructuring of relations between social classes and groups, promotion of economic development by reducing bureaucratic barriers, optimization of the economy in conditions of scarcity of resources, etc. the presence of quite certain subjects corrupt relationships (patron - client), distribution social roles(bribe giver, bribe taker, intermediary); the presence of certain rules of the game, norms, known to the subjects of corrupt activities; slang And symbolism(for example, the well-known and well-understood gesture of rubbing the index and middle fingers with the thumb) corrupt practices; established and known to stakeholders dachshund services. For example, the fee traffic police officers was published back in 1996 by the Strela newspaper. Published existing rates in the field "law enforcement" payment for not initiating a criminal case ($1,000-10,000), for changing the preventive measure with release from custody ($20,000-25,000), for mitigating a sentence ($5,000-15,000), for ignoring customs violations ($10,000-20,000 or 20-25% of customs duty). But the "price of services" on the highest federal level: the cost of appointing a deputy of the State Duma to the position of chairman of the committee is about $30,000, the cost of submitting any bill to the State Duma is about $250,000, the status of an assistant to a deputy is estimated at $4,000-5,000. corruption, but covering the whole of society as a whole, a complete institutional system (economics, law, administrative relations, etc.) - all entirely outside the sphere of legal law. And corruption is only an element (albeit one of the most important, perhaps the most important) of this shadow reality of our existence.

The concept of corruption, its signs and types, forms of manifestation

In the Basic Provisions of the Draft Federal Law "Fundamentals of Anti-Corruption Policy": corruption- bribery (giving or receiving a bribe), as well as any illegal use by a person of his public status, associated with the receipt of benefits (property, services or benefits, including non-property ones) both for himself and for his loved ones contrary to legitimate interests society and the state, or providing such benefit to the specified person. However, there are other definitions of corruption. For example , corruption- this is a social phenomenon, expressed in the use by a person of his power, organizational and administrative or administrative and economic functions in order to obtain material and other benefits; this is the abuse of power by persons performing managerial functions in state and non-state organizations and institutions to obtain property benefits in the interests of themselves and their loved ones, which has harmed the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and organizations, the legally protected interests of society and the state; this is an abuse (excess) of power (official) powers in personal and corporate interests; this is the state of public authority, in which the exercise of its functions becomes possible only on a reimbursable basis, etc. Indeed, corruption in the narrow sense - this is when officials deliberately neglect their duties or act contrary to these duties for the sake of a certain material reward. Along with corruption in the narrow sense, there are bribery and independent bureaucratic entrepreneurship. Bribery differs from corruption in that an official is bribed not for the sake of violating his duties, but for the sake of fulfilling them. Bureaucratic entrepreneurship differs from corruption in the absence of a bribe. The customer of an official violation here is the executor himself, who derives income from the monopoly on decision-making. All of the above forms are united by the use of an official position for private interests - “privatization of the state”.

Types of corruption. As I mentioned above, corruption is a very complex, due to its ambiguity, and poorly understood phenomenon. Usually, two types of corruption are distinguished in the literature, which are inherent in absolutely all of its mechanisms: - top - bottom. First covers politicians, higher and middle officials and is associated with the adoption of decisions that have a high price. For example, the formulas of laws, government orders, changing the form of ownership of a significant part of state-owned property. Here, corruption begins when the goals of protecting the interests of the state and society are replaced by the selfish interests of an official, embodied in specific actions. The problem is very simple, for example, the state budget is not transparent, and depending on the situation, some may receive funds at the beginning of the year, while others - two years after the adoption of the budget. If someone is entitled to some kind of industry support, then, of course, any employee of the Ministry of Finance who distributes these amounts is an extremely important figure. This is one side of the matter. These are the three most significant services you can get from a government official. Such conditions are accompanied by many acts for the issuance of state loans, budgetary funds, as well as in the distribution of government orders. The cooperation of officials with commercial banks made it possible to change the forms of receiving bribes in cash and move on to soft loans, high interest on deposits and other forms of gratitude. At the same time, the transfer of illegal proceeds abroad reduces the risk of corrupt transactions and thus encourages corruption.

Second distributed at the middle and lower levels, and is associated with constant, routine interaction between officials and citizens (fines, registration, etc.). The situation in which lower officials took bribes and transferred part of the money received to higher officials existed only in the first 2-4 years of the development of a market economy in Russia. Then there was a familiar scheme in which access to a higher official was carried out through a lower official. This limited access to high-level officials by competitors. Then the financial capabilities of the oligarchic groups increased so much that they no longer needed intermediaries to access top officials.

There are the following types of corruption: Domestic corruption is generated by the interaction of ordinary citizens and officials. It includes various gifts from citizens and services to an official and members of his family. This category also includes nepotism (nepotism). Business corruption arises in the interaction of government and business. For example, in the event of a commercial dispute, the parties may seek to enlist the support of a judge in order to reach a decision in their favor.
Corruption of the supreme power refers to the political leadership and supreme courts in democratic systems. It concerns groups in power whose unscrupulous behavior consists in implementing policies in their own interests and to the detriment of the interests of voters. The official definition of corruption is given in the Federal Law of December 25, 2008 No. official position, giving a bribe, accepting a bribe, abuse of authority, commercial bribery or other illegal use by an individual of his official position contrary to the legitimate interests of society and the state in order to obtain benefits in the form of money, valuables, other property or services of a property nature, other property rights for themselves or for third parties, or the illegal provision of such benefits to the specified person by other individuals.
Legislatively, the concept of "corruption" is defined in two meanings (simple and complex - if you resort to the language of criminal law): 1) as an identified and proven fact of abuse by a person (official or other person) of his official position. Further, the forms of such abuse are specified: a bribe (giving or receiving it), commercial bribery or other use by an individual of his official position contrary to the legitimate interests of society and (or) illegally;
2) as an identified and proven fact of abuse by a person of his official position on behalf of or in the interests of a legal entity.
A special approach to the definition of the concept under consideration, based on the collective content, is noted.

Forms of corruption. On the basis of the types of corruption listed above, the following forms of corruption are distinguished: bribery for the legal and illegal provision of goods and services; protectionism, manifested in the promotion of persons on the grounds of kinship, friendship or personal loyalty; merging employees of government bodies with criminal elements and concealing the crimes of individuals and ensuring their impunity; supporting and lobbying the interests of the shadow economy in response to political support or promotion to positions in power structures; investing in private enterprises and organizations at the expense of the state or local budget; privatization with the illegal transfer of state property into private hands, aptly named by the people “privatization”; granting privileges, secret official information to interested persons; granting the right or opportunity to conclude profitable contracts; assistance in concluding contracts with foreign firms that are unfavorable for the state, and others. Existing

forms of manifestation of corruption are diverse: bribery is a collective term that covers two independent compositions of malfeasance against state power, the interests of public service and service in local governments - receiving and giving a bribe; excess of official powers and their abuse is a crime against the interests of the state (municipal) service. It consists in the use by an official of his official powers contrary to the interests of the service or clearly beyond the limits of his official powers, if this act is committed out of mercenary or other personal interest and entailed a significant violation of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens or organizations, or legally protected interests of society or the state; favoritism - historically: a socio-cultural phenomenon that aimed to exalt a specific person (or group of people) in connection with the personal affection of the monarch for the favorite; nepotism (nepotism) - historically: the distribution by the popes of Rome to strengthen their power of profitable positions, higher church ranks or lands to close relatives. High officials, like

As a rule, they do not have the opportunity to transfer their power to children directly, but they use their opportunities to provide their close relatives. The harm from nepotism is to limit competition and suppress the selection of the best people; protectionism is the illegal provision of assistance in finding employment, promotion

service, encouragement of a subordinate, as well as other patronage in the service, made out of selfish or other personal interest, that is, the desire of an official to derive a benefit of a non-property nature, due to such motives as careerism, familial

the desire to embellish the real situation, to receive mutual favors, to enlist support in resolving any issue and hide one's incompetence; lobbying - any activity of organizations or individuals that influences public authorities, puts pressure on a parliamentarian by personal or written appeal, or in another way (organization of mass petitions, a flow of letters, publications), the purpose of which is to achieve the adoption or rejection of a bill in order to promote their own interests, as well as the interests of business and organized crime in general; illegal distribution and redistribution of public resources and funds, illegal support and financing

political structures, parties, movements; blat (providing services to relatives and friends) - acquaintances or connections used for personal purposes and infringing on the interests of third parties.

A professional (competent) economic analysis of the company's activities, the effectiveness of its management differs from a non-professional (incompetent) one by unreality, a significant inaccuracy in reflecting both the advantages and the problems that determine the final results. As already noted in paragraph 1.4, about 60% of Russian companies are victims of various kinds of fraud related to their practice of interacting with dishonest people: company executives, employees, representatives of credit institutions and investors, suppliers, customers (consumers) and officials. The question arises of ranking these fraud threats against Russian companies in terms of their importance.

Along with the study of all types of significant threats from the external environment, it is also important to identify the subjects of threats to the flawless operation of companies, including the audit of personnel security in accordance with the powers vested in certain employees. We are talking about the separation of approaches to the analysis of the safety of the activities of employees of lower and middle levels of management and employees of senior management, endowed with the right to make strategic and key operational management decisions. It should be noted that today this analysis (in relation to the current heads of Russian enterprises, their competence, suitability for their position and legitimacy of activity) is a weak link in the competitiveness management system, and business corruption, understood as the appointment of relatives, acquaintances, etc. P. not by intelligence, but on the terms of relations of favoritism and a clearly expressed (in 2010–2015) differentiated approach to the distribution of company resources and payment of remuneration not by intelligence, ability to work, labor results, but by access to resources, is almost not studied, although it is a real threat to the further development of Russian society.

Scientific discussion

In the field of long-term scientific discussion in Russia - assessing the guilt of specific individuals acting illegally in order to achieve personal financial success, and the related problems of the real (not imaginary) competitiveness of Russian companies, their survival in the face of serious corruption pressure on them and the spread of other types of crimes .

The Ministry of Economic Development of Russia on October 24, 2014 summed up the results of a study of business and everyday corruption in Russia. In the course of sociological surveys of different groups of the population, everyday corruption was considered as a citizen getting into a corruption situation when applying to state authorities and local governments, public authorities. It was noted that, according to citizens, domestic corruption still reaches the highest level in the areas of activity of the traffic police, higher professional, school and preschool education. However, institutions of educational activities, health care, housing and communal services, where, according to official data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, there is a high level of corruption, they do not belong to public authorities. Business corruption, which has involved more than half of Russian enterprises for many years, refers to "informal payments", which is especially typical for litigation and the small business sector. It is also noted that the highest degree of corruption in the countries of the European Union belongs to the police (36%), the courts (23%) and education (11%), and among the sectors most at risk of corruption, it is possible to single out urban planning and construction - these are the sectors where exposure to corruption is generally high throughout the European Union, and health care is the sector that is the main contributor to so-called petty corruption .

Ya. A. Makeev came to the following conclusions: “The spread and rooting of corruption in our country has led to the fact that entire sectors of the economy and public administration are called corrupt.<...> The question of the nature and institutional features of corruption, its manifestations at the meso- and micro-levels of the social organization of society remains understudied." position of considering corruption only as the relationship of unscrupulous state and municipal employees among themselves, with the population and companies, he identifies the following features of the behavior of corrupt officials: informality of relations, opacity of actions, uncertainty of management procedures and practices, which defines corruption as a characteristic of not only state, but also corporate management in Russia and other countries of the world Let us give an example from the Russian practice of organizing educational activities, which does not yet have authority in the world community. and nomination for awards, bonuses not based on professional characteristics) showed that 85% of the contingent of employees of several tested universities do not have publications (not only in peer-reviewed journals from the VAK List, but in general any publications over the past three years, 2012-2015 ., and some do not have them after defending their dissertations and obtaining an academic title, moreover, they teach not according to the profile of their dissertations as a criterion of compliance in the absence of publications). A paradox arises: highly paid teaching positions are occupied by a contingent formed by an internal corporate or external corrupt administrative resource (as control over cash flows in a crisis situation in other areas of employment). Corporate corrupt officials in universities (often with a biography of involvement in state corruption in the past and present) have moved from buying or administratively pushing through their dissertations of little scientific value to buying their "scientific contributions", evaluated by themselves. It is difficult to figure out what such a contingent is talking about in their training sessions (especially on streams), not being able to correctly express their thoughts in publications (in their absence). The paradox lies in the fact that students whose studies are financed by the state or by themselves are not to blame for this corrupt history of poor quality education, in which the hand is a bridge. Admission of non-professional contingent to work - intra-corporate management based on corruption in the company, in this example, at the university; business corruption associated with the deception of consumers of a service (goods) regarding the conformity of the price to the unconfirmed declared quality and with the deception of employees with the carefully concealed purpose of their exploitation and, as a result, discrimination based on the level of involvement in corruption, nationality, gender, age, appearance and etc. This conclusion is presented in other terms in many works of Russian researchers. For example, I. S. Konstman emphasizes that the quality of educational services provided by a higher educational institution is officially assessed by state accreditation bodies. The result of graduates' knowledge is evaluated by the employer. However, it is important to identify the main factors influencing the educational process. The most significant and significant resource that provides a high level of knowledge of students is the contingent of university teachers. Their qualifications, level of professionalism, pedagogy, communication, contribution to the development of science and numerous other factors contribute to a high level of knowledge of future graduates. That is why the management of universities needs to competently and effectively manage the staff, since the activities of the entire educational institution largely depend on this.

According to a sociological survey conducted by VTsIOM in 2007, over the past 10–15 years, the qualities of the people who surround the respondents have changed (according to the largest share of answers as the main characteristic of the trend obtained in the course of the sociological survey). Weakened (in descending order of importance for analysis, % of the number of respondents), according to respondents, disinterestedness - 67; honesty - 66; mutual trust - 65; benevolence and sincerity - 63; sincerity - 62; patriotism - 60; loyalty to comrades - 49; industriousness - 43; activity, initiative - 40; ability to cooperate - 35; increased cynicism - 54 and education - 43. In the period 2007-2015. these surveys were no longer conducted.

The results of the survey testify, in fact, to the serious difficulties that employees in Russia face in connection with the change in relationships, primarily between company executives and the spheres of hired labor, within labor collectives, as well as an increase in the threat of fraud both in the companies themselves, as well as against them. Approximately 95% of all cases of fraud are caused by the pressure of circumstances, or financial circumstances, or human vices, the manifestation of which has worsened. The fact that moral qualities are important in business was actually confirmed by the data of a survey conducted by VTsIOM in 2008. When applying for a job, as a criterion for the significance of this place of application of their labor, employment, Russian citizens quite logically put the value of their future wages, the low level of which they are constantly concerned about in the course of similar surveys. A good salary is the most important factor for Russians when applying for a job: this indicator in the course of all-Russian surveys conducted in 142 regions of the Russian Federation scored 5.81 points out of six possible. In second place is the company's full and timely fulfillment of its promises (5.53), which is also, obviously, a signal of the problems accumulated in the management of modern Russian companies and the reduced labor productivity associated with them. When choosing a company-employer for Russians, confidence is important. that changes for the worse will not happen (5.45), openness, honesty and conflict-free relations between employees (5.39), convenient schedule, comfort (5.38). Among other requirements of applicants are the employer's social package (5.33), a good psychological climate in the team (5.3), mutual assistance and support between employees (5.27), concern for the health and safety of employees and the opportunity to apply professional knowledge (5 ,26). The least of all, as it turned out in the course of surveys, Russians are concerned about the effectiveness of management in a company (5.13), which cannot be provided only by the asocial art of squeezing sweat and numerous schemes for deceiving their fellow citizens at their place of work, associated with multiple understatement of wages, labor legislation, the almost complete lack of motivation for professional development through the ranks, infringements in bonuses and nominations for state awards.

In accordance with the results of surveys of the heads of Russian companies conducted by the company's specialists pricewaterhousecoopers, in Russia, the top management of companies (according to this group of respondents) is involved in a significant part of fraud cases - in 2005 in 50% of cases, in 2007 - in 41%. The average world level (but surveys of company executives in different countries of the world) was 20%. At the same time, in other countries, fraudsters are mainly middle managers and line personnel. According to other data - a study conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud Investigators - the average loss of large companies associated with the illegal activities of their ordinary employees is about 60 thousand dollars a year; the damage caused by managers reaches 140 thousand dollars. However, in the case of estimates of the amount of damage by ordinary employees, the question of how independently they acted against the interests of the company or they were blamed for committing a crime by persons with higher positions requires clarification. At the same time, "fraudulent activity" is defined by the World Bank as "omission, including misrepresentation, knowingly or negligently, misleading or having the intent to mislead a party in order to obtain financial or other benefit or to avoid the performance of an obligation" .

Scientific discussions and generalization of the results of the conducted surveys allow us to conclude that the security of a company is determined both by the actions of its management and the actions of employees controlled by the management. Types of economic crimes committed by hired workers are shown in fig. 5.7. Obviously, the degree of reasonableness in approaches to the study and prevention of economic crimes should be associated with the amount of damage caused and take into account the real practice of slander in Russian organizations in connection with the search for corrupt officials among powerless executors, endowed with minimal powers and, as a rule, destitute of wages.

Depending on the field of activity, the following types of corruption are distinguished:

Domestic corruption is generated by the interaction of ordinary citizens and officials. It includes various gifts from citizens and services to an official and members of his family. This category also includes nepotism (nepotism).

Business corruption arises in the interaction of government and business. For example, in the event of a commercial dispute, the parties may seek to enlist the support of a judge in order to reach a decision in their favor.

Corruption of the supreme power refers to the political leadership and supreme courts in democratic systems. It concerns groups in power whose bad faith is to pursue policies in their own interests and to the detriment of the interests of voters.

It should be noted that different authors: Sattarova G.A., Levina M.I., Medvedev V.V., Selikhov N.V. and others have different types of classification of corruption. Tolkachev V.V., for example, divides corruption into four types depending on the field of activity:

1. According to the subject composition for:

Higher corruption, which covers politicians, government officials and is associated with the adoption of laws and decisions at the highest level: in the Government, the Supreme Court and other bodies. This type of corruption covers the highest bureaucracy and is associated with the adoption of decisions that have a high price - this is the adoption of laws, a change in the form of ownership (privatization), government orders, contracts, the issuance of licenses for the use of subsoil, etc.

Grassroots corruption occurring in the direct interaction of a person with representatives of local governments;

Special corruption manifested in non-governmental organizations, whose employees (commercial or non-commercial) can also dispose of material assets that do not belong to them for personal gain, i.e. they commit actions that violate the interests of the organizations they represent, in favor of third parties, or organizations that receive their benefits from this.

2. According to the object of influence:

Corruption in the legislature, which manifests itself in the form of bribery to make the right decision, lobbyism, protectionism, appointment of "necessary people" or relatives to other state bodies. The harm from this type of corruption manifestation is enormous, since the legal norms created and changed do not reflect national interests, but narrowly corporate and selfish, which leads to social inequality, political apathy of the population and the latter's distrust in democratic values;

Corruption in the executive authorities, a feature of which is illegal activities in the exercise by officials of their official powers in the implementation of management decisions. This includes: bribery, embezzlement, bribery, abuse of power, lobbying, protectionism, provision of inside information, etc.;

Corruption in the judiciary, entailing grave consequences of "not punishing" the guilty, resolving cases, and manifesting itself mainly in bribery and bribery.

Corruption in local self-government bodies, which largely repeats corruption in executive and legislative bodies and is characterized by a "smaller scope" of corruption offenses;

3. By the nature of the impact on regulated relations:

criminal offences;

Civil - legal violations;

Administrative and disciplinary offenses;

Abuse of public status: lobbyism, nepotism, protectionism, provision of proprietary information to third parties, transition to senior positions in commercial and non-profit organizations, etc.

4. According to its coverage (size):

Regional, operating in a certain region and depending on many factors.

National, operating within one country, one system of law;

Interethnic (international), covering several states with its action. Thus, large US corporations paid bribes to officials of various levels abroad to obtain foreign orders for the supply of weapons, oil products and other goods. In connection with the exposure of the latter, in 1977, the first in the world practice Law on Foreign Corrupt Practices in the United States was adopted, which provided for sanctions of up to 2 million dollars for corporations and 5 years in prison for individuals involved in corrupt practices. This law prohibited offering, giving, or authorizing payments of any value to any official or party officials in order to influence an official act or decision for the sake of gaining a competitive advantage.

Corruption in the sphere of public administration takes place because there is an opportunity for a civil servant (official) to manage state resources and make decisions not in the interests of the state and society, but based on their personal selfish motives. Often, both parties interested in a corrupt transaction belong to the same state organization. For example, when an official gives a bribe to his boss for covering up the corrupt actions of the bribe-giver, this is also corruption, which is usually called "vertical". It usually acts as a bridge between top and bottom corruption.

The results of a study on the types of corruption that pose the greatest danger to Ukrainian society, conducted by the Youth Against Corruption, have been published. During the all-Ukrainian forum "Youth against corruption", which took place on December 6, 2011 in Kiev, a rating voting was held, in which young human rights activists from all regions of Ukraine, involved in providing legal assistance to victims of malfeasance, took part. The voting showed that the most dangerous manifestation of corruption was recognized as the total corruption of Ukrainian courts, which, according to the delegates, "deprives law-abiding citizens of protection, makes the law worthless, and criminals go unpunished." Second place was taken by corruption in the healthcare sector. The third place in terms of the degree of public danger was given to total bribery in the prosecutor's office. The sale of drugs, which is carried out under the guise of employees of law enforcement agencies, was in fourth place. Corruption in the economic sphere, which makes it impossible to legally carry out entrepreneurial activity, scares off investors and drives business into the shadow sector, was in fifth place. (Based on materials: vlasti.net)

Corruption has a significant variety in its manifestation. All types of corruption actions are divided, first of all, into two forms:

exogenous corruption(corruption generated by external factors in relation to the bureaucratic system);

endogenous corruption(corruption deliberately created within the bureaucratic system by the bureaucrats themselves).

Exogenous corruption can be divided into two types.

We will refer to the first one as domestic corruption. In this case, citizens interacting with the authorities act as clients. This includes corruption in state universities and medical institutions, in military registration and enlistment offices and traffic police, in social security institutions and police departments. It is clear that not all varieties of domestic corruption are listed.

The second type is business corruption, in which representatives of legal entities (commercial organizations) act as clients. These may be representatives of business, public organizations or other organizations that are not government bodies (otherwise we will fall into the sphere of endogenous corruption). It is important that by interacting with officials and entering into corrupt deals with them, these representatives defend the interests of their organizations. For example, if the owner of a restaurant is stopped by a traffic inspector on his way home in the evening, then a bribe to the latter should be classified as domestic corruption. If the same restaurant owner gives a bribe to a representative of the tax inspectorate who came to the restaurant for another inspection, then this transaction naturally refers to business corruption.

Business corruption can, in turn, be divided into areas to which the relevant organizations belong. We can talk about corruption in trade, education, medicine, agriculture, industry, etc.

Business corruption can find its manifestation in "state capture", i.e. in shadow lobbying in government bodies, in buying decisions of executive bodies, establishing corrupt control over political parties, etc., or in “capturing business”, i.e. in the establishment by officials of illegal control over business in order to extract administrative rent (officials use administrative resources to put pressure on campaigns), the rent is provided here not by bribes, but by business and income from it. At the same time, a feature of modern corruption is that if earlier officials performed the role of service personnel, receiving corrupt benefits for transactions agreed upon by market participants, now they often provide their services on their own initiative, and more often by imposing them. Individual representatives of state power and administration are turning into the main players in the illegal services market. If earlier business corruption was a form of existence of business itself, then at the present stage it is now increasingly becoming a form of existence of individual representatives of the state apparatus.

In the field business corruption, it is extremely important which authority is represented by the agent who enters into corrupt interaction with the client. This circumstance can give rise to several classifications formed by different grounds, for example:

level of power;

branch of government;

executive authority.

Finally, there is a specific type of clients whose corrupt interactions with officials can hardly be attributed to one of the two types of corruption mentioned above. These are representatives of the underworld. For this purpose, a special type of exogenous corruption can be distinguished - criminal corruption. In this case, the client is a representative of the criminal world and his corrupt interaction with the agent is intended to ensure the interests of his criminal activity. A policeman who "leaks" information to a gangster about the progress of the investigation of his gang's crime is involved in criminal corruption.

Endogenous corruption is divided into three types.

horizontal corruption;

vertical corruption (downward and upward);

mixed corruption.

Horizontal corruption: participate in the conversation agents are subjects of power relations that are not in principal-agency relations with each other. These can be, for example, representatives of various departments or agents having a common principal. For example, the head of the region gives a bribe to an official of the Ministry of Finance for the "location" of the latter. The head of the region may be dependent on the official of the Ministry of Finance by virtue of the decisions that he can take. But this dependence is not generated by agency relations between them. It is obvious that they have different principals.

Vertical corruption is ascending and descending corruption: in these cases, the agent and the client are simultaneously in an agency relationship, either directly or through intermediate principals, i.e. are part of the same hierarchical chain.

Rising corruption obvious, common and easily recognizable. This definition includes all cases where officials transfer part of the corruption proceeds they have collected to higher authorities. This usually buys the protection of permanent corruption income that the authorities can provide. At the same time, the loyalty of this bosses in relation to the corrupt activity of subordinates is bought, since the bosses usually have a control function over the fulfillment of the agency agreement by the subordinates.

Top-down corruption less obvious. Top-down corruption takes place in cases where a higher official uses his power not to solve the tasks that the principal who elected him has set for him, but for his own selfish goals - to retain power at any cost. At the same time, this person does not have enough administrative and other resources. Therefore, to ensure the loyalty of lower-ranking officials, a higher-ranking official uses shadow levers. A superior official will promise one subordinate a promotion, another that he will influence the prosecutor so that he does not initiate a case of abuse of power, etc.

Finally - mixed endogenous corruption. The term itself indicates that the interacting corrupt officials are with each other (in different combinations) in different relationships from the two types listed above. Thus, ordinary networks of corruption groups of corrupt officials united on a long-term basis to extract selfish benefits from their position.

Above, various manifestations of corruption were classified by types of clients. The same can be done with regard to the variety of agents involved in corrupt transactions.

Here, first of all, one distinguishes grassroots corruption And top corruption. The distinction is made on the basis of the level of decision makers and the scope of decisions made. Moreover, the second criterion is more important. For example, a high official, say, a deputy minister, can, using his official position, attach one of his distant relatives to a low position in his ministry. It is clear that this case can be attributed to grassroots corruption. But if the deputy minister's assistant - a low-ranking official - influences the outcome of a major state tender for a bribe, such corruption should be classified as top-level. It should be said that there may be cases when any manifestation of corruption will be difficult to attribute to one of the two specified types.